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Abstract
LA WAN THANADSILLAPAKUL, LL.B. (HONS), (T.U.), LL.M. (T.U.), LL.M, (V.U.B.).
“A New Direction for ASEAN Regionalisation in the Changing Global Legal 
and Economic Environment”, thesis presented for the degree of Ph.D.,
Department of Law, Lancaster University, October 1999.
ASEAN is an economic group comprised of the countries of Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN and Asia Pacific has been the most dynamic and fastest growing region in the 
world. But the 1997 Asian crisis sent the Asian Tigers’ into turmoil. The rise and fall 
o f Asia clearly reflects the interdependence of East Asian countries and the world 
economy, and also reflects the impact of the changing global legal and economic 
environment on these countries. ASEAN countries have gone through a volatile period 
and thus have embarked on deeper integration to strengthen regional economic self- 
reliance while committing to an open market orientation. A new direction for ASEAN, 
“Open Regionalism”, will balance regional integration and global liberalisation.
Economists who are specialists in the Asian region have overwhelmingly 
applauded “Open Regionalism”, while lawyers have remained ambivalent and 
suspicious about how it works in balancing preferential regional agreements with 
generalised global liberalisation. ASEAN is going to test the feasability of 
implementing “Open Regionalism” in reality. Regionally, ASEAN has launched new 
integration schemes to liberalise trade, investment and services using a hybrid model 
of liberalisation based on MFN and NT treatment with negative lists, but subject to 
stand still and roll back principles. Preferences granted to ASEAN members would be 
enjoyed by non-ASEAN enterprises through the concept of “ASEAN Investor” and 
“ASEAN Service Provider” under AIA and AFAS, through the “ASEAN Rules of 
Origin” under AFTA, and through the AICO scheme, as well as through “Short-Term 
Measures” adopted in 1998. ASEAN has kept margins of preference as low as it can 
to encourage inflows of trade and investment into the region. Nationally, ASEAN
ii
countries are reinforcing their openness by unilaterally liberalising their trade and 
investment regimes, complying with WTO regulations. By all these means, ASEAN 
can both strengthen regional integration and encourage outsiders to invest in ASEAN 
due to economies of scale.
ASEAN has adopted concerted unilateral liberalisation and negative 
integration, but the strengthening of its legal and institutional framework through 
regulatory networks and layered governance will be fundamental to its success. This 
thesis considers whether ASEAN can resolve the dichotomies between regionalism 
and global liberalisation and successfully achieve a balance between the two, which 
would further propel global economic development and narrow the gap between North 
and South.
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Introduction
Over the past three decades, the success of East Asian economies in achieving 
rapid and equitable growth has raised complex questions about the relationship 
between government, business firms and the market, and the interaction between laws, 
institutions and economic policy in East Asian countries.
No single theory could explain the extraordinary growth of this region. Rather, 
successful outcomes had been achieved under a spectrum of policies and 
circumstances. A combination of multi-factors suitable for each economy and the 
favourable external environment during that period (1960s-1990s) were all ingredients 
of East Asian economies’ success. Government intervention, economic policies, and 
the laws harmoniously played an important role in the process of industrialisation in 
the East Asian countries and they enabled these countries to take off in international 
business.
But the implications of the global environment are changing: while both 
neutral and interventionist outward-oriented strategies worked well during the early 
stage o f the East Asian miracle, it is doubtful whether they can still be effective, as 
some are now prohibited under WTO regulations and some require revision. East 
Asian countries are increasingly pressured to follow not only trading rules negotiated 
under WTO but also a range of other rules covering investment, intellectual property, 
and many other matters.
Today international competition increasingly favours transnational 
corporations with networks of complementary production subsidiaries. The surge of 
internalisation of production through TNC networks, and of internationally integrated 
production, has dramatically changed the pattern of trade and investment, especially 
the shift of investment to the service sector and the more sophisticated high-
XX
technology industries. This also emphasises the need of ASEAN countries to adapt 
their economic policy to cope with this change.
It is therefore essential for ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific to consider how to 
sustain economic growth in the region when the global economy has changed. Not 
only has the pattern of trade and investment changed considerably but also the global 
legal and economic environment has not remained as it was in the past decades, which 
were favourable to the success of the East and Southeast Asia.
ASEAN has gone through sharp swings of the rise and fall of Asia, and has 
realised that to sustain economic growth in today's world needs law and policy 
changes. Most important, ASEAN seeks a new direction for economic integration 
aiming at strengthening regional economic self-reliance, and cushioning any negative 
impact from global changes that might occur. ASEAN has recently launched new 
framework agreements for intra-regional liberalisation aiming at a higher level of 
economic integration. Meanwhile ASEAN is still committed to outward-looking 
policies and to strengthening its external economic relations. Under these 
circumstances, ASEAN can only resort to an “Open Regionalism” that would 
facilitate ASEAN regional integration while maintaining its strong economic ties with 
outsiders, in a way that will further enhance the region's integration with the world. 
O bjectives o f the Thesis
This thesis endeavours to analyse the new direction of ASEAN in implementing 
regional integration based on the approach of “Open Regionalism”. The main thrust of 
this ideology is to balance regionalism and global liberalisation. ASEAN countries 
have mostly espoused an open market orientation, as they have heavily depended on 
trade and investment that has flowed into the region. Therefore, while they move 
towards deeper regional integration for strengthening regional economic self-reliance, 
they still require to maintain their external economic ties, and they desire to encourage
x x i
external trade and investment into the region to continue and even increase through 
regionalisation. ASEAN countries are committed to a “concerted unilateral 
liberalisation” rather than binding themselves under a regional supranational legal 
system, facilitated by centralised supranational institutions. This raises the question 
whether ASEAN will be successful in achieving its goal through “Open Regionalism” 
and by which means? How to balance regional integration that involves preferential 
treatment among member countries with the generalised liberalisation that requires 
non-discriminate liberalisation? This thesis thus seeks to analyse whether ASEAN will 
successfully achieve its objectives through its present means, and how to reach its 
goals in the long term.
The O utline o f the Thesis
The thesis will firstly explore the historical, political and economic background of 
ASEAN and its member countries, ASEAN in the regional and global context and its 
economic interaction within and outside the region. I move on to analyse the impact of 
the changing global legal and economic environment on ASEAN countries, and then 
the rationale behind ASEAN’s embarkation on regional integration based on the 
approach of “Open Regionalism”. This overall view of ASEAN will lead to the focus 
on investment, the main engine propelling economic growth of the region, by 
analysing ASEAN countries' investment regimes, laws, regulations and investment 
agreements concluded by individual countries, and at regional level. The analysis of 
this chapter will indicate a trend of ASEAN countries’ investment liberalisation and a 
feasibility to achieve the goal of regional integration. This is followed by an analysis 
of the legal aspects of the new ASEAN framework agreements that centre on the 
liberalisation of trade, investment and services by establishing an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area and ASEAN Investment Area encompassing service trade, going beyond the 
liberalisation under the GATS. The new schemes include co-operation on Intellectual
Properties facilitating the enforcement of IP laws. This chapter will explain how 
regionalism may be balanced with generalised liberalisation, how regional preferential 
treatment may be balanced with global liberalisation, and how ASEAN can implement 
regional integration while reinforcing its open market orientation. This is followed by 
a chapter focusing on competition laws and policy. Since ASEAN embarks on 
regional liberalisation and deregulation of trade and investment, this involves issues of 
fair competition between firms doing business within the region, and the 
establishment of regional competition laws and policy is very crucial to monitor 
enterprises’ business practices to ensure maximum advantages from regional 
liberalisation. I conclude with an analysis of ASEAN’s institutions and mechanisms, 
and the necessity of developing an effective legal and institutional infrastructure based 
on an appropriate framework in order to successfully achieve its ultimate goal of 
“Open Regionalism”.
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ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region
Introduction
ASEAN countries1, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other 
East Asian economies have been regarded as the highest economic growth area of the 
world (Bergsten & Noland, 1993; World Bank, 1993a) and thus were named ‘the 
Asian Tigers’. Despite the 1997 Asian financial crisis that caused economic turmoil in 
the region, the Asia-Pacific region including ASEAN countries still constitute a very 
attractive market for trade and investment2. Economists have predicted that after 
recovering from the crisis these dynamic economies will grow even faster than before, 
provided that they adjust their economic policies, laws and regulations as well as 
develop their infrastructure in the right direction-5.
There are several factors influencing the economic growth of East Asia and the 
combination of legal and economic environments that affect the rise and fall of Asia. 
ASEAN countries are located in the economically dynamic and fastest growing region
1 The original five founding members o f ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand, had achieved impressive economic growth during the period o f  the Asian economic boom. 
Now members o f ASEAN have increased to 10 countries composing o f Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The new members still 
have modest economic performance and thus are not included in the term “high economic performance 
economies”, in fact, they all became members o f ASEAN after the Asian crisis, except Vietnam which 
joined ASEAN in 1995.
2 See UNCTAD (1998a, chapter VII), also see UNCTAD and ICC (1998). The report emphasised that 
FDI flows have remained closed to pre-crisis levels, and are expected to remain high in the long term. 
Also see Asia Pulse Pte Ltd (1999). It reported that out o f the US$760 billion FDI inflows to 
developing countries between 1993-1998, 87% of the total investment to LDCs went to Asia and some 
Latin American countries. And accounting 80 % share o f the total FDIs to developing Asia were made 
in ASEAN and China, the two dominant recipients o f FDI flows. FDI flows were concentrated in six 
ASEAN countries, accounting for 98 percent o f the US$132.5 billion in FDI flows to the region in the 
same period.
3 See Statement o f the ASEAN General-Secretary “The Impact o f the Economic Crisis on Asia: a 
blessing in disguise?” Keynote address by H. E. Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General o f ASEAN at 
the opening o f the Seventh ASEAN Conference, Antara, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 April 1999.
2of the Asia-Pacific4 and they have gone through episodes of economic development 
affected by the global and regional economic environment. Recently, ASEAN has 
entered into innovative free trade arrangements encompassing investment and service 
trade liberalisation, in a new direction for regionalism balancing regionalisation and 
globalisation. This may be adopted as a future model of economic integration that is 
consistent with WTO principles. The factors affecting the rise and fall of Asia have 
significant implications for ASEAN's development of this new direction, especially it 
reflects the impacts of the global economy on the ASEAN's legal and institutional 
adjustment, as well as the direction of its economic integration that based on ASEAN's 
outward orientation. This chapter will examine how the global and regional economic 
environment affects ASEAN and how the interaction between the two helps shape 
ASEAN economic development.
1.1 The Rise and Fall of Asia
1.1.1 The Asian M iracle and the M ain Factors o f Econom ic G rowth in the 
Asia-Pacific Region from 1960s-1997
The expansion of the Japanese economy since the 1960s, the emergence of the 
newly industrialised economies (NIEs) ten years later, the rise of another group of new 
NIEs in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) since the 1980s and the more recent emergence of 
China have prompted economists to assess the causes of the success of these 
economies. The economic growth of this region has been sustained for decades (World 
Bank, 1993a) even when the growth of world economy was slow5, and if this high 
growth rate continued the World Bank speculated that East Asia would be the core of
4 See Cardenas, Lorraine and Buranakanis, Arpaporn (1999) Vol 5. P. 52.
5. The global economy witnessed a substantial slowdown in growth in the early 1990s. East Asia was the 
only region that was able to maintain very high growth rates during that period with an average growth 
rate o f 7-8% as well as to maintain low inflation rate down to below 5% (World Bank, 1993a).
world economic growth6, heralding the emergence o f the ‘Pacific Century’ (Forbes, 
1995: 24).
The success story of East Asia has raised complex questions about the 
relationship between government, the private sector, and the market, how they can 
efficiently and effectively work, what factors make East Asian economies differ from 
other developing countries. The explanations of this phenomenon had been diverse, 
based on the different theories adopted. Neo-classical approaches (Krueger, 1993: 17- 
19; Balassa, 1997) had emphasised outward orientation and macroeconomic 
discipline; Structuralist theories (Amsden, 1989; Pack and Westphal, 1986: 88-128; 
World Bank, 1991) had pointed out the government leadership in industrial policy and 
promulgating favourable laws and regulations to foreign investment; and finally, 
Culturalist explanations had centred on the governance and societal characteristics, as 
shaped by the region’s Confucian traditions (Petri, 1993a). Confucian tradition 
stresses self-improvement, emphasises education and facilitative bureaucratic control. 
In addition to these theories, an explanation based on the so-called “contagion of 
regional success” resulting from the ‘Flying Geese’ economic pattern spearheaded by 
Japan has been broadly recognised as a cause of the East Asian miracle (Primo Braga 
and Bannister, 1994: 97-136) which is due to the economic proximity, intra-regional 
integration in East Asia and the strategic location of the countries in this region.
In this region, governmental intervention had had an important influence on 
the process of industrialisation, evolving from an import substitution to an export- 
oriented policy and moving towards an open or market orientation. Major 
development agencies, including the World Bank, were forced to rethink many
6 See World Bank (1993a), and COM (94) 314 final, Commission o f the European Union (EEC).
4previously unexamined assumptions that stand behind the economic policy-making of 
these economies7.
In fact, there was nothing miraculous about the success of the East Asian 
economies. Rather, each country had deliberately established the essential conditions 
for growth, and the development strategies employed had been carefully matched to 
their institutional capacity and economic environment. Petri (Petri, 1993a: IX) has 
mentioned that:
“The adaptation o f policies to endowments was not usually the result o f  luck, but 
rather o f  search, experimentation and reform. Pragmatic, perseverent policy­
making was facilitated in the region’s successful countries by exceptional social 
and political stability”.
In order to analyse the current and future economic trend of East Asian 
countries, I will discuss economic development in this region, focusing on the main 
factors in the economic growth of East Asian economies.
1.1.2 Economic Development in the Asia-Pacific Region 
The East Asian economies have been characterised as dynamic economies, 
based on their fast development in industrialisation and high success in export. 
International trade and investments have been the foundation of East Asia’s 
impressive economic growth as they have been the engines of development in the 
region. Thus the reason for the strong economic performance of East Asia has been the 
sharp increase in trade and investment resulting from industrialisation and the export 
push policy, and later, the open market-oriented policy implemented by the countries 
in the region. Over the past quarter century, East Asia’s exports rose more than thirty 
fold to about US$ 850 billion, raising East Asia’s share of world exports from about
7 See World Bank (1993a) and Petri (1993a) for detailed analysis o f the “Asian Miracle” and its
s t ra teg ic  po l icy  im p lem en ted .
57% to 21%, the import trend had also been rising8. The World Bank estimated that 
during the rest of this decade, East Asia was likely to account for at least a third of the 
increment in total world imports as indicated in Table 1 (World Bank, 1994b; IMF. 
Direction of Trade Statistic various issues).
Table 1
Increase in Imports 1992-2000 
(USS billion)
1992 2000 Increase % of total increase
East Asia 792 1,443 651 33
European Union 1,525 1,997 472 24
United States 553 922 369 19
Rest o f the World 973 1,448 475 24
Source: World Bank 1993, World Bank staff estimates
Regarding investment, East Asian countries have been the largest developing 
FDI recipients, accounting for 65% of the total investment flows to developing 
countries9. East Asian economies have been attracting increasing amounts of FDI 
because of sound macroeconomic policies and an open investment climate.
So trade and investment have been the main engines of economic growth in 
East Asia10. There have also been many factors reinforcing the performances of each 
economy in the region. Now I will briefly discuss these factors, which have 
encouraged the success of the East Asian countries.
8 See World Bank (1994b), also see Petri (1993a), and Forbes (1995).
9 UNCTAD Overview (1999b: 17), especially only the top five developing host countries (China and 
ASEAN countries) receive 55 % of inflow foreign investment in developing world.
10 Iqbal, B. A. (1986: 236). He further pointed out that trade and development are the two sides o f the 
same coin. Trade brings development and development in turn boosts trade, which truly applied in the
c ase  o f  A S E A N .
61.1.3 The M ain Factors o f Econom ic Progress in the Asia-Pacific
1.1.3.1 The ‘Flying Geese’ Pattern of Trade and Investment 
A key factor in the success of the industrialisation process of the East Asian 
countries has been the ‘Flying Geese’ pattern11 of trade and investment led by the 
Japanese TNCs. According to this pattern, the dispersion of technology is transmitted 
through FDI from the lead country to the follower countries (Akamatsu, 1960; Braga 
and Bannister, 1994). In the case of East Asia, Japan is regarded as the lead country 
followed by the early NIEs, which in turn have been followed by the new NIEs: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Thailand. Japanese TNCs combined their 
technological advantage with the lower factor costs in follower countries, to move 
production of ‘second-tier’ products offshore12. Then the combination of foreign 
capital and cheaper production costs made the follower country’s products more 
competitive in world markets. Moreover, FDI provided the experiences, management 
skills and know-how needed to connect the East Asian economies to the world market 
(World Bank, 1994a), especially the large markets of North America and the 
integrated European Union, which helped to absorb new products. This resulted in the 
increase of East Asia’s exports.
This ‘Flying Geese’ pattern reflected economic adaptations to changing factor 
endowments, and countries are helped by following and copying the successful 
policies and technologies of neighbouring countries, which Petri called “the contagion 
of economic success” (Petri, 1992). Close ties through trade, culture, and history have
11 See Primo Braga and Bannister, (1994) and Petri (1993a) for detailed analysis o f the “Flying Geese 
Pattern”.
12 When Japan has reached the advanced economy its real wage increased and needed to re-allocate the
b asic  m an u fa c tu r in g  industr ie s  ( se co n d - t ie r  p ro d u c t io n )  to the  m o re  c h e a p e r  l a b o u r  coun tr ies .
helped East Asian countries take advantage of each other’s experience in production, 
marketing, management, and policy-making.
This sequential industrialisation pattern has evolved remarkably smoothly over 
the past 25 years. Japan, the NIEs, China and the more advanced Southeast Asian 
countries followed each other in a range of industries and markets without any sign of 
losing their momentum. By moving to a higher rung, each economy left the lower 
rungs of the ladder to less advanced economies. And countries all along the ladder 
have been able to upgrade their manufacturing relatively free of market constraints, as 
fast as their investments in technology and capital would permit. This trade and 
investment pattern also contributes to intra-regional trade. This is because TNCs 
locate operations in more than one East Asian country, and intra-firm transfers create 
regional trade. For example, the case of computer trading, intra-regional trade grows 
much faster than external trade accounting for 25% of NIEs’ trade in computers 
(World Bank, 1994a: 53). In fact the industrialisation process of East Asian countries, 
especially developing East Asian countries, went along with various policies, ranging 
from an import substitution policy in the early stage of their development, to an export 
push policy in the middle stage, and then to a market-oriented policy. As the East 
Asian countries have been successful in industrialisationlj, they have upgraded their 
production methodology and technology, resulting in an increase of production output. 
Then East Asian countries were pushed to seek external markets to absorb new 
products, as their internal market was too small.
Obviously trade and investment policies have been very crucial to the 
development of the countries in this region. However, the policies implemented varied
13 For detailed analysis o f the evolution o f  ASEAN industrialisation and the economic policy changes in 
ASEAN see Ariff, Mohamed & Hill, Hal (1985).
8from country to country depending on their economic infrastructure and their level of 
economic development.
1.1.3.2 The Government Intervention Strategies, Institutions and Economic 
Policies of East Asian Countries
The key policies fundamentals used in East Asian economies are ensuring low 
inflation and competitive exchange rates, creating an effective and secure financial 
system, limiting price distortions, absorbing foreign technology, limiting the bias 
against agriculture and finally building human capital. These policies were 
implemented by various government intervention strategies.
In the early stage of East Asian countries’ development process, the import 
substitution policy had aimed at promoting local industry with a strong bias against 
imports and at protecting domestic infant industry. But they moved to establish a pro­
export regime more quickly than other developing economies. First Japan in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, and then the four Tigers14 in the 1970s, shifted trade policy to 
encourage manufactured exports, followed by the new NIEs, ASEAN countries in the 
1980s. East Asian governments established a pro-export incentive structure that still 
coexisted with the variable protection of domestic markets and industries13. A wide 
variety of instalments were used, including export credits, duty-free imports for 
exporters and their suppliers, export targets, and tax incentives. This period saw the 
launching of investment incentive packages granted for both domestic and foreign 
investment.
Penetration into world markets was the priority policy of East Asian 
economies, since the success of industrialisation made productivity output grow very
14. The four NIEs: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore.
15. F o r  ins tance,  local co n ten t  req u irem en ts  have  b een  used  in all East  A s ian  co u n tr ie s :  see  c h a p te r  4.
rapidly, so that the domestic market was too small to absorb new products, and also 
because they were compelled to acquire foreign exchange. Instead of stricter import 
controls, East Asian countries sought to earn more foreign exchange by increasing 
exports. Thus trade policies encouraging manufactured exports were the most crucial. 
Exchange rate policies were liberalised, and currencies frequently devalued in order to 
support export growth. Government intervention was also made through the direct 
fiscal costs of subsidies. All East Asian countries’ sectoral policies were geared 
toward export performance, even programmes of selective industrial promotion were 
also export-promoting.
In order to direct economic growth toward its goals, governments promoted 
specific industries, and under some circumstances in specific areas, by granting 
incentives and subsidies to investors in the promoted industry16. Usually promoted 
industries were capital- and high technology- intensive. However, some specific 
indigenous local industries essential to domestic economy were also promoted in order 
to preserve cultural values and traditional industries in the country.
In the capital markets, East Asian governments controlled interest rates and 
directed credit, but acted within a framework of careful monitoring and generally low 
subsidies to borrowers. Most East Asian economies influenced credit allocation by 
enforcing regulations to improve private banks’ project selection, by creating financial 
institutions, especially long-term credit development banks, and by directing credit to 
specific sectors and firms through public and private banks17. The implicit subsidy of 
directed-credit programmes in East Asian economies was generally small, but access
l6. For instance, Japan promoted heavy industry in the 1950s followed by Korea, the well-known 
“Conglomeration Project” in heavy industry. In other countries the advance, capital-and knowledge-
intensive industries have been promoted (World Bank, 1993a).
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to credit and the signal of government support to favoured sectors or enterprises were 
important.
In labour markets, governments focused their efforts on job generation, 
effectively boosting the demand for workers. As a result, employment levels have 
risen first, followed by market- and productivity-driven increases in wage levels18.
The East Asian countries sought foreign technology through a variety of 
mechanisms ranging from licensing transfers, capital good imports, foreign training, 
and especially openness to foreign direct investment, which speeded technology 
acquisition. Manufactured export growth also provided a powerful mechanism for 
technological upgrading in imperfect world technology markets. Because firms that 
export have greater access to best-practice technology, there are both benefits to the 
enterprise and spillovers to the rest of the economy that are not reflected in market 
transactions. These information-related externalities are an important source of rapid 
productivity growth.
In addition to these policies and strategies, East Asian countries created 
institutions19 to promote economic growth. The institutional mechanism facilitates 
close relations and co-ordination between the private sector and government by 
improving communication between them. Formal deliberation councils have been
l?. For example, in Thailand there is the Bank for Agriculture and Co-operatives, which grants loan for 
farmers and co-operative business in the villages with very low interest and with a long grace period. 
This helps the agriculture sector and helps poor people in the villages to be self-reliant.
18. Even in the agriculture sector, high productivity and income growth in agriculture helped to keep 
East Asian urban wages close to the supply price of labour. In the industrial sector government 
legislated a minimum wage, but this policy is subordinate to the policy o f job generation (World Bank, 
1993a: 32-36).
19. For example, in Thailand, the Board of Investment (BOI) effectively promotes, co-ordinates and 
facilitates investment o f both domestic and foreign investors. In Japan, MITI is the main institution to 
facilitate and promote Japanese and foreign investment. In Malaysia, the Ministry o f  Trade and 
Investment is the one responsible for trade and investment issues, especially foreign investment.
established in many East Asian countries20, which included government officials, 
journalists, labour representatives, and academics. Politically they helped establish a 
commitment to share growth and reduce rent-seeking. The World Bank report (World 
Bank, 1993a: 353) pointed out that:
“Information sharing made it more difficult for firms to curry special favours from
the government and for government officials to grant special concessions”.
One important policy behind this mechanism is to create a business-friendly 
environment and reinforce the government-private sector co-operation. Legal and 
regulatory structures were also generally hospitable and transparent to private 
investment.
East Asian countries provided a stable macroeconomic environment and a 
reliable legal framework and institutions to promote domestic and international 
competition in each economy in the region. High investments in human capital, 
education and health were regarded as legitimate roles for government as well. 
Nevertheless, there is debate about whether government intervention was an essential 
factor in the success of the East Asian economies. However, the very fact was that 
almost if not all East Asian economies did use strategic policies and government 
intervention in their development process. Thus it does seem that the mixture of this 
factor with the other ingredients, earlier mentioned, harmoniously worked together, 
especially the adaptation of these countries’ policies to the changing global economy, 
and the adoption of outward-oriented and market-driven policies in the latter stage of
20. Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore have established forums called “Deliberation Councils” in 
which private sector groups are invited to help shape and implement the government policies relevant to 
their interests. In contrast to lobbying where rules are murky and groups seek secret advantage over one 
another, the deliberation councils are intended to make allocation rules clear to all participants. In East 
Asian countries, the private sector participated in drafting the rules and the process was transparent to 
all participants so that private sector groups became more willing in the leadership’s development 
efforts. This results in reducing the private resources devoted to wasteful rent-seeking activities and 
making more resources available for productive endeavours (World Bank, 1993a: 352-3).
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their development. Thus, government intervention21 did play an important role in the 
success of East Asian economies. However, this was not the only factor in the success 
story of East Asia, there have been other factors.
1.1.3.3 The Favourable External Economic and Legal Environment
An important factor in the success of East Asian economies was the favourable 
external economic and legal environment. In the period when these countries switched 
to export-push, the world market opened to the products exported from the region, 
while the global legal framework still tolerated a degree of government intervention 
(see evolution of part IV under GATT in section 1.2 below). They benefited also from 
the results of the Tokyo Round that legalised special treatment for developing 
countries in derogation from the MFN rules, for example the GSP system and the use 
of safeguard action for development purposes.
Developing countries, including the East Asian economies, focused on 
obtaining derogation from GATT principles to preserve special and differential 
treatment (S&D)22 in trade negotiations and the right not to grant reciprocity for tariff 
reductions in their favour . Thus the term S&D contains both an access component 
and a right-to-protect component (Whalley, 1990). This resulted in their retention of 
high unbound tariffs. They were also, under certain circumstances, entitled to lax
21 It has been claimed that “Strategic Theory” plays an important role in the early stage o f economic 
development. This was true even in the case o f developed countries such as the case o f the US that 
imitated technology from the Britain and employed strategic policy in its early stage o f economic 
development.
22. The term special and differential treatment (S&D) refers to various rights and privileges given to 
developing countries Contracting Parties to the GATT, not extended to developed countries. 
Developing countries have been committed to S&D treatment for themselves under GATT rules. They 
argued that trade problems of developing countries are special, for instance, balance o f payments 
problems endemic to low-income countries make liberalisation difficult. They needed different 
treatment from developed countries in order to grow, that is, trade preferences in developed countries 
markets. They also asked for fair treatment, for example, an equalisation o f tariffs on manufactured 
goods and raw materials and the elimination o f tax escalation.
23. Part IV o f  GATT exempted developing countries from the need to make reciprocal concessions in 
trade negotiations. They could thus escape GATT disciplines.
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treatment by resorting to Art. XII to safeguard their balance of payments, and under 
Art. XVIII to promote infant industries, especially by invoking Art. XVIII b which is 
the balance-of-payment escape clause for developing countries24, and which allows the 
application of quantitative restrictions (QRs) to tackle balance of payments problems. 
Art. XVIII c permits developing countries to apply quantitative import restrictions for 
infant industry protection, and Art. XVIII a 25 allows developing countries to re­
negotiate a tariff binding in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry. 
It was assumed that developing countries should have greater freedom to modify and 
withdraw tariff concession than do the developed countries. Art. XXVIII, bis (3) states 
that the need of developing countries to use tariffs for economic development and 
fiscal purposes, should be taken into account in tariff negotiations^6.
Over the years developing countries have claimed exemptions from GATT 
rules and this was formally agreed when part IV was added to the Agreement27. Thus 
developing countries, including East Asian countries, were able to follow the trade 
policies they chose at home while benefiting from liberalisation in developed 
countries. That is why the USA called developing countries "free riders" (Tussie, 
1993: 79). However, the US and other developed countries also maintained their own
24. Section b o f revised Art. XVIII added in 1955 is more flexible than Art. XII, which is the basic 
provision on the use of quantitative restrictions for balance o f payment purposes. Before its revision, 
developed and developing countries were alike in resorting to Art. XII. But when Art. XII was tightened 
up, it became necessary to provide a safety valve for developing countries under section b o f Art. 
XVIII. Section a o f Art. XVIII also assumed that developing countries should have greater freedom to 
modify and withdraw tariff concession than do the developed countries.
25. But Art. XVIII a was less practical as developing countries using this provision would be expected to 
offer compensation or face retaliation.
26. GATT (1955) BISD, 3rd Supplement, p. 49.
27. Art. XXXVI recognises the development needs o f developing countries in improving market access, 
commodity price stability, diversification o f economic structures and inter-agency co-operation and the 
non-reciprocity principle. Art. XXXVII contains a stand still commitment, and refers to fiscal or 
internal taxes. This article concerns the prioritisation o f products o f interest to developing countries in 
any trade liberalisation exercise, including in relation to tariff escalation. Art. XXXVIII provides for 
joint developed and developing countries actions in commodity field, inter-agency co-operation, 
possibility o f studying the export potential o f developing countries and related questions
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protectionism and did a lot of free-riding under GATT, especially in the last two 
decades that have seen many derogations from GATT rules and the wide use of grey 
area measures.
Resulting from these derogations from GATT rules, East Asian countries were 
able to employ an import substitution policy in the early stage of their development, 
and were able to protect infant industries as well as using subsidies to promote 
projects and an export push policy. Moreover, developing countries, including East 
Asian countries, actually obtained better than MFN treatment through GSP 
arrangements. In fact, GSP arrangements were in principle inconsistent with GATT. 
GSP was previously authorised by a temporary waiver from the Most-Favoured- 
Nations provision of Art. I. But one result of the Tokyo Round, under the ‘enabling 
clause’, was the provision of a permanent legal basis for the extension of the GSP 
arrangement granted by developed countries to developing ones28. East Asian 
countries had also gained advantages from exports under the GSP scheme in North 
American and European markets.
Furthermore, the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement, which entered 
into force on 31st August 1977, was approved by the GATT Council29. The Enabling 
Clause of GATT30 allows the implementation of regional arrangements that are not 
justified under Art. XXIV31. The Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading
28. GATT, the Tokyo Round o f Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Geneva, April 1979, p. 149.
29. GATT (1980) GATT A ctivities in 1979 and Conclusion o f  the Tokyo Round M ultilateral Trade 
N egotiations (1973-1979). Geneva: GATT. pp. 67-68.
30. The results o f the Tokyo Round cover regional and global preferential arrangements among 
developing countries, under certain circumstances, not conforming to Art. XXIV to enable them to fulfil 
their objective under such preferential arrangements. And ASEAN was permitted to implement its 
Preferential Arrangement in this Tokyo Round.
31. Art. XXIV permitted regional economic group, may take a form of a customs union or a free trade 
area, as an exception to the general rule o f Most-Favoured-Nation treatment, provided that certain 
requirements are met, intended to ensure that the arrangements facilitate trade with the outside world. 
Other special trading arrangements have been presented in GATT as being justified in the light o f
Arrangement provides for tariff reductions for approved projects, the purchase of 
finance support at preferential interest rates, preferences in procurement by 
government entities, tariff preferences, and liberalisation of non-tariff and other trade 
measures. Member countries of ASEAN thus granted each other preferential treatment 
and waived the MFN rule. This favourable legal environment facilitated the growth of 
East Asian and ASEAN economies through export performance.
1.2 The Global Institutional Environment: the Changes and their 
Impacts on East Asia
This section will provide a brief discussion of the global institutional environment and 
its changes/evolutions that have had impacts on East Asia, and that have shaped the 
trade and investment policies of Asian countries (from import-substitution to export- 
push policies and an open market orientation, and now to the approach of balancing 
deeper regionalism with an open economy). This global environment is the main 
factor reinforcing the implementation of “Open Regionalism” of ASEAN.
The global trading system has been governed mainly by GATT. Since its 
emergence in 1947, GATT has played an important role in overseeing global trading 
activities, concentrating in its early years on trade liberalisation by removing border 
barriers. GATT was primarily concerned with the reduction of tariffs and elimination 
of quantitative restrictions, through a series of multilateral conferences, and based on 
principles of non-discrimination (Dam, 1970; Jackson, 1969). National Treatment 
provided in Art. Ill is aimed at preventing discrimination with reference to domestic 
and imported products, which imposes a general prohibition on the use of internal
previous preferential or other relationships between the participants, or o f the special provisions o f Part 
IV o f the General Agreement concerning trade o f developing countries.
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taxes and other internal regulatory measures so as to afford protection to domestic 
production32.
However, developing countries claimed that their special circumstances and 
especially the different level of their economic development make them unable to 
compete with developed countries under the same conditions. They are economically 
small compared to developed countries, so their leverage in global trade negotiations 
is correspondingly limited. Their economies are concentrated on a few product lines, 
mainly agriculture, primary products and some basic manufactures. Hence they need 
special treatment, and they were not ready to reciprocate in trade negotiations. They 
needed to grow, and thus improved market access was very essential for them to 
enable their exports to gain access to developed countries' markets to increase their 
export earnings, for a sound balance-of-payments and to maintain foreign exchange 
availability.
Developing countries’ concerns had been debated, and in fact a particular 
provision on developing countries had been included in the Havana Charter and was 
included in GATT (Art. XVIII). It permitted developing countries to withdraw tariff 
bindings under certain circumstances for infant industries. The 1955 Review Session 
amended Art. XVIII33 by adding an authorisation to use quantitative restrictions for the 
same purpose, and also added a special set of criteria authorising developing countries
32. This obligation clearly extends also to products not bound under Art. 11 and this is confirmed by the 
negotiating history o f Art. III. See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Case. WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R.
33. Art. XVIII divided into three major components covering different policy areas. Art. XVIII a allows 
developing countries to re-negotiate tariff bindings in order to promote a particular industry, but if 
invoking this provision developing countries have to offer compensation or face retaliation. Art. XVIII 
b is the balance of payment escape clause for developing countries only, its criteria for imposing 
quantitative restriction are less onerous than the criteria which apply to developed countries under Art. 
XII. Art. XVIII c allows developing countries to apply quantitative import restrictions for infant 
industry purpose, in order that new industry and production structures can be specifically established 
according to the development policy and economic strategy.
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to impose import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons. This allowed 
developing countries, especially East Asian and ASEAN countries to implement an 
import substitution policy during that period. However, Art. XVIII was limited to 
measures for developing each country’s internal market34, and did not deal with access 
to export markets.
Art. XXVIII bis (3) was also added in 1955. This article recognised the needs 
of developing countries to use tariffs for economic development and fiscal purposes 
by taking into account this necessity in tariff negotiation.
In 1963 developing countries called for an ‘Action Program05 which included 
a standstill provision on tariffs and other barriers to developing country exports, duty­
free entry for tropical products, and elimination of tariffs on primary products. The 
GATT Ministerial meeting recognised the need for a formal institutional framework 
for the contracting parties to deal with developing countries’ responsibilities in 
reciprocal concession offers in tariff conferences. This allowed developing countries 
to gain market access in developed country markets without reciprocating to reduce 
their tariff rate at home.
However, the re-evaluation of the ineffectiveness of the import substitution 
policy caused developing countries to move toward an outward-oriented policy, which 
was especially the case for East Asian countries. They realised that this policy did not 
work well, spawning domestic inefficiency and a bureaucracy administering import 
controls, and importantly, inhibited export performance. The export-push policy
34. Art. XVIII had its focus on the relaxation of GATT strictures to enable developing countries to 
pursue inward-looking policies based on protection and promotion o f infant industries. 
j5. This program resulted from the 1956 GATT report on international trade, which drew attention to the 
disproportionate increase in exports in favour o f developed countries and the instability o f commodity 
trade o f developing countries. GATT thus appointed a group o f experts to examine international trade 
trends. This resulted in the Haberler Report (1958). See GATT (1958) Trends in International Trade.
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supported by export-led growth theory led to the negotiation of Part IV36 of GATT in 
1965, which added three new Articles dealing with developing countries’ concerns. 
Art. XXXVI recognises the development needs of developing countries, the 
importance of improved market access, commodity price stability and especially the 
non-reciprocity principle37. Art. XXXVII contains provisions'38 relating to the 
prioritisation of products of interest to developing countries in any trade liberalisation, 
including those relating to tariff escalation and the standstill commitment.
However, unlike other Articles of the GATT, Part IV contained no binding or 
obligatory commitments. Developing countries had also resorted to other 
organisations outside the GATT, especially UNCTAD39, to press for their concerns. A 
key study for UNCTAD was the Prebisch Report “Toward a New Trade Policy for 
Development” of 1964, which advanced the preferences debate further. Prebisch 
recommended the granting of preferences to the industrial exports of developing 
countries by developed countries on a product-by-product and country-by-country
Haberler Report. Geneva: GATT. Then developing countries put forward a resolution in the GATT 
calling for an “Action Program” to solve this problem.
j6. Part IV concerns the access o f developing countries to developed country markets. This implied the 
endorsement o f the theory o f export-led policies, as the perambulate section of Part IV states that “...the 
export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties can play a vital part in their economic 
development...” (Part IV: Art. XXXVI: 1 (b)).
j7. Art. XXXVI: 8 stated that “the developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the 
trade o f less-developed countries”. Trebilcock and Howse argued that “this principle o f non-reciprocity, 
along with special dispensations for import substitution policies, are often referred to as ‘special and 
differential status’ for developing countries”. The persistence of the inward-looking approach was 
reflected in this Article, which implied “that export-led growth is consistent with, and indeed should go 
hand in hand with, protection o f developing countries’ domestic markets’”, see Trebilcock & Howse 
(1999:371).
j8. However, the loose words contained in Art. XXXVII did not provide legal binding obligations on 
developed countries and “the only remedy specified in Part IV where developed countries are not living 
up to these loosely-worded commitments is the possibility o f a developing country requesting 
consultations either with individual developed countries or in the GATT Council” (Art. XXXVII, 2) as 
pointed out by Trebilcock & Howse (1999:371).
39. UNCTAD was found in 1964 as a periodic conference of all UN members with intention to establish 
a forum on trade where developing countries would find themselves less marginalised in the decision­
making process than was the case with the GATT. See Trebilcock, Michael J. & Howse, Robert (1999) 
The Regulation o f  International Trade. London and New York: Routledge.
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basis in a specific period of time and subject to renewal in order to strengthen 
developing countries’ exports. This resulted in the emergence of the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP), under which developed countries would grant 
preferential treatment to developing countries on a selective basis. Subsequently, the 
GATT contracting parties agreed to suspend the MFN principle in favour of the GSP. 
This waiver of MFN was initially applied temporarily for ten years from 1971. GSP 
had been an important instrument facilitating export growth of ASEAN, especially in 
the European market and the North American market. This enhanced the 
industrialisation in East Asia that further propelled investment growth in this region as 
investors from both intra and extra Asian could gain advantages from the GSP 
schemes. This reinforced the success of the export-push policy of East Asian 
countries.
Also, the Tokyo Round of 1973-79 resulted in an agreement on several aspects 
of the so-called Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries, under 
which developing countries are given special treatment with respect to Art. XVIII, Art. 
XXVIII bis (3), and the new Part IV of the GATT. In addition, the 1979 Framework 
Agreement known as the “Enabling Clause” provided a permanent legal status for 
GSP, and covered regional and global preferential arrangements among developing 
countries that do not conform to Art. XXIV of the GATT. However the Enabling 
clause contains the celebrated “Graduation” Provision which states that developing 
countries recognise that as their economies grow stronger, they would participate more 
fully in the GATT framework of rights and obligations (GATT, 1986).
Over the years, there have been serious tensions between developed and 
developing countries over trade. While developed countries made significant 
reductions in tariff barriers, developing countries received special treatment that
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exempted them from complying with GATT rules, especially in reciprocating their 
concessions. This caused developed countries dissatisfaction with what they see as 
developing countries derogating from GATT rules. Thus in several GATT Rounds, 
developing countries’ concerns were disregarded. Developing countries, for their part, 
felt that the GATT was incomplete in its coverage of issues of importance to them, 
especially in agriculture. Moreover, the 1961 Short-term Agreement on Cotton 
Textiles and its enlargement into a long term agreement with wider product coverage, 
which, in turn, led to the MFA in 1974, intensified the perceptions of developing 
countries that developed countries are unwilling to allow liberalised trade in product 
areas important to developing countries. In the 1970s and 1980s the growth of 
voluntary export restraints (VERs), the widespread use of countervailing and anti­
dumping duties40 against developing countries, and the threats of use of safeguard 
measures against developing countries ever more intensified developing countries’ 
mistrust of developed countries. They saw developed countries using these measures 
as disguised trade restrictions toward them. At the same time, developed countries 
showed reluctance to grant the Special and Preferential Treatment which had been 
agreed in Part IV of GATT41, in other words developed countries had not lived up to
40. Anti-dumping actions had become a favoured instrument o f protection by developed countries. From 
1980-1986, Australia, Canada, the European Community (EU) and the United States were recorded to 
account for 1,276 cases out of the total o f 1,288. Between 1987 and 1989, 354 actions were initiated, 76 
by the EC Commission, 97 by the United States, 79 by Australia and 55 by Canada. The number of  
actions against developing countries rose from 8 in 1981/2, to a peak of 69 in 1985/6. The majority 
were against the four Asian NICs. Between 1980-7, the US brought fifteen cases against China, see 
Page Sheila, Davenport, Michael and Hewitt, Andrain (1992), p. 45. From 1981-1990 the European 
Community took 402 actions and the incidence of actions against developing countries has increased. 
See GATT, (1991) EC, Trade Policy Review. Messerlin demonstrates that quantities o f imports are 
sharply reduced after successful anti-dumping actions, particularly where anti-dumping a d  valorem  
tariffs are imposed. He estimates the average direct costs o f a successful EC anti-dumping action, in 
term o f loss o f export volume and of trade diversion to other suppliers, at 25% o f the value o f exports 
for the NICs and 17% for other developing countries. See Messerlin, Patrick (1988).
41. Part IV o f GATT, the Special and Differential Treatment, exempts developing countries from having 
to reciprocate reductions in trade barriers made by developed countries, to the degree that such 
reciprocity would be inconsistent with their development needs. In fact, non-reciprocity by developing
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their commitments42. Thus developing countries have seen GATT as a rich man’s 
club, and did not actively participate in GATT Rounds, as they could not see that any 
further improvements would be made. They believed that they were too small to 
exercise much leverage to make developed countries change their position.
Outside the GATT, protectionism increased in the forms of both aggressive 
unilateralism and regionalism (Bhagwati, 1990). For instance, the United States’ 
Super 301 provision of the Trade Act to sanction “unfair trade practices” has been 
used selectively against targeted countries4j. Developing countries see this practice as 
the naked use of power to extract trading gains from weaker powers.
The United States and the European Community (EU) implemented anti­
circumvention measures to attack low-price competition from foreign owned plants in 
the US and the EU. A number of developing countries' firms, particularly from South 
Korea and Taiwan, opened such plants in the EU and the US. The host countries 
threatened that existing firms would face anti-dumping duties on imported 
components without a specific investigation. The effect was that investment by 
potential new entrants could be deterred.
countries was formally accepted in the General Agreement under Art. 36:8 o f Part IV, see GATT 
(1974b) BISD 20th Supplement, p.63 and GATT (1986) BISD 32nd Supplement, p.30-31.
42. In the Declarations launching the Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds, developed countries have 
on each occasion accepted the principle o f non-reciprocity, and references to Part IV and Special and 
Differential treatment have been included. In practice, however, developed countries have never fully 
accepted the concept.
4j. For example, the US exempted Singapore from its GSP, despite earlier assurance to the contrary if 
Singapore agreed to stop infringing US copyrights and trademarks. The US also retaliated against South 
Korea citing infringement o f intellectual property rights. Also, the US forced Thailand to open its 
cigarette market for US cigarette exports. Thailand argued that Thailand has had policy to reduce 
cigarette smoke and protect young generations from being addicted to cigarette. But the US used section 
301 to threaten to exempt Thai exports from the US GSP on the ground that Thailand also has domestic 
cigarette producers, so the refusal to open its cigarette market is a kind of protection. The US also won a 
favourable GATT Panel decision on this. Finally, Thailand has had to liberalise trade in cigarette from 
the US for the exchange of GSP right. However, Thailand was partially graduated from the US GSP 
eventually.
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Additionally, developed countries gradually graduated developing countries 
from their GSP schemes. East Asian countries have been targeted as their economies 
developed “efficiently and competitively”44 Developed countries had argued that:
“In the long run, if the economies o f developing countries were to develop more 
efficiently and competitively, it would be in the interest o f these countries 
periodically to examine their protective policies and to assume some commitments”
45
The celebrated Graduation provision also stated this obligation and the concept 
of graduation has been invoked by the developed countries to graduate, especially, the 
NICs from their GSP schemes.
In the 1980s, great frustration was evident on the part of both groups of 
countries, so that there was clearly an urgent need to set better rules for the trading 
system46. This coincided with the new issues which were emerging, and developed 
countries argued in favour of incorporating these issues under the GATT umbrella as 
they regarded trade-related issues that could be more effectively dealt with if brought 
into trade negotiations. This led to a debate in the Uruguay Round to extend the scope 
of GATT to cover the new areas as well as to re-evaluate the existing GATT rules and 
to re-organise the GATT structure.
However, there have been many factors, which have encouraged developing 
countries to re-think and re-evaluate their economic policy, partly resulting from the 
change of their perception toward rule-based trading regimes. They realised that to 
claim special and favourable treatment did not really work well, even though the
44. In the late 1980s, the US and the EU both graduated Korea from their GSP schemes. The US also 
graduated Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. In early 1989, Thailand was partially graduated from US 
GSP.
45. GATT (1969) BISD, 16th Supplement, Geneva.
46. The GATT Ministerial Meeting of November 1982 indicated the strains in the relationship between 
developed and developing countries: “Existing strains have been aggravated by the differences of 
perception regarding the balance of rights and obligations under the GATT, the way in which these 
rights and obligations have been implemented and the extent to which the interests o f different 
contracting parties have been met by the GATT”, see GATT (1983) BISD, 29th Supplement, p. 10.
derogation from GATT rules benefited them in the early stage of their development. 
But later this resulted in the difficulties they gradually faced from the protectionism of 
developed countries, as their derogation from GATT rules became the justification for 
developed countries to erode GATT rules too, and to maintain high protectionism 
against them, especially in the products of interest to developing countries such as 
textiles and clothes, shoes, and electrical appliances. Thus the only way that they could 
ensure that developed countries would comply with the rule-based trading system was 
if they themselves fully participated in GATT negotiations. Once developing countries 
were strict in complying with the rules, developed countries would have a moral 
obligation and commitment not to break the rules themselves. And this has signalled 
to East Asian countries to move forward to the more open trade and investment 
regime. Even before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round most Asian countries had 
unilaterally liberalised their trade and investment (see chapter 4).
On the other hand developed countries saw the necessity of improving the 
trade relationship between the two, as some developing countries were becoming 
potentially important export markets, especially in the services sectors. Individual 
developing country markets were becoming more important to developed countries, 
and there was growing awareness of this fact. Thus, developed countries attached 
increasing importance to developing country participation in GATT disciplines 
(Whalley, 1989a). The changing global economy narrowed the gap between developed 
and many developing countries and enhanced the need for the two worlds’ relationship 
to be more closely linked. By the time the Uruguay Round began, developing 
countries had taken important and major first steps by their unilateral liberalisation 
and more active participation in GATT, and they had moved a long way towards the 
goal of fuller participation set for them by developed countries. They now felt that
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developed countries had an important moral obligation to foster the development of 
the rule-based system and to refrain from the use of measures violating legal 
obligations (Jackson, 1995).
1.2.1 The Uruguay Round and the W TO
Prior to the launch of the Uruguay Round there had been various tensions, and 
the erosion of the GATT rules led to the fear of the deterioration of the world trading 
system and international economic relations. Movements toward • protectionism, 
bilateralism, and regionalism seemed to threaten the liberal world trading system and 
led to a more fragmented world. While tariffs had been successfully reduced47 during 
the several rounds of GATT negotiations, non-tariff barriers have grown or become 
more evident and they were considered more dangerous than tariffs as obstructions to
48international trade . NTBs have come to be considered as the greatest threat to a fair, 
liberal world trading system.
In fact, non-tariff barriers issues were not unnoticed during the Tokyo Round 
of trade negotiations, and the NTBs codes were negotiated to restrict and regulate the 
use of NTBs. However, the spread of technical barriers to trade and the phytosanitary 
and health protection standards are unwittingly created trade barriers, due to the 
differences in the standards and regulations applied in different countries.
Non-tariff barriers are more difficult to tackle, as they encompass all private 
and governmental laws, regulations, policies and practices that serve to restrict or to 
distort the volume, commodity composition, or direction of international trade in 
goods and in services, as well as any distortion or restriction that can possibly reduce 
potential real income (Pestieau & Henry, 1974). This involves a wide range of
47. Tariffs were cut until today they are less than 5% on most industrial products.
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regulations such as packaging, labelling, mark of origin requirements, health and 
sanitary regulations, safety and industrial standards, border tax adjustments, custom 
clearance procedures, custom-valuation and custom-classification procedures.
All these intense situations called for the reformation and strengthening of 
GATT rules in order to preserve the liberalised world trading system, to incorporate 
agriculture and textiles issues into GATT as well as to bind contracting parties to 
agreed multilateral standards in other relevant areas, at least to assure that there is a 
common standard of rules for governing international relations.
In addition to these major problems, the emergence of new issues, trade in 
services, trade-related issues in intellectual property and investment, were demanded 
to be included under GATT. In fact many of these issues had already been negotiated 
in the Tokyo Round such as non-tariff barriers to trade, even the new issues of 
services and intellectual property and investment were discussed and studied since the 
early 1970s (Griffiths, 1975; Baldwin, 1979). However, it was in the Uruguay Round 
that these new issues were introduced and successfully incorporated in the 
GATT/WTO legal framework including a reformed and restructured of GATT, 
particularly, the creation of the WTO establishes an obligations to bind all contracting 
parties to the whole package of GATT/WTO rules. These include a number of 
provisions that impact on the East Asian countries, especially in strategic policy and 
the role of government intervention in economic development.
1.2.2 The Results o f the Uruguay Round and their Impact on East Asian 
Countries
The results of the Uruguay Round brought about a new legal environment that 
affects East Asian countries’ strategy and policy, especially their trade and investment
48. As much as 50% of world trade is now affected by this new protectionism, see Salvatore, Dominick.
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regimes, laws and regulations. These changes are both in revisions of the existing rules 
and the expansion into new areas of the WTO.
The first and foremost change is the establishment of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) to succeed the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). 
The liberalisation of global trade that followed the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
has synchronised with East Asian countries’ own liberalisation efforts. These 
economies were well placed to take advantage of the positive trading climate. 
However, global trade liberalisation also meant increased competition for investments 
and for markets. The East Asian countries would have to gird themselves to play by 
the rules, as well as to ensure that the others also play by the same rules. In fact East 
Asian countries, especially ASEAN countries, are heavily dependent on international 
trade in goods, services, and technology as well as on foreign direct investment flows. 
As such, ASEAN and East Asian economies collectively and individually need to be 
proactive in helping shape the WTO agenda and programmes.
The success of the Uruguay Round was the most ambitious goal ever achieved 
under the GATT. It succeeded in bringing all contracting parties into line to comply 
with the whole package of GATT/WTO Riles as well as to comply with the other areas 
of global regulations establishing minimum standards for each contracting party to 
deal with each other under the umbrella of GATT/WTO49. The results of the Uruguay 
Round created a new trading regime under which the regulatory differences, i.e. the
(1993) p. 1.
49. The WTO agreement provides in Art. XVI (4) that “Each Member shall ensure that its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures conform with its obligations as provided in the annexed 
Agreement” (under the GATT 1994 Agreements). If a participating nations fails to ensure that its laws 
are in conformity with its obligations under WTO Agreement as mentioned above, then that nation will 
either (a) have to bring any domestic law into conformity with the rules o f the WTO Agreement, or (b) 
offer compensatory market access to the nation which has complained about the failure to conform with 
obligations, or (c) to accept the retaliatory withdrawal o f market access by the complaining nation. The
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differences of internal rules and regulation of the individual country, have been 
focused upon and dealt with at a certain level. The reformation of GATT rules has 
been part of the process of global regulatory reform. In fact, on the one hand, these 
changes have been the results of the changing global economy and society, and of the 
process of globalisation, and on the other hand, global regulatory reformation further 
facilitates and encourages globalisation in turn.
Globalisation has stimulated various concerns and changes in the global 
economy and society. The broader agenda of this process has been the reduction or 
elimination of all barriers either in the form of border or non-border barriers. Thus it 
has not been limited to a particular area, but includes legal, economic, political and 
social factors (see Table 2 “Summary of the Uruguay Round Results in Relation to 
Developing Countries”, p. 43).
The extension of WTO to cover investment issues has had a crucial impact on 
ASEAN countries. The obligations of ASEAN countries under the new agreements, 
i.e. TRIMs, GATS and TRIPs, has required them to revise their laws and policies 
dramatically. TRIMs deals with specific trade-distorting investment measures 
(performance requirements)50. These include local content requirements, export 
performance requirements, trade-balancing requirements, and foreign-exchange- 
balancing requirements. These measures have been considered to be within the 
jurisdiction of the WTO as they directly affect trade. However, they also take the 
WTO into the field of investment regulation. Nevertheless, while TRIMs centred on 
performance requirements employed in developing countries, it did not affect
compensation and the retaliation must be proportionate in value to the impairment o f  right or market 
access opportunities that were caused by the failure to conform. See Davies, DenzifRt. Hon. (1995).
50 The Illustrative List in the Appendix to the Agreement on TRIMs indicates the measures that WTO 
Members must eliminate.
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comparable measures such as cash grants or tax breaks employed in developed 
countries (Moran: 1992a: 62-63)51. This is because TRIMs only prohibits measures
that are "mandatory  or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage". This lopsided development of TRIMs makes developing countries see 
themselves as being in a disadvantaged position in exercising national policy to attract 
foreign investors.
Most ASEAN countries have employed performance requirements32 in 
conjunction with investment incentives for attracting foreign direct investment, 
usually as prerequisites for approving the entry of foreign investors (see chapter 4). 
Since these measures are considered, under the TRIMs, as directly distorting trade, 
ASEAN countries have to eliminate all these measures to comply with the rules of the 
WTO. This directly affects their investment laws and regulations as well as their 
investment policy and regimes.
The GATS deals with services liberalisation by facilitating market access of 
service providers from one WTO member country into other member countries, who 
have committed themselves to open their domestic market for all services under the 
GATS, subject to MFN exemptions and reservations made under their Country 
Schedule and Schedule of Specific Sectoral Commitments (limitations on market access 
and limitations on National Treatment). The definition of modes of service provision 
(mode of supply) in GATS covers all types business transactions, so it inevitably 
involves investment. In particular, supply via commercial presence of service
51 Moran revealed the substantial dimensions o f locational inducements currently offered by European 
and United States to attract, for instance, automobile, petrochemical and computer facilities. European 
Governments offer cash grants up to 60% of the cost o f the entire investment; United States have given 
as much as USS 325 million per project or US$ 108,000 per job to foreign firms. It is incredible that 
average state expenditures in the United States to induce inward investment and to promote exports 
have grown over the last decade by more than 600%!
providers entails an establishment in the recipient country, and hence involves 
investment. Until now, foreign service providers often have to go through the approval 
of entry and operation in the recipient country. ASEAN countries have restricted 
service sectors for foreign investment and for foreign service providers, such as in 
banking, insurance, telecommunications, transportations and professional services. 
Negotiations under the GATS create commitments to liberalisation of services. This 
will require ASEAN countries to change their laws and regulations relating to 
services, including their investment regimes involving foreign commercial presence, 
and to liberalise internal regulations concerning their service sectors. GATS also 
permits a more rapid regional liberalisation of services, which now ASEAN has 
undertaken in its GATS-Plus Scheme (see chapter 5).
TRIPs deals with Intellectual Property protection to ensure that international 
laws and regulations on IP have been effectively accepted by and enforced in WTO 
Members. TRIPs also affects investment, especially in the field of sophisticated 
technology investment. ASEAN has responded to these altered global IP regimes by 
launching the Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Co-operation in 1995, 
with the intention of ensuring co-operation among ASEAN countries in applying IP 
laws and regulations and the effective enforcement of IPRs. Even though no 
significant progress has been made regionally in the past, ASEAN countries are 
beginning to develop IP co-operation and to explore the possibility of setting up an IP 
centre in the region (see chapter 5). Substantial development of IP laws will mainly be 
made at national level, as individual ASEAN countries have been embarking on the 
process of promulgating IP laws that have never been established systematically in
52For instance, ASEAN countries apply local content requirement for promoting domestic industries. 
This measure falls under category 1 (a) o f the Illustrative List o f the Agreement on TRIMs.
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these countries before. This is due partly to pressure from the US and partly to 
commitments under the WTO.
Therefore, the altered global legal frameworks, especially the new package of 
WTO agreements, have had a crucial impact on ASEAN law and policy reform. 
ASEAN has now come to a transitional period in a new era in its development. 
Indeed, the changing external legal and economic environment has been regarded by 
some as an ingredient in a blend of many factors and causes of the Asian misery.
1.3 Asian Misery: The Causes and Effects
The 30th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN took place amidst economic turmoil 
and financial crisis. This initially occurred in Thailand, and then spread to Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Indonesia and further affected Korea and Japan, as well as other 
economies in the region. The region's woe raised the question of the end of Asian 
miracle, but most of all required an analysis of the causes to guide the strategies to 
recover from the crisis and develop long term plans for improving their economies. 
What were the reasons for this collapse, in the region with the highest economic 
growth for many decades, and which economists lauded as an example for the other 
developing countries?
The root causes of this situation in ASEAN were perhaps a combination of the 
impact of changes in the global economy, its trading regimes, the liberalisation of 
financial markets in the region without prudential measures and sufficient control in 
financial institutions, protectionism in western markets as seen from the drastic export 
slowdown of ASEAN countries. All these causes hampered the ASEAN economy and 
inevitably affected the rest of the region, especially Japan and Korea which are closely 
linked to the ASEAN member countries' economies.
The crisis, in fact, indicates a fundamental need to change ASEAN policy 
toward regionalisation. Thanks to the currency turmoil, ASEAN countries take the 
opportunity to rethink their dependence on the US currency and take measures to 
combat the instability of their currencies. Also the dramatic decline of ASEAN 
exports, they need to adjust their industrial policy and investment regimes, laws and 
regulations. The changing global economy and the new approach to a co-ordinated 
international trading regulatory regimes, and the interaction and interdependence of 
various global institutions have created a new socio-economic and legal environment 
to which ASEAN must adopt. Any further Asian miracle is unlikely to be based on the 
previous combination of legal and socio-economic factors.
1.3.1 Drastic ASEAN Export Slowdown: Impacts from External Economic 
Dependence
Prior to 1996, the exports of the four ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand) grew uninterrupted at high rates over a long period. In 
1995, Indonesia's exports rose 13.0%, those of Malaysia 25.9%, those of the 
Philippines 28.9% and those of Thailand 23.6%. Suddenly, export growth of those 
four ASEAN countries slowed down sharply, to those of Indonesia 9.5%, those of 
Malaysia 5.6%, those of the Philippines 17.7%, and those of Thailand posting a 
negative growth rate of -0.2%. Table 3 shows how ASEAN exports sharply dropped in 
their major markets, in the EU, the US, and even in the Japanese markets.
Especially in the case of Thailand, where the crisis first occurred, Thai exports 
severely and dramatically dropped down in its world markets. Table 4 shows this 
sharp downward trend in Thai exports.
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Table 3
The sharp drop in ASEAN exports before the Asian Crisis 
(% o f yearly growth rate)
Trading Partners 1994 1995 1996 1997
European Union 19.8 30.0 9.1 7.5
The US 22.9 19.4 6.7 4.3
Japan 12.0 16.7 9.2 8.2
Source: Trade Statistics Centre, Dept. o f Business Economics, Thailand
Table 4
The sharp drop in Thai exports before the Asian Crisis 
(% of yearly growth rate)
Trading Partners 1994 1995 1996
World 20.9 23.6 -0.2
Japan 21.8 21.5 0.6
The US 18.2 4.8 1.2
European Union 18.6 19.4 6.0
ASEAN 35.1 35.2 -0.3
Other 21.8 33.8 -2.7
Source: Trade Statistics Centre, Dept, o f Business Economics, Thailand
The principal causes of this abrupt weakening trend were firstly, the major 
trading partners' implementation of more complicated regulations concerning trade- 
related issues, such as health, labelling, environment, labour, sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection measures, so that ASEAN exports encountered more 
difficulties in penetrating world markets. This sharp export decline immediately 
followed the implementation of the GATT/WTO new trade regime that legalises 
regulatory requirements, provided they are legally implemented in importing countries 
consistently with GATT/WTO rules5-5.
53. For instance, protection under Art. XX General Exceptions, either on the ground o f the protection of 
animal or plant life or health, or relating to the labour issue, public moral, they must now comply with 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
and Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade (TBT).
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Secondly, most ASEAN exports were being graduated from the GSP scheme. 
For instance, under the new EU GSP System launched in 199554, ASEAN countries 
were targeted for GSP cuts. Products regarded as being very sensitive under new EU 
GSP scheme that affect ASEAN exports are nine categories (three being agricultural 
and six industrial) including fishery products, vegetables and fruits, prepared 
foodstuffs, plastics and natural rubber products, leather products, apparel, garments, 
footwear, ornaments and electrical/household appliances. This mostly affected 
ASEAN exports as these categories of GSP cuts affected the main ASEAN exports to 
the EU. For instance, in the case of Thailand, Thai exports received GSP privileges 
altogether totalling US$ 8,984.8 million in 1994 and US$ 9,984 million in 1995. Of 
these, exports given privileges by the EU accounted for US$ 4,453.6 million and US$ 
5,348.6 million, or 49.6% and 53.7% respectively. These export amounts given GSP 
privileges by the EU made up 66.2% and 62.6% of total Thai exports to the EU, which 
were US$ 6,723.2 million and US$ 8,542.6 million. Manufactured exports to the EU 
under the GSP cover were US$ 3,844.7 million and US$ 4,681.3 million, equivalent to 
86.3% and 87.5% of total export to the EU that enjoyed GSP privileges or 57.2% and 
54.8% of overall exports to the EU35. Thus the cuts in the EU GSP drastically affected 
Thailand’s exports as more than 50% of their exports enjoyed GSP privileges in the 
EU market (see Table 5). The cuts of EU GSP similarly affected other ASEAN 
exports to the EU as they all have the same categories of exports to the EU36.
54. The EU began to grant Generalised System of Preference (GSP) privileges to agricultural and 
industrial products in 1971, with the implementation period o f a GSP project lasting 10 years. Then 
following the completion o f the second project in 1990, the EU extended the implementation period o f  
this project on a year-by-year basis from 1991 to 1994. From 1995 has been the third GSP scheme that 
no longer grant privileges to ‘extremely sensitive products’ having a strong impact on similar products 
in the EU and products o f the type that need specialised production from the third country.
55. The Foreign Trade Department, Ministry o f Commerce, Thailand.












European Union 4,453.63 49.57 5,348.63 53.57
The US 2,486.54 27.67 2,394.49 23.98
Japan 1,283.89 14.29 1,670.16 16.73
Source: Foreign Trade Department, Thailand
Consequently, ASEAN’s ability to compete in the sale of these products 
against its rivals in the EU market was much affected. Since, the GSP system 
constitutes the giving of trade privileges on a non-reciprocal basis, it can therefore, be 
revoked at will by the donor countries. The US also was on the way to graduating all 
ASEAN exports from GSP57. Since the main ASEAN exports encountered higher 
tariff rates that made ASEAN exports’ prices in western markets much higher than 
before, ASEAN exports declined suddenly.
Thirdly, competitive capability was eroded in exports of labour-intensive 
products, such as textiles and footwear. ASEAN countries lost their comparative 
advantages on cheap labour to their competitors such as China, India and Bangladesh, 
which have even cheaper labour costs. Thus they were gaining larger market share in 
western markets because of their cheaper product prices. In ASEAN, these industries 
are on the way to becoming ‘sunset industries’.
The export slowdown directly impacted on the currency value of ASEAN 
countries and led to the instability of their currencies. This led currency traders to 
believe that ASEAN would lower the value of their currencies as a means to stimulate 
growth of their exports, as the lower value of their currency would lower the price of
57. Singapore completely graduated from US GSP, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
partly graduated from US GSP as well.
35
products. In fact, ASEAN governments tried to maintain their currencies’ value58. 
Unfortunately, the US dollar strengthened against the Japanese Yen. Consequently, 
ASEAN currencies, which were virtually pegged to the US$, appreciated accordingly. 
This even further reduced ASEAN’s competitive edge in the world’s leading markets. 
In addition to their worse competition position, the price of their exports went even 
higher, so that they lost their market share to their competitors. This further 
exacerbated the ASEAN export slowdown even more.
In addition to the drastic export slowdown, the current account deficit problem 
has been chronic, bedevilling ASEAN over a long period. A root cause of this problem 
is due to the large importation of machinery and intermediate products. The large 
current account deficit combined with overvalued currencies in ASEAN made them a 
target for the speculators. They were apparently grave enough to precipitate off and on 
attacks on ASEAN currencies. The ASEAN governments used up a large proportion 
of their countries’ international reserves in their efforts to prop up the currencies. In 
the end, ASEAN currencies were floated, thus changing the foreign exchange system 
from a link to a basket of currencies, mainly the US dollar, to a managed flotation.
1.3.2 O ffshore Loans and ASEAN Econom ic Crisis
ASEAN economic expansion during the past has been boosted mainly by 
foreign funds, which have flowed copiously into this region. Since ASEAN countries’ 
central banks play a key role in regulating interest rates for the purpose of domestic 
savings, the internal bank’s prime rate was high. For instance, Thailand’s prime rate, 
the MLR, in 1996 stood at 13.0%, that of the Philippines 14.5%, that of Indonesia 
20.0%, and that of Malaysia 9.2%. As a result, the majority of investors turned to
5S. The reasons given for this was a currency depreciation would bring in many problems, particularly
the augmented private sector’s foreign debt burden and rampant inflation.
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borrowing from abroad where interest rates were lower. As over the past decades, 
ASEAN enjoyed high economic growth, becoming newly industrialised countries and 
potential markets that have attracted world-wide attention. Bond issuance by private 
sector companies in overseas markets has experienced strong demand. As a 
consequence, borrowing from overseas rose sharply, boosting the foreign debt burden.
A high degree of dependence on foreign sources of funds has been a weakness 
of ASEAN, particularly because a good deal of the foreign borrowing took the form of 
short-term loans, which could be obtained easily. On the one hand, these loans have 
been used rather carelessly, having been invested in most cases in sectors, which were 
not truly productive. For instance, they have been used for speculation in the stock 
market and in the real estate business59, the latter to the extent that a large oversupply 
materialised. Thus the risk in repayment of foreign borrowings heightened. On the 
other hand, offshore loans for foreign investment in ASEAN, especially for Japanese 
investors who invested in ASEAN countries, in the export-oriented industries suffered 
losses from the drastic export decline. The ability to service debt was severely limited. 
Both factors weakened the credibility of ASEAN countries.
1.3.3 Conclusion
Thus, the causes of economic crisis in ASEAN involve a combination of 
factors. The emergence of new global trading regimes and regulations and the 
suspension of GSP make it more difficult for ASEAN exports to penetrate their major
59 For example, 58 finance companies in Thailand were closed down due to over-financing in real 
estate business and loans for trading in stock market (mainly for speculating rather than long-term 
investment). It appears there was an oversupply of real estate throughout the country, especially in 
Bangkok, and when the crisis took place that real estate was abandoned by the speculators leaving the 
building unfinished and failing to repay the finance companies. Therefore the finance companies 
collapsed because o f overwhelming bad debts. This situation was similar in all ASEAN countries. See 
Limthammahisorn, W. (1997:1-15). Also see “Asia’s Economic Crisis: How far is down?” The 
Economist. 18 November 1997. Further relevant discussions are also available at website
markets. Declining industrial competitiveness came to haunt the economy. Inadequate 
attention to human resource development and industrial upgrading and over-reliance 
on labour-intensive industries characterised the industrial scene. With costs of doing 
business rising, the emergence of lower-cost competitors, and increasing efficiency in 
global markets weakened the competition position of ASEAN. Increased capital 
inflows resulting from financial market liberalisation in the early 1990s exposed rigid 
exchange rate policies, inadequate regulation of financial institutions, and a 
speculative real estate bubble. These factors converged almost at the same time. In 
1996 and early 1997 stagnating exports combined with the meltdown in the stock 
market and the disclosure of large non-performing loans in the financial sector.
Facing financial crisis by the middle of 1997, ASEAN countries had to put 
their house in order, which has been fundamental to their recovery from the crisis. 
ASEAN governments were compelled to seek the financial and technical resources of 
the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and of other nations. The 
move to create a rescue package followed a serious depletion of ASEAN’s reserves, 
spent defending the ASEAN currencies before they went into a managed float in the 
middle of 1997. There were costly attempts to support over-extended finance 
companies and other institutions after ASEAN’s once-booming property market and 
export sector entered a negative cycle. The dramatic decline of exports caused the 
export-oriented industries to suffer losses and to encounter difficulties from debt 
services, which mainly borrowed short-term-loan from offshore and they could not roll 
over such debts. The ASEAN currencies depreciated about 20-50% against the US 
dollar, increasing the cost of servicing ASEAN countries’ massive foreign borrowing.
http://www.europe.economist.eom/e..al/freeforal/current/sf0983.html. See Limthammahisom, W (1997: 
1-15)
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Over-investment had caused excessive levels of external debt, which in turn 
grew into an unacceptably high current account deficit. Over-valuation of the ASEAN 
currencies, which have been pegged to the rising dollar, combined with these forces to 
cause capital flight and a weakening of ASEAN’s financial systems after three decades 
of continuous economic growth. Developments such as a regional slowdown in 
exports, a fall in the stock market, and structural pressure on ASEAN due to the 
emergence of several lower-cost competitors, exacerbated the region’s fiscal position.
The recovery program of affected ASEAN countries focused on two areas. The 
first is financial institutions, for which a comprehensive restructuring plan was drawn 
up. The second involved looking at more long-term issues related to competitiveness 
in the so-called ‘real’ or productive sectors. These include proposal for professional 
training and other human resource development, to industrial upgrading and enterprise 
privatisation. The programme allows at least two to three years to completely recover 
from this crisis. Also all ASEAN countries have to restructure their economy and 
especially their financial sector. The ASEAN misery has prompted the real need to re­
think a new direction for ASEAN regionalisation.
1.4 Implications for East Asian Countries
As discussed earlier, East Asian economies had grown steadily and suddenly 
collapsed, due to combination of factors that generally affected by the global legal and 
economic environment. It has long been believed that the relative openness of the 
post-war trading system has been crucial to their growth. Before the Uruguay Round 
regime and the Asian crisis, it could be argued that the remarkable feature of these 
economies was their ability to grow even in the presence of significant restraints on 
their exports, and in the absence of any firm disciplines to which they could appeal, to 
limit trade actions against them. For example, most of these countries have passed
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through initial period of GDP growth where exports of textiles and apparel have been 
crucial to their trade growth60. These products have been one of the most heavily 
trade-restricted areas with trade restraints under the MFA, but little of this seems to 
have had a major impact on the growth performance of these economies. This had 
happened partly because of the advantages enjoyed by East Asian exporters under the 
GSP scheme in Europe and North America. The concern then for these countries is 
whether a new regulatory regime, i.e. a post-Uruguay Round regime, may possibly 
impose new trade restraints on them, and the withdrawal of privileges, previously 
granted to them, may put them in a less advantage competitive position. Also 
industrial countries' use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties is likely to continue 
and may even accelerate (Elamilton and Whalley, 1995: 43).
The reformation of the global trading system therefore has major implications 
for East Asian countries. In many ways, the new rule-based trading systems of the 
WTO will be more beneficial to them and afford them more leverage in negotiating 
with developed countries. The more they comply with the rules, the more they can be 
guarded by the rules, and they will be fully entitled to the right and obligations61 set 
under WTO. This will also show that developing countries are moving toward meeting 
developed countries' demands for their fuller participation in the trading system. In 
conclusion, the new global legal and economic environment implies that East Asian
60. For example, in Korea during the early stages o f industrialisation, textile and apparel exports were as 
large as 50% of exports.
61. Hamilton & Whalley (1995) pointed out that “the benefits developing countries can get from a 
multilateral trading system depend upon what they can gain from an affective rules-based multilateral 
system o f discipline. The main benefits is to set limits on the trade policy behaviour o f other countries, 
particularly more powerful developed countries. Effective discipline provides better assurance o f access 
for developing country exports to developed country markets, and in addition, limits their ability to 
distort third country markets by means o f export subsidies. The smaller and weaker the country, the 
more value there is in multilateral discipline, for it is only through such disciplines that small countries 
can restrain the behaviour o f larger and more powerful governments. As a group, therefore, and since 
they are small, developing countries stand to benefit from multilateral source o f discipline”, see 
Whalley (1989a) p. 11.
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countries have to enhance their openness or market-orientation and develop a rule- 
based trading system in the region consistent with the global regulatory regime.
1.5 Economic Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region
Historically, regional interdependence in East Asia was substantial at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. In 1938, 67% of East Asian trade was intra-regional (Petri: 
1993b). At that time, most of this trade went through the entrepot ports of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Shanghai, and Manila. These ports not only handled trade between the 
colonies and the European powers, but also helped co-ordinate a vast network of 
commerce stretching from India to Japan and China along the Pacific Rim62. In this 
period, the high interdependence within the region was influenced by the western 
powers that laid down trade routes and that channelled trade through the main ports in 
the region.
1.5.1 The Surge o f Japanese Econom ic Power
The interdependence of East Asia continued to intensify between the two 
world wars. The wars highlighted the complementarity of the region’s economies and 
weakened their ties with western colonial powers as war made sea transport unsafe. 
The foundation for the post-war economic interdependence in the region had been 
laid. This period saw the increasingly important role of Japan in linking regional trade 
initially with Korea and Taiwan and then throughout the region. Japan had displaced 
the Netherlands as Indonesia’s largest trading partner and also replaced England as 
Malaysia’s largest trading party. Japan also invested in China, replacing investors 
from Great Britain. Also Japan began to develop Korea and Manchuria and sought
62. For example, Singapore mediated 70% o f Thailand’s trade, sending Thai rice to China and Japan in 
exchange for textiles from India and England.
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deep changes in these countries by making large investments in transport and 
communication.
1.5.2 The Decline in Econom ic Interdependence in the Region
The two world wars left East Asia in disarray, disrupted by the collapse of pre­
war institutions and political relationships, insurrections, and civil war. Economic 
interdependence in the region dramatically declined. Intra-regional trade became 
relatively less important as trade flows abruptly shifted toward the United States. 
Furthermore, the region developed stronger connections with North America and with 
European countries. This coincided with industrialisation of East Asia and the export 
push policy that encouraged new products and manufactured output in large volumes 
needed to seek world markets. Then these products needed to be exported to the larger 
markets, i.e. the North American and European markets. During this period (1970s) 
intra-regional trade dropped down to less than 30% of its total trade.
1.5.3 The New Trend of Econom ic Integration in the Region
The intensity of East Asian trade links, after a long decline, is once again on 
the rise, with an increase of intra-trade from 29% in 1970 to 41% in 1993 of the total 
trade of the region. The 1980s began to see East Asia trade more internally, simply 
because its markets have become so important. Rising costs in Japan and the newly 
industrialised economies have shifted industries to other East Asian countries, 
increasing the regional trade in components and machinery. Also, more liberal trade 
and investment policies are opening East Asian markets, though some scope remains 
for more action.
However, East Asian ties to North America and Europe are still very important 
, because more than half of the region’s trade still depends on extra-regional 
markets. However, the region’s own markets are also increasingly critical to the 
sustainability of its growth in the future. Intra-regional trade and investment is now the 
main engine in sustaining and strengthening economic growth in the region. As trade 
and investment played a vital role in the structural development of East Asian 
economies, today the region’s prospects are crucially linked to openness in trade and 
investment. It is in the region’s interest to take initiatives that strengthen linkages both 
within the region and with trading partners outside.
The only long-established regional grouping existing in the Asia-Pacific region 
is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN was created in 
response to the combination of internal and external factors that affected social, 
political and economic stability of the founding countries of ASEAN. In chapter two, I 
will discuss the formation of ASEAN, its internal and external economic co-operation, 
and especially its relationship with the EU and the US (in the context of APEC and 
NAFTA), its main trading partners.
63. This can be seen from the region’s export growth slowed in 1993 to about one half o f the growth in 
1992, partly in response to the economic slowdown outside the region.
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Table 2
Summary the Uruguay Round Results in Relation to Developing Countries
Area Main features Implications for 
developing countries
1. Agriculture Decisions in three areas limit 
agricultural policies




Improved access for 
agricultural exporters, 
but




importers fear losses 
from higher prices.
2. Textiles and Apparel 10-year phase-out o f MFA with 
elevated growth rates in quotas, 
sequential elimination of  
product coverage, but with 
temporary selective safeguards.
Potentially major gains 
to developing countries 
in area of prominent 
trade interest, but
(1) concern that 
adjustments in industrial 
countries concentrated in 
later years;
(2) concern over 
potential replacement by 
protective regime (anti­
dumping);
(3) concerns o f many 
countries they will be 
uncompetitive against 
other suppliers, and will 
lose.
3. Tariffs and Grey Area 
M easures (VERs)
Tariffs to be cut a comparable 
percentage to Kennedy and 
Tokyo Rounds. VER measures 
to be phased out
Tariff cuts and the 
elimination o f VERs will 
improve developing 
country access. But 
regarding tariff cut, it
(1) will likely be small 
in areas o f special 
developing country 
interest (textiles and 
apparel) and
(2) tariffs have already 
been low in most 
developed countries.
4. TRIM s Elimination o f investment 
measures affecting trade.
Elimination of trade- 
related investment 
requirements. Extension 
o f WTO into investment 
regulation.
5. Services Broad principles agreed with 
sectoral exceptions, and 
conditionality (MFN). Market 
access and national treatment 
embodied, with access 
commitments tabled
Relatively few specific 
concession which is 
more likely to prove the 
beginning o f a process 
towards liberalisation, 
rather than substantive 
liberalisation in its own 
right.
6. Intellectual Property Establishment o f broad Many developing
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international minimum standards 
o f protection in the three areas 
o f patents, trademarks, 
copyright. Disputes to be settled 
under the integrated dispute 
settlement body under the World 
Trade Organisation.
countries had already 
moved closed to the 
minimum standards, in 
part due to prior bilateral 
pressures.
7. Dispute Settlement Firm time limits over the stages 
of the dispute process, and the 
need for a concerns to reject a 
panel report strengthening the 
process
Strengthened procedures 
in the interest o f small 
countries bringing 
complaints against larger 
countries
8. World Trade Organisation 
(W TO) New World Trade body 
established to give permanence 
to GATT. Two features are that
(1) countries acceding to WTO 
must accept all decisions in the 
Round as a package
(2) acceding countries agree to 
be bound by an integrated 
dispute settlement process 
covering the three areas o f  
goods, services, and investment.
Absence of menu choice 
in selecting which 
Uruguay Round 
decisions to sign on to 
concerns some countries, 
as does the integrated 
dispute process.
Source: Adapted from Table 1., Hamilton, Colleen and Whalley, John (1995).
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Chapter 2
The Formation of ASEAN and its External Economic 
Relations in the Global Context
Introduction
This chapter will discuss the formation of ASEAN, the only long established regional 
economic organisation in East Asia1. The historical background of the formation of 
ASEAN has shown significant rationale for the establishment of this unique 
organisation2 although it has long been criticised for its nature and the “ASEAN 
Way”3. Even the rationale behind the implementation of the “Open Regionalism” of 
ASEAN now can also be traced back to this historical origin, as well as from the 
current changing global economic and legal environment that has influenced this new 
approach. Therefore, it is essential to discuss in some detail, both the history and 
institutions of ASEAN, as well as the relations between ASEAN and its economic 
partners in the global context. This will help explain the “ASEAN Uniqueness” that 
developed along the “ASEAN Way” and further forms the basis of “ASEAN Open 
Regionalism”.
Section 2.1 will focus on ASEAN’s historical background, and the complex 
strands of historical, cultural, political and economic factors shaping the ASEAN way.
1 There have now been other regional and sub-regional economic groups such as APEC, EAEC, and the 
Growth Triangle (see Figure 1) but all o f them are either non-binding groups, or are formed as a forum 
thus there is no formal legal entity or international legal personality.
2 This is because ASEAN was formed as a very loose organisation without any supranational legal and 
institutional framework, all decision- and treaty- making power have been conceitedly made by the 
Head o f ASEAN countries. ASEAN agreements were enforced at national level while they were 
committed at regional level. ASEAN uses the “No-Vote” system but relies on the “Musyawarah”
principle. All economic co-operation programmes (prior to the new schemes were launched) were 
implemented mainly on a selective basis not on an across the board approach. ASEAN has been 
represented by all member states in international forums or organisations, and has been represented as 
an organisation in addition to the individual ASEAN countries (but the organisation itself has no vote). 
Despite such inadequacy, ASEAN has remained in existence for over 30 years (unlike other 
unsuccessful organisations), and has achieved a certain level o f success (even though, in the past, not in 
economic co-operation).
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Its institutional structure and functional mechanisms were also influenced by the 
ASEAN strong sentiment of “Independence, Equality, and Peace”4. Therefore, it is not 
surprised that ASEAN did not create supranational legal and other institutions, and it 
initially avoided the word “Integration” (Pelkmans, 1997: 199-243). Over years of 
ASEAN development, both citizens and governments never favoured any kind of 
formal regional integration, supranationalism, or even regionalisation3, as they had a 
fear of imperialism or colonisation and a strong desire to remain independent. Thus, 
their political will emphasised “Concerted Action” for achieving any common goals of 
economic co-operation schemes. This strong sentiment was translated into the concept 
o f “Concerted Liberalisation” for a new economic policy in Asian countries, also
6 7adopted by APEC in its non-legally binding trade and investment liberalisation , and 
also adopted by ASEAN in the new “Open Regionalism” for its implementation of 
regionalisation based on “Concerted Liberalisation”. This means that ASEAN 
regionalisation would be implemented by co-ordinated trade and investment 
liberalisation within the group, then it would be extended to the rest of the world on an 
NT/MFN basis implemented under the ASEAN new schemes (see chapter 5).
Therefore, ASEAN has implemented the dual objectives of strengthening 
regional economic self-reliance by conceitedly liberalising trade and investment
3 For example see Broinowski, Alison (1982), Palmer, Norman D. (1987). Also see Kemapunmanus, 
Lawan (1985).
4 This clearly reflects in the Bangkok Declaration, the founding instrument o f ASEAN. Also all 
mechanisms o f ASEAN operated the “Rotational Basis”. In the early years, ASEAN did not have even a 
Secretary-General, only a Secretary-General o f the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN countries sought to 
have individual ASEAN Secretaries in each individual member country. Only in 1992 was the ASEAN 
Secretariat given a new status and headed by a single Secretary-General o f ASEAN.
5 The creation o f ASEAN as a regional organisation thus, initially was not regarded as a process o f 
regionalisation but rather to create a commitment among member countries for joining hands together in 
achieving the common goals set forth in the ASEAN Agreements economically and politically.
6 Although APEC is composed of Asian and Western groups o f members, the two have different 
perspectives, while the Western group prefers a formal institutional infrastructure the Asian group 
prevails the “Asian Way”.
7 See Bogor Declaration, and for the discussion o f the non-legal binding trade and investment 
liberalisation, see Walter, Andrew W. (1995).
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among member countries, and has decided to open its regional market to outsiders 
without creating a closed economic bloc. ASEAN members remain as independent as 
they could be under the new form of regionalisation, since it does not require them to 
render much sovereignty to supranational institutions but rather to employ the ASEAN 
pattern of network co-operation.
It needs to be made clear here that the discussion in section 2.2 endeavours to 
explain the rationale for ASEAN in implementing open regionalism from the 
economic point of view, as ASEAN heavily depends on trade and investment flows 
into the region. Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 thus discuss ASEAN and its relations with the 
EU, the main trading and investment partner of ASEAN, to show the strong economic 
and political ties between the two that emphasises the necessity for ASEAN to 
maintain its external economic links with this group. Section 2.2.3 analyses the EU 
and ASEAN integration, to clearly distinguish between the EU’s institutional 
integration and ASEAN open regionalism, which is based on the ASEAN pattern of 
network co-operation.
Also the interdependence between ASEAN, APEC and NAFTA discussed in 
section 2.2.4 further emphasises ASEAN’s policy in developing open regionalism. 
Moreover, economic integration in ASEAN has relied less on its institutional 
framework, but rather the economic system and member state policies have been ever 
more shaped by the structure and dynamics of an increasingly globalised world 
economy. ASEAN’s integration into this global economy has been fuelled by intra­
firm and intra- industry trade and investment by the TNC networks established in the 
region (see chapter 3).
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2.1 Historical Background of ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established by five 
founding members, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, 
when the Foreign Ministers of these countries signed the Bangkok Declaration or 
ASEAN Declaration on the 8lh August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. Brunei became the 
sixth member in 19848. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 19959. Laos and Myanmar 
(Burma) joined ASEAN in 199710, and Cambodia, the tenth member of ASEAN, was 
admitted in 199911. The aims and purposes of the Association stated in the Bangkok 
Declaration are to foster regional economic, social, and cultural co-operation and to 
promote regional peace and stability12.
The creation of ASEAN is a result of the deep desire of its member states for 
regional co-operation. ASEAN is a significant achievement after the previous 
unsuccessful attempts that had been made in this region since the Second World War
declaration  o f  the Admission of Brunei Darussalam into the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations,
Jakarta, 7th January 1984, ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1989, third edition.
9 Vietnam was admitted as the seventh member o f ASEAN on 28th July 1995.
10 The admission o f Laos and Myanmar into ASEAN was held on 23rd July 1997 in Subang Jaya,
Malaysia.
11 ASEAN admitted Cambodia as the tenth member on 30th April 1999, fulfilling its vision to establish
an organisation for all Southeast Asian countries.
12 The aims and purposes o f A S E A N  provided in the Bangkok Declaration are as follows:
1) To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through
joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for 
a prosperous and peaceful community o f Southeast Asian Nations;
2) To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule o f law in
the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles o f the United 
Nations Charter;
3) To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters o f common interest in the
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4) To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the
educational, professional, technical, and administrative spheres;
5) To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation o f their agriculture and industries, the
expansion o f their trade, including of the study of the problem o f international commodity trade, 
the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising o f the 
living standards o f their people;
6) To promote Southeast Asian Studies;
7) To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional
organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer co­
operation among themselves.
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to establish and consolidate indigenous regional political and economic institutions. 
Several organisations had been created before 1967, notably SEATO, ASA, and 
MAPHILINDO, amidst the political conflicts between some of the member states, and 
with the threat of the communist aggression shaking regional political stability.
2.1.1 Regional O rganisation before 1967 and the Form ation  of ASEAN
World War II shattered the established colonial pattern in most regions of the 
world including Southeast Asia. After the decolonisation period, the withdrawal of the 
colonial powers from the region caused a power vacuum, which might have attracted 
outsiders to step in for political gain. This was the fear of the countries in this region 
that prompted them to encourage the idea of working together in a joint effort 
(Khoman, 1994). At the same time, there were countries outside Southeast Asia, 
especially major western countries, which inspired and supported the formation of a 
regional organisation. In the economic field, Southeast Asian nations participated in 
the UN Economic Commission For Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and the Colombo 
Plan. In the military and security field, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) and the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement were the most significant 
organisations (Palmer, 1987).
In 1954, SEATO was formed by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. They agreed to protect 
this region against aggression by way of armed attack, and attempted to establish an 
anti-Communist regional association. The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
or the Manila Treaty, the founding treaty of SEATO, had two crucial features, one 
military and one political, concerning security in Southeast Asia. The signatories 
extended the benefits of the Manila Treaty to Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam as 
the Protocol states.
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The Manila Treaty served as the framework for collective defence in this 
region that allowed the military operations of western countries to spread throughout 
Southeast Asia, including the entire territories of Asian parties and the general area of 
South West Pacific (Modelski, 1964). SEATO became the “Pro-American and Pro- 
Western” alignment in this region. American and western military forces were based 
widely in Southeast Asia. This caused the countries in this region to feel unhappy with 
too much interference of western great powers on their soil. Thus finally SEATO died 
in 1977 even though the Manila Treaty is still in effect.
In April 1955, Indonesia hosted the Afro-Asian Conference, a forum for self- 
assertion of the newly independent Third World countries in Asia and Africa to a 
voice in deciding the conduct of world affairs (Palmer, 1994). Up to the early 1960s, 
the first efforts to achieve institutional forms of regional co-operation were made by 
indigenous Southeast Asian countries by the formation of two regional groupings: the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO. They were confined to 
Southeast Asian states and were created as a regional initiative (Irvine, 1982).
ASA was established in July 1961 by Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
However, this organisation remained in existence for only six years because there was 
a dispute between Malaya and Philippines over North Borneo, which was later 
renamed Sabah. Sabah became part of the Malaysian Federation in September 1963. 
ASA was also handicapped by the accusation that it was a pro-western, anti- 
Communist group whose motivations were primarily political. In fact, ASA’s 
objectives emphasised co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and 
administrative fields (Irvine, 1982: 9).
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At approximately the same time as this interruption of ASA's activities, the 
Philippines was developing proposals for a “Greater Malay Confederation” creating an 
association of the Malay speaking countries comprising Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia. MAPHILINDO came from the first syllables of the name of the three 
member states. This also had a brief life because of its limited membership and 
political conflicts between member states. The hostilities were aroused by Indonesia’s 
confrontation with the new Federation of Malaysia from September 1963. This ended 
the activities of this organisation (Fifield, 1979: 3-6).
In 1966, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was formed for economic co­
operation. The participants were Australia, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand. Japan tried to take a 
leadership role by substituting its aid for the US economic aid to Southeast Asia. The 
organisation was again perceived to be a front against the expansion of Communism 
in this region, which was penetrating from Indochina into other countries in Southeast 
Asia (Palmer, 1994: 28). But ASPAC failed to develop, and lapsed in 1972 when the 
US ended military involvement in Vietnam, and finally the US withdrew its military 
bases from Southeast Asia in 1975 (Yoshiyuki, 1994: 37). The inter-state disputes 
between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia which neutralised ASA and 
MAPHILINDO, and the political tension which arose with the separation of Singapore 
from the Malaysia Federation in August 1965, underlined the desirability of regional 
co-operation among these states (Frank, 1990: 4).
In 1966, with the ending of the September 1965 coup in Indonesia and the 
termination of “Confrontation”, moves were made to renew co-operation attempts in 
this region. Indonesia normalised relations with Malaysia. At the same time, the 
Philippines and Malaysia were reconciled, and Singapore and Malaysia also re­
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established their relationship. The reconciliation between the four disputants was 
mediated by Thailand, the only country that was neutral in this region, and Thailand 
was able to help to re-create the environment of good friendship and the feeling of ‘go 
together hand in hand’ in preserving the region.
A new association was required for further co-operation. For this reason, the 
Foreign Minister of Thailand invited the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia to a meeting to set 
up the new organisation (Khoman, 1994: XVIII). Finally, they signed the Bangkok 
Declaration establishing ASEAN on 8lh August 1967.
2.1.2 Rationale for ASEAN Co-operation
ASEAN was formed in response to a political challenge. The Southeast Asian 
states faced common external and internal problems. All (except Thailand, which had 
not been colonised) experienced suffering from the long historical struggles for 
independence and freedom during the colonial period, and from inter-state conflicts 
and political tensions13. All felt threatened by the regional instability caused by 
Communist aggression, the Japanese occupation, and the modem western great power 
domination, especially from the US involvement in Southeast Asia.
This condition underlined the deep desire for regional co-operation in 
Southeast Asia. Collective self-reliance and regional integrity were crucial in dealing 
with regional problems. ASEAN states declared that:
“Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and 
exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and 
respecting all nations on the basis o f mutually advantageous relationships, and in 
accordance with the principles o f self-determination, sovereign equality and non­
interference in the internal affairs o f nations” l4.
13 Thailand is also the only country in this region that was neutral and there was no inter-state conflict 
with its neighbour during that period, so Thailand had an important role in the reconciliation among 
other states in Southeast Asia.
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The formation of ASEAN provided its members with a framework both for 
maintaining political unity, particularly against external threats, and for acting together 
to achieve economic advantage for all. The ASEAN member states agreed that 
economic co-operation not only paved the way for co-operation in other areas but was 
indeed an essential precondition for the achievement of objectives in various areas in 
this region. So, firstly they considered that they should:
“Share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability 
o f the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, 
and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external 
interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national 
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations o f their people” 1;>.
It can be concluded that political motivations and economic objectives are the
twin rationales for ASEAN co-operation. The member states of ASEAN all gained
experience and learned the lesson from previous unsuccessful organisations, which
had the wrong direction and methods of operation. These lessons had strengthened the
formation of the new organisation, ASEAN, which has existed for more than 30 years,
and has strengthened member countries' relationships in various fields of co-operation.
2.1.3 ASEAN Institutional Structure and its Functions
The institutional structure of ASEAN clearly shows the decentralised nature of
ASEAN, especially before the Bali Summit. The main characteristic of ASEAN
system is “Concerted Action” through the joint representatives of the Head of ASEAN
members for ASEAN, the separate ASEAN National Secretary-General in each
ASEAN country, and the “Rotational Basis” adopted in all levels of meetings. This
further developed into a pattern of co-ordinated networks, interactive functioning (see
chartsl, 2, and 3, pp. 115,116,117) and concerted liberalisation that is at the heart of
open regionalism.
14 Section 8 o f the Declaration o f ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24th February 1976.
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However, the institutional structure of ASEAN has been amended twice16 since 
it was established in 1967. Firstly, it was reorganised at the 1976 Bali Summit meeting 
of ASEAN Heads of Government. Secondly, a restructuring was performed in 1992, 
the Fourth ASEAN Summit meeting. Both reorganisations took place in response to 
the improvement and expansion of ASEAN co-operation, in order to streamline the 
efficient mechanism for implementing its activities.
2.1.3.1 The Organisational Structure of ASEAN before the Bali Summit
The Bangkok Declaration laid down the formal structure (see chart 1, p. 115), 
specifying in its third section that the highest decision-making body in ASEAN was 
the Annual Ministerial Meeting, attended by the five foreign Ministers, held on a 
rotational basis in each of the ASEAN capitals. Its responsibilities were policy 
formulation, co-ordination of activities, and reviewing of the decisions and proposals 
of lower-level committees.
In between these Ministerial meetings the ASEAN Standing Committee is 
responsible for the day-to-day running of all the group's activities. The Committee is 
comprised of the Foreign Minister of the host country as Chairman, and resident 
ambassadors of the other ASEAN countries in that host country. The seat of the 
Standing Committee is the site of the following Ministerial Meeting. The Standing 
Committee meets several times a year and its annual report is submitted to the meeting 
of Foreign Ministers for adoption.
Down the line, there were eleven Permanent Committees composed of senior 
government officials and experts from each country. Their task was to recommend and 
implement ASEAN programs, both economic and non-economic features, reported
15 The Bangkok Declaration, paragraph 6.
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through the Standing Committee to the Annual Ministerial Meeting17. In addition, 
there were several special and ad  hoc committees. The first was the Special Co­
ordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) created in 1972 to co-ordinate 
links with the European Union and other third countries. In 1975 the Joint Study 
Group was formed, specially charged with the task of examining the substance and 
mechanisms of co-operation between ASEAN and the European Union18.
The other committees were the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC), the 
ASEAN Geneva Committee made up of ASEAN representatives in Brussels and 
Geneva respectively to handle the external relations of ASEAN, the ASEAN Co­
ordinating Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indochina States 
(ACCRRIS)19, the Senior Officials on Sugar, the Special Co-ordinating Committee of 
ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities, and the Special Committee on the 
ASEAN Secretariat20. All these committees had specific functions but they did not 
periodically change their location and chairmanship, as did the other ASEAN bodies. 
Other semi-permanent and sub-committees as well as working groups were set up 
from time to time to deal with individual matters as they arose.
An important element of the structure was the ASEAN National Secretariat in 
each member state, located within the foreign ministries. Their function was to co­
16 The reorganisation has not totally changed the machinery o f ASEAN, but has streamlined its 
organisation.
17 The first four o f these committees came into existence in August 1968 and covered Civil Air 
Transport (first sited in Singapore), Communications Air Transport (sited initially in Malaysia), Food 
and Agriculture (Indonesia), and shipping (Thailand). By December 1969 five more permanent 
committees were added to the list. These were Commerce and Industry (Philippines), Finance 
(Malaysia), Mass Media (Malaysia), Tourism (Indonesia), and Transportation and Telecommunications 
(Malaysia). In July 1970 a Science and Technology committee was established in Indonesia and in 
December 1971 one for Social-Cultural Activities was created in Philippines. The sites o f these various 
committees were rotated once every two or three years.
18 The EU delegation's visit to ASEAN in 1974 led to the emergence o f the Joint Study Group in 1975. 
It comprised officials from both sides but the JSG was not included in the formal institutional structure.
19 ACCRRIS was formed in February 1973 reflecting an intention to assess the economic requirements 
o f Indochinese states and facilitate ASEAN assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
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ordinate national responses to ASEAN requirements, to implement the work of the 
Association and to service the Annual Ministerial Meeting or other covered ministerial 
meetings as well as the Standing Committee. The heads of these National Secretariats, 
Director-Generals, met formally as a group to prepare the agenda for all Standing 
Committee meetings. This group constituted the pivot of the ASEAN committee 
system. Another important group of officials, the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM)21, 
was established by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in November 1971. It was a 
regular forum for intra-ASEAN political consultation but it was not part of the formal 
institutional structure of ASEAN.
2.1.3.2 The ASEAN Institutional Structure after the Bali Summit 
The 1976 Bali Summit meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government resulted in 
the acceleration of ASEAN activities. It laid down the framework for ASEAN co­
operation in various fields, e.g. political22, economic23, social, cultural and 
informational, and for security, and also improved the mechanisms for ASEAN in 
order to enhance its effectiveness in implementing its activities.
The major restructuring was in three areas (see Chart 2, p. 116): firstly, the 
creation of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and the other ASEAN Ministers 
(OAM)24 in addition to the Foreign Ministers Meeting; secondly, the regrouping of the 
permanent and ad  hoc committees into five economic and three non-economic
20 This committee was created to look into the establishment o f a central Secretariat.
21 This committee o f senior Ministry officials was at the Permanent Secretary level or its equivalent. 
They initially met regularly over the years to discuss the implementation o f the Zone o f Peace, Freedom, 
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).
22 Signing o f the Treaty o f Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, providing the settlement o f intra- 
regional disputes by peaceful means, recognition and respect for the Zone o f Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality, strengthening o f political solidarity.
23 Co-operation on basic commodities, food and energy, Industrial co-operation, co-operation in trade, 
joint approach to international commodities problems and other world economic problems, setting up 
the machinery for economic co-operation.
24 ASEAN Ministers o f Labour, Social Welfare, Education, Information, Health, Energy, Science and 
Technology, and Environment.
57
committees, plus the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD); thirdly, the 
establishment of an ASEAN Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General sited in 
Jakarta, Indonesia, which came into existence in June 1976.
The ASEAN Secretariat's role was to monitor, co-ordinate and assist co­
operation in ASEAN as well as to foster relations between various ministerial 
groupings in ASEAN. Reports of the Economic Ministers and their committees were 
transmitted to the ASEAN Secretariat, which in turn passed them to the ASEAN 
Standing Committee and the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. It was also responsible for 
the discharge of all the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting and the Standing Committee. It facilitated communications with 
non-ASEAN countries and organisations, conducted research and explained ASEAN 
co-operation to the outside world.
A Secretary-General was to be appointed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 
a rotational basis for a two-year term. However, the Secretary-General was not the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN, or the political spokesman of the association, but only 
the Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat. He had the authority to address 
directly the member governments, to ensure that ASEAN committees were informed 
of current developments in ASEAN activities, and to act as a channel for formal 
communication between the committees. He could also “harmonise, facilitate and 
monitor progress in the implementation of all approved ASEAN activities and initiate 
plans and programs”25. Some have criticised the ASEAN Secretariat for having weak 
functions and have described it as a glorified post office (Chin Kin Wah 1988: XV-
25 The functions and powers o f the Secretary-General were laid down in Article 3 o f the Agreement on 
the Establishment o f the ASEAN Secretariat.
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XXXV). There were some changes to, and an upgrading of, its functions and powers 
in 1992.
The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) was given the task of accelerating 
economic co-operation and this body was considered a part of the formal institutional 
structure of ASEAN26. The AEM was serviced by the Senior Economic Officials 
Meetings (SEOM). It met about twice a year to review the progress of the various 
areas of ASEAN economic co-operation and to consider the reports and 
recommendations concerning various ASEAN economic issues.
Five economic committees were set up and each ASEAN country was assigned 
to host one of them. The host country designated the chairman, provided the interim 
technical secretariat and convened the meetings. The five committees and their host 
countries were as follows:
Host country Committee
Indonesia Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry (COFAF)
Malaysia Committee on Transport and Communication (COTAC)
Philippines Committee on Industry, Minerals, and Energy (COIME)
Singapore Committee on Trade and Tourism (COTT)
Thailand Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB)
The ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), industrial joint venture schemes (AIJV) 
and industrial complementation schemes (AIC) were under the general scope of 
COIME. Trade liberalisation schemes such as the Preferential Trading Arrangements 
(PTA) came under COTT. The economic committees reported to the AEM.
26 Section 5 o f the Declaration o f ASEAN Concord empowered the AEM to carry out economic co­
operation directly. The meeting may be attended by all Ministers in the member countries who are 
involved in economic matters such as Ministers o f Trade, Industry, Finance, Agriculture, Transportation 
and Communications, and so on.
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The non-economic committees were the Committee on Science and 
Technology (COST), the Committee on Social Development (COSD)27, and the 
Committee on Culture and Information (COCI). In addition to the functional 
committees, there is a Committee on the Budget, which manages and disburses the 
ASEAN Fund and the budget of the Central ASEAN Secretariat. This committee 
reports to the Standing Committee.
Turning to the role of the ASEAN private sector, it is very important for 
implementing various ASEAN economic co-operation programmes, as ASEAN 
economies are basically private enterprise economies. In order to stimulate the effort 
and enthusiasm of the private sector in participating in the ASEAN economic co­
operation schemes, the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) 
was formed in 1972 with the support of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. It is an 
effective machinery for inter-country private sector interaction and for dialogue with 
official ASEAN bodies (see Chart 3, p.l 17), which need to incorporate the views of 
the private sector in their decision-making. ASEAN-CCI has been actively involved in 
the formulation of various ASEAN co-operative programs, especially in the areas of 
trade and industry such as the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) and 
ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) schemes.
The annual ASEAN-CCI Meeting rotates around the ASEAN capitals. Its 
executive body is an ASEAN-CCI Council consisting of two representatives from 
each country. The President of the ASEAN-CCI has a two-year term. Its subsidiary 
bodies are structured to match the official ASEAN Committees28. The ASEAN-CCI
27 The ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters has the main function to discuss and formulate 
regional policies, approaches and strategies to combat the drug problem. It meets once a year and the 
co-ordinating work is carried out by the Narcotics Desk Officer at the ASEAN Secretariat.
28 Since 1976 there has been an established pattern o f communication between these official and private 
sector bodies.
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Working Group on Industrial Complementation (WGIC) has organised industry clubs 
to identify possible avenues for complementation in specific fields. These clubs are 
the grouping of entrepreneurs from the same manufacturing sector, covering a variety 
of fields. This relatively (and still) partial ASEAN private sector participation in inter­
governmental processes at a regional level may be a weak point in the achievement of 
more effective economic co-operation in ASEAN (Chng Meng Kng, 1990: 268-82).
2.1.3.3 The Fourth ASEAN Summit Reorganisation 1992
Resulting from the fourth ASEAN Summit Meeting, the organisational 
machinery of ASEAN was changed in three main areas. Firstly, the Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting (SEOM), which had previously worked on preparation of ASEAN 
Economic Meetings, will now supervise the economic plans, as it is an 
intergovernmental body. Moreover, this body has replaced ASEAN's five economic 
committees. Secondly, the ASEAN Secretariat was given a new stature; it can initiate, 
advise, co-ordinate, recommend, supervise and implement ASEAN activities29. It is 
now headed by the Secretary-General of ASEAN, replacing and upgrading the office 
o f Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat. The position has been filled by 
recruitment, instead of the practice of rotation among member states.
Finally, Summit Meetings are to be held on a three-year basis with informal 
meetings in between30. Previously, a Summit Meeting could be scheduled when the 
member states felt it necessary31. Since ASEAN was formed, there had been only four 
Summit Meetings held in twenty-eight years, namely, 1976, 1977, 1987, and 1992. 
Since then they have been held in 1995 and 1998, with informal meeting in between. It 
was hoped that regular meetings of the Heads of Government would help promote
29 Art. 2 o f the Protocol Amending the Agreement on the Establishment o f the ASEAN Secretariat
which amended Art. 3 o f the latter.
more effective in regional co-operation because the meetings will be the main forum 
for policy- and decision- making. The meeting can also regularly assess the 
implementation of ASEAN co-operation as well as introducing new co-operation 
schemes, or strengthening the effectiveness of existing programs in order to achieve 
the stated goals and objectives of ASEAN.
2.1.4 ASEAN Economic Co-operation
The Bangkok Declaration of 1967, the ASEAN's founding document called for
economic co-operation in five areas32:
1) Co-operation in Trade and Tourism (COTT);
2) Co-operation in Industry, Minerals and Energy (COIME);
3) Co-operation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry (COFAF);
4) Co-operation in Finance and Banking (COFAB); and
5) Co-operation in Transport and Communications (COTAC).
Economic co-operation is the main objective of ASEAN, however it was not 
until 1970 that the first Permanent Committees as envisaged in the Bangkok 
Declaration were organised, and the other Committees dealing with economic matters 
were set up such as Committees on Food and Agriculture, Civil Air Transportation, 
Communications and Air Traffic Services, Shipping, Commerce and Industry, Land 
Transportation and Tourism. In 1971 a wide range of issues were discussed including 
trade issues such as trade liberalisation, trade fairs and promotion, the harmonisation 
of statistics and industrial complementation. The ASEAN-CCI (mentioned above) was 
also organised in this year to encourage the private sector to participate in economic 
co-operation and to co-operate with the governmental sector.
j0 Section 8 o f Singapore Declaration of 1992.
jl Section A. 1 o f the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali 24th February 1976.
32 The second paragraph of the Bangkok Declaration provided for general collaboration among ASEAN 
countries in agriculture, trade, industries, transportation and communication but the five economic 
committees (COTT, COIME, COFAF, COFAB, and COTAC) were set up later, in 1977, by the 
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting.
During the first ten years of its establishment, ASEAN members put more 
efforts into improving relations between themselves, regaining their previous cultural 
and social links and developing a new political consensus, as they had been separated 
in the past for several centuries during the colonial period33. Thus they spent time in 
conceptualising and organising, and they also had more concerns about regional 
political problems than economic issues at that time, especially the communist 
expansion from Indochina into ASEAN. They feared that ASEAN countries might be 
the next dominoes falling to the Communist World. The political and military conflict 
in the region no doubt prompted the ASEAN member states to move forward 
cautiously, and to make political and diplomatic co-operation the main thrust of their 
attempts to integrate. This was the first phase of ASEAN development.
Nevertheless, the highlight of this first phase was the study on economic co­
operation in ASEAN, commissioned by the Foreign Ministers at their 1969 Annual 
Meeting and conducted by a UN team34. The main objective of the study was to 
identify the possible ways in which co-operative action among the ASEAN countries 
could make their economies individually and collectively more efficient and more 
capable of achieving the objective set out in the ASEAN Declaration (United Nations, 
1974). The UN report (or, as it was known, “the Kansu Report”) was endorsed in 
principle by the relevant committees. The report became a blueprint for ASEAN 
economic development strategies and influenced ASEAN economic co-operation
33 Mohamad Mahathir, Keynote Address to the First ASEAN Economic Congress, on 13th-22nd March 
1987, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
34 The Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies o f the Department o f Economic and 
Social Affairs o f the United Nations Secretariat, in co-operation with the Secretariats o f the United
Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations 
(FAO) set up a team o f experts, led by Prof. G. Kansu with Prof. E.A.G. Robinson, working from 
January 1970 to June 1972.
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schemes initiated in the early second phase of ASEAN development during 1976- 
1978.
The UN team pointed out that special attention should be given to agriculture, 
industry, trade, transport, and communication. The general techniques of co-operation 
in trade and industry proposed were selective trade liberalisation35, industrial 
complementarity agreements36 and the so-called ‘package deal’. This was an 
agreement to allocate among the ASEAN countries certain large-scale industrial 
projects for a specified and limited period of time and to create the conditions, 
including unidirectional trade liberalisation measures, that would enable them to serve 
the whole or a large part of the ASEAN market. This would result in large savings in 
capital and production costs that can be secured by taking advantage of economies of 
scale. Co-operation in the financing of industrial development, in monetary and 
balance-of-payments matters, in insurance and reinsurance, and in export credits and 
export credit insurance were also proposed. Finally the harmonisation of statistics, 
standards and specifications, co-operation in various forms of training, the pooling of 
research results, the simplification of trade documentation and a variety of other 
similar activities were suggestions included in this report.
Economic co-operation within ASEAN really began in 1976 after the Bali 
Summit, which was held soon after the Economic Ministers Meeting37. This AEM
j5 “Selective trade liberalisation is aimed to increase efficiency and secure a more economic use o f  
resources both in the short run and in the long run by increasing the trade among ASEAN countries and 
permitting increased specialisation on activities o f the greatest advantage, a gradual step-by-step and 
item-by-item approach was considered appropriate, with a policy of progressive advance towards the 
long-run goal o f a limited free trade area”. The UN team Report, p. 2.
j6 This proposal is to encourage the specialisation and the exchange of products or components through 
unidirectional preferences. The reduction or abolition of intra-regional tariffs, the removal o f 
quantitative restrictions, the establishment o f joint ventures and the sharing o f markets are the measures 
for implementing the programmes, which might be beneficial to the ASEAN countries.
37 Joint Communique o f the First ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting held in Jakarta, 26th-27th 
November 1975. Paragraph 1 stated that this meeting was held to prepare the groundwork for the Bali 
Summit.
dealt mainly with economic matters, and resulted in the signing of the two crucial 
ASEAN instruments: the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia and 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord by the Heads of Governments of ASEAN states. 
The Bali Summit formally accepted the recommendations of the UN Report. Many 
economic co-operation programs38 were introduced, including the Co-operation on 
Basic Commodities, particularly food and energy, Industrial Co-operation, Co­
operation in Trade, as well as a joint approach to international commodity problems 
and other world economic problems39. The creation of machinery for economic co­
operation was also included, and in 1977 an agreement on ASEAN preferential trading 
arrangements was signed. Subsequently, a number of other measures were also 
launched to improve economic co-operation within ASEAN.
2.1.5 The Framework for ASEAN Economic Co-operation 
The 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord provided general frameworks for 
implementing regional economic co-operation in various programs as follows:
2.1.5.1. ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs)
The ASEAN member states have co-operated to establish large-scale ASEAN 
industrial plants to meet regional requirements for essential commodities. Thus the 
priority has been given to projects which utilise the materials available in the member 
states that contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange 
earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment40. In compliance with this 
objective41, the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects was concluded on 6th 
March 1980. This agreement initially specified the first five ASEAN Industrial
38 These programs are mainly based on the result o f the UN team report.
39 Declaration o f ASEAN Concord, Section B resulting from the Bali Summit in 1976.
40 Section B 2(i) and (ii) o f the Declaration o f ASEAN Concord.
41 Art. 1 o f the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects.
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Projects42 so that each member state was to have at least one ASEAN Industrial 
Project. Each of the five projects had five shareholder entities except for the project 
established in Thailand, which had seven shareholders according to Thai law. The 
shareholder entity of the host country had 60% of the total equity of the respective 
ASEAN Industrial Project, with the balance equally shared by the shareholder entities 
of the other member states. The equity participation in the shareholder entity was at 
least one third from the government of the member states, and the rest could be from 
the private sector in the country and from non-ASEAN interests43.
The products manufactured by AIPs enjoy zero tariffs when they flow within 
the ASEAN region, however they are subject to duties on supplies from third 
countries. In practice, the projects are government owned and managed, and also are 
monopolies, thus they are not so efficient. ASEAN economists (Ariff and Hill, 1985) 
feel that AIPs misallocate resources that the private sector could utilise more 
economically and effectively44.
2.1.5.2. ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC)
The Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation was signed on 
18th June 1981. Its main aim was to encourage the private sector to play a major role in 
most economic activities including industry and trade. The guidelines and frameworks 
for implementing the ASEAN Industrial Complementation packages (AIC packages) 
consist of organised complementary trade exchanges of specified processed or 
manufactured products as agreed among the ASEAN member countries. Production in
42 The first five projects were: the ASEAN Urea Projects in Indonesia and Malaysia, the ASEAN 
Phosphatic fertiliser Project in the Philippines, the ASEAN diesel engine Project in Singapore, and the 
ASEAN Rock Salt-Soda Ash Project in Thailand. But they were subsequently changed. The fertiliser 
Projects in Indonesia and Malaysia have been in operation. Singapore changed its project to be a 
manufacture o f Hepatitis B vaccine. Thailand is now developing a potash mine instead o f the Rock Salt- 
Soda Ash project. The Philippines proposed a new project to be a copper purification plant.
43 Art. 3 o f the Basic Agreement on Industrial Projects.
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an industrial sector should be allocated between private enterprises in the ASEAN 
countries in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and to permit economies of scale, 
for example, in the automotive industry. The individual items such as diesel engines, 
body panels, universal joints etc. were allocated among entrepreneurs in various 
ASEAN countries. The governments agreed to reduce the tariffs on such inputs by 
50%. The ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN CCI) and the 
industry clubs play an important role in the implementation of this scheme. However, 
the process for approval of the scheme was cumbersome because of the ASEAN 
bureaucratic machinery43, and in practice all ASEAN members have been promoting 
their own national car industries in collaboration with various transnational 
manufacturers.
The industrial complementation in the automotive industry has been 
supplemented by the Brand to Brand Complementation (BBC) program46, an 
agreement on which was signed in October 198847. The BBC scheme is an 
arrangement whereby specified parts or components of specific vehicle models are 
traded and used by the brand-owners and brand-related original equipment
44 Each AIP project required an investment o f US$ 250-300 million.
45 According to article 1 (3), 2, 3, and 4 o f the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial 
Complementation, an AIC scheme would be recommended by the Committee on Industry, Minerals and 
Energy (COIME) and approved by the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM). The ASEAN-CCI shall 
identity products for inclusion in any AIC package and the AEM would finally approved such AIC 
package to enjoy exclusivity privileges.
46 For instance, the Mitsubishi Corporation has launched a brand-to-brand car parts complementation 
scheme, under the BBC program, which involves a regional division o f labour among Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines. In this scheme, Malaysia concentrates on the production o f door panels 
and other stamped parts, Thailand specialises in the manufacture o f fuel tanks, consoles, bumpers, and 
windshields, while the Philippines focuses on the production o f transmission parts. See Ariff, Mohamed 
(1994) “Open Regionalism a la ASEAN”. Journal o f  Asian Economics. Vol. 5 No. 1. pp. 99-117. Cited 
in Athukorala, Prema-Chandra and Menon, Jayant. (1996) “Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN: Can 
AFTA Make a Difference?” in AFTA in the Changing International Economy. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, p. 81.
47 This scheme was proposed by the ASEAN Automotive Federation (AAF), one o f the industry clubs 
o f  the ASEAN-CCI's Working Group on Industrial Complementation.
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manufacturers in their respective original equipment products48. The BBC products 
must comply with the rules of origin, which provide that the ASEAN content must be 
50% (it was reduced to 35% on a case-by-case basis for a period of five years from 
1987 and it was subjected to review after five years)49. The other BBC projects 
included a security paper mill, a magnesium plant and a mini-tractor factory.
2.1.5.3. ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Scheme (AIJV)
The ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture scheme is aimed at promoting industrial 
joint venture opportunities and increasing industrial production in the region through 
resource pooling and market sharing. It was introduced in November 1983. The major 
feature of the scheme is that investors are free to locate their projects in any 
participating country to produce accredited AIJV products50. The AIJV scheme is 
much more flexible than the AIC scheme because it requires only two participating 
countries for an accredited product rather than a sharing of production among all 
ASEAN member countries. Any product of a joint venture, formed by the 
participation of nationals from at least two ASEAN countries with minimum equity 
ownership of 51% and at least 5% equity51 contribution from nationals of each 
participating country, could obtain accreditation as an AIJV product under the scheme 
qualifying for tariff preferences in all of the ASEAN countries.
In order to render the AIJV scheme more flexible, quicker to implement, and 
more attractive to investors, the Manila Summit held in December 1987 approved a
48 Section 1 o f the Memorandum of understanding Brand-to-Brand Complementation on the 
Automotive Industry under the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation (BAAIC).
49 Art. V o f the Protocol on Improvements on Extension o f Tariff Preferential Trading Arrangement, 
15th December 1987, resulting from the approval o f the Manila Summit as provided in paragraph 23 (d) 
o f  the Joint Press Statement Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Government, Manila, 14th- 15th December 
1987.
30 Art. I paragraph 6 o f the Revised Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures.
31 The twenty-fourth meeting o f the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) in October 1992 agreed to 
sign the Second Protocol to amend the revised Basic Agreement on the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture 
(BAAIJV), which relaxed the minimum 5% equity requirement.
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reduction in the proportion of non-ASEAN participation in AIJVs from 49% to 60%52, 
and the deepening of the margin of preference from 75% to 90%.
Since the purpose of the AIJV scheme as well as the AIP and AIC schemes is 
to provide preferential treatment to AIJV products, it is useful only in a situation in 
which trade is not free. In other words, trade liberalisation within ASEAN would 
make the scheme redundant. Thus, the new concept of economic co-operation in 
ASEAN to enhance general trade liberalisation across the board would supersede that 
o f creating specific programs like AIP, AIC and AIJV, as will be discussed in chapter 
5 below.
2.1.5.4. ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)
The ASEAN preferential trading arrangements were introduced in February 
1977. It was considered that the most important steps towards regional market 
integration in ASEAN, as the UN Report advised, and the most fruitful progress to 
liberalisation, would be achieved by an item by item approach53. Under these 
arrangements, the member countries were to grant trade preferences to one another on 
a selective basis. Each ASEAN member country submits its national list of selected 
products for which it would like the other partner countries to grant it concessions, and 
its list of commodities for which, in exchange for these concessions, it would be 
prepared to make concessions to the other countries. To be eligible for tariff 
preferences in the PTA, products must satisfy the Rules of Origin which stipulated that 
the total value of the non-ASEAN content must not exceed 50% (later reduced to
52 This was effective from 1987 up to 315,1 December 1990 and it was extended to 31st December 1993 
upon the EU's (EC) request, resulting from the Ninth EC-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 
30lh-31sl May 1991. It was incorporated in Art. I paragraph 5 o f the Revised Basic Agreement on 
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures.
53 Art. 8 o f the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading arrangements concluded on 14th February 
1977 in Manila, the Philippines.
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35%)54 of the FOB value of the products, and the final process of manufacture must be 
performed within the territory of the exporting country.
Initially, therefore, the extension of tariff preferences has been undertaken with 
member countries voluntarily offering products for inclusion in the PTA, and through 
negotiation based on a request list of products submitted by member countries for 
tariff preferences. After 1985, in a move to accelerate the reduction of tariff rates in 
ASEAN, tariff margin preferences of 20 to 25% were automatically extended across 
the board on the basis of the import value of the products imported by member 
countries, subject to an Exclusion List of products that are excluded from tariff 
preferences under the PTA.
In order to enhance intra-ASEAN trade co-operation and to attract foreign 
investments, as well as to work towards a significant expansion in intra-ASEAN trade 
by placing a substantial share of the number and value of the traded items in the PTA, 
the ASEAN Heads of Government approved measures for achieving this goal by 
reducing the Exclusion Lists of individual member countries to 10% or less of the 
number of trade items and achieving a greater harmonisation of the Exclusion Lists. 
Items remaining in the Exclusion Lists should account for 50% or less of the total 
value of intra-ASEAN trade. The instruments to be used for granting such preferences 
were:
“Long term quantity contracts; purchase finance support at preferential interest 
rates; preference in procurement by Government entities; extension o f tariff 
preferences; liberalisation o f non-tariff measures on a preferential basis; and other 
measures”55.
On 15th December 1987 a Memorandum of Understanding on Standstill and 
Rollback on Non-Tariff Barriers among ASEAN countries was signed, aimed at
54 Approved by the Manila Summit and provided in Art. V o f the Protocol on Improvements on 
Extension o f Tariff Preferences under the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement, December 1987.
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effectively reducing non-tariff barriers to trade in the region. This helped to promote 
trade liberalisation in the region more effectively.
2.1.5.5. Investment Guarantee Agreement
The Agreement for the promotion and Protection of Investments, otherwise 
known as the Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), was promulgated among 
ASEAN countries in consideration of the following purposes:
“To stimulate increased flow of technology, know-how and private investment 
among ASEAN countries, thereby accelerating the industrialisation o f the region; 
to create favourable conditions for investments by nationals and companies o f any 
ASEAN member state in the territory o f the other ASEAN member states; and to 
facilitate the desired flow o f private investments therein to increase prosperity in 
their respective territories”.
Under the Agreement, the investments of nationals or companies of any 
member state are not subject to expropriation or nationalisation or any equivalent 
measure, except for public use, for public purpose, or in the public interest. If so, such 
expropriation should be under due process of law on a non-discriminatory basis and 
upon payment of adequate compensation. The compensation should amount to the 
market value of the investments affected, immediately before the measure of 
dispossession became public knowledge, and should freely be transferable in freely 
usable currencies from the host country.
The IGA applies to investments brought into, derived from, or directly 
connected with the territory of any ASEAN member state by nationals or companies of 
any other member state and which are specifically approved in writing and registered 
by the host country.
Regarding the capital and earnings repatriation and subrogation rights, each 
ASEAN country is obliged, subject to its law, rules and regulations, to allow without 
unreasonable delay the free transfer, in any freely-usable currency, of the capital, net
55 Art. 3 o f the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements.
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profits, dividends, royalties, technical assistance and technical fees, interest and other 
income, accruing from any investments of the nationals or companies of the other 
member states. The proceeds from the total or partial liquidation made by nationals or 
companies of the other member states, and funds in repayment of loans given by 
nationals or companies of one member state to the nationals or companies of another 
member state which both states have recognised as investment, are also to be freely 
transferred.
However, the IGA does not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of the 
member states. Such matters are governed by the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
agreements between member states and the domestic laws of each member state. The 
agreement also provided that any dispute between and among the member states 
concerning the application of the IGA may be submitted to the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers for resolution, if the dispute cannot be settled amicably between the parties 
to the dispute, either party can seek a solution by conciliation or arbitration.
2.1.5.6. ASEAN Financial Co-operation
The main objectives of intra-ASEAN financial co-operation are:
• to facilitate the movement o f financial resources within ASEAN;
•  to harmonise the rules and regulations relating to customs and other duties affecting intra- 
ASEAN trade;
•  to help eliminate double taxation within ASEAN and to prevent tax avoidance by multi­
national corporations with production units and/or offices in more than one ASEAN 
country;
•  to provide facilities for insurance and reinsurance cover for ASEAN customers;
•  to provide financial assistance to members to tide over temporary international liquidity 
problems.
Co-operation in the area of finance involves customs, insurance, taxation and 
banking matters. In addition to these intra-ASEAN matters, the Committee on Finance 
and Banking (COFAB) voices ASEAN positions with regard to major international 
financial issues and co-operates when necessary with third countries on matters of
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interest to ASEAN. The Special Committee of ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary 
Authorities, which was formed in 1972, was the first regional body to be set up for 
financial co-operation. Its function was to develop a common ASEAN approach to 
understanding and responding to developments in the international financial arena, 
and to co-operate in finance matters within the Association. After the Bali Summit of 
1976, the COFAB was established. The financial aspects of the various ASEAN 
investment projects under the AIC, AIP, and AIJV, for example, were looked after 
largely by the COFAB, which operated through its sub-committees such as the 
working group on tax matters, and the working group on customs matters.
The ASEAN Banking Council, a private sector body, started operating in June 
1981 as an organisation incorporated in Singapore. Its issued capital of S$ 100 billion 
was composed of stocks owned by banks in the original five countries, with each 
country owning 20% of total capital. Its financial services within ASEAN included 
providing finance in the form of equity capital and loans to ASEAN projects under the 
various ASEAN industrial co-operation schemes. It also lends to ASEAN financial 
and training institutions. The AFC has also been a channel of investment funds and 
technology from overseas bodies to ASEAN projects. It is the ‘ASEAN arm’ of 
Japanese and EU development financial aid bodies, such as the ASEAN-Japan 
Development Corporation (AJDC) or INTERACT which is an EU organisation 
representing development finance institutions of member governments (Srikanta, 
1990: 71-3).
ASEAN also launched the ASEAN Swap arrangement in 1977. The 
arrangement provides for short-term currency swap facilities among members to help 
tide them over temporary international liquidity problems arising from a balance of 
payment deficits. Each participant contributed US$ 20 million to the total swap fund
73
of US$ 100 million, and was entitled to a maximum credit of US$ 40 million for a 
period of one, two or three months, which may be renewed once for a maximum of 
another three months. The swap fund was later doubled to US$ 200 million and US$ 
80 million respectively56. The shared amount of swap fund contributed by each 
member was increased from US$ 20 million to US$ 40 million57. This facility has 
been used by every member, and it has proved its usefulness as a co-operative 
arrangement, although the generalised effect of the crisis of 1997-8 overwhelmed the 
resources available in it.
2.1.5.7. ASEAN Food Security Reserve
ASEAN has recognised the importance of the agricultural sector since its early 
years even though the ASEAN countries have developed and promoted the industrial 
sector to bring about structural changes in their economies. Agriculture continues to 
play an important role in all these economies since it contributes very significantly to 
the growth and stability of the region, not only in the production of food crops, but 
also in the provision of employment in the rural areas of the ASEAN economy.
The ASEAN Food Security Reserve was introduced in October 1979 aimed at 
strengthening food security in the region by noting “the high vulnerability of the 
region to wide fluctuations in the production of basic foodstuffs and hence to 
instability of the region's food supply”, so it is the common responsibility of the 
ASEAN member countries to assure food security in this region on the basis of a co­
ordinated security plan. The first tangible result of this plan was the setting up of an
56 Art. II o f the Supplementary Agreement to the Memorandum o f understanding on the ASEAN SWAP 
Arrangement, concluded on 26th September 1978, Washington DC.
57 Art. Ill o f the Fourth Supplementary Agreement to the Memorandum o f understanding on the 
ASEAN SWAP Arrangement, signed on 21st January 1987, Nepal.
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ASEAN emergency rice reserve of 50,000 metric tons58. The reserve was increased 
from time to time with the admission of new members,59 raising the total amount of 
the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve Stock to 87,000 tons of rice as follows:
Table 1












Source: ASEAN Secretariat, Summary of the ASEAN Food Security Reserve 
As of 1999
The purpose of the project is to minimise the impact of any temporary supply 
shortage within the region resulting from various causes such as crop failure. The 
AFSR agreement also provides for a food information and early warning system for 
maize, soya beans and sugar, in addition to rice.
The AFSR Board has also been responsible for the Crops Post-Harvest 
Program (ACPHP), which aims to improve the post-harvest handling of crops and to 
reduce waste. This included the Grain Post-Harvest Program, which deals with the 
post-harvest problem of food and feed crops60. The ASEAN countries have also had
58 Art. 4 o f the Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve concluded on 4th October 1979, New  
York. The reserve was contributed by Indonesia 12,000 metric tons, Malaysia 6,000 metric tons, the 
Philippines 12,000 metric tons, Singapore 5,000 metric tons, and Thailand 15,000 metric tons.
59 Brunei has joined the scheme in 1985 with the contribution of 3,000 metric tons, Vietnam joined the 
ASEAN in 1995 and Laos and Myanmar were admitted as new members o f ASEAN in 1997, and 
Cambodia was admitted as the lastest Member o f ASEAN in 1999, bringing the Emergency Rice 
Reserve to 87,000 metric tons.
60 The ASEAN Crops Post-Harvest Program was set up in response to Art. 1 (ii) o f the Agreement on 
the ASEAN Food Security Reserve.
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co-operation programmes in fishery and livestock, forestry, eradication of foot and 
mouth disease, animal disease free zones, plant quarantine rings, and standardisation 
of import and quarantine regulations on animal and animal products. All these 
programmes help to promote closer co-operation in the field of agriculture among 
ASEAN countries on the principle of collective self-reliance, which will contribute to 
the strengthening of regional economic resilience and stability.
2.1.6 Assessment of the ASEAN Economic Co-operation Programmes 
ASEAN economic co-operation has developed through three major phases. 
The first stage was the first ten years, from 1967 to the first Summit in 1976, during 
which each ASEAN country basically tried to get to know each other and lay the 
foundation for co-operation. Regional peace and political stability was the main thrust 
for ASEAN collaboration at that time. So it inevitably caused a slow and cautious 
pace in economic co-operation among the ASEAN countries.
The second phase was the subsequent period of 15 years, from 1976 to the 
fourth Summit of January 1992. There was more active co-operation, a launching of 
various new economic co-operation schemes, as well as a focus on building 
institutions for effective co-operation. However, at the beginning of this stage, intra- 
ASEAN economic co-operation was still not impressive due to various economic 
factors, which I will discuss below.
The third phase runs from 1992 to 2010, a period of consolidation in the 
creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN liberalised trade and 
investment region, and other forms of regional co-operation characterised by much 
more active and productive economic co-operation in the region (Naya and Imada, 
1992). This has involved the launching of new economic integration programmes 
include the Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), the ASEAN
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Framework Agreement on Trade in Services (AFAS), and the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Intellectual Property Co-operation. These new ASEAN schemes have 
more interactive and complementary implementation that facilitates the ASEAN’s 
move towards deeper regional integration. They also enhance trade and investment 
interactively (market-based investment and factor-based FDI) in the region, to 
generate an integrative regional market and production base, which further induces 
inflows of trade and investment into the region. A detailed analysis of these new 
schemes is provided in chapter 5.
Initially, in the first and second phases, ASEAN did not have the political will 
to move towards economic integration, and even economic co-operation was 
cautiously implemented. Thus, Imada et al. (1991) stated that:
“ASEAN leaders elected to maintain a marginal rate o f integration. In other words,
the slowness was essentially by design” (Imada, Montes & Naya, 1991: 1).
There were also many factors that were obstacles to ASEAN economic co­
operation in the early stage. They can be assessed as follows:
1) The economic structure o f most o f the ASEAN countries was competitive rather than 
complementary. They were predominantly primary producers specialising in the export 
of food, raw materials and minerals, and whose major markets were in advanced 
industrial countries.
2) In the early years, although industrial development had progressed significantly since 
the formation of ASEAN, the ASEAN countries were still inward-looking and 
concentrated on import substitution. Where export-oriented industries had been 
established, many o f them were again directed towards markets in advanced industrial 
countries, either in the form of component manufactures such as electronic components, 
or in finished products such as textiles and garments. The lack o f complementarity in 
economic structure and the need to protect import-replacing industries, were the main 
obstacles to economic co-operation, as they competed against each other, resulting in 
conflicts o f interest between them.
3) ASEAN members were at different stages of economic development. Singapore was 
more advanced in technology, industry and commerce, important in entrepot trade. 
Brunei was an oil rich country with high GNP per capita. Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand were intermediate economies with developing industrialisation, while the 
Philippines was less developed than the other members. The uneven economic 
development of each ASEAN country in the past has caused them to have difficulties in 
co-operation.
4) ASEAN member countries have traditionally looked outside their region for their 
exports, so the growth prospects o f their extra-regional markets were usually better than
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those o f their intra-regional market. Thus it was more difficult to devise measures to 
encourage intra-regional trade.
5) National, rather than regional, interests dominated ASEAN economic affairs. The 
conflict between national interests and long-term regional interests was usually resolved 
in favour of the former, in other words, national interests took precedence over regional 
interests (Tan, G. 1982). As Young pointed out “this is clearly seen in the negotiations 
surrounding the ASEAN Industrial Projects and the ASEAN Industrial 
Complementation schemes” (Young, 1981).
6 )  The lack of regional investment planning resulted in the inefficient implementation of 
ASEAN industrial co-operation in various schemes.
Firstly, industrial co-operation schemes did not take into consideration the 
structure of the industrial sector in the ASEAN countries, especially the under­
development of small and medium industries, which generally operated in all ASEAN 
countries. All the ASEAN industrial schemes were large-scale industries, and they 
needed high capital investment. This reduced the capital available to improve and co­
operate in small and medium industries. They were left out of the scope of co­
operation, so only a few large-scale industries co-operated in ASEAN.
Secondly, the schemes placed too much emphasis on market sharing at a time 
when several ASEAN countries were still reluctant to move towards a free trade area, 
so co-operation among them was hesitant.
Thirdly, while the industrial co-operation schemes were introduced for co­
operation in the pooling of resources, issues such as industrial finance, marketing, and 
technology were not emphasised and promoted enough to support the industrial 
schemes. So there was no subordinate function encouraging the industrial co-operation 
program.
Fourthly, the govemment-to-government projects of this type were generally 
difficult to negotiate between all ASEAN countries as they tended to maximise 
bureaucratic influence, and at the same time state owned projects potentially competed 
with private sector development in the same industry. However the AIC and AIJV 
programs have been more complementary to the private sector and they took
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advantage of regionalisation as they were initiated and implemented by the private 
sector. The AIC program itself was private-sector oriented and geared to attract 
foreign investment, as it could be used as an efficient means of rationalising 
production in the region and taking advantage of the specific endowments of all 
ASEAN countries involved.
7) Weaknesses in institutional and procedural frameworks caused delays and 
ineffectiveness in economic co-operation. The ASEAN projects had to go through 
unnecessary channels before they were approved, and once approved there was no 
systematic arrangement for monitoring or providing supportive assistance for those 
projects. Apart from these problems, the ASEAN economic co-operation agreements 
usually did not provide detailed frameworks to implement the programmes in order to 
attain the aims and purposes stated in the agreements.
8 ) In the past, the economic structures o f ASEAN countries were weak, with most o f them 
following an inward-looking economic policy. Thus there were several trade barriers in 
all ASEAN countries, except Singapore, which has been virtually a free trade port since 
1960s. There were tariff barriers such as high tariff rates, fiscal charges, and restrictive 
licensing as well as other non-tariff barriers. This was because o f the competition 
among themselves for both extra- and intra-ASEAN trade. Regarding investment, they 
also competed w'ith each other in attracting foreign investment into their countries. 
There were six separate markets in ASEAN for almost the first two decades since it has 
been established.
Ali these negative factors explained the modest growth of intra-ASEAN trade 
in the first phase (Naya, 1980; Ooi, 1981). However, success in political co-operation 
among ASEAN countries resulted in the creation of regional peace and political 
stability, which is one of the factors inducing foreign investment. The boom in 
investment has been an important factor in the economic growth of all ASEAN 
countries.
Even though ASEAN formally has neither a conventional collective defence 
nor a collective security function, but political co-operation was firmly established and 
successfully achieved. ASEAN was established with regional security against 
communism very much in mind, however, its founding declaration made no mention 
of an overt security role. Over time, in practice, the Association has assumed a 
distinctive, albeit limited, security role based on the medium of political dialogue.
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ASEAN succeeded in reducing tension and promoting regional co-operation 
through informal processes without the implementation of explicit confidence- 
building measures. It directed attention to well-established practices of consultation 
and consensus, known in Malay as Musyawarah, enhanced by regular high-level visits 
among ASEAN countries. It has been claimed that this pattern of regular visits has 
effectively developed into a preventive diplomacy channel.
The evidence that political co-operation among ASEAN member countries has 
been firmly and successfully achieved is the existence of peace and stability in the 
region since ASEAN has been established, in contrast .to the situation in the pre- 
ASEAN period when all countries in the region had political conflicts with each other.
ASEAN has overcome its nationalist sentiments and set about dismantling the 
different barriers to cross-border trade and investments. Most ASEAN countries have 
implemented trade liberalisation and have significantly reduced tariff rates. They all 
changed from their inward-looking policy to an outward-looking policy and now 
employ a market-oriented strategy, an open economy and freer trade, as well as the 
promotion of industrialisation. The export-oriented policy has been accelerated and 
has replaced import-substitution and protectionism. This has created a new 
atmosphere for enhancing both internal and external economic co-operation. Recently, 
ASEAN countries have diversified their market into differing manufacturing sub­
sectors, at a different pace and with a different degree of diversification that has made 
changes in the industrial structures of the ASEAN economies. Interestingly, ASEAN 
as a group is considerably more diversified than each individual ASEAN country. This 
implies some degree of complementarity among the ASEAN countries' manufacturing 
structures. The apparent divergence in ASEAN countries' comparative advantages
8 0
helps confirm the expectations of increasing intra-ASEAN trade opportunities 
(Pupphavesa, 1991).
2.1.7 Creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
Even though limited intra-ASEAN economic co-operation has been achieved 
in the early stages, it has been successful in political co-operation, promoting peace 
and stability in the region as well as cultural development and better inter-relationship 
among the ASEAN members, and has laid a solid foundation and created a favourable 
environment for the present liberalisation.
In addition to the failure of the industrial co-operation approach, rapid global 
economic changes and the present interdependent world economy as well as 
international political diversion after the Cold War were a catalyst for ASEAN to put 
more effort into advancing its economic co-operation in order to maintain its success 
in economic performance, to further strengthen itself to cope with changing economic 
environments, and tc* shield them from any deterioration or damage caused by external 
pressure, especially the rising protectionism from other regional trading blocs.
2.1.7.1 Rationale for the Creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
The endorsement of the AFTA vision is a very positive development. Large 
benefits can accrue to member nations from the pooling of resources and the sharing 
of markets, with dynamic effects reinforcing such benefits.
Both internal and external factors61 have led to the creation of AFTA. First, the 
economic evolution within ASEAN countries makes internal economic conditions 
more appropriate now for the implementation of a free trade area than they were 
previously. Recent unilateral liberalisation among ASEAN members has harmonised
61 Section 2 o f the Singapore Declaration o f 1992 clearly stated that “the profound international 
political and economic changes that have occurred since the end o f the Cold War” were the main
tariff structures to a considerable degree. Consequently, the disparities of tariff 
structures have been reduced, facilitating further regional integration efforts.
Rapid industrialisation in all ASEAN countries, which took place in the last 
two decades, has caused the percentage of manufactured exports to increase sharply. 
This has given rise to a large increase in intra-industry trade in manufactured products 
in the region, making trade now more complementary than the previous 
competitiveness among ASEAN countries. Previously ASEAN countries still traded in 
similar primary products such as agricultural products and basic manufacturing 
products. They exported to the same markets so that they competed with each other, 
and intra-ASEAN trade was modest due to the same product lines. Now ASEAN 
countries have developed their industries and up graded technology to produce more 
sophisticated products enhanced by the more advanced technology distributed by 
TNCs located in the region. Therefore with the TNCs network established in the 
region, intra-firm and intra-industry trade have been actively transacted making now 
ASEAN trade now more complementary.
Intra-regional trade creation is essential to enhance the development of a trade 
pattern based on intra-industry specialisation, such as occurred within the EU. Studies 
have shown that trade creation would outweigh trade diversion for AFTA (Imada, 
Montes, & Naya, 1991). Regarding investment, ASEAN's attractiveness to investors 
both from inside and outside ASEAN should be enhanced and it was considered that 
one way to do so is to create a large single regional market through AFTA.
Second, increasing external pressures push ASEAN countries together 
economically. The creation of the European Union and the European Economic Area
reasons for the ASEAN “to move towards a higher plane o f political and economic co-operation to 
secure regional peace and prosperity”.
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(EEA) made ASEAN fear a ‘Fortress Europe’62. NAFTA, with the inclusion of 
Mexico in the U.S-Canada Free Trade Area and possibly other developing countries, 
especially Chile, in the future, may divert trade and investment away from ASEAN 
resulting from the proximity of those members of NAFTA.
The emergence of several Asia-Pacific organisations has also pushed ASEAN 
to seek more cohesion to enhance its effectiveness in Asia-Pacific Economic Co­
operation (APEC) and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), etc. AFTA will be a 
major step in establishing this internal cohesion so that ASEAN's role as a single 
bargaining bloc will be enhanced. ASEAN explicitly acknowledged this reason for 
promoting greater regional economic co-operation in the Singapore Declaration of 
199263. ASEAN recognised the importance of APEC and EAEC as it was stated that:
“With regard to APEC, ASEAN attaches importance to APEC's fundamental 
objective o f sustaining the growth and dynamism o f the Asia-Pacific region. With 
respect to an EAEC, ASEAN recognises that consultations on issues o f common 
concern among East Asian economies, as and when it arises, could contribute to 
expanding co-operation among the region's economies, and the promotion o f an 
open and free global trading system”64.
The economic policy change in China to move towards an open economy and 
outward-looking policy, as well as enhancing export and promoting industrialisation, 
has been an important factor that ASEAN had to seriously take into consideration. The 
huge consumer market in China has possibly diverted trade from ASEAN, as China 
will be a major potential export market of the advanced industrial countries, at the
62 The ASEAN countries have declared in the Preamble o f the Singapore Declaration that “ASEAN 
shall constantly seek to safeguard its collective interests in response to the formation o f  large and 
powerful economic grouping among the developed countries, in particular through the promotion o f  an 
open international economic regime and by stimulating economic co-operation in the region”.
63 It was stated that “ASEAN has made major strides in building co-operative ties with states o f the 
Asia-Pacific region and shall continue to accord them a high priority”.
64 Section 5. Directions in ASEAN Economic Co-operation Singapore Declaration o f 1992.
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same time China has dramatically increased its exports to ASEAN's traditional 
markets such as the EU65.
Apart from an economic point of view, political change in the Socialist 
countries, especially the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the new dimension 
of Eastern Europe, were also the main issues challenging the collaboration among 
ASEAN countries, as the EU has paid more attention to and co-operated more closely 
with Eastern Europe than earlier. This has caused ASEAN countries to take 
cognisance of the global political and economic situation in which ASEAN member 
states have to cope. Thus the ASEAN Free Trade Area involves not only an ordinary 
regional economic co-operation among ASEAN countries, but also a crucial step for 
ASEAN in facing the rapid growing economic and political challenges of the 21st 
century that ASEAN has to put most effort and endeavour to cope with such a 
challenge. The legal aspects and the implementation of AFTA will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 5 below.
In addition to the creation of AFTA, ASEAN further launched new 
liberalisation schemes to cover investment, trade in services, and intellectual property 
rights (these new ASEAN schemes are analysed in chapter 5). The implementation of 
these schemes indicates a new direction of ASEAN economic integration that clearly 
reflects how ASEAN is taking a bold step toward intra-regional liberalisation while 
make progress in generalised liberalisation. Trade and investment are the main engines 
to accelerate ASEAN economic growth propelled by its strong external economic 
relations. Therefore, considering ASEAN's external economic ties, ASEAN strongly 
requires to maintain its openness. This is fundamental to ASEAN regional economic
55 In 1993 Chinese exports to the EU were worth 19,538 million ECU and imports from the EU were 
worth 1 1,302 million ECU, EUROSTAT, 1994.
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policy so that any scepticism about ASEAN's stumbling bloc is unlikely. Now I will 
discuss ASEAN’s main external economic relations in the global context, especially 
with the European Union, because the two have had long historical relationships both 
at the national and regional level that still exist to date.
2.2 ASEAN in the Global Context
2.2.1 The Evolution o f the Relationship between ASEAN and the 
European Union
The member countries of ASEAN and of the European Union have had long 
historical relationships since the colonial period. Southeast Asia's strategic position 
between two continents (Europe and Asia) and athwart the approaches to the Indian 
and Pacific oceans is of major importance. It lies across the main sea (and presently 
air) routes between both Oceans. In this respect the strategic significance of centres of 
communication such as Singapore, Bangkok, Manila and Saigon scarcely needs 
emphasis. It also has strategic importance to Australia and New Zealand. As Southeast 
Asia's position is on an important trade route, Singapore has been a world's great 
entrepot port and free trade port for a long time.
Apart from its importance as a strategic position, Southeast Asia is rich in 
natural resources, and has an impressive potential as a source of food for Asia itself 
and for the colonial masters at that time. The Federation of Malaya (Malaysia 
including Singapore and Sarawak) and Brunei were colonies of the United Kingdom, 
which still has a considerable direct territorial interest in the area covered by the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Chatham House Study Group, 1958) on the 
mainland and immediately adjacent to it are Malaysia, Singapore, Borneo, Brunei, 
Sarawak and Labuan, even though those territories are now independent.
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British possession of these territories was originally brought about by the 
necessity to secure and to keep open the eastern end of the great trade route across the 
world from Britain to India and thence to China and Japan. The basic links in this 
chain at this point were not the hinterland territories, especially Malaya, which were 
subsequently developed along the route, but the great entrepot port and naval bases of 
Singapore and Hong Kong.
Undoubtedly, British trade relations with its former colonies have been laid 
down since the colonial period, and not only trade and investment but also the 
foundation of the legal, political, social, cultural as well as the educational systems 
have been based on the British system. In particular, many British companies have 
been established and have invested considerably throughout the region and many of 
them have maintained their business in this area up to now.
The Netherlands had colonised and dominated Indonesia for more than three 
centuries and certainly it laid down fundamental social, cultural, political and 
commercial fundamental structures in this country as well. The Netherlands and 
Indonesia still have trade and commercial links as well as other forms of co-operation 
between them. While the Philippines had belonged to Spain for 350 years and then to 
the United States before being conquered by Japan, Spanish influence inevitably 
remained in the Philippines. Even though Thailand is the only independent country in 
this region it had been surrounded by European colonies. Thailand’s location was on 
the British trade route channelling from India, and Burma through Thailand to the 
Federation of Malaya, and downward to Indonesia and the Philippines. So all 
Southeast Asian countries have had close trade and other relationships with these 
European countries.
During the colonial period, foreign investment was channelled to plantation 
agriculture, to mining in Malaya and Indonesia and to the service sector in Singapore. 
For the industrialisation programme in the post-independence period, the region has 
again relied on foreign direct investment, but this time through multi-national 
corporations who have used the region as an offshore platform for their global 
production networks. Again the United Kingdom is the most important source of 
investment from Europe in this region. This is because the British base companies, 
both in commercial and industrial sectors, have been scattered throughout the region 
for a long time.
This bilateral level of close relationships between the ASEAN member 
countries and some of the member countries of the European Union naturally induced 
inter-regional relations between the EU and ASEAN, especially after ASEAN was 
founded and the two regional groupings had formally signed a Co-operation 
Agreement in 1980. When ASEAN was established in 1967, the EU recognised and 
acknowledged the existence of ASEAN, and they have had an informal relationships 
although no concrete contacts developed until 1972, when the Special Co-ordinating 
Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) was established to initiate regular contact 
and to formulate negotiating postures as well as to undertake negotiations with the EU. 
This was due to Britain's accession to the EC, resulting in the loss of the 
Commonwealth trade preference for Malaysia and Singapore. At that time the United 
Kingdom was concerned about this issue and sought a solution by concluding bilateral 
commercial co-operation agreements with the countries affected by the enlargement of 
the EC. ASEAN was sounded out about this solution but preferred to develop its 
relations with the EC at a regional level as ASEAN developed institutionally. ASEAN
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did not wish to conclude commercial co-operation agreements similar to those being 
signed by individual countries in the Indian subcontinent66.
In 1974, an EC delegation visited the ASEAN region leading to the emergence 
of the Joint Study Group (JSG) of officials from both sides in 1975. It was charged 
with the task of examining the substance and mechanism of co-operation between the 
two regional organisations. This group has met regularly commencing in June 1975. 
dealing with trade co-operation. However, progress was limited, so ASEAN, which 
was aware of the need for contacts at a political level with the EC, pressed for a 
meeting with the ambassadors of the ASEAN countries in Brussels. Thus the ASEAN 
Brussels Committee was created and the Committee of Permanent Representatives of 
the EC countries was also founded. These meetings led to the first EC/ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting, in Brussels on 21st November 1978, which agreed to establish 
“a dialogue”67 at the Ambassadorial level between Permanent Representatives of the 
Member States to the European Communities, the Commission of the European 
Communities, and the ASEAN Ambassadors to the Communities. It also provided a 
crucial framework for co-operation in various fields, especially in trade, commodities, 
investment, transfer of technology, training programmes and scientific co-operation 
and development co-operation. The Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-EC Ministerial
66 India and Pakistan established diplomatic relations with the EC some 30 years ago, when the U.K. 
first applied to join the EC, in order to safeguard their exports to the British market. In 1973 India 
concluded a non-preferential trade co-operation agreement with the enlarged Community, which entered 
into similar agreements with China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. But at that time ASEAN 
preferred to concluded intra-regional agreement instead o f the similar bilateral co-operation agreements 
as such and this was the good first step for furthering their co-operation at the regional level.
67 At the present, ASEAN maintains Dialogue-relations with the European Union (since 1972), 
Australia (1974), New Zealand (1975), Japan (1977), Canada (1977), United States (1977) and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (since 1977). The UNDP is a major multilateral agency 
for funding technical assistance to ASEAN. The ASEAN dialogue partner-relations arrangements with 
external powers have become a useful mechanism for co-ordinating ASEAN’s common position on 
various issues that are primarily economic in nature as well as other dealings by ASEAN with these 
countries. ASEAN has benefited tremendously from their special relations with the dialogue countries 
who are ASEAN major trading partners in the world.
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Meeting also encompassed international relations and regional integration and co­
operation as well as cultural co-operation. The Framework of co-operation was 
designed such that:
“The Communities recognised that ASEAN is a developing region and agreed that 
co-operation between ASEAN and the Communities should be expanded in such 
manner as to contribute to ASEAN's efforts in enhancing its self-reliance and 
economic resilience”.
This led to the conclusion of the ASEAN-EC Co-operation Agreement of 1980 
68. However, there was no privilege clause applied in trade relations between ASEAN 
and the EU other than Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, which is in accordance with 
the provisions of GATT. On the commercial side ASEAN and EC agreed to develop, 
expand and diversify their two-way trade to the fullest extent possible and the ASEAN 
Trade Promotion Centre was established in the Communities. In order to facilitate 
economic co-operation between the two groups, the EEC-ASEAN Business Council 
was also created. This Council provides a framework for establishing and fostering 
contacts and deepening mutual knowledge between the private economic operators. 
This helps promote and encourage the participation of the private sector of both sides 
in economic co-operation. Art. 5 of the ASEAN-EC Co-operation Agreement set up a 
Joint Co-operation Committee, which regularly meets once a year to facilitate the 
implementation and to further the general aims of the agreement.
Since the signing of the ASEAN-EEC Co-operation Agreement in 1980, 
commercial, economic and development co-operation between ASEAN and the EU 
has made significant progress. Both groups are outward-looking, GATT-consistent 
and supportive of the process of trade liberalisation (the EC moved to a single market 
and ASEAN to a Free Trade Area). However, ASEAN has had to put great efforts into
68 The Agreement was signed at the second EC/ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 
7th March 1980.
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lobbying and urging the EU to accord more priority to ASEAN along the evolution of 
this intra-regional relation before reaching the current situation in which the EU has 
recently begun to change its strategy in dealing with ASEAN.
The issue of investment protection arrangements has been discussed between 
the EU and ASEAN since the early stage of their co-operation. Almost the member 
states of the European Union have now concluded with ASEAN countries specific 
agreements on the mutual promotion and protection of investments (see lists of BITs 
concluded between the EU and ASEAN countries in chapter 4). Such agreements 
contain provisions aimed at protecting and thereby stimulating investment. Among 
other things they provide for non-discriminatory legal or administrative treatment, for 
protection against arbitrary expropriation, and above all for adequate, prompt and 
freely transferable compensation in the event of nationalisation and for the settlement 
of disputes by a neutral arbitration body. Some parties have concluded such 
investment protection agreements since the early sixties but some of them have signed 
the agreements recently69. Another key provision of the agreements is the requirement 
that each contracting party should accord investments, nationals and companies of the 
other party both national and MFN treatment. However, these contain a specific 
derogation from these two principles to exclude from non-discriminatory treatment the 
privileges accorded by a party to nationals of third states as a result of its participation 
in a regional economic group, i.e. a common or single market. Regarding the 
commodity issue, ASEAN urged the EU in the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting 
several times70 to guarantee within the global context the stabilisation of the export
69 Commission o f European Communities “Protecting and Guaranteeing Private Investments: EEC and 
ASEAN” Brussels: the European Union.
70 The issue was raised in the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 1978, in Bangkok in 1983, 
and ASEAN also urged the EU to consider the commodities issues in all meeting between them, 
especially in 1981, 1983, 1984 and 1986.
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earning of ASEAN countries as well as other developing countries. Because the 
developing countries were affected by balance of payments problems, falling 
commodity prices, the burden of debt and protectionist pressures in the 1980s, so 
ASEAN reiterated to the EU the need to maintain an open trading system and to 
improve market access further. However, the EU noted ASEAN’s interest but did not 
respond to ASEAN’s needs, especially in stabilising export earnings of agricultural 
products that had previously been the most important export product of ASEAN 
countries. The instability of prices of primary products in world markets deteriorated 
ASEAN member states' economies, which made ASEAN countries review their 
economic policy and promote industrialisation since the 1980s.
ASEAN also asked the EU to join the International Natural Rubber 
Agreement, which was finally agreed by the EU. The Ministers of both sides reiterated 
their commitment to closer co-operation necessary for achieving the objective of the 
integrated Program for Commodities (IPC)71, in particular, the establishment of 
individual commodity agreements. The need to put the Agreement on the Common 
Fund into operation72 has been reiterated but this has been postponed since 1980. 
ASEAN Ministers also urged the EU to sign and ratify the 6th International Tin 
Agreement, and to participate in the International Sugar Agreement. At that time the 
EC was reluctant to immediately tie itself to those agreements.
In the fourth ASEAN-EC Meeting the Ministers agreed on the urgency of 
stabilising the international sugar market by adopting appropriate policies within the
71 The integrated Program for Commodities (IPC) and the establishment o f the Common Fund have 
been firstly emphasised in the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 1978 and the issues were 
reiterated after that several times.
72 The Common Fund is one element o f the UNCTAD Integrated Program proposed as the principal 
solution to commodity problem. The Common Fund was established to facilitate the financing o f buffer 
stock operations which is to be instituted on the presumption that purchases and sales o f centrally 
managed stockpiles o f commodities would help mitigate the amplitude o f price fluctuations with the
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framework of a new International Sugar Agreement. And in the fifth ASEAN-EC 
Meeting, the Ministers stressed the importance of the establishment of the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation, and also urged the major producing and 
consuming countries to become parties to the re-negotiated International Cocoa 
Agreement.
In 1988 ASEAN emphasised the importance of vegetable oils and fats products 
for the development of their economies, and stressed the need for further expansion of 
their exports to the world market, especially the EU. Both sides agreed to continue to 
enhance co-operation in various International Commodity Agreements and 
Arrangements to address commodity related problems, in particular price instability, 
and in this context they underscored the importance of continued co-operation towards 
more effective operation of the Common Fund. Nevertheless, at that time, the EU 
(EC) had not yet taken serious steps in seeking solutions concerning the commodity 
issue as the ASEAN side had urged them.
Regarding co-operation between ASEAN and the EU on investment, the EU 
reiterated its support for ASEAN Industrial Co-operation and agreed to encourage 
further and to assist financial institutions in the EU members such as the Grouping of 
the Community's Public Development Finance Institutions (INTERACT)73 and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) in securing funds for ASEAN Industrial Projects. 
The European Council of Ministers agreed to extend this on a case-by-case basis, and 
initially allocated a total of 250 million ECU a year over a three-year period by 
establishing various specialised JCC sub-committees to propose suitable programmes
declared objective o f stabilising certain key commodity prices at levels “remunerative to producers and 
fair to consumers”.
73 The Community agreed to act as a catalyst in the financing o f large scale ASEAN Industrial Projects 
through the Community's Public Development Finance Corporation known as INTERACT. This was
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in the priority sectors. ASEAN and the EU also created a Joint Investment Committee 
in each ASEAN country74 to facilitate and explore avenues for closer investment co­
operation between the EU and ASEAN investors. They encouraged the ASEAN-EU 
(EC) Business Council, which was established in 1981 as a result of the agreement 
reached at the Meeting between the ASEAN Ministers and the Commission of the 
European Community. The ASEAN-EU Business Council aims to enhance the 
participation of the private sector in strengthening their contacts for promoting 
mutually beneficial investment in the ASEAN region75.
At the ninth EC-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Luxembourg, on 30th-31st 
May 1991, both sides reaffirmed that industrial development and investment should be 
accorded high priority in EC-ASEAN relations, as they would be the thrust of 
economic co-operation between the two groupings for the future. This was a turning 
point from the previous relationship between ASEAN and the EU, which generally 
involved lip service rather than actual implementation in the early years of their co­
operation (Harris and Bridges, 1983).
The ministers thus agreed to prolong and improving the EC International 
Investment Partners (EC-IIP) Scheme, which was established in 1989 in order to 
realise more ASEAN-EU joint venture projects, and it completed a three-year 
experimental phase in 1991. As this scheme had met wide acceptance in the ASEAN 
region, it was extended to finance over 100 potential joint ventures between
adopted in the First ASEAN-EC Joint Co-operation Committee Meeting on 28th-29th November 1980 in 
Manila, the Philippines.
74 The Ministers reiterated in the sixth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting that it is very important to set 
the Joint High Level Working Party on Investment to facilitate the EC investment in ASEAN as the 
European investment has been increased in this region and the Joint Investment Committee should be 
created in order to constitute a valuable means o f pursuing the objectives as stated by the Joint High 
Level Working Party on Investment.
75 In the Sixth Meeting o f the ASEAN-EC Joint Co-operation Committee held in Brussels on 20th-21SI 
March 1986, the ASEAN and EC recognised the importance o f the EC/ASEAN Business Council in
93
companies in the EU and ASEAN and it increased the resources for each EC-IIP 
project to 1 million ECU. The EU committed itself to assisting in the organisation of 
investment missions to ASEAN to facilitate this program. Besides, the ministers 
recommended the establishment of a European Information Centre in each ASEAN 
country that would further strengthen industrial and investment co-operation between 
ASEAN and the EU.
Another new step in promoting private sector participation in the ASEAN-EU 
industrial co-operation programme, which was adopted by the ministers, was the 
following:
•  for both sides to consult with their own private sectors directly;
•  for private sectors o f both regions to find effective ways for joint consultations;
•  to involve the private sectors o f both sides in EC-ASEAN programs76.
These have been effective avenues for encouraging the private sector of both sides to 
co-operate directly in the field of industrial co-operation, which was previously very 
limited in practice.
The shift in ASEAN exports towards industrial products with higher added 
value was so remarkable, and ministers shared the view that joint efforts by the EU 
and ASEAN to maintain this position development should made through improved 
market access, trade and investment promotion and effective technology transfer. The 
EU and ASEAN agreed that the EU GSP scheme was an important tool by which 
ASEAN's exports to the EU could be diversified and increased. So the ASEAN 
ministers urged the EU to revise the GSP Scheme in order to make it simpler and 
more transparent. They also asked the EU to take into account ASEAN interests inter
bringing together representatives o f the business community o f the two regions in supporting the 
activities under the Co-operation Agreement.
76 Section 43, Economic and development co-operation agreed in the Joint Declaration, the Ninth EC- 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 30th-31st May 1991.
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alia  the inclusion of the donor country content. This time the EU took improving the 
GSP scheme more seriously than before77, which can be seen from the revised GSP 
Scheme proposed by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament for 
GSP 1995-200478. However, the EU has applied cumulative rules of origin to the 
ASEAN region since 1985 resulting from the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting on 
Economic matters in Bangkok, Thailand between 17th-l 8th October 1985.
At the tenth Ministerial Meeting in 1992, following the treaty agreed at 
Maastricht to establish a European Union, the major steps towards completion of the 
Single Market and prospects for enlargement of the Community, the EU and ASEAN 
clearly expressed the policy of two-way trade and the improvement of access to the 
EU's market to maintain ASEAN’s high rates of growth. They agreed to jointly 
improve access and enhance rapid information networks linking business operators in 
the two regions through the establishment of business information centres and 
networks of European Chambers of Commerce in ASEAN. The EU adopted motions 
to provide more systematic information on the Single European Market with a view to 
assist ASEAN in adjusting to changes and market opportunities arising therefrom. 
These new steps, moving towards closer economic relations between the two, initiated 
by the EU as it admitted that “the EC had not kept pace with the post-1988 investment 
boom in ASEAN”79. So the EU emphasised the need to accord high priority to 
ASEAN-EU relations and stated that it was becoming more urgent to especially 
promote direct investment in the ASEAN region.
The EU underlined the importance of the decision of the fourth ASEAN 
Summit of 1992 to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area as a strengthening of an
77 In the past, the EU just applied the basic principles underlying the GSP to ASEAN and ASEAN  
countries were ranked very low hierarchy under the EU's GSP Scheme.
open multilateral trading system which would further expand trade and investment 
flows between the two regions. The European Community offered to share its 
experiences from the European economic integration process and to provide technical 
assistance to strengthen the institutional capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat. The EU 
and ASEAN agreed to enhance consultation in trade matters through better use of the 
ASEAN-EU Trade Experts Meeting (TEM) which would meet at the request of either 
side. They also established a Partner Research Network to facilitate research based 
business co-operation and joint ventures. This helped to promote technology transfer, 
and in the initial stage, both sides commended the establishment of a 7.5 million ECU 
ASEAN-EU Patents and Trademarks Program to realise the implementation of 
protection of intellectual property rights.
Apart from economic co-operation between ASEAN and the EU, there have 
been various fields of co-operation between them, especially in political issues. Both 
sides devoted a large part of the time to discussions about political problems in 
Indochina: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. They strongly condemned the military 
invasion by Vietnam of Cambodian territory. Moreover, ASEAN and the EU were 
seriously concerned with the ‘Boat People’ problem. The flood of Vietnamese 
refugees into the ASEAN countries challenged the morality and political policies of 
these countries and it has been a great burden for them. Europe tried to assist in 
providing food, money and facilities to the refugee camps along the border of 
Thailand, as well as to accept some of those refugees seeking asylum in third 
countries.
78 COM (94)212 final.
79 Joint Declaration Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Manila, the Philippines, 1992.
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The Fourth Ministerial Meeting in 1983 was the first time that ASEAN and 
the EU jointly urged speedy progress towards a Middle East peace settlement. They 
also discussed the problem of Afghanistan. They took the view that the crisis could be 
overcome constructively through the emergence of a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan, 
outside competition among the power. In their political concerns, ASEAN and the EU 
generally have the same standpoint and the EU has always supported ASEAN, 
especially in the United Nations.
Complementary with government-level contacts, various other forms of 
contact have been developed. Under EU auspices, private sector and academic 
conferences have been organised and contacts between Euro-MPs and ASEAN MPs 
have gradually been established on a regular basis. There have been meetings between 
delegations from the European Parliament and the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Organisation that have brought closer relationships between the two groups' 
politicians.
In 1979 the European Community established a representative office in 
Bangkok to facilitate co-operation between ASEAN and the EU80. Presently, there are 
EU Delegation Offices in all ASEAN member countries to help promote closer of 
networks relations between the two groups.
Regarding agricultural co-operation, the EU helped to finance a feasibility 
study for ASEAN Post-Harvest Grain Research, and training Program aid on ASEAN 
Timber Industry Research. The Development and Training Centre was established for 
this purpose. This program has been implemented fruitfully in ASEAN countries.
ASEAN and the EU also have had closer co-operation on drug control and 
prevention efforts in the implementation of a programmes under the Comprehensive
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Multidisciplinary Outline (CMO) for future Activities in Combating Drug Abuse and 
the UN Global Program of Action Against Drug Abuse. They agreed that the 
European Plan against Drugs, approved in December 1990, constitutes an important 
contribution to the implementation of that internationally concerted strategy. The 
measures taken in 1990 by the EU to control and regulate the trade in chemicals, in 
accordance with the 1988 UN Convention, as well as its intention to take comparable 
measures against money laundering, has been welcomed by both sides. The guidelines 
in the field of money laundering, which have been defined by the International 
Financial Action Task Force, have also been observed. Finally, the ASEAN-EU 
Projects in the areas of drug prevention, detection, treatment and rehabilitation have 
been seriously implemented.
The main change in ASEAN-EU co-operation since the 1990s is a crucial step 
taken towards a new dimension of closer economic co-operation in an era of a rapidly 
changing world economy.
Chronology of the ASEAN-EU (EEC) Relationship
1972 Establishment o f Special Co-ordinating Committee o f ASEAN Nations (SCANN).
1975 Establishment o f Joint Study Group (JSG).
1978 First ASEAN-EEC Ministerial Meeting.
1980 Second ASEAN-EEC Ministerial Meeting: ASEAN-EEC Co-operation Agreement.
1985 Establishment of ASEAN-EEC Ministerial Meeting on Economic Matters: 5-year 
extension o f the Co-operation Agreement.
1986 Report o f High Level Working Party (HLWP) to 6th ASEAN-EEC Ministerial 
Meeting.
1987 Third ASEAN Summit in Manila.
1989 2-year Extension o f ASEAN-EEC Co-operation Agreement.
1992 Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore: AFTA Agreement.
1996 Asia-Europe Summit Meeting.
2.2.2 A New Era of the ASEAN/EU Relations
2.2.2.1 The EU and ASEAN: Dynamic Groups in the World Economy
80 Joint Declaration o f the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 2 1st November 1978.
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Since the 1960s economic growth in East and Southeast Asia has been steadily 
rising, and especially in the 1990s their economic growth rates have dramatically 
increased up to the 1997 Asian crisis. ASEAN countries had been among those 
achieving the fastest economic growth of the world. Thus Asian regional 
developments inevitably affected EU-ASEAN relations. The EU, as one of the most 
important trading partners of ASEAN, was very concerned about the dynamic 
economic change in this region, and set new strategies in dealing with ASEAN and 
other Asian countries. They had shown the need for a greater European Union 
presence in the region and closer economic ties. The EU therefore introduced a 
number of policy changes in its relationship with ASEAN81. This is hoped to have a 
positive impact on trade and investment between the EU and ASEAN in the future.
The Commission of the European Union submitted a communication to the 
Council, which stated that:
“The rise o f Asia is dramatically changing the world balance o f economic power.
By the year 2000, the World Bank estimates that half the growth in the economy 
will come from East and Southeast Asia alone. This growth will ensure that by the 
year 2000 one billion Asians will have significant consumer spending power and o f  
these, 400 million will have average disposable incomes as high, if not higher, than 
their European or US contemporaries. The European Union needs therefore to 
accord Asia a higher priority than is at present the case. The European Union 
needs as a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in 
order to maintain its leading role in the world economy. The establishment o f  a 
strong, co-ordinated presence in Asia will allow Europe at the beginning o f the 
XXIst century to ensure that its interests are taken fully into account there” 82.
This meant that the EU would take a new position in this region and employ new 
strategies in dealing with Asian countries, especially with ASEAN, which not only has 
become the EU's main trading partner83 but also is a vital key to Europe's weight in
81 Commission o f the European Union, Europe Information No. 127/ X / 91, 1994. Brussels.
82 Communication from the Commission to the Council, “Towards a new ASIA Strategy”. Commission 
o f  the European Union, Directorate-General for Information, Brussels, 1994.
83 EUROSTAT, External Trade Statistic yearbook, 1994: ASEAN: only 6 countries exported 28,785 
million ECU to EU while importing 26,230 million ECU from the EU. They were ranked among the top 
50 main trading partners o f the EU.
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whole Pacific Rim region, as well as to the success of EU industry in penetrating the 
Japanese marketplace and to balance the US economic role in Asia.
2 .2 .2 2  ASEAN and the EU's Economic Prospects
As mentioned in chapter 1, economic growth in East and Southeast Asia had 
been impressive, higher than any other regions of the world84 (see Tables 2 and 3, p. 
120), before the Asian crisis. Despite the 1997 Asian crisis, the region still has great 
economic potential, especially once it recovers from stagnation.
On the other hand the European Union has become the biggest trading bloc in 
the world. In 1990 EU merchandise trade accounted for 20.7% of world trade85, 
compared to 16.8% for the United States and 9.7% for Japan. In the same year, the EU 
accounted for 27.1% of world trade in commercial services, ahead of the United States 
of America (16.1%) and Japan (10.2%)86. Trade and investment made and received by 
this Union are very significant in the world economy. Thus, if the European Union and 
ASEAN, two regional groupings which have very high economic potential and 
prospects, have close economic co-operation and strengthen their ties in trade and 
investment, both regions will reinforce their economic growth based on mutual 
interest.
2 .2 .23  Why is the European Union interested in ASEAN?
The ASEAN region now has a total population of about 500 million, a total 
area of 4.5 million kilometres, a combined gross national product of US$ 685 billion 
and a total trade of US$ 720 billion, which represents both a large consumer market
84 The World Bank Annual Report (1994b), p.88, and also see World Bank. (1993a). The East Asian 
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
85 This percentage excludes intra-EU trade. If one includes intra-EU trade in the value o f both Union 
and total world trade, the share o f the EU rises to 39.3%.
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and a ready supply of relatively low labour cost87. It also brings together an abundant 
source of natural resources88.
Besides its richness in natural resources and agricultural products, ASEAN is 
making fast progress in producing manufactured goods. It has become a main exporter 
of manufactured goods among the leading developing countries. In the past decade 
ASEAN has much improved its industrial sector and has developed its infrastructure 
as well as other factors for implementing the promotion of industrialisation. Rapid 
economic development in ASEAN has been accompanied by a transformation of 
economic structures. Manufactured goods now represent more than 70% of all exports 
by the ASEAN countries. As a percentage of total merchandise exports, manufactured 
goods jumped from 2.5% in 1980 to 35% in 1990 in Indonesia; from 18.5% to 53.5% 
in Malaysia; from 25% to 63% in Thailand89. Some ASEAN countries are ranked 
among the top 25 exporters at the global level, while ASEAN as a group was ranked 
fourth of the world's top traders. They also are ranked among the world's twenty-fifth 
top traders in commercial services90.
86 The Directorate-General for Economic and Finance Affairs and The Directorate-General for External 
Relations (1993) The European Community as a W orld Trade Partner. The Second Report. Brussels: 
The European Commission.
87 See ASEANWEB http://www.aseansec.org/histoiy/asn_his2.htm.
88 World o f Information, Asia and Pacific Review, 1986. ASEAN is rich in natural resources and 
agricultural products. For example Brunei's main minerals are oil and natural gas. Indonesia is a major 
producer o f  tin and nickel ores. It also has reserves o f coal estimated at 21 billion tons and that o f oil at 
9.6 billion barrels. It has two very large fields of natural gas and potentially large offshore supplies have 
also been discovered. Malaysia has an estimated 2500-4000 million barrel oil reserve and 79 trillion 
cubic feet o f natural gas reserves. It is the world's largest producer of tin. The Philippines is one o f the 
largest producer of copper, with estimated reserves o f 1,030 million tons. Thailand is the world's second 
largest producer of tin and precious stones, especially sapphires. The region is also rich in agriculture 
cash crops and forestry products. Indonesia is the second largest producer o f natural rubber and its other 
major products are timber, particularly tropical hardwood, coconut and palm oil, tea and coffee. 
Malaysia is the largest producer of natural rubber, accounting for nearly 40% of the total world output. 
In the Philippines the main cash crops include coconut, sugarcane, hemp, bananas, coffee, tobacco, and 
peanuts. Thailand is one of the largest rice exporters. Sugar, tapioca, rubber, kenaf, cotton, jute, 
tobacco, pineapples, oilseeds and coffee are also important commercial crops.
89 Source: GATT, International Trade 1990-91, also see Asia's Economies: Outlooks to the Year 2000, 
NRI Quarterly, Autumn 1993.
90 Asia's Economies: Outlooks to the Year 2000, NRI Quarterly, Autumn 1993.
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It can be justified from a political economy point of view that the economic 
strength and future prospects of ASEAN one among the most attractive points to the 
EU among other reasons, which we will discuss further below. Firstly, we will look 
into the macroeconomics of ASEAN and its economic environment that induces trade 
and investment into this region. Also the formation of ASEAN has contributed to the 
political and economic stability of its member countries, thereby improving their 
in v estm en t c lim ates, prom oting  trade and enhancing  econom ic grow th.
Direct foreign investment has been a key ingredient in the success of ASEAN 
economies in at least three aspects: as a source of foreign exchange, as a conduit for 
the transfer of technology, and as an avenue for markets for its exports. Total foreign 
investment that flowed into the ASEAN countries, except for Brunei, totalled US$ 
14,840 million in 199491. This included FDI from the EU, as the most important 
destination of Foreign Direct Investment from European Union (EU.6) were the 
countries in South East Asia. It accounted for 32% of the total EU’s FDI for the period 
of 1984-85 and 38% in the period of 1988-8992. The member countries of ASEAN, 
individually and collectively, offer a growing array of economic opportunities and 
extend a wide range of incentives to further attract foreign investment. Developments 
in the international capital markets have also had a substantial impact on the economic 
performance of ASEAN, as their economies are to a considerable degree based on a 
market-type system.
ASEAN has economic ties with most countries in the world but its major 
trading partners are Japan, the U.S and the EU, and the region’s volume of trade has 
generally increased (see Table 4, p. 121). The inflow of FDI into ASEAN as a whole
91 Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN has steadily increased in the past several years as recorded, it 
increased from US$ 6,972 million in 1989 to US$ 14,840 million in 1994, and in 1995 FDI reached
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in the 1990s also increased (see Table 5, p. 121). As shown in Table 6, Asia has 
performed well in trade compared to the other regions of the world. Undoubtedly 
ASEAN has played an important part in this region's trade performance.
Table 6
Selected Trade-Performance Indicators 1970-1993 
(Average annual percentage change)
Country Group & Indicator 1970-80 1980-90 1991 1992 1993
Low & Middle Income
Import Volume 3.5 0.8 11.3 8.6 6.5
Export Volume 2.7 3.6 11.1 5.6 3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Import Volume -0.5 -4.9 8.8 -1.0 4.0
Export Volume -0.7 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.4
Asia
Import Volume 7.3 7.0 16.4 9.4 11.2
Export Volume 8.5 9.6 16.2 12.5 7.4
Europe & Central Asia
Import Volume 2.4 3.5 2.4 -1.0 0.8
Export Volume 4.0 3.0 13.3 -1.4 -4.0
M iddle East & North Africa
Import Volume 5.7 -4.5 3.6 10.2 1.0
Export Volume -2.4 -1.6 9.3 -0.4 1.2
Latin America & Caribbean
Import Volume 0.1 -2.5 21.0 19.0 7.6
Export Volume 2.5 2.7 5.0 6.3 5.6
Source: World Bank
Note: Trade Volume measured in constant 1987 prices and exchange rates.
In the past, trade between the EU and ASEAN was not significant93. In 1970, 
EU trade with ASEAN represented only 1.7% of the Union's external trade and 2.4% 
in 1980, while the percentage share of EU in ASEAN external trade was 12% in 1981. 
However, the EU has acknowledged that the trend of trade between the two groups:
“Has grown significantly, especially since their ninth meeting. ASEAN's exports to 
the European Union continued to grow faster than its exports to any other market
US$ 14,950 million.
92 World Bank (1992) Global economic prospects and the developing countries.
93 Harris, Stuart and Bridges, Brian, 1983; Langhammer, Rolf J, 1985, 1986, 1991; Wagner Norbert, 
1991; Imada, Pearl, Montes, Manuel, & Naya, Seiji, 1991; Langhammer, Rolf & Christopher, Hans 
Reiger, 1988.
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and the EU (EC) was now its second largest market for manufactured goods. EU's 
exports to ASEAN has expanded at a higher rate than to any other region in the 
world”94,
both in volume and percentage shares (see Table 7). Some ASEAN countries are now 
ranked among the top 20 main trading partners of the EU95.
Table 7 
EU Trade with ASEAN 
(Million ECU)
1958 1960 1965 1970 1975 1984 1985 1986 1987
EU Imports 708 865 872 1,066 2,321 10,061 10,417 9,213 10,037
EU Exports 603 699 887 1,264 2,643 10,166 10,078 8,497 8,906
Trade Balance -105 -166 15 198 322 105 -339 -716 -1,131
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
EU Imports 12,203 15,173 16,748 19,947 22,403 25,667 28,785 43,400 53,653
EU Exports 10,689 14,110 16,083 17,282 19,282 22,920 26,230 41,429 43,898
Trade Balance -1,514 -1,063 -665 -2,665 -3,121 -2,747 -2,555 -1,971 -9,755
Source: Compiled from EUROSTAT statistics, various years
The present volume of trade between EU and ASEAN is 55 billion ECU, five 
times the volume of trade in 1980 when the EU/ASEAN Co-operation Agreement was 
concluded. ASEAN enjoyed a remarkable trade surplus of 2.5 billion ECU in 199496. 
The EU ranks second among the trade partners of ASEAN97. It covers 15.5% of 
ASEAN exports and 13.7% of ASEAN imports98.
ASEAN exports of manufactured goods to the EU increased from 23% in 
1975 to a present 75% of total exports. Exports of ASEAN textiles in particular rose 
from ECU 148 million in 1980 to ECU 1,846 million in 1988, an increase of 900%",
94 Joint Declaration Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 29th-30th October 
1992.
95 EUROSTAT, 1994 External Trade Statistic Yearbook Recapitulation 1985-1993.
96 Commission o f European Communities 1994. Also see EUROSTAT 1994.
97 Section 10: Trade and Commercial co-operation stated in the Joint Declaration Tenth ASEAN-EC 
Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 29th-30th October 1992.
98 Commission o f the European Communities, MEMO/94/58 “EU-ASEAN Relations” Brussels, 15th 
September 1994.
99 Commission o f the European Communities, “The European Community's Relation with ASEAN”. 
Brussels, Europe Information No. 1/91, April 1991, p.3.
while raw materials decreased from 36% to the present 6%. More than one third of 
ASEAN exports to the EU enjoy tariff concessions under the EU GSP scheme, and 
they accounted for as much as 72% of imports by the Union under the scheme in 1992. 
Five ASEAN countries were among the top twelve users of the scheme100. Thus they 
are among the major beneficiaries of the EU GSP even though ASEAN has the lowest 
priority under the scheme: the 69 ACP countries under the Lome Convention are 
ranked as first priority. However, despite the EU grants of special support and 
privilege to the ACP countries especially under GSP, the ACP countries are hardly 
able to exploit these privileges (Wagner, 1989: 30). They give way to ASEAN, which 
is at the lowest hierarchy of privileges but enjoys the highest trade under GSP. This is 
because, as reported by the World Bank and IMF, in the past several years the ACP 
countries have stagnated with poor economic performance and a debt burden (see 
Table 8, p. 122).
When considered from the economic perspective of ASEAN and from its 
position in a changing Pacific and world economy, it can be justified that the EU 
should have benefits and gain advantages in several aspects of their relationship with 
ASEAN.
Firstly, ASEAN has implemented the AFTA, which enlarges the ASEAN 
market for EU exports in this region. The ASEAN population of 500 million has high 
purchasing power, and the region has a very young population, almost 50% and 70% 
of the people are below 20 years old and 30 years old respectively. This means a 
continuous flow of workforce supply at competitive wages, and a rising demand for 
consumer and household products (Akrasanae, 1991). International investment has 
also moved to the region, mainly because of the competitive cost of
100 Section 12 o f  the Joint Declaration Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting.
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industrial/commercial sites and labour, and because of the market-oriented investment 
policies of all ASEAN countries resulting in trade and investment liberalisation in this 
area.
Secondly, the creation of the AFTA gives the EU most opportunities to invest 
in this region, which is endowed with natural resources, low cost labour and skilled 
management. The establishment of an AFTA will attract trade and FDI into the 
region because of its economies of scale generated by the intra-regional liberalisation. 
In addition, AFTA will be moving in train with, and complementarily to, the 
globalisation process both in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world. This will 
enhance economic prospects in the region which is hoped will attract EU investment 
into ASEAN.
Thirdly, ASEAN is in the Pacific rim among the other dynamic Asian 
countries where important economic co-operation schemes have been implemented, 
such as the Asia- Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC), the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC), and the 
Pacific Business Economic Council (PBEC) (Tan Kong Yam, Toh Mun Heng, & 
Linda Low, 1992: 309-31). ASEAN countries are members of those economic co­
operation arrangements and the location of ASEAN is the centre of economic progress 
in ‘the Growth Triangle’ and on the line of the Asia's New Economic Frontiers (Kwan 
Chi Hung, 1993: 6-10) and see Figures 1 and 2 (pp. 118 and 119). The EU's presence 
in this region, by channelling through ASEAN, closen its links with the whole region. 
This will benefit the EU in establishing economic bases in this region. Closer 
European links with ASEAN could help to give greater access to other Asian markets 
in various ways; through trade, through proximity, and as a means of understanding 
the Asian way of doing business.
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Fourthly, the enlargement of ASEAN encompassing the whole Southeast 
Asian region will increase economic strength in this region as Indochina, which is 
developing their economies after the cold war, is becoming a commercial area in 
Southeast Asia. These ten ASEAN countries will become one of the major trading 
groups and a major potential region for investment from the EU.
The ASEAN economies are market-oriented with outward-looking policies and 
open economies, The Union itself has acknowledged that the dynamic growth record 
of ASEAN's economies has resulted in considerable trade expansion. The EU has also 
acknowledged that ASEAN's exports to the EU have grown faster than its exports to 
any other market in the world since 1984101.
Fifthly, the EU has had a negative impact on trade and investment in other 
regions such as the ACP countries, even though the EU has a special relations with 
them, interaction in trade between the EU and those countries has been based on 
dependence more than interdependence. The Commission reported that:
“Economic growth in North America, the dynamic Asian economies and EFTA 
countries more than off set the adverse impact on EC exports o f poor economic 
performances in heavily-indebted countries o f Latin America, and Africa, and in 
the Middle East” (The European Commission, 1993: 8).
So in the long run the EU would not hope to gain any advantages in terms of 
trade from these countries other than trade with aid, except the Middle East countries 
which are important sources of energy for the EU. So ASEAN is the alternative choice 
of the EU for a new dimension in two-way trade.
Finally, the EU would like to maintain its leading role in the world economy. 
Hence it seeks to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to compete with 
Japan and the United States. Thus close co-operation with ASEAN is a step towards
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economic penetration of this region, as ASEAN is the only regional grouping in Asia 
which combines not only economic but also political elements in maintaining regional 
stability.
2.2.3 Com parison of the EU and ASEAN integration
Considered from the point of view of institutional structure, the EU and 
ASEAN have significant differences, especially different mechanisms of regional 
integration and types of institutional arrangements. The EU, based on French-inspired 
law and institutional integration (Eliassen, Kjell A. and Monsen, Catherine Borve 
: 1997), has a formal centralised supranational legal and institutional framework 
facilitating regional integration102, while ASEAN is less formally institutionalised, and 
opts for a pattern of co-ordinated networks: based on a decentralised system. ASEAN 
regional integration has been enhanced by economic production and trade networksl0j. 
This means that ASEAN regional integration has relied less on a legal and institutional 
framework or regional centralised governance (as clearly seen in section 2.1.3 
discussed above), but rather it has functioned by “non-state actors and authority”104 
based on network co-ordination facilitated by the co-operation of national laws and 
institutions. ASEAN member countries are committed to the concerted liberalisation 
of trade and investment at the regional level and then by incorporation of such 
agreements into national laws and regulation, or applying agreed rules conforming to 
the general principle, enforced at national level. The concerted actions and the
101 Commission o f the European Union, “The European Community's Relation with ASEAN”, Europe 
Information No. 1/91 April 1991. This growth was confirmed in the Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial 
Meeting.
102 As the literature on EU institutions and integration mechanisms are considerable and well 
understood, the author will not repeat the topic here. See for example El-Agraa, A. M. (1998).
103 Eliassen and Monsen argued that ASEAN regional economic integration has been developed 
economically by “the production networks, sub-regional economic zones, ethnic business networks, 
trade patterns, business operations and investments and informal personal contacts”. See Eliassen and 
Monsen (1997: 2)
104 See Picciotto (1996, 1998) also see Eliassen and Monsen (1997), Beeson and Jayasuriya (1997).
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enforcement of the framework agreements have been ensured by the implementation 
of the Protocol on a Dispute Settlement Mechanism (discussed in chapter 7).
The development of ASEAN and the EU regional integration of course have 
been different due to their different historical, political, economic and cultural 
background. The great differentiation in the political, legal, cultural systems of 
ASEAN countries is obviously a major barrier to the formalisation of regional legal 
and institutional structures. ASEAN is a much more heterogeneous region compared 
to the EU. Thus, the major characteristics of non-institutional economic co-operation 
are informal, gradual and flexible. ASEAN therefore considers that informal 
approaches are a good way to open up its market while minimising the outside shock 
accompanying liberalisation103.
However, in the future ASEAN may become somewhat more similar to the 
EU, as the further development of ASEAN in trade and investment liberalisation 
enhances greater needs for rules and controlling institutions in order to be effective 
and efficient in its implementation of regional economic integration. At the same time, 
the EU has already developed some more informal patterns of co-operation, as 
evidenced by the EU’s new approach of mutual recognition and the more recent 
regulatory competition such as in the banking business106.
2.2.4 Econom ic Relations/Interdependence between ASEAN, APEC and
NA FTA
The success of ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region has relied heavily both on 
trade with other countries and investment flows from outside, especially from North
105 Peng, Dajin (1997) An East Asian M odel o f  R egional Economic Co-operation. Oslo, Norway: 
Centre for European and Asian Studies, p. 48.
106 See Bratton, William; McCahery, Joseph; Picciotto Sol and Colin Scott (Eds.) International 
R egulatory C om petition and Coordination: P erspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and  the 
U nited States. Oxford: Clarendon Press, See introduction.
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America and European countries, and also gradually from within the region. Thus the 
intra-regional and inter-regional economic relations of these economies have been 
crucial to their economic performance. Tables 9 and 10 (p. 123) show the inter- and 
intra-regional trade of the three economic blocs, indicating the gradually increasing 
intra-regional trade in Asia and also the increasing trade with the EU and the North 
America. On the other hand, the EU and North America are also having positive 
upward trends in trading with East Asian economies. Table 11 also shows the 
significance of two-way trade between ASEAN and NAFTA.
Table 11 
ASEAN Trade with NAFTA 
(US$ Million), 1994
ASEAN Exports  ASEAN Imports
United States 53,142.27 20.01% 42,736.34 14.80%
Canada 2,283.38 0.86% 1,809.18 0.63%
M exico 799.50 0.30% 149.26 0.05%
NAFTA 56,255.15 21.17% 44,694.78 15.48%
Source: ASEAN Secretariat.
Economically ASEAN fears that NAFTA would threaten ASEAN's economic 
standing in the North American market and would divert trade and investment from 
ASEAN countries to Mexico. Therefore, for ASEAN, to forge closer economic co­
operation with NAFTA both at a regional and national level is very crucial to 
ASEAN's economic sustainability. Thus APEC, in which all ASEAN and NAFTA 
member countries are members, functions as a forum for discussion between the 
western hemisphere and Asia-Pacific, to ensure that any economic tension between 
them can be resolved.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) was created in 1989, during 
the period in which the success of the Uruguay Round was not certain. There were
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also threats by the USA of unilateral retaliation, and fear of a ‘Fortress Europe’. It was 
formed by countries in East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, North America and some 
Latin American countries joining hands to develop economic co-operation and 
liberalisation.
APEC therefore provides a linkage between Asia and the western hemisphere, 
so in effect it combines two of the triads, i.e. Japan and East Asian economies on one 
hand, and USA, Canada and some Latin American countries on the other. In 1998, 
Japan, all high-performing Asian economies and all member countries of NAFTA are
i r\n
members of APEC . APEC's main objective is to strengthen liberalisation both
among member countries and the rest of the world. APEC members enter into non-
legally-binding agreements based on political commitments and consultation. APEC
108has thus been characterised as an informal organisation with very loose institutional 
structures. But Cardenas and Buranakanits (1999: 49) have argued that “APEC's 
success has resulted from its informal and amorphous nature, and reflects the fact that 
the forum constitutes a process for co-operation rather than an institution”. They 
concluded that APEC's focus on openness, voluntariness, and decentralisation will 
continue to foster regional co-operation among its members. This confirms the strong 
intention of APEC to maintain an open trading and investment regime in the region.
In fact, APEC’s members are composed of two groups with two different 
ideologies. The western members of APEC, led by the US and supported by Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, prefer a more formal and effective legal and institutional 
infrastructure, while the Asian members have insisted on maintaining their Asian Way
107. The current member of APEC are Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, USA, Canada, Mexico and Chile.
108 Pelkmans (1997: 217) argued that it is somewhat difficult to decide whether APEC is an 
international organisation or a network for dialogue and project co-operation. Also some o f its members
I l l
as they fear western power domination in APEC109. The rationale behind the US's 
support for upgrading the institutional structure of APEC was to show the EU that it 
would risk being marginalised if APEC was strengthened and institutionalised, 
encompassing two-thirds of the world’s economy. But after the success of the EU-US 
solution on agricultural issues in the Uruguay Round, the US placed less emphasis on 
the institutionalisation of APEC.
APEC can therefore be described as the fulcrum of the triad, containing an 
engine propelling the openness of the global economy. ASEAN and other East Asian 
countries joined APEC in the hope of gaining relatively easy access to the US market 
and of integrating themselves with NAFTA, and also to be shielded from the impact of 
a possible ‘Fortress Europe’. The US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand joined 
APEC to facilitate penetration of the Asian markets for their trade and investment, and 
also to threaten the EU (Pelkmans, 1997: 221) if they encountered conflicts in 
transatlantic relations. The EU, after assessing the increasing economic strength of 
Asia, expressed its intention to accord closer economic ties with Asian countries, 
although not with APEC itself (see discussion in section 2.2.2 above). Its aim was to 
ensure access to Asian markets and to balance the role of the US and Japan in Asia.
Thus, from ASEAN’s point of view, APEC operates as an inter-regional 
institution through which ASEAN's relations with NAFTA, as well as Japan and 
Australia can be managed in a way that mediates its relations with the EU and the rest
can hardly be called countries, e.g. Hong Kong and Taiwan, so they are defined as APEC member 
economies instead o f countries.
109 Dr. Mahathir, the Malaysian Prime Minister, has frequently expressed the ‘Asian intention’ to 
exclude the US from involvement in Asian regional integration, and thus the East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC), which excluded all western countries from being members, was to be strengthened 
(EAEC was proposed by the Malaysian Prime Minister in 1990 and was established in 1991). However, 
other Asian countries did not respond strongly to the proposed idea, as they are fully aware o f their 
economic links with the West that outweigh the sentiment o f exclusion o f the West. The EAEC was 
however operated.
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of the world economy. As ASEAN moves towards deeper regional integration, this 
role for APEC will become more important as will be discussed in chapter 5. 
Conclusion
The emerging new approach of “Open Regionalism” implemented in ASEAN is 
related to three fundamental elements shaping ASEAN regionalism. Firstly there have 
been the historical, political, economic and cultural patterns that form the ASEAN 
Way as well as the interaction between ASEAN states. These factors significantly 
underpin the decentralised system while remaining coherent with the pattern of co­
ordinated networks. This can be clearly seen from the ASEAN institutional structure 
and its functional mechanisms (discussed in section 2.1).
The second element is the external economic relations of ASEAN with the rest 
of the world, especially with the integrated EU and the US, that facilitates the 
integration of ASEAN’s economy into the world economy. The third is the changes in 
the global system in which state policies are ever more shaped by the structure and 
dynamism of an increasingly globalised world economy and a political system in 
which the boundaries between the domestic and the international arena have become 
blurred (discussed in chapter 3). In the case of ASEAN in particular, where business 
activities play an important role in de facto  regional economic integration (discussed 
in section 2.2.3), a minimal formal institutionalisation would be developed just to 
facilitate the actual economic regional integration. Therefore ASEAN mainly relies on 
co-ordinated national regulatory and institutional networks in conjunction with co­
operation networks of non-state actors and authorities.
In the EU, “central government” has played a key role in forging regional 
frameworks serving to shape regional business activities. In ASEAN, it has been the
activities of the business community that have forced government to consider the way 
of regularising regional relations driving regional economic integration (Gamaut, 
Ross; Drysdale, Peter & Kunkel, John (Eds.): 1994). The closed economic ties 
between ASEAN and the EU member countries, the NAFTA (especially the US and 
Canada), Japan, and among the East Asian countries themselves as well as Australia 
and New Zealand, have influenced the ASEAN economic pattern that forced ASEAN 
to keep its regional market open (discussed in section 2.2). The establishment of TNC 
networks based in those countries propelled the process of intra- ASEAN 
regionalisation while integrating ASEAN with the world. Therefore, de facto  
economic integration in ASEAN is a result of trade and business operations that have 
forced through a minimum of regional economic integration arrangements110. All 
these factors influence and shape the ASEAN pattern of regionalisation and the new 
paradigm of “Open Regionalism”. In the next chapter, I move on to discuss the 
changing factors in the global economic and legal environment that affect ASEAN 
regionalisation, focusing on the regulation of international investment in the global 
economy, that has a significant impact on ASEAN countries’ policy reform and on 
laws and regulation adjustment, since investment is the main engine propelling 
economic growth of the region.
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Table 2
The World Economy: Real Growth o f GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
W orld 2.0 0.5 0.8 0.9 2.2 3.2
Developed Market Economies 2.5 0.7 1.5 0.9 2.3 2.9
United States 1.0 (1.2) 2.1 3.0 3.3 3.0
Japan 5.6 4.0 1.5 (0.3) 1.3 3.3
Germany 4.5 1.0 1.4 (1.4) 1.9 2.4
Canada 0.5 (1.4) 0.9 3.1 3.9 4.3
France 2.8 0.8 1.7 (0.8) 0.9 2.6
United Kingdom 0.8 (2.2) (0.8) 1.6 2.6 2.1
Italy 2.0 1.4 1.3 (0.3) 1.7 2.8
Developing Countries 2.8 3.4 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.5
Middle East 0.7 (10.3) 7.0 6.5 4.3 8.6
Africa 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.8
Asia 6.0 6.1 7.0 7.2 6.7 6.5
Latin America (0.9) 3.3 2.4 3.3 2.6 1.9
ASEAN 8.0 6.2 5.7 6.6 6.8 7.0
Source: Compiled from The World Bank Annual Report 1994 and the ASEAN Macroeconomic 
Outlook 1994-1995, Asian Data Handbook.
Table 3
ASEAN Countries’ GDP Growth Rate
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
ASEAN 8 . 0 6.2 5.7 6.6 7.8 7.9
Indonesia 7.2 6.9 6.3 6.5 7.5 8.1
Malaysia 9.8 8.7 7.8 8.5 6.8 9.5
The Philippines 2.7 (0.5) 0.1 1.7 4.2 5.4
Singapore OO 6.7 5.8 9.9 10.5 8.8
Thailand 11.6 8 . 1 7.6 7.7 8.8 8.6
Source: Compiled from ASEAN Macroeconomic Outlook 1994-1995 and ASEAN Secretariat
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Table 4
Trade o f ASEAN with Major Trading Partners 
(USS Million)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Export To: 181 214 269 271 297
Japan 31 34 43 43 42
US 42 49 56 48 70
EU 30 34 43 47 46
ASEAN 43 57 69 78 86
Rest o f  the World 35 40 58 55 53
Import From: 194 232 285 316 313
Japan 56 67 78 73 71
US 34 39 46 53 62
EU 29 36 46 57 51
ASEAN 38 47 53 67 68
Rest o f  the World 37 43 62 66 61
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 1993-1997
Note: ASEAN excludes Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (data not available)
Table 5
Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN 
(USS Million)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
ASEAN-5 6,972 9,736 10,857 12,958 13,362 14,840 14,947
Indonesia 682 1,093 1,452 1,774 1,474 1,564 1,652
M alaysia 1,668 2,332 4,073 4,118 4,677 4,477 4,254
Philippines 575 554 571 798 1,137 1,961 1,452
Singapore 2,317 3,368 2,883 4,287 4,872 5,456 6,068
Thailand 1,730 2,389 1,848 1,981 1,202 1,382 1,521
Source: The Philippines Institute for Development Studies 1994
Table 8

























Source: IBRD Financial Statements, Summary o f  Loans as o f 30th June 1994 
The World Bank Annual Report 1994
123
Table 9
Intra-regional and inter-regional trade am ong the three economic blocs 1972-1990
(Percentage o f total trade)
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1990
North America
Intra-Regional 30.4 31.5 32.3 34.0 36.0 34.4
With EU 19.1 18.1 18.6 18.4 18.6 20.8
With East Asia 18.7 19.6 18.2 18.3 28.6 28.0
EU
Intra-Regional 60.2 62.2 50.6 53.1 58.9 60.6
With N. America 9.9 8.1 8.7 9.5 8.9 10.8
With E. Asia 5.2 5.6 4.9 6.3 6.9 7.4
East Asia
Intra-Regional 30.3 31.7 32.8 33.4 37.2 39.4
With N. America 19.1 22.5 22.1 29.1 31.8 28.9
With EU 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.5 13.8 16.3
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. 
* East Asia: Japan, NIEs and ASEAN, excluding China
Table 10
Intra-East Asian Trade (USS billion)
1980 1985 1990 1993
Intra-Asian 96 127 279 418
Exports
Intra-Asian 91 127 288 441
Imports 
Total Asia 288 381 735 1006
Exports 
Total Asia 296 348 699 906
Imports
Intra-Asian Trade as 32.8 34.7 39.4 43.7
a Percentage o f Total 
Trade
Source: IMF, Directory o f Trade, various issues.
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Chapter 3
Regulation of International Investment in the Global
Economy
Introduction
This chapter will analyse the interaction of legal and economic factors in FDI policy 
that effects the policy changes and legal adjustment of ASEAN countries, and which 
have led to the implementation of ASEAN open regionalism.
The legal framework governing foreign direct investment consists of national 
investment laws, administrative regulations and policies as well as bilateral 
investment agreements that have been developed for ensuring the protection and fair 
treatment of foreign investment1. In fact, there are no comprehensive international 
investment regulations existing in today’s world2 but rather the BITs networks that 
governs the international investment activities in addition to the national investment 
laws and regulations. As Muchlinski has pointed out,
“if  one were to look at legal sources alone the MNE [multinational enterprise] 
would not exist: all one would find is a series o f national companies whose 
principal shareholder happens to be a foreign company, and/or a network o f  
interlocking contracts between entities o f different nationalities”. (Muchlinski,
1995:lv).
Therefore MNEs or TNCs (the terms are used interchangeably) are mainly
subject to national laws of the host countries, where they are established, that vary
considerably and have different standards regulating FDI. This is because it is
accepted in international law that nation states have sovereignty to screen and control
* ^foreign investment or even to expropriate foreign properties . Thus, the entry and 
establishment of foreign investors is generally left to the host country’s discretion.
lSee UNCTAD (1988:1).
2 See Somarajah (1994: chapter 6, p. 225-236) Also see Schwarzenberger, G. (1969: 109-20).
3 Schwarzenberger, G. (1969).
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In the international sphere, under such circumstances, the interaction of the 
home and host states of FDI, and the TNCs, which are the three main players of 
international investment, encounter difficulties and conflicts in the treatment of FDI, 
in various aspects. The problems range from double taxation, repatriation of profit, 
expropriation, compensation, employment of TNCs’ staffs, operation of the TNCs to 
environmental protection, labour relations, technology transfer, group liabilities, the 
liabilities of directors, accountability, disclosure, and anti-trust.
In order to seek solutions for such problems, the three players must 
compromise on a rule-based approach. On the one hand, there is a need for some 
standards/guidelines for regulating firms’ behaviour and their 
liabilities/responsibilities to host and home countries. This entails a certain level of 
coordination or harmonisation of national controls by host and home country over 
TNCs, by trying to set international standard or a common agreed set of rules and 
regulations governing FDI. Countries, especially developed capital- exporting 
countries, and various international organisations4 have endeavoured to reach these 
aims5 and to tackle the problems of legal disparities among nation states.
However, in the international sphere, it is difficult to develop a multilaterally 
agreed set of rules for governing FDI6. BITs have thus developed in order to provide a 
certain level of legal stability and are now relied upon by developed capital- exporting 
countries as part of their effort to safeguard the investments of their nationals7.
4 See UNCTAD (1996c: Volume III) also see Muchlinski (1995: 573-616) and Sornarajah (1994:187- 
224). However, they were mainly developed in a “soft law” form.
5 See UNCTAD (1996c) extensively discussing various agreements on FDI, also see Muchlinski (1995: 
chapter 16.) discussing the codification o f international standard for the treatment o f foreign investors. 
But so far they have not yet achieved hard law multilaterally agreed rules for host and home countries 
o f FDI, and only BITs have developed as the main instruments for FDI, see Muchlinski (1995: chapter 
17), Dolzer &Stevens (1995), Sornarajah (1994: chapter 6).
6 This is due to the conflict o f interest and the different ideologies between developed and developing 
countries and countries of different political systems therefore the host and home states o f foreign 
investment cannot reach the same criterion or agreed rules for the FDI, see Sornarajah (1994: 27-29).
7 See UNCTAD (1988:1).
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However, BITs do not entail host country investment liberalisation8 but rather, as 
mentioned above, ensure the protection of foreign investment in the host country. 
BITs are generally based on negotiations between the host and home countries, hence 
the terms and conditions of BITs vary depending on the position of the contracting 
parties to each BIT (discussed in section 3.4 below).
Under such circumstances, investment liberalisation would be made at a 
national level under national investment laws and regulations depending on the host 
countries’ policy (discussed in section 3.3, which shows the interaction of economic 
factors in legal and FDI policy). It appears that hardly any country fully liberalises 
investment without any conditions. Even though there has been a surge of investment 
liberalisation, especially when investment capital is needed by developing countries, 
such liberalisation always requires foreign investors to comply with national 
investment priorities or to meet conditions for obtaining investment incentives. 
Countries compete with each other to attract FDI and to offer attractive national 
investment laws and regulations, so few disciplines have been agreed especially in 
relation to investment requirements and incentives. This situation both allows TNCs to 
gain windfall profits from regulatory/treaty shopping, while on the other hand they 
encounter difficulties from the regulatory differences in host countries.
The implementation of regionalisation, especially the regional integration 
arrangement that focuses on investment liberalisation, thus has been regarded as a 
“fast track” in investment liberalisation9 contributing to the process of global 
investment liberalisation, and this further contributes to the development of a 
multilateral agreed set of rules governing FDI. It is argued that regionalisation and the 
establishment of international investment regulations are complementary. On the one
8 Investment liberalisation is regarded as the main issue as foreign investors require an equal right of 
entry and establishment in host countries.
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hand, regionalisation would help enlarge the liberalised investment areas so that it 
would be easier to establish a common set of rules for international investment. Once 
many parts or regions of the world have liberalised, they would have similar 
standards, rules and regulations so that it would be easier to converge such rules and 
regulations towards common models. On the other hand, if a multilaterally agreed set 
of rules could be established and accepted by nation states, it would also be a great 
contribution to the farther liberalisation of international investment. Because investors 
could freely invest subject to the same rules and regulations in any country they 
consider appropriate, they would have more confidence and security in their 
investments. The interaction of regionalisation and the establishment of an 
international standard is closely linked to the international economic changes and 
evolution, as well as the nation states’ policy adjustment that was also affected by the 
international economic environment (discussed in section 3.3.3).
Considered from this point of view, ASEAN open regionalism based on 
regional investment liberalisation needs to consider both national investment laws and 
ASEAN countries’ BITs (because they are the legal frameworks governing foreign 
investment), as well as the impact of the changing international economic and legal 
factors, in particular, the emerging concept of the creation of a MAI to govern 
international investment. ASEAN countries would be required to further liberalise 
their national investment laws to conform to a feasible MAI, which would provide a 
higher standard of treatment for foreign investors. ASEAN countries may be under 
pressure to accept a MAI to ensure the confidence of investors from the OECD 
countries. Therefore, if ASEAN countries accept a MAI, it may replace the existing 
BITs, and thus they would need to change many of their national laws and policies in
9 See UNCTAD (1999a: 22-28).
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order to comply. All these changes would reinforce the process of open regionalism.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the international economic factors that 
shape the international investment regime, and the changing global legal and 
economic environments that crucially impact on the ASEAN countries’ investment 
laws and policy changes. This chapter clearly shows the interaction of global 
economic and legal factors in FDI policy in nation states (discussed in section 3.2), 
including ASEAN countries, that has led to the creation of an ASEAN investment area 
by adopting regional investment integration: the launch of AIA. The discussion in this 
chapter thus leads to the analysis of the current ASEAN investment regimes and BITs 
based on the theoretical background discussed in this chapter. The result will show 
how ASEAN national laws have changed and needed to change to further the process 
of open regionalism, it also discusses the legal aspect of ASEAN BITs, and how to 
tackle the problem of differences between the ASEAN BITs.
This discussion of BITs in this chapter establishes the theoretical background 
for the analysis of ASEAN BITs in chapter 4. It also clearly shows that the BIT is a 
lex specialis, and BITs have considerably different terms and conditions, so that it has 
remained possible for ASEAN countries to maintain different treatments of foreign 
investors. However, the trend towards a stronger non-discrimination and investor 
protection standard, as revolved in the MAI, has led to the new open regionalism 
approach, including the AIA. The discussion on MAI10 will only focus on its 
substance, relating to AIA, that would affect the current ASEAN investment laws and 
policy, especially to pin point the aspects of their national laws and policy that 
ASEAN countries need to modify in the process of “open regionalism”. Also ASEAN 
countries should play more part in negotiating a MAI, if possible (since a MAI would
10 For excellent analysis on MAI see Picciotto (1999: chapter 5).
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possibly be accepted by ASEAN).
The trend of development of international investment regulations in the 
context of the changing international economic system has been driven especially by 
the activities of transnational corporations (Dunning, 1993; Michalet, 1994: 9-12). 
The development process of international investment regulation, and of international 
law on foreign investment and national investment laws, interact with the evolution of 
the international economic and political system, as well as the globalisation process 
(Dunning, 1992: 7-45). These developments have implications for investment policy 
adjustment and the development of investment laws and regulations in the ASEAN 
countries not only to enable them to keep pace with rapid change in the global 
economic system, and be consistent with the global regulatory regime, but also to 
facilitate the implementation of ASEAN open regionalism.
I will firstly analyse the role of transnational corporations in changing the 
international economic system, and consider the interaction between the regulation of 
foreign investment and the global economic system. Secondly, I will analyse the 
debates around the global regulatory regime for foreign investment. Finally, I suggest 
how ASEAN countries should respond to this trend, and adjust their economic policy 
and develop their national investment laws and regulations in harmony with the 
changing global regulatory regime. In the same time such legal and policy changes 
would facilitate its open regional investment area.
3.1 The Role of Transnational Corporations in Changing the Global 
Economic System and its Implications for Nation States
3.1.1 Transnational Corporations and the Changing Global Econom ic 
System
The growing role of transnational corporations has not only contributed to the 
rapid economic development of the world economy (Dunning, 1974; UNCTAD,
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1995b), but have also changed the very nature and structure of the international 
economic system (Michalet, 1994). This dramatic change is a result of the emerging 
process of integrated international production, and the proliferation of cross-border 
linkages (UNCTAD, 1993), which are mostly the activities of transnational 
corporations networks.
The world economy is totally different today from that of fifty years ago. At 
that time, the classical trade theory was uni-dimensional, only focusing on trade 
among nations. The benefits of free trade and the subsequent optimal allocation of 
resources were considered to be essentially related to the exchange of goods and 
services among nation states based on the principle of comparative advantage 
(Ricardo, 1951-55). Generally, capital flows, technology transfer and labour migration 
are excluded from this model (Michalet, 1994: 4), and comparative advantage is 
determined by the factor endowments of nation states. These endowments - labour, 
capital, land and technology - must be subject to constant returns to scale. According 
to the static comparative approach, factor immobility within the borders of a nation 
state is the most crucial determinant. Country borders determine the characteristic of 
the “location” where factors of production are combined in perfectly competitive 
markets. In this perspective, nation states are the main actors in the international 
economy and have the most important roles in policy- making as well as creating laws 
and regulations, and states have the absolute authority and sovereignty to control 
economic activities within their borders.
The new world economy, by contrast, is characterised by close interaction 
between FDI, trade, technology transfer, finance and skilled labour, in a 
multidimensional and complex set of interrelations. Trade has become part of a 
package of international integrated activities through TNCs, which are the main actors
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in the new world economy. Therefore the strategies and structures of the TNCs have 
been evolving. TNCs have followed global strategies and have adopted global 
structures (UNCTAD, 1993), so that now the borders of national economies have 
become blurred. This indicates the interaction between globalisation and business 
firms’ strategies.
3.1.2 TNCs and New Form s of Socio-Econom ic Integration
Over the past decades there has been growing integration of national 
economies fuelled by the rapid growth of international trade and investment that links 
national economies together11. International trade in goods and services grew faster 
than gross domestic product (GDP), and the growth of international investment was
1 9even faster than the growth of trade. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
period 1980-1988 rose 1.5 times faster than trade (UNCTAD, 1992); there are up to 
39,000 parent firms, which invested in their 270,000 foreign affiliates, which reached 
US$ 2.7 trillion in 1995 (UNCTAD, 1996b: XIV). This is the result of the evolution of 
TNCs’ strategies and the modification of their organisational structures in response to 
the changing global economy, and particularly in response to imperfections in goods 
and factor markets (UNCTAD, 1993: 113; UNCTAD, 1996b: XIII). This has evolved 
from the simple functional and geographical links between parent firms and their 
foreign affiliates towards those involving broader and more complex forms of 
integration (UNCTAD, 1993: ch.V-VI). The most important feature of TNCs' 
strategies and organisational structure adaptation is the exploitation of the
International trade and investment has been carried on by transnational corporations through 
complex corporate strategies and an intricate network structure. TNCs engage in international 
production characterised by sophisticated intra-firm division o f labour for each corporate function. 
Therefore, trade and investment flows between countries channelled through TNCs are enormous and 
this has facilitated the integration o f national economies. (Michalet, 1994; UNCTAD, 1993).
I2. UNCTAD reported in the World Investment Report 1996 that “Investment flows in 1995 increased 
by 40%, to an unprecedented US$ 315 billion.... Foreign direct investment is a major force shaping 
globalisation. The outward FDI stock which the 39,000 parent firms invested in their 270,000 foreign 
affiliates reached US$ 2.7 trillion in 1995. Moreover, FDI flows doubled between 1980 and 1994
internalisation of the TNCs' networks which enable TNCs to strengthen their ability to 
achieve economy of scale in production and distribution, and their ability to achieve 
co-ordination economies in many industries. TNCs networks established in various 
parts of the world help reduce transaction costs due to both geographical and business 
proximity as well as internalised managerial structure, as they are set up the spider- 
webbed structure. Intra-firm transactions include distributing products, disseminating 
R&D, technology transfer and providing advanced market strategies, all could be 
made with decreased transaction costs. The existence of TNCs network in various host 
countries replaces market transactions by internal transactions to avoid imperfections 
in the markets for intermediate inputs. All firms’ activities, including marketing, 
research and development, and training of labour, are interdependent and are related 
through flows of intermediate products, mostly in form of knowledge and expertise. 
The internalisation of transactions can bypass the market and keep the use of 
technology within the firm. This produces an incentive for the creation of intra-firm 
markets and thus reduces transaction costs. The growth of internalised activity 
suggests the presence of substantial efficiency gains (Coase, 1988: 33-56).
The internalisation of business is of course not a new thing. It began during the 
latter part of the 19th century (Wilkins, 1970), and accelerated greatly during the 
1950s and the 1960s. Initially, the predominant TNCs originated from the US 
(Wilkins, 1974 and 1989), but during the 1970s this event slowed down due to the 
economic downtrend, including the two oil shocks and the widespread incidents of 
nationalistic reactions to multinational corporations. But during the 1980s, the 
globalisation of business again accelerated, with a surge of European and Japanese 
firms competing with US firms, and the United States became host to large numbers
relative to both global gross fixed capital formation and world GDP.
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of subsidiaries of firms headquartered outside the United States (Bergsten and 
Graham, 1992: 15; Graham and Krugman, 1991).
What is new in the globalisation of business is firstly the number of firms that
i  o
have created international operations and the number of nations that are home and 
host to such firms, and secondly, the more complex and wide scope of their operations 
as well as the more integrated structural networks of these firms. The international 
business corporations are increasingly global in terms of the scope of their operations 
and the nature of their concerns. However, business firms are still subject to national 
laws of the host country where they located. The new form of socio-economic 
integration created by this kind of global corporation thus has the main feature of 
complex integration within its networks. In complex integration strategies, any value- 
added activities can be located in any part of TNC network systems, and integrated 
with other activities performed elsewhere, to produce goods for national, regional or 
global markets. The decision of where to locate an activity is based on its expected 
contribution to the overall performance of the corporate system as a whole. A firm’s 
organisation structure becomes correspondingly complex, involving multi-directional 
linkages and flows within the firm and also with unrelated firms. By this means, they 
achieve near-maximisation of global benefits and they can even find ways to 
circumvent or neutralise efforts and powers of national governments (Bergsten and 
Graham, 1992: 19). Integrated international production allows TNCs to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale and scope from increased internal functional 
specialisation and international division of labour. The 1993 World Investment Report 
indicated that:
“TNCs in the largest home countries have internationalised their value-added 
activities and internalised the exchange o f goods and services to such a degree that
13. In 1990, the number of firms that could meaningfully be called multinational was well over one 
thousand. See Julius (1990) cited in Bergsten, C. Fred & Graham, E. M. (1992) p. 16.
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global sales o f affiliates are considerably larger than export in delivering goods and 
services to markets world-wide” (UNCTAD, 1993: 213).
There is an interesting record showing that, for instance, in the case of the US TNCs
networks, the share of intra-firm trade in the US total trade in 1993 reached 80-90% in
many manufacturing industries (UNCTAD, 1996b: 103-4, and see Table 1 below).
Table 1
Shares of Intra-Firm Trade in the International Trade o f US 
Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, by Industry,
1983-1993
Parent Firms Foreign Affiliates
Share of Intra- Share of Intra- Share o f Intra- Share o f Intra-
Firm Exports in Firm Exports in Firm Exports in Firm Exports in
Total Exports Total Exports Total Exports Total Exports
Sector & Industry 1983 1993 1983 1993 1983 1993 1983 1993
Petroleum 13.8 32.1 21.8 30.5 47.8 47.3 54.8 75.8
Mining 8.6 - - - 19.4 15.5 43.7 79.2
Manufacturing 43.0 48.5 60.6 63.4 70.3 74.2 83.4 82.5
General Machinery 61.5 74.9 74.9 75.8 76.1 84.3 92.7 87.0
Electronics 32.6 39.2 54.1 45.2 73.1 76.6 89.2 93.2
Transport Equipment 49.3 45.9 84.5 77.0 89.3 87.9 81.3 76.1
Wholesale Trade 9.2 13.8 6.2 10.3 37.5 57.0 88.6 93.4
All Industries 33.8 44.4 37.9 48.6 55.2 64.0 82.8 85.5
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1996, based on United States, Department o f  
Commerce, 1986 and 1995
This new form of socio-economic integration is enhanced by the transfer of 
technology, movement of finance and labour, and the mobility of created factor 
endowments (Dunning, 1992). Technological change has become extremely rapid, 
notably in the information technologies. For instance, computer-aided manufacturing 
has been combined with organisational changes in production, and the impact of the 
information revolution in services has led to a major expansion of TNCs in areas such 
as banking and telecommunications (Safarian, 1991: 187-203). TNCs have in part 
responded to these changes and, in part, are the major purveyors of the change. And 
indeed, it is the TNCs that initiate new innovations and high technology advancement.
In the light of these new characteristics of TNCs and their advanced
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technological management skills and strategies, economists have revised the economic 
theory for explaining the phenomenon and activities of TNCs and have assessed the 
impact of the complex integration of TNCs on the world economy and the 
implications for nation states’ policy adjustment (Rugman, 1975, 1980; Agarwal, 
1980; Majumdar, 1980; Chang and Katayama, 1996).
Today TNCs can determine the suitable location of their networks and with the 
help of the “created endowments”, which play an important role in international 
investment, TNCs can even create their own business kingdom. TNCs have the power 
to endogenise an imperfection and perpetuate a firm's specific advantage (Rugman, 
1980). Yet most market imperfections that exist in the real world are truly exogenous 
or are erected by governments, such as tariffs, taxes, and controls on international 
capital (Dunning, 1992). This is particularly relevant to the explanation of the rise of 
the TNC networks. While the formation of the internal market is usually in response 
to a market imperfection, the continued exploitation of a firm's specific advantage 
often serves to maintain the advantage in an endogenous manner. Rugman concluded 
that “thus the MNE is both a victim of external market imperfections and a villain in 
seeking to retain them” (Rugman, 1980: 376).
Indeed, location-specific factors, which attract FDI by TNCs, differ from the 
traditional concept of factor endowments, as there are no longer just “natural 
endowments” but increasingly “created” ones that are the determinants for 
international investment. Moreover, TNCs have the ability to create “specific factor 
endowments” by their possession of advanced technology and information as well as 
the technological administration, strategies, marketing power and the use of 
multimedia in advertising (Dunning, 1992).
The location chosen by TNCs will depend on its strategic value to the firm. In
general, TNCs will locate in the county where they can maximise revenue, have less 
cost and less tax burden. Moreover, the extent to which TNCs are able and willing to 
switch locations varies according to industry, firm and country-specific differences. 
Therefore for some countries that are part of large integrated markets, and for some 
activities, there is evidence that re-siting of TNCs has occurred and continues to 
occur. It can be clearly seen that new locational-specific factors, with sophisticated 
technology enhancing the creation of created assets, have been the main determinants 
of FDI in today’s world economy rather than the country’s traditional natural 
endowments. Although a country’s natural endowments are still important as they are 
the factors of production in various industries, especially in labour-intensive industry, 
now created assets are more important in sophisticated technology industries. This is 
because the composition of economic activity has switched from the one based on 
natural assets to the one based on created assets, and the sectoral composition of FDI 
has shifted toward tertiary' industry (United Nations, 1993: 20), which concentrates on 
sophisticated technology. This makes created endowments increasingly important to 
FDI. Created endowments enable TNCs to locate their network worldwide without 
constraint. This facilitates both internalisation and the globalisation of TNCs.
The global approach of TNCs thus means that within the TNCs’ networks 
there are no economic borders;14 TNCs1 networks can be settled wherever they 
consider best suited, to their own advantage. TNCs’ main target is expanding world 
market share and pursuing “the profit-maximising goal” (Vagts, 1970: 744). Their 
foreign affiliates located in different countries, tend to be specialised and flows among 
them are internalised to reduce transaction costs. Moreover, these affiliates may 
function as suppliers, or marketing bases, as well as research and development centres
14. In the new world economy, the political frontiers o f a country no longer coincide with the economic 
borders. The multidimensional nature o f international production and transaction operated by TNCs in
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depending on their nature, location, operation and competitive position.
Therefore, with factor endowments continuously changing, it is no longer 
possible to define a nation-state’s comparative advantage in a static manner. For 
instance, low labour cost may not be an advantage in setting up a sophisticated high- 
technology industry, instead skilled technicians and educated labour may be needed 
even though the real wages are higher. On the other hand, labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry may consider low labour cost and availability of natural 
resources as advantages. TNCs are thus locating their activities according to the 
comparative advantages of potential host countries, either with the location of new 
activities, or the relocation of existing ones. Nowadays, FDI is becoming a crucial 
determinant of a country’s pattern of specialisation. With TNCs following global 
strategies and structures, any effort to assess a country’s competitiveness on the basis 
of its current account is misleading. Therefore, Michalet has pointed out that “the new 
way of comparing the level of economic development among countries is by 
observing their predominant forms of integration into the world economy” (Michalet, 
1994: 13).
Today, the world economy is a multidimensional system within which 
decisions affecting the location of production facilities and activities are made by 
transnational agents operating in oligopolistic markets15. In addition, increasingly, the 
funding of economic activities is made by transnational banks taking advantage of 
offshore financial centres. This facilitates the mobilisation of capital responding to the 
locational decisions of TNCs' global networks.
Consequently, policy makers have to consider together trade flows, capital 
movements, inward and outward FDI, technology flows and labour movement,
various countries integrated those countries into the complex world economy.
15 This means TNCs can choose to locate production where they consider they would be able to
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because imports and exports of goods and services are no longer the exclusive forms 
of economic transactions among nation-states. The various dimensions of the world 
economy are tightly interconnected. Countries are connected through inward and 
outward flows of trade, FDI, technology and capital. In particular, trade and 
investment have become closely interlinked and governments have to consider them 
together in economic policy-making. Moreover, nation-states and enterprises 
increasingly need to co-operate, as competitive performance is more and more 
dependent on the countries’ and firms’ ability to combine various fields of expertise. 
As the TNCs’ networks spread, measures for strengthening local production units that 
are efficient and able to comply with the networks’ specifications might become 
important in attracting TNCs by means of FDI promotion.
3.2 Legal and Policy Implications for States
The implications of the global strategies and structures of TNCs are that nation-states 
are no longer the only players in law and policy determination. Nation states need to 
take a worldwide perspective in designing laws and regulations as well as the 
economic policy. For instance, if a country employs protectionist measures, they could 
hurt those of their export-oriented national firms that are located abroad16.
In the past, many host country governments were suspicious of foreign 
investors (Muchlinski, 1995: 6-7), afraid that they would dominate in competition 
with local firms for domestic market share and damage domestic industries; in other
maximise economic returns from their integrated operations.
16 . Portable electric typewriters from Singapore, 1993 ITC LEXISs 642 USITC Publication. United 
State International Trade Commission, Investigation No. 731-TA-515 (Final) September 1993. The 
petitioner in this investigation, BIUSA, was a wholly-owned subsidiary o f Brother Industries Ltd. 
Nagoya, Japan. It is a significant U.S producer o f portable electric typewriters was damaged by the 
increased importation o f portable electric typewriters from Singapore produced by Smith Corona, the 
American subsidiary located in Singapore. The US International Trade Commission encountered 
difficulties to decide "who is US"? Because the American company in the USA is a Japanese subsidiary 
and the Singaporean company is an American subsidiary in Singapore. This is a good example that if  
any country applies protectionist measures against the other country it could hurt their own national 
firm located abroad.
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words, the fear was about foreign control of local economies. Fear was growing that 
TNCs would completely conquer the economy of the host countries. Moreover, they 
feared that TNCs were a threat to their sovereignty. They believed that there were 
sensational abuses of international corporate power, especially by US firms. The US 
government itself was aware of this situation and checked abuses by its own 
corporations. This resulted in, for example, the passage of the Foreign Corrupt 
Business Practice Act in 1977 (Muchlinski, 1995: 7).
Because of these circumstances, almost investment codes and national 
regulations imposed restrictions on foreign investors. Those restrictions included 
limiting foreign participation in the ownership of local firms, imposing local-content 
requirements and import-compensation ratios and making technology transfer a 
prerequisite for FDI approval. The rationale for investment policy was to strengthen 
the national economy by pursuing two objectives: to protect national firms against 
powerful competition from TNCs, and to use FDI as a tool for the industrial 
development of their countries. Therefore, foreign firms were welcomed as long as 
they were proved to be able to contribute to national economic development. FDI was 
prohibited in some industries that were considered as having strategic importance for 
the national sovereignty to the country, for instance, the defence-related industries, 
telecommunications, transportation, steel, electricity, water and gas, as well as the 
production of commodities for export that were crucial for strengthening the domestic 
currency (Michalet, 1994: 16).
Since the late 1970s, government attitudes towards TNCs have changed 
drastically (Muchlinski, 1995: 9-11; Michalet, 1994: 16; Sornarajah, 1994: 8-20, 68). 
Instead of being suspicious of TNCs, governments now welcome them. Especially 
when capital has been scarce, countries compete fiercely with each other to attract
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foreign investment. Michalet pointed out that “investment laws and regulations in 
most countries have been changed dramatically”17. With a global strategy, outward 
FDI as well as mergers and acquisitions are all aimed at strengthening a firm’s 
competitiveness in the world market. Therefore, local constraints, complex regulations 
etc., are no longer acceptable to TNCs because they increase transaction costs and 
thus affect their international competitiveness. Michalet pointed out that “a global firm 
is not ready to spend a lot of time negotiating with a host country government; instead, 
it looks for another, more convenient location”. Thus, countries appear to be no longer 
in an absolute position to screen and control potential investors, as was the case in past 
decades.
In most countries, investment codes have been liberalised, incentives have 
been used and administrative procedures have been simplified. At the same time, 
countries have established investment promotion agencies to attract and service 
foreign investors in order to improve the country’s image abroad and to implement
promotion strategies. Foreign investment promotion is the key priority of host
• * * 1 8  countries. As trade-related investment measures have to be eliminated , countries are
replacing them with alternative strategies: creating an attractive investment climate,
the liberalisation of FDI laws and regulations, and opening service sectors and
financial markets. Ultimately, the ongoing liberalisation of foreign investment
regulatory frameworks may reduce inward investment controls and strengthen FDI
17 See Michalet (1994). Many Asian countries began to liberalise investment rules in order to attract 
FDI, particularly in conjunction with investment incentive packages. BOl offices were established in 
each country to monitor foreign investments. The surge o f industrialisation began in the 1970s in this 
region, even though in that period policies aimed not at generalised liberalisation but rather to liberalise 
investment in particular areas. See ESCAP (1998) for detailed studies o f investment liberalisation in 
APEC economies since the 1970s. Also Latin American countries which were previously hostile to FDI 
turned to welcome foreign investment due to their need o f capital. Also privatisation began to be 
implemented in various countries especially in Europe and North America, Parker, David (ed.) (1998).
I8. According to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, developed countries have to 
abolish TRIMs within 2 years while developing countries oblige to eliminate TRIMs within 5 years 
from the year the agreement was signed.
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protection, as well as promote the free flow of foreign investment.
In conclusion, nation-states now aim to enhance the essential factors 
considered as the main determinants for inducing FDI. TNCs now demand trained 
human resources, good communications and transportation networks and an overall 
high standard of infrastructure from the host countries, as well as transparent and 
stable laws and regulations, social order and political stability. The nature of the 
comparative advantages that make a territory attractive in today’s economic world is 
no longer only the result of natural endowments but increasingly of created ones. 
Comparative advantages are built up, firstly, by the activities of foreign affiliates and 
their linkages with local firms, and secondly, by governmental measures aimed at 
improving a country’s investment climate. The latter is directly concerned with policy 
adjustment and law making in the host country, and this interdependence between the 
law and the economy means that the two have to be consistent and complementary.
3.3 The Interaction between the Global Economic System and the 
Regulation of International Investment
The regulation of international investment consists of laws and regulations in various
forms and at different levels. Foreign investment is subject to domestic investment
law and regulations of the host country and the investment-related laws of the home
country, as well as the regulation of international investment in the international
sphere, ranging from bilateral investment treaties to regional investment treaties and
multilateral investment treaties. There are also several forms of regulation, e.g. Treaty,
Code, Guidelines and Model Treaty. The regional level may involve a supranational
regulatory authority established by a group of countries having common economic
interests in a defined geographical area. The multilateral level involves regulation by a
substantial majority of the world’s states usually acting through intergovernmental
organisations. The following table presents the jurisdictional levels of foreign
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investment regulation and provides example of some important agreements of such 
level (see Table 2).
Table 2
International Investment Arrangements












1961 OECD Code o f  










1961 OECD Code o f  
Liberalisation o f Current 
Invisible Operations
1958 Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement o f  
Foreign Arbital Awards
1963 OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on 
Capital
1962 UN GA Resolution 1803 
(X V II): Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources
1967 Revised Recommendation 
of the OECD Council 
Concerning Co-operation 
Between Member Countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices 
Affecting International Trade
1965 Convention on the 
Settlement o f Investment 
Disputes between States and 
Nationals o f other States
1967 Draft Convention on the 
Protection o f Foreign Property
1974 UN GA Resolution 3201 
(S -V I): Declaration on the 
Establishment o f a New  
International Economic Order 
and UN GA Resolution 3202 
(S -V I): Programme of Action 
on the Establishment o f a New  
International Economic Order
1969 Agreement on Andean 
Subregional Integration
1974 UN GA Resolution 3281 
(X X IX ): Charter o f Economic 
Rights and Duties o f States
1970 Agreement on Investment 
and Free Movement o f Arab 
Capital among Arab Countries
1976 Arbitration Rules o f the 
UN Commission on 
International Trade Law
1973 Agreement on the 
Harmonisation o f Fiscal 
Incentives to Industry 
(Caribbean Common Market)
1977 ILO Tripartite Declaration 
of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy
1973 Treaty Establishing the 
Caribbean Community
1979 UN Draft International 
Agreement on Illicit Payments
1976 OECD Declaration on 
International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises
1979 UN Model Double 
Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing 
Countries
1980 Guidelines Governing the 1980 The Set o f Multilaterally
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Protection o f  Privacy and Trans 
border Flows o f  Person Data
Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control o f  
Restrictive Business Practices
1987 Revised Basic Agreement 
on ASEAN Industrial Joint 
Ventures
1983 Draft UN Code o f  
Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations
1987 Agreement Among the 
Governments o f the ASEAN  
Countries for the Promotion and 
Protection o f Investment
1985 Draft International Code 
of Conduct on the Transfer of  
Technology
1994 Protocol o f Colonia for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection o f investment in the 
MERCOSUR
1985 Convention Establishment 
the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency
1994 Protocol on Promotion and 
Protection o f Investment from 
States not Parties to 
MERCOSUR
1992 IBRD Guidelines on the 
Treatment o f Foreign Direct 
Investment
1994 APEC Non-Binding 
Investment Principles
1994 General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, Multilateral 
Agreement on Trade in Goods, 
Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, 
Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects o f Intellectual Property 
Right
1994 Energy Charter Treaty
1995 Pacific Basin Charter on 
International Investment
Source: Selected and compiled from the UNCTAD-DTCI, (1996) Compendium of International 
Investment Agreements
Throughout the period of the evolution of foreign investment and the 
development of the regulation of international investment one can see the close 
interrelation and interaction between TNCs, host and home states in the changing 
international economic system (Muchlinski, 1995: 90-114; Sornarajah, 1994) as 
discussed below.
3.3.1 The Evolution of Foreign Investm ent and the Development o f  
Foreign Investm ent Laws
In order to understand the interaction of the economic system and the 
regulatory regime, one must inevitably look into the evolution of foreign investment 
and the development of foreign investment regulation as a dynamic process. In fact, 
the evolution of modern foreign investment and international law on foreign 
investment can be traced back to the colonisation period, and the protection of foreign
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investment has existed since then. However, foreign investment and international 
investment law have evolved over time.
In the early stage of the expansion of foreign investment, which generally took 
place in the colonies of the states of investors (Sornarajah, 1994: 9; Fisher, 1988: 96- 
7), investment protection was integrated within the colonial legal system of the 
imperial powers, which gave sufficient protection for the investment in those colonies 
(Hopskins, 1980: 787). Even if the investments were made in areas that remained 
uncolonised, a blend of diplomacy and force ensured that these states did not interfere 
with foreign investors (Sornarajah, 1994: 10). Thus Colonial power was the final 
arbiter of foreign investment disputes in this early period.
The ending of colonialism totally changed the condition of foreign investment 
and its regulations. The newly independent states struggled not only for freedom from 
their former colonial power's economic dominance, but also for a new world order 
which would permit them more scope for the ordering of their own economies and 
access to world markets (Sornarajah, 1994: 1). This was a period of hostility and 
antagonism toward foreign investment, generated by nationalistic fervour. 
Nationalism was itself a result of the anti-colonialist movements which spread 
throughout the colonised parts of the world. Thus after decolonisation, the newly 
independent states endeavoured to recover control over vital sectors of their 
economies from foreigners, largely nationals of the former colonial powers. The result 
was a wave of nationalisation of foreign properties. This trend towards nationalisation 
in host developing countries resulted in intense debates on the legal problem of 
foreign investment protection. The international law on foreign investment has been 
developed and the issue of nationalisation, or expropriation, and rules of 
compensation and the general regulation for protection of foreign properties in host
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states have been seriously constructed, in the context of conflicts between developed 
and developing countries, especially Latin America19.
The emergence of the “Calvo Clause” or “Calvo Doctrine”20 severely shook
the stability of foreign investment in developing host countries that adopted this
doctrine, as this uncertain situation placed foreign investors at risk. International
lawyers and scholars therefore sought to establish an international standard for legality
of expropriation, that should be based on national treatment or non-discrimination,
non-violation of specific undertakings, and on the ground of public purpose with due
process of law and judicial review. This contradicts the traditional view of developing
countries, which referred to provisions in domestic law21. However, it is generally
accepted in international law that a state has a right to expropriate or nationalise a
foreigner’s properties, provided that such expropriation takes place on the ground of
public purpose or public interest, without discrimination and with lawful 
22compensation . The legal requirement of compensation when expropriation takes 
place, according to the “Hull formula”, must provide prompt, adequate and effective
19 Historically the protection o f foreign properties has been built up as a part of the area o f diplomatic 
protection o f citizen abroad and o f state responsibility for injuries to aliens. It is possible to link the 
protection o f foreign investment to the already existing norms on the diplomatic protection o f aliens. So 
the roots o f the international law on foreign investment lie in the effort to extend diplomatic protection 
to the assets o f the alien. On this basis, the extension o f the right was contested from the time it was 
attempted on the ground that it leads to the unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs o f the host 
states.
20 In 1896, the Argentine Jurist Carlos Calvo asserted that rules governing foreign investment should be 
based on the concept o f national treatment and the relevant rules o f domestic law should not be 
modified by norms o f international law. See Dolzer, Rudolf and Stevens, (1995); Margrete (1995), also 
see Sornarajah (1994), chapter 6 and Muchlinski (1995), chapter 17, p. 626 for discussions o f the 
“Calvo Doctrine”. The national treatment accepted in Calvo Doctrine is that foreign investors are to be 
accorded treatment no better than that given to the domestic investors, regardless o f whether such 
treatment falls below international minimum standards. Thus, in the case of nationalisation, if domestic 
investors do not receive compensation, foreign investors do not have a right to be compensated alike.
21 More than 100 developing countries overwhelmingly voted for passing the General Assembly 
Resolution (G.A. Res. 3281) in 1974 establishing the Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties o f  States, 
and they were especially in favour o f Art. 2(2) (c) o f this Resolution.
22. According to Schwarzenberger, the applicable law can be stated in two well-established rules o f  
international customary law: (1) state property; the property of sovereign states situated abroad is 
immune from the jurisdiction o f the territorial sovereign, (2) private property; in principle, private 
property is subject to the municipal law of the sovereign state in which it is situated, then such property 
may be expropriated in the public interest, without unjustifiable discrimination, and on payment o f full
146
compensation. However, this conflict was later on compromised by using the terms 
like “just”, “full”, “reasonable” or “fair and equitable” based on the fair market value 
or genuine value of the asset taken, by providing these terms in the bilateral 
investment treaties concluded between the host and home states. The loosening of the 
strict rule of the Calvo Doctrine was simply because foreign investment was needed in 
developing countries.
The assertion of national treatment is considered to be the normative rule 
applied to foreign investors. In fact, the historical development of international law on 
protection of aliens' properties went further than national treatment. It required 
external standards of treatment for aliens. This theory asserted that the treatment 
provided to the nationals in a host state may be low and therefore unacceptable. This 
is the source of “the international minimum standard of treatment” applicable to 
foreign investors invoked by the developed capital-exporting countries. Both views 
consolidated the concept that the law should be designed to further the free movement 
of trade and investment. And this can be realised when the foreign investors have 
sufficient protection wherever their investment activities take place.
But the scenery in the foreign investment sphere was altered again by the 
changes in the international political and global economic situation. Among these 
conditions one can see the surge of transnational corporations, and the establishment 
of their networks in both host and home countries. TNCs have been an important 
source of private capital in the world economy. Where capital is scarce, private capital 
is the only possible resort for developing countries. The increasing role of TNCs in 
economic development in many developing countries especially in the East Asian 
countries, which has been evidenced by their high economic performance, has
or adequate, prompt and effective compensation.
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stimulated other developing countries to promote foreign investment as discussed in 
chapter 1.
However, in the early stage of industrialisation in developing countries, there 
was still a firmly established fear that a new period of economic dominance would be 
ushered in by an unfettered flow of foreign investment, and that the entry of powerful 
multinational corporations would lead to external control of their economies instead of 
contributing sufficient economic advantages to the host states. Thus there was an 
increasing consciousness that the best way of resolving this dilemma was to admit
9 Tforeign investment on a selective basis” and ensure that such investment promoted the 
economic objectives of the host state while earning profits for foreign investors.
The concurrence of developing countries' perception and the need to attract 
inward foreign investment made them exploit economic policy instruments by 
promoting foreign investment and export-orientation. Thus foreign investment 
promotion packages, including tariff and non-tariff incentives, have been multiplied 
for attracting foreign investors. But at the same time this policy came along with the 
regulations of entry to control and screen the influx of foreign investment. Moreover, 
investment measures such as local content requirements, export-performance 
requirements, trade-balancing requirements, local equity requirements, limitation on 
remittances of profits and manufacturing limitations have been employed as 
instruments to gear economic development in developing countries toward 
industrialisation and export promotion. The aims of such regulation and investment 
measures are to attract foreign investment into the country while ensuring that 
investment is geared toward the economic goals of the host state of foreign 
investment, and that potential harmful effects on such goals are eliminated.
23 As a Vietnamese leader pointed out “If the door is kept open, it is not only the wind but dust and flies 
also that get in” cited in Cohen, J. (1990) Foreign Investm ent in Vietnam. Hong Kong: Longman, p. 1.
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3.3.2 The C hanging Attitude toward Foreign Investm ent o f H ost 
Developing Countries and the Liberalisation of Investm ent Laws
The changing global economy has altered the attitude of the host developing 
countries again and, accordingly, national investment laws and regulations in these 
countries have been modified. The emergence of industrialisation and the debt crises 
in developing countries as well as the recession in capital exporting countries 
precipitated a shortage of funds for foreign investment. Thus this situation forced 
developing host countries to welcome FDI bringing capital to the host country.
The position of developing countries in attracting FDI was even worse when 
this happened in conjunction with the global trend of foreign direct investment, which 
increased concentration in developed countries, especially as the sectoral composition 
of FDI shifted toward tertiary industry (United Nations, 1993: 20). The global pattern 
of foreign direct investment can now be characterised as tripolar, with the EU, the 
United States and Japan being the members of the “Triad”, as they are the largest host 
and home countries for FDI. In 1995, the Triad accounted for 85% of total outward 
stock and 65% of the total inward stock of FDI (UNCTC, 1991; UNCTAD, 1996b). 
Indeed, the share of FDI directed to developing countries has continuously declined 
from 26% in the mid-1970s to less than 20% in the late 1980s, and further declined to 
only 17% (amounting to US$ 32 billion worth of FDI flow) in 1990. The change is 
more dramatic in the case of Japan, which has traditionally invested a large share of its 
capital in developing countries. By the end of the 1980s, Japan directed 46% of its 
total outflows of investment to the United States and 20% to the European countries. 
As a result, Japan’s position in developing countries declined from 42% of its own 
total foreign stock in 1986 to 34% in 1988. Even though in 1995 the inflows of FDI to 
developing countries increased to US$ 100 billion, only South, East and South East 
Asia continued to be the largest host developing region, with an estimated US$ 65
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billion of inflows, accounting for two-thirds of all developing country FDI inflows, 
and some Latin American countries are the recipients of the rest24.
A major reason for the increased concentration of FDI in developed countries 
is the shifts in sectoral composition of FDI in favour of the tertiary sector25 (the 
service sector) which now has a more important role in the global economy as a result 
of the liberalisation of financial markets and services. As Japan, the United States and 
the European countries compete with each other in their large developed market, so 
they have to maintain their share of business and economic activities through their 
networks of TNCs and by huge investment there. Thus the growing concentration of 
FDI within the Triad and the development of regional networks of TNCs around each 
Triad pole has been matched by increased concentration of economic activity and 
trading within developed countries. This means that developing countries as a whole 
have to compete with each other for a relatively small share of foreign investment.
In addition, the ending of the Cold war between the superpowers, and the 
opening of the former Soviet Union, the Eastern European economies, China and 
Indo-china has made new demands on capital. This situation has made world capital 
more scarce. So fierce competition for foreign investment among developing countries 
has resulted in the deregulation of investment controls as well as the opening up of 
financial markets and the liberalisation of the service sector in those countries.
Apart from changes to internal laws and regulations, developing countries, 
especially the previous centralised-economy countries, have increasingly made
24 Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in Latin America, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, China, 
Korea, and Taiwan in South East Asia and Egypt in Africa.
25. Economists have classified industry into three categories: the first sector is agriculture, mining and 
oil extraction industries; the second sector is manufacture or other kind o f production industries; and 
the tertiary sector is services and real estate industries. See Dunning, John. H. (1993) M ultinational 
E nterprises and the G lobal Economy.
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bilateral investment treaties with capital-exporting countries26. The reason for the 
treaty activity of these previous socialist countries may be to dispel perceptions that 
they are high-risk countries. Thus from the 1980s onwards one can see a surge of 
bilateral investment agreements concluded between host and home countries
27(UNCTAD, 1998b: 10) to ensure the protection of foreign investors’ properties in 
those countries and to promote foreign investment (as will be discussed in more detail 
in the next section). These treaties have been seen to boost investor confidence in the 
host state and, as a result, more investment flows can take place. This may be regarded 
as a factor influencing the locational decision of FDI, although not a decisive one 
compared to the other political and economic factors such as a favorable investment 
climate and environment attraction.
There are also increasingly bilateral investment treaties between developing 
countries, as some of them, the newly industrialised countries, become capital-
? o
exporting countries investing in other developing countries . Then they have also 
concluded BITs between them, such as the treaties between Singapore and Sri Lanka,
79Thailand and Bangladesh, China and Vietnam, Korea and Malaysia, etc" .
The competition for foreign investment among developing countries has
26 “China which announced its ‘open door policy’ in 1984 has rapidly signed over 50 treaties within 10 
years. Vietnam has signed 15 BITs within 3 years, 1991-1993. And the Soviet Union has signed 14 
BITs between 1989-1990”: Dolzer and Stevens, 1995.
27 UNCTAD (1998b) reports that “(D)uring the 1990s the number o f BITs has increased dramatically. 
By the end o f 1996 a total o f 1,332 such treaties existed, o f which 824 were concluded by developed
countries The number o f BITs concluded between developing countries and economies in transition
has also increased dramaticallv during the 1990s, from 64 by the end o f the 1980s to 508 at the end of 
1996”.
28The NICs are relocating less technology-intensive industries to other developing countries as the latter 
are sources o f cheaper labour and products made in these countries are able to have greater access to 
markets o f developed countries due to the generalised system o f preferences. For instance, Singapore 
was removed from the list as it became an industrialised country. Among other economic reasons are 
developing countries which that fear such graduation will seek to promote investment in other less 
developed countries.
29 Among developing countries, more than 90 capital-importing countries are now parties to bilateral 
investment treaties: in the Caribbean, 11 states have entered into at least one treaty each. In Africa, 40 
states have concluded BITs. In Asia, 19 states have signed BITs, especially China has concluded 57 
treaties and 43 o f them are concluded with developing countries. For details o f the texts see the ICSID
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resulted in not only the deregulation of investment law and regulations as well as the
surge of BITs, but also changing attitudes toward foreign investors. It has ended the
hostile attitude toward foreign investment, and many developing countries have turned
to pamper foreign investors. As Mohamed Ariff put it:
“Ironically, more often than not that the local investors in (developing countries 
like) ASEAN countries who feel that they are being discriminated against while 
foreign investors are being pampered” (Ariff, 1993: 40).
Thus the past half century has seen a sharp swing in the attitudes of countries 
towards FDI, and national investment regulatory regimes have evolved over time 
according to economic necessity, from protection to restrictions and control, to 
facilitation and liberalisation. Again, the rules of the game in today’s world economy 
have changed. Now many of the investment measures that were mainly used in 
developing countries are regarded as trade-distorting measures (Moran, 1992b: 62-3)
30 . These measures were studied and their economic effects assessed by scholars and 
economists, especially in the United States, which was seriously concerned at this 
problem. Research has shown that investment measures have affected trade and 
investment flow (Guisinger and Associates, 1985). Thus trade-related investment 
measures are regarded as a kind of trade barrier to be eliminated. This brought about 
the inclusion of the trade-related investment measures issue into the agenda of the 
GATT Uruguay Round, and finally the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) was concluded. This was the first step to linking investment issues
compilation o f Investment prom otion and protection  (loose-leaf publication).
30 Actually investment measures have been widely used in both developed and developing countries but 
the measures like local content requirements, export-performance requirements and local equity 
requirements are mainly used in developing countries and these are regarded as trade-distorting 
measures. In fact, the measures such as cash grants or tax breaks used in developed countries like the 
United States and European countries are also trade-related investment measures. For instance, 
European governments offer cash grants up to 60% of the cost o f the entire investment to attract 
automobile, petrochemical and computer industry investment, while the United States have given as 
much as US$ 325 million per project or US$ 108,000 per job to foreign firms. It is incredible that 
average state expenditures in the United States to induce in ward investment and promote export has 
grown over the last decade by more than 600%: “It would be disingenuous to argue that such efforts are 
not trade-related investment measure”, see Moran, 1992b: 62-3.
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with trade issues within the umbrella of the WTO.
However, the development of the regulation of international investment was 
already taking place outside GATT since the 1960s under the scope of other 
organisations such as the OECD, the United Nations, UNCTAD and the World Bank. 
In the initial stage, attempts were made to elaborate on a comprehensive code and to 
introduce norms on the control of the conduct of multilateral corporations31. The 
rationale of this task was to liberalise international investment and to protect foreign 
investment. The most important reason behind the process was to create multilaterally 
agreed norms and to enhance an international rule-oriented regime in the international 
investment sphere.
3.3.3 The Interaction of Legal and Econom ic Factors in FDI Policy and ASEAN  
O pen Regionalism
The discussion in the earlier sections shows the complex strands of the 
evolution of the economic and political factors shaping investment laws and policy of 
nation states. This section will analyse more specifically the interaction of legal and 
economic factors in FDI policy at the national level, and shows how this evolution of 
the interaction has influenced the process of ASEAN open regionalism, especially in 
the implementation of the ASEAN investment area. The discussion in chapters 1 and 2 
has offered a clear picture of the ASEAN economic backgroimd and its interaction 
with the global economy. This chapter now focuses on the investment and FDI issues, 
i. e. the impact of the global economic and legal environment and the changes in 
ASEAN countries’ national investment laws and policy. This leads to the process of 
development of an open regional investment area.
Economic theories on investment, and political ideologies, have influenced 
nation states in choosing their legal pattern and FDI policy (discussed below). Also
153
the legal factors and economic theories have contributed to the growth of TNCs in 
various aspects such as the ownership structure and legal form of TNCs, liabilities of 
TNCs, anti-competitive practices, and patent and trademark protection. Legal factors 
also influence locational decisions and internalisation of TNCs. Economic theories 
influence the legal choice of methods for controlling and regulating FDI i. e. screening 
FDI or restriction of FDI entry, reserving restricted investment sectors, managerial 
control, or on the other hand encouraging FDI by using investment incentives. Various 
legal patterns and FDI policy options have been chosen/adopted by countries 
depending on the economic theory/perspective that the country espoused. The 
economic theories/perspectives include"’2:
i. the Neo-liberal perspective which favours an open market economy;
ii. the Orthodox economic perspective which concerns TNC control policy;
iii. the Marxist perspective which centres on monopoly capitalism and 
imperialism;
iv. the Nationalist perspective which fears that large foreign firms undermine 
host state political and economic independence and threatens cultural identity 
so that states may impose control on TNCs;
v. the Environmentalist perspective which concentrates on the ecological 
effects o f TNC operation;
vi. Global consumerism which concentrates on the creation and maintenance o f  
long-term employment for the consuming public. Therefore employment 
stability is a policy consequence o f furthering consumerism, given its faith in 
economic growth and increasing consumption.
Now we will look into national laws and FDI policies which are the result of 
such interaction, and from which the relations between states and business firms are 
formed, where the real activities of FDI take place. This reflects the influence of the 
economic theories upon the national laws that are based on the theory of control and 
regulation. Theories which emphasise control result in the state’s designation of the 
legal form of investment by TNCs. Those which stress regulation, mainly entail 
regulating relations between states and enterprises, and consider that states should
3I. For a detailed discussion o f the codification of international standards for the treatment o f foreign 
investment, see Muchlinski, 1995: 573-616, also see Schwarzenberger, 1969: 109-181.
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evaluate the benefits that can be best obtained from allowing business firms to operate 
on their soil.
According to neo-liberalism, the market is the most efficient allocator of 
resources so it should be allowed to operate with as little regulatory interference as 
possible. This leads to a preference for an open international economy with minimum 
state or international regulation^3. Foreign investment is regarded as an important 
source of capital, and FDI also brings to the host countries advanced technology, 
managerial skills, employment, and the improvement of production methods as well 
as competition that helps to up-grade local firms’ operations. This perspective entails 
an open market economy, even though firms still could be subject to some restrictions 
(on the grounds of security, public order, health and other sensitive issues).
Beyond Neo-liberalism, a country adopting Orthodox economic perspective 
argues that markets can become imperfect allocators of resources because they are 
distorted by the costs of technology and the costs associated with the distribution of 
resources and products. Therefore such distortions must be eradicated by selective 
public sector interventions in the economy. For example, a large firm due to its size 
and technological capability can monopolise and distort product markets and 
undermine consumer choice through advertising and selling strategies, reinforcing its 
dominant position in the market. This requires selective and flexible state 
intervention/control to minimise market failures caused by such distortion. This may 
result in national laws requiring indigenous involvement in the ownership and control 
of local subsidiaries of foreign corporations, as well as for disclosure, accountability, 
and worker participation in TNCs. If state control is ineffective, measures of 
supranational control through regional and international organisation may be required
32 Muchlinski (1995: chapter 4).
33 Muchlinski (1995: 93).
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(Muchlinski, 1995: 94). For example the OECD Guidelines on Multinational 
Enterprises of 1976 were the product of negotiation between the OECD member 
governments and the Trade Union and Business Advisory Committees of OECD. This 
approach leads to the idea of “Corporatism”, where the interests of capital, labour, and 
society interact through public bodies, composed of governmental, business and 
labour interests dedicated to national economic planning.
More restrictive measures are employed in Marxist perspectives, which 
emphasises the exploitation of labour by capital, and the global division of labour 
leading to imperialism, entailing the monopolistic control of markets. This emphasises 
the role of “core country” and “centre-periphery relations”. The core country is 
considered to control peripheral economies through the function of financing and 
controlling investments, and through the managerial hierarchy i.e. through the 
hierarchical division of authority in the firm between the highest levels of 
management in the home country of the parent, intermediate management in regional 
sub-centres and the lowest levels of management in the branch plants located in the 
peripheral countries'54. The extreme Marxist theory of the imperialist economy 
advocates withdrawal from the capitalist global economy in order to avoid 
interference and distortions due to flows of capital from outside.
The nationalist theory is concerned with national independence, self- 
determination and cultural autonomy. Consequently states may impose controls on 
TNCs that are not justifiable in economic terms and may even be damaging to the 
national economy. States may purchase or nationalise foreign owned assets, or by 
imposition of tariffs, taxes, subsidies or other instruments make foreign ownership of 
property less attractive, in order to have certain kind of production controlled by
34 See discussion in detail in Brewer, A. (1990).
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nationals rather than foreigners. Moreover, nationalism is concerned with the 
redistribution of national wealth, to increase the availability of high-income jobs for 
nationals or local ethnic groups. This strategy is espoused for example by Malaysia, 
where the government reserves a high ratio for “Bumiputra”, the ethnic Malays, in 
ownership, employment, and management in the business sector, as well as of other 
benefits in society (discussed in chapter 4). Divestment, control over the main means 
of production, and exclusion of foreign investment from sensitive sectors are also 
measures applied to foreign investors by nationalist regimes.
The environmental perspective influences a country to take precautions in 
relation to the effects of international investment operations in the host country, to 
ensure adequate environmental protection. The principal regulatory concern that has 
been raised in this context leads to the development of corporate group liability for 
damage caused by environmental hazards under the control of TNCs33. Also this 
perspective encourages improved disclosure on environmental matters, and better 
compensation in the case of accidents. ASEAN countries also require TNCs to comply 
with their national environment laws, as a prerequisite for obtaining investment 
incentives (see discussion in chapter 4). This seems to develop a new general 
framework for the evolution of business activities and to influence the FDI policy of 
host countries.
Finally, global consumerism36 favours the social and cultural effects of the 
expansion of global firms producing goods for private consumption. The influences of 
the increasingly global culture on life styles and consumption patterns that are distinct 
from the traditional and indigenous life styles and patterns in host countries, are 
fuelled by the role of transnational media and advertising corporations as the creators
35 The matter was highlighted by the accidents at Seveso and Bhopal. See Cassels, James (1993), also
see Baxi, Upendra (1986), and Baxi, Upendra and Thomas, Paul (1986).
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of images changing consumer tastes to fit with the products and services offered by 
TNCs. This perspective affects nation states’ FDI policy in two distinctive ways. On 
the one hand, a country may be aware of this negative impact of the changing life 
style and consumption patterns threatened by foreign cultural domination so that it 
may see fit to protect its cultural industries or even prohibit foreign ownership or 
screen out the entry of such investment. On the other hand, as consumer choices move 
towards the acquisition of globally marketed products, countries may encourage the 
continued development of global consumerism. In this way, a country may also 
support long term and stable employment. In this perspective, employment stability is 
considered to result from economic growth and increased consumption. Global 
consumerism, in contrast to environmentalism, encourages competition, free markets, 
and consumption. States may help enhance a high standard of employment and job 
creation to maintain high purchasing power, and welcome foreign investment.
From this overview and discussion of the interaction of legal and economic 
factors in FDI policy as well as global economic changes, and the growth of TNC 
networks and international integrated production system, we can clearly see that 
ASEAN countries, which have heavily relied on trade and investment flows into the 
region must integrate themselves into the global economy. The shift from state- 
centred policies to an emphasis on the role of non-state players implies that ASEAN 
countries may need to adjust their FDI policy accordingly. Therefore the crucial FDI 
policy for ASEAN is how to facilitate the integration of the region into the global 
economy and to encourage the role of non-state players i.e. the TNCs. With this 
fundamental rationale in mind, ASEAN decided to implement an open regional 
investment area by liberalising intra-ASEAN investment and extending liberalisation
35 See Sklair, L. (1991).
158
to non-ASEAN investors (discussed in chapter 5). Considered from this perspective, 
we need to examine ASEAN national laws, BITs, and the international investment 
regime (discussed in chapter 4) in which the interaction between ASEAN countries 
and TNCs occurs, to consider further how far ASEAN countries have developed their 
legal framework to accommodate the process of open regionalism. First, however, it is 
necessary to consider these aspects of the global regulatory regime that would affect 
the ASEAN legal framework governing FDI in the region. To this I now turn.
3.4 The Emergence of Global Regulatory Regimes in the Foreign 
Investment Sphere
In this section, I suggest a future trend of the global regulatory regimes in the foreign 
investment sphere and of the creation of normative rules to govern foreign investment 
activities. The discussion will focus on the factors facilitating the emergence of the 
new regime and will point to the problems of the current investment regulation 
framework. The move toward a multilateral regulatory regime has been fuelled by the 
changing global economic system and the role of TNCs, which have a crucial 
influence on the changes in laws and regulations as well as on the attitude of 
countries. On the other hand, it is the countries that would consent to the agreed set of 
rules governing international investment activities. This can be seen from the 
evolution and the development of the international investment framework as well as 
from the rationale for creating each form of such regulation. The existing investment 
regulatory regime has been attributed to the combined strands of the legal, political 
and economic system and the development thereof.
The emerging idea of creating multilateral regulation can already be found in 
the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation. For instance, Art. 11 and 
12 of the Charter contained language that balanced “investor protection” against 
“decent conduct” provisions. The Havana Charter was drafted during 1946-48, but the
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Charter never entered into force. Instead, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) which was negotiated and agreed during 1946-47 and provisionally applied
since 1st January 1948 has survived, and has been reviewed several times37. As the
GATT initially focused on trade issues and the reduction of tariff rates, the investment
issue, which had been regarded as a non-border issue, and generally beyond GATT’s
umbrella was left behind. The bilateral investment treaty has become the alternative.
3.4.1 The Rationale for Bilateral Investm ent Treaties: the Alternative to 
M ultilaterally A cceptable Norm s and Global Rules on Investm ent
Since there is no global or central organisation regulating international
investment, and because of the absence of a consensus to create multilaterally
acceptable norms (Carty, 1991: 66), problems arising from these inadequacies were
left to be solved by the parties concerned, which usually means between the host and
the home states, and the transnational corporations. Actually they are the main players
in the field of international investment. Thus they have mainly resorted to bilateral
investment agreements, as these have enabled them to reach solutions in a flexible
way and avoiding severe conflicts between them especially where host countries are
developing states. In particular, as discussed in the previous section, they have
• • 38embodied a compromise solution to the problem of compensation for expropriation . 
The failure in bringing about a comprehensive code or multilateral investment 
agreement is largely because of the different ideology and conflict of interest between 
states. Thus the emergence of bilateral investment treaties has been regarded as a 
specific legal instrument seeking to solve the specific problem of international
37. The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade was agreed during negotiations that partially paralleled 
the negotiations for a larger agreement, the Havana Charter that originally aimed to create the 
International Trade Organisation. This idea was developed in discussions during World War II on 
planning for reconstruction o f the world trading system in the post-war period that all over the world 
had suffered from the destruction o f the war.
38 The complexity o f these issues brought about the hot debate on the emerging Resolution o f the UN 
GA o f the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the New International Economic Order 
through out 1960s and 1970s.
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investment relations, and therefore “creating an effective lex specialis between the 
parties” (Muchlinski, 1995: 639, also see Somarajah, 1994: 231-76; Vagts, 1990: 112; 
Salacuse, 1990: 655).
The modem bilateral investment treaties are a rather recent phenomenon on 
the international investment scene as the first one was signed between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Pakistan on 25th November, 1959 (Dolzer & Stevens, 1995: 
1; Muchlinski, 1995: 618). However, before the emergence of BITs, treaties of 
friendship, commerce and navigation were concluded as the instruments for 
conducting bilateral economic relations between states39. The FCN agreements 
concluded among developed countries were quite successful but it proved difficult to 
conclude FCN agreements with developing countries, because the FCNs contained a 
wide variety of matters, including the right to enter, access to local courts, 
enforceability of arbitral awards, the right to engage technical experts, questions 
concerning the lease of land, tax issues, customs treatment of commercial travellers, 
treatment of products and consultations regarding restrictive business practices 
(Dolzer & Stevens, 1995; 10). This is because these agreements were primarily 
concerned not only with facilitating trade but related to foreign property, so the wide 
scope of the agreement had been thought to cover all issues concerned. Developed 
countries were concerned that the broad spectrum of close political, economic and 
cultural co-operation that was envisaged by FCNs was probably more appropriate for 
agreements between states of comparable economic stature. Furthermore, key features 
of traditional FCNs, like the unrestricted right to entry and the unqualified right of 
national treatment, were incompatible with the post-colonial political realities (Aksen,
39 The FCNs had been concluded since the 18th century. The first FCN treaty was signed between 
France and the United States in 1778.
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1981: 357), reflected in various U.N Resolutions40. Thus the FCNs were viewed as an 
inappropriate instrument for bilateral economic co-operation and the BIT emerged as 
the preferred type of agreement for foreign investment protection.
Indeed, bilateral investment treaties reflected well that firstly, there has been a 
need for rapid development of the law in the area of international investment but such 
development was not forthcoming41 because of the conflicts that were inherent in this 
area. Hence, states had to resort to the second best solution by making bilateral 
investment treaties to ensure that, at least, there would be some rules relating to 
foreign investment. Secondly, BITs were the result of state bargaining so it allowed 
some divergence in terms and definitions in BITs as well as in the practices of even a 
single state. Thirdly, the surge of BITs was the result of economic and political 
conditions. This can be seen from the period when BITs were concluded reflecting the 
surge of BIT where capital is needed.
By the end of 1996, BITs were increased to 1,332 (UNCTAD, 1998b: 10), 
two-thirds of them were concluded in the 1990s alone (UNCTAD, 1996b: 147). This 
happened concurrently with the changes in economic and political systems. When host 
developing countries and new open economies coming into the field compete fiercely 
with each other for FDI, they have to be willing to conclude BITs with all capital- 
exporting countries, both developed and developing countries, to ensure the 
confidence of foreign investors through their guarantee of investment protection. 
China, for example, concluded 57 treaties within 10 years, of which 32 were entered
40 See U.N GA. Res. 1803 (XVII) (1962) and U.N GA. Res. 2158 (XXI) on Permanent Sovereignty 
over National Resources especially the U.N GA. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment on 
a New International Economic Order.
4I. See Barcelona Traction Light & Power Company Case ICJ Rep. (1970) p.46-7. The International 
Court o f Justice in this case stated that “Considering the important development of the last half-century, 
the growth o f foreign investment and the expansion o f international activities o f corporations, in 
particular o f holding companies, which are often multinational, and considering the way in which the 
economic interests o f states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of 
the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallised on the
162
into in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 1996b).
Even though the number of BITs has been increasing and they have a basic 
similarity in their structure, their contents are widely divergent. They indicate the 
adoption of a variety of standards depending on the negotiating positions of the 
different states. Often the same state will accept varying standards on areas such as 
compensation for expropriation, the repatriation of profits and the arbitration of 
disputes that arise.
Generally, BITs begin with a prefatory statement including the aims of the 
treaty, i.e. to encourage and protect investment flows occurring between the two 
states. The four major aspects of BITs are then indicated. These are:
1) Scope o f Application: the definition and identification o f the types o f property that are 
protected and the nature of the link or nationality to one o f the parties that entitles the 
foreign investor to the protection o f the treaty;
2) Admission and Treatment: the standard o f treatment to be accorded to the foreign investor,
the right to repatriation of profit etc.;
3) Expropriation and Compensation: the standard o f compensation in the event o f a take-over
o f the foreign investor’s property;
4) Settlement o f  Disputes: the procedure for settlement by arbitration o f disputes arising from 
the investment.
These are standard contents in all bilateral investment treaties. But there are variations 
in the statements of the rules to be applied between the parties. The following is a 
discussion of the wide divergence of BITs in certain aspects.
3.4.1.1. The Statement of the Purpose of the Treaty
Every bilateral investment treaty states the motives, objectives and 
circumstances through which a treaty can be seen in its proper perspective, 
specifically the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment. (Dolzer & 
Stevens, 1995: 20-1). However, variations from the standard pattern have existed in 
various treaties. Some treaties may include a reference to reciprocal protection (BIT
international plane ”, cited in UNCTAD, 1998b: 2.
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between the Czech Republic and Hungary, 1993)42 or to co-operation between private 
enterprises of the two countries (BIT between Belgium-Luxembourg and Bangladesh, 
1981)43. Others have included a reference to the transfer of capital and technology 
(BIT between France and Hungary)44. The investment treaty between Switzerland and 
Turkey provided reference to international law or to the principles of international law 
as a basis for economic co-operation. A number of treaties concluded by Central and 
Eastern European countries have made reference to the Final Act of the Helsinki 
Conference to include obligations in the field of Human Rights. German treaties have 
frequently incorporated a reference to the benefits that may flow from the “contractual 
protection”. But typical U.S treaties contain the commitment of the parties to fair and 
equitable treatment of investments43. These variations reflect the background of the 
relevant political, economic, historical and cultural consideration of each party to the 
treaty.
3.4.1.2. Definition of Investment
In the early days, the idea that the intangible property of an alien is incapable 
of protection by international law existed, as the early stage of foreign investments 
were mainly made in the mineral resource sector and plantations as well as in other 
tangible property. So due to the nature of investment in those day, an alien’s property 
mostly involved tangible property. The creation of intangible rights was rare and 
presumably was dependent on the laws of the host state. Thus rights to intellectual 
property such as patents, copyright and know-how were vested in a person only to the 
extent that the local law recognised those rights. The host state had absolute control
42 See BIT between the Czech Republic and Hungary, 1993 in ICSID, Compilation o f Investment 
Promotion and Protection Treaties. Release 95-4, issue November 1995, Oceana Publications, Inc.(now 
it is updated as o f November 1999)
43 See BIT between Belgium-Luxembourg and Bangladesh, 1981, Ibid.
44 See BIT between France and Hungary, 1986, ibid.
45 For detailed survey, see Dolzer & Stevens, 1995: 20-25.
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over intangible property as such rights were dependent on the law of the host state for 
their recognition. (Verdross, 1931: 364).
But it became increasingly recognised that protection of intangible rights was 
essential and central to investment protection46. This began with concession 
agreements, which created contractual rights that were intangible. So a number of 
early treaties entered into following that period defined the term ‘investment’ in a 
broad general way, such as “the term ‘investment’ shall comprise all categories of 
assets including all categories of rights and interest”47.
Modem forms of foreign investment treaty involve the transfer of intangible 
rights; licensing agreements, management contracts and consultancy contracts also 
have intangible assets as their subject matter. The definition of investment in modem 
BITs now tends to be as broad as possible, using a more elaborate formula, in order to 
dispel any lingering doubts that may exist from the early idea that intangible property 
is not property that is protected by international law.
The general standard formula of the definition of investment in recent BITs 
has included traditional property rights, rights in companies, monetary claims and 
titles to performance, copyrights and industrial property rights, as well as concessions 
and similar rights.
For instance, the term ‘investment’ defined in typical English BITs include:
• movable and immovable property and property right such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
• shares, stocks and debentures in companies and other interests in companies;
• claims to money or to any performance under contracts having a finance value ;
• intellectual property rights and goodwill, technical processes and know-how;
• business concessions including concessions relating to natural resources (“business 
concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concession to search for,
46 It had begun recognised the intangible right since 1960s such as the dispute in the Carl Zeiss Stiftung 
Cases which litigated in England and elsewhere concerned trademarks. See Appeal Case (1967) 1. p. 
853.
47 See Dolzer & Stevens, 1995: 26. For example, they cited BIT between Germany and Sri-Lanka, at 
Art. 8 (1).
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cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources” is the term in more recent BITs)48.
Most European countries have also adopted these five groups of specific rights 
formula in concluding their BITs.
The American model BIT contains the above five categories and include 
“licences and permits issued pursuant to law, including those issued for manufacture 
and sale of products”, and “any right conferred by law or contract, including rights to 
search for or utilise natural resources, and rights to manufacture, use and sell 
products”. The American model seeks to secure such achieved rights, which are 
granted by host countries under administrative law at the time the investment took 
place so that they could not later be withdrawn by the administrative agency, as these 
rights entail permission to conduct a certain activity in the host state. The whole 
course of the foreign investment may depend on the existence of such public law 
rights. The investment would not be valuable if the right to repatriate profits initially 
granted is later withdrawn. So the extension of the definition of property to include 
these public law rights acquired under the host state’s law is to ensure the security of 
foreign investment in those countries. Also copyrights and industrial property rights 
defined in the US BITs are considerably more elaborate. They spell out these rights as 
follows:
• intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to :
•  literary and artistic works, including sound recording;
•  inventions in all fields o f human endeavour;
•  industrial designs; semiconductor mask works;
•  trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business information; and
• trademarks, service marks, and trade names49.
However, though ‘investment’ has been defined as widely as possible, many 
treaties confine the term investment only to investment approved by the state parties
48 For instance, BIT between UK and Indonesia, Art. 1. Also see BITs between UK and individual
ASEAN countries.
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to the treaty. Some states require approval for all incoming foreign investment, others 
maintain an open door for all foreign investment but give special privileges only to 
investment that has secured approval. The approval is usually given only to such 
investments that are considered particularly beneficial to the host country and are 
subject to the satisfaction of conditions that might be imposed.
The great variety of and the more and more elaborate definitions in BITs 
reflect the fact that BITs cannot cope with rapid change in the world economy, the 
changing features of international investment, the integrated production processes and 
transactions of TNCs across the world, as well as the dynamic technology in today’s 
world.
3.4.1.3. Criteria for Determining Nationality
BITs generally define the persons who may make an investment, and who may 
as a consequence enjoy the protection laid down in the treaty’s substantive provisions. 
While some BITs use the term “investors”, some treaties refer to “nationals”, and in 
doing so draw a distinction between (a) individuals or natural persons and (b) 
companies and other juridical entities. These two categories of potential beneficiaries 
present distinct problems and will therefore be treated separately. Generally, states are 
free to choose the criteria that will determine an individual’s nationality under BIT. 
Most BITs usually define “nationals” by reference to the parties’ domestic laws on 
citizenship. The determination of juridical person's national is more complex with 
various approaches. Since the regulation of foreign investment mainly concerns 
juridical person, I will confine my discussion to corporate nationality.
BITs have essentially relied on three basic criteria to determine the nationality 
of a company or juridical person, namely:
1) the concept o f incorporation or constitution, according to which a company is deemed
49 For example, see US-Ecuador BIT (1993), at Art. I (1) (a) (iv) and other recent U.S BITs.
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to be attached to the legal order under which it was incorporated, irrespective o f  the 
place and seat o f its economic activities. This approach is preferred in the Anglo- 
American legal system. The rationale for this criterion is consistent with traditional 
international law50;
2) the concept o f the seat (siege social), according to which the actual management o f a 
company determines its nationality. This concept has generally been followed in 
German BIT practice;
3) the concept o f control, according to which nationality is determined on the basis o f the 
nationality o f the shareholders that own or control the company. This concept has been 
included in most o f the recent Swiss treaties.
The rules governing the attachment of a juridical entity to a state present some 
difficulty (Metzger, 1971; Reismann, 1971)51, and a decision to rely on any one of the 
criteria may lead to different results. For instance, while the requirement of 
incorporation obviously leads to certainty, it may be outweighed by the fact that the 
place of incorporation may be no more than a formal or artificial link. Thus investors 
from third countries might stand to benefit from the treaty simply by incorporating 
their venture under the laws of a BIT Contracting Party. On the other hand, greater 
uncertainty may result from relying on the concepts of seat and control, though these 
criteria may be better suited to establish the true links of a particular company to a 
state. Some BITs have combined two of the above criteria in order to restrict the 
application of the treaty to companies that have indeed established appropriate ties 
with the home country. Other BITs refer to these criteria as possible alternatives, 
thereby broadening the scope of application of the treaty (Dolzer & Stevens, 1995: 
36). These BITs specify that a company incorporated in one contracting party could be 
protected by the other party provided the seat of control of the company is located in 
the other contracting party or where there is control or substantial interests in the 
company by the nationals of the other party. In this manner, the treaty would ensure
50. Because the corporation is a creature o f domestic law and depends for its existence on domestic law. 
It can be destroyed at will by the domestic system that created it. For this reason, international law did 
not interfere with corporate personality in any significant manner. It was also logical that since the 
creation o f the corporation depended on the will o f the state as expressed in its domestic law, the 
corporation should have the nationality o f the state in which it was created.
51. See Metzger (1971) N ationality o f  C orporate Investment under Investment Guarantee Schem es - The 
R elevance o f  Barcelona Traction. 65 AJIL 532; and Reismann (1971) Nationality and D iplom atic
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protection for subsidiaries o f multinational corporations that are incorporated in a host 
state party, and also in the situation where the multinational corporation invests 
through the formation of a joint venture in the host state party. The protection of joint 
venture interests will still remain a problem in many states, as the foreign party may 
be a minority shareholder who will not have control over the joint venture corporation. 
If the minority foreign shareholder’s shares are affected through the procedure 
prescribed in the internal constituent documents of the joint venture company in 
accordance with the law of the host state, there will be little by way of diplomatic 
protection that can be given (Sornarajah, 1994).
Though some of the BITs seek to grapple with the problem raised by corporate 
nationality, there is no consistency in the solutions adopted by them to give rise to a 
uniform principle. One can see a wide array of solutions in different treaties. The 
practices of even single states vary. For instance, the Singapore-United Kingdom 
Treaty52 defines a British company as a company incorporated in Britain, whereas the 
Singapore-Germany Treaty33 defines a German company as one “having its seat in the 
Federal Republic of Germany”. British practice is also inconsistent on this point. 
Whereas the incorporation theory is preferred in the treaty with Singapore, the United 
Kingdom-Philippines Treaty 54opts for a theory of control when it defines a protected 
company as one “actually doing business under the laws in force in any part of the 
territory of that contracting party wherein place of effective management is situate” 
(Art. 1 of the BIT between the United Kingdom and the Philippines).
Indeed, the definition of a corporate nationality in bilateral investment treaties
P rotection  o f  Companies and Their Shareholders. Journal o f World Trade Law 719.
52 See BIT between Singapore and The United Kingdom in ICSID, Compilation o f Investment 
Promotion and Protection Treaties. Release 95-4, issue November 1995, Oceana Publications, Inc. 
(now it is updated as of November 1999)
53 See BIT between Singapore and Germany, Compilation o f Investment Promotion and Protection
Treaties. Release 95-4, issue November 1995, Oceana Publications, Inc. (now it is updated as of
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goes against more traditional notions in international law, which lags behind the 
development of economic reality. The general rule relating to the diplomatic 
protection of corporations making investments in foreign countries was stated in the 
Barcelona Traction case33. According to that case, a corporation has the nationality of 
the state in which it is incorporated and only the latter state has the right of diplomatic 
intervention on behalf of the corporation36. The court referred to the growth of 
multinational corporations within the international economy and expressed surprise 
that there had been little development towards securing greater protection for 
investment by multinational enterprises.
3.4.1.4. Standard of Treatment
Treatment is a broad term, which in the context of BITs refers to the legal 
regime that applies to investments once they have been admitted by the host state37. 
This is an issue of considerable disagreement between states on the question of what 
treatments are generally accepted. In the past, as discussed above, there were two 
main principles asserted by states. One is the minimum standard of treatment, which 
was invoked by capital-exporting countries. The recognition of a minimum standard 
of treatment permits international scrutiny of the treatment of the foreign investor by 
the host state. The other is the national standard of treatment espoused by developing 
countries, especially Latin American countries. The principle of the national standard 
of treatment under “Calvo Doctrine” was that the protection for the foreign investor
November 1999)
54 See BIT between the United Kingdom and the Philippines, ibid.
55. I.C.J. Report (1970), also see Asian A gricultural Products Ltd. (A.A.P.L.) v. Sri Lanka (1992) 17 
Yearbook o f  C om m ercial Arbitration  106 at para. 90. Also see the separate judgement o f Oda J. in the 
Elsi Case.
56. In this case, the court denied that Belgium had locus standi to maintain an action against Spain to 
protect the interest o f Belgian shareholders o f Canadian company whose investment in Spain had been 
affected by Spanish judicial and administrative measures.
57 However, as will be discussed below, some states have recently re-formulated the national treatment 
standard to apply also to admission, i.e. pre-entry NT.
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should not be better than that given to the domestic investor58. The developed 
countries rejected this principle, as the treatment by some countries was lower than the 
minimum standard expected by the capital-exporting countries.
In modem times, however, national treatment may have its advantages as 
states reserve many of their economic sectors and privileges to nationals. Therefore 
the giving of national treatment, as a minimum standard, may confer advantages on 
foreign investors as it will enable them to have the privileges enjoyed by nationals. 
For this reason, there is a tendency among the developed countries to include a new 
formulation of national treatment, as “no less favourable” than the treatment given to 
nationals.
As there have been differences in the standards of treatment of foreign 
investment, states have sought to agree on the standard of treatment that they would 
accord to the investment of their nationals in bilateral investment treaties. There are 
four different devices used in BITs. Firstly is “fair and equitable treatment” principle 
to be accorded to the nationals of the contracting parties. This phase is vague and open 
to different interpretations59. It permits treatment that reaches the standard of fairness 
and requires that all foreign investors be treated equally.
Second is “full protection and security”. This phrase is also difficult to give an 
exact meaning because it stems from a lack of clarity, as in fact, the origin of the 
phrase came from the FCN treaties which were less detailed than the modem BIT. A 
number of BITs have followed the OECD Draft Convention and have combined the
58 See Muchlinski (1999: 626) also see UNCTAD. (1999) N ational Treatment: IJNCTAD Series on 
issues in International Investment Agreements. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
59. Mann (1981: 242), on the other hand, argues that the term “fair and equitable treatment” envisage 
conduct which goes far beyond the minimum standard and afford protection to a greater extent and 
according to a much more objective standard than any previously employed form o f words. A tribunal 
would not be concerned with minimum, maximum or average standard. It will have to decide whether 
in all the circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable. No standard 
defined by other words is likely to be material. The terms are to be understood and applied 
independently and autonomously.
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principle of full protection and security with the principle of fair and equitable 
treatment by providing that full security and protection shall be enjoyed “in a manner 
consistent with international law”.
Third is national treatment. This may be the optimal position that could be 
obtained. It means that the host state is obliged to accord foreign investor treatment no 
less favourable than that enjoyed by its own nationals. National treatment is, however, 
rarely accorded without limitations and many treaties provided that such treatment 
will apply only where the foreign and the domestic investor find themselves in 
“identical” or “similar” situations or “in like situation”. Alternatively, the provision 
may refer to “similar enterprises” “similar investments” or even investors “with 
similar activities”. Since the situations of the foreign and domestic investors are 
seldom identical, the application of the provision may well be a difficult task. It is 
even worse when the treaties did not seek to determine what in fact constitutes 
“similar” circumstances, activities, or enterprises.
In the earlier period, developing countries have traditionally been reluctant to 
extend national treatment to foreign investors. This attitude was clearly reflected in 
the course of discussions on the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
where there was concern that an unqualified obligation to extend national treatment 
would curtail developing countries’ ability to control their domestic economies 
(Asante, 1989; UNCTC, 1988b: 46).
Fourth is the Most-Favoured-Nation treatment (MFN) standard, which also 
came from the old FCN treaties. This principle enables the nationals of the parties to 
profit from favourable treatment that may given to nationals of a third state by either 
contracting party. In other words, the MFN standard seeks to assure investors of one 
home country treatment which is not less favourable than that which the host state
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accords to nationals and companies of any other country.
The majority of BITs combine the MFN and national treatment standards so 
that the nationals of either state may claim the more favourable standard of treatment. 
In several BITs the reference to national and MFN treatment is complemented by the 
phrase “whichever is more favourable”60. Some treaties combine these standards in 
one clause with other standards of treatment such as fair and equitable principle or full 
protection and security.
However, economic, political and legal circumstances may require the host 
country to limit the investors’ right to national and MFN treatment. Such exception 
clauses may refer to a range of different qualifications, the broadest and most common 
of which is the denial of preferential treatment that results from the host states’ 
membership of customs union or a regional organisation. This will be stated in the 
treaty itself. It cannot therefore be argued later that measures taken under these 
regional arrangements conferring privileges should be conferred upon foreign 
investors on the basis of the most favoured nation clauses.
3.4.1.5. Repatriation of Profit
The main objective of all foreign investment is to make profits and repatriate 
them to the home state. If repatriation of the profits is prevented by the host state this 
purpose of foreign investors would be frustrated. Many BITs contain absolute 
statements protecting the right of repatriation. This is unrealistic, as problems will 
arise when a contracting party has foreign exchange shortfalls necessitating currency 
control. However, many BITs address this problem and provide exceptional clauses 
according to the financial crisis of the contracting parties. Many of the British treaties 
provide that the right of repatriation of profits may be restricted “in exceptional
60. This formula has been followed in US treaties and in some o f the treaties concluded by the 
Netherlands.
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economic or financial circumstances”61. The repatriation clause will usually include 
not only the profits that are made but also all other payments such as fees or other 
entitlements that are paid to the alien62. But if the property of the national is taken 
over and compensation is paid, there may be separate provision made for the 
repatriation of such compensation.
3.4.1.6. Nationalisation and Compensation
Nationalisation poses the greatest threat to foreign investment. Capital- 
exporting countries have sought to circumscribe the right of a state to nationalise 
foreign property by regarding at least certain types of taking of alien property as 
unlawful. Under international law a state has the right to nationalise foreign owned 
property provided certain conditions are met, namely that the taking of the investment 
is done for public purposes6-3, in accordance with the law64 and against compensation 
65. There is broad agreement that the right is subject to the payment of compensation. 
The treaties also seek to indicate that the provisions relating to expropriation apply not 
only to outright taking but also to “creeping expropriation”, or the slow erosion of the 
alien’s ownership rights through regulatory measures.
It is the issue of compensation, particularly the amount of payment, which is
61. For example, Singapore-United Kingdom Treaty (1982).
62. One problem with the right to repatriate relates to the fact that foreign investment often earns several 
times the capital that is invested. The net outflow from the host state is far greater than the initial 
inflow. When this situation eventuates, the host state will begin to have second thoughts about the 
unrestricted right o f repatriation o f profits but will be restricted by the bilateral investment treaty which 
imposes an obligation to permit repatriation. The treaty provision on repatriation is formulated in such a 
manner as not to permit the host country to resign from its obligation on this matter. This poses a 
potential for dispute between the treaty partners.
63. In the absence o f an internationally agreed upon definition, the notion of what in fact constitutes 
public purpose will to a considerable extent rest with the state concerned and it is hardly conceivable 
that it can be reviewed or contested by another organ. See Sornarajah, 1986 & 1994; Dolzer & Stevens, 
1995)
64. Nearly all BITs require that expropriations be effectuated under due process o f law. In an 
international instrument, the requirement would suggest that the investor for example has the right to 
advance notification and a fair hearing before the expropriation take place; and that the decision be 
taken by an unbiased official and after the passage of a reasonable period of time.
65. The draft UN Code o f Conduct on Transnational Corporations contains the following clause: It is 
acknowledged that States have the right to nationalise or expropriate the assets o f a transnational
174
the most contentious and controversial. Capital-exporting states, particularly the 
United States, have steadfastly adhered to the standard of “prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation”, the “Hull formula”66, as the standard of compensation that 
has to be satisfied in the event of nationalisation. The standard would require, at the 
very least, the payment of the full value of the property that had been taken over. The 
developing countries have collectively articulated the standard of “appropriate 
compensation”. They asserted that it would be a flexible standard that would permit a 
state to take into account factors such as the profits made by the foreign investor, the 
duration of the period during which profits were made and similar factors in assessing 
the compensation. Developing countries have also expressed the view that the tribunal 
of the host state should be the sole arbiters of the amount of compensation.
Given the existence of this conflict between states and the long-standing 
absence of agreement on this issue at the multilateral level, BITs have become the 
means by which parties could agree on the standard of compensation that is to be used 
between themselves. Therefore, BITs make law as between the parties but make no 
contribution to the formation of common norms of international law. BITs are not 
made with the aim of subscribing to the formulation of a uniform standard of 
compensation but rather are efforts by the parties to agree to a standard on which they 
would compensate in the event one of them nationalised the property of a national of 
the other.
One can see that there are wide divergences in bilateral investment treaties. 
But given the uncertainty that exists in international law on foreign investment, 
bilateral investment treaties will be looked upon as the best way of securing
corporation operating in their territories, and that adequate compensation is to be paid by the State 
concerned, in accordance with the applicable legal rules and principles.
66. In 1983, U.S. Secretary o f State Hull declared in correspondence to the Government o f Mexico that 
“under every rule o f law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for
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investment protection between parties. And this is the reason why BITs are currently 
accepted and increasingly concluded between states.
3.4.2 From Bilateral Investm ent Treaties to a M ultilateral Investment 
Agreement?
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), like other treaties, may lead to the creation 
of customary international law if the same standards of investment protection and 
other aspects of the agreements form a consistent or uniform pattern. But in the case 
of investment agreement, it seems the states making such treaties create lex sp ec ia lis t  
because of the uncertain state of existing international law on foreign investment, as 
well as variations in legal systems, legal ideology, conditions and bargaining between
/TO
the parties concerned . Especially most bilateral investment agreements refer to 
domestic law and also are often subject to provision in the domestic legal systems, and 
are prone to be interpreted differently by national courts. Thus the differences in 
formulation reduce the opportunity for common standards emerging from such treaties 
69, because the diversity of the investment agreements causes differences in standards 
and practices among each party to those agreements. The absence of standard norms 
may allow TNCs to gain advantages from “treaty shopping”. Even if every state 
agrees to conclude bilateral investment treaties with each other for governing foreign 
investment, thousands of BITs would have to be signed. And thus under the current 
situation the same country may have different practices in relation to different parties 
depending on the bargaining position and legal system of each party, e.g. the problem 
of different definitions and identification of corporate nationality. Some rely on the
whatever purpose without provision for prompt, adequate and effective payment therefore”.
67 Salacuse, J. W. (1990) “BIT by BIT” International Lawyer. 24 issue 655. p. 660. Salacuse stated that 
the purpose o f the treaties was to establish “specific legal rules” as between the parties.
68. See Muchlinski, 1995, chapter 17, p. 639. and Somarajah, 1994, chapter 6, p. 227.
69 Somarajah, M. (1986) “State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties” Journal o f  W orld 
Trade Law  No. 79. He argued that “despite o f the growth in the number o f bilateral investment treaties, 
there has been no reason to change this conclusion.... It is premature to regard these treaties as creating 
customary law”.
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criteria of incorporation or constitution, some regard the seat of the corporation, and 
some determine the nationality by judging the control of the corporation. In addition, 
differences in the definition of investment have resulted in differences in protection 
right coverage.
Therefore, some have argued that bilateral investment agreements are 
insufficient in the integrated global economy that needs an agreed set of standards and 
rules to regulate international investment activities. Even though BITs have been 
increasing and supposing that countries will accept the same standard and rules to be 
incorporated into the BITs, this does not mean that BITs are suitable instruments 
governing international investment. Hence, it may be time to re-think a suitable 
regulatory regime in this field. Instead of concluding thousands of BITs, should states 
turn to the agreed set of rules governing international investment, which nowadays is 
becoming a globally integrated network? The problem is how to create a proper 
multilateral investment agreement that is appropriate to the global economy. The 
difficulties involved have been revealed by the failure of the OECD countries to reach 
agreement on the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) even after 
seven years of negotiation up to 1998.
Recently, OECD countries worked on drafting a multilateral agreement on 
investment to provide a strong and comprehensive multilaterally legal framework, 
rules and regulation for international investment in order to facilitate the global freer 
investment regime, to assure non-discriminatory treatment and to protect foreign 
investment. In other words the MAI sought to minimise or eliminate barriers to 
foreign investment and also widen the scope of existing liberalisation and provide 
legal security for international investors. The proposed Agreement aimed to ‘level the 
playing field’ and ease market access, essentially by embodying the principle of
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national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment in the context of a multilateral 
investment agreement.
The existence of regional grouping in various parts of the world that 
implemented economic integration enhance the possibility of creation of common 
standards of regulation of foreign investment that gradually harmonises the 
fragmented practice and different principles espoused by different countries. For 
instance, ASEAN countries entered into an ASEAN investment agreement; NAFTA 
member countries are bound by chapter XI of the NAFTA agreement, which covers 
investment issues. The EU has implemented deep economic integration. The wide 
existence of regional investment agreements means a narrowing of the regulatory 
differences among nation states.
It was considered appropriate to negotiate a MAI at the OECD and between 
developed countries, because they are host and home countries of international 
investment that accounts for two-third of the world investment flows. This would 
however influence and inevitably affect the rest of the world, especially when 
investors from developed countries require the same rules and standards implemented 
world-wide. If any developing host countries lack high standards of investment 
protection or do not comply with the rules and regulation of MAI those countries may 
be disadvantaged in determinants of foreign investment. This important impact on 
developing countries would have forced them to accept the MAI in the end, even if 
most of them were not participants in the negotiation.
3.5 The Proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
It is important to analyse the background and substance of the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment, even though it was ended in the OECD, as it may be revived under 
WTO because of the strong support of especially of the EU and Japan. Secondly I
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suggest the reform and revision of the MAI for coping with the problems that might 
be encountered by host countries, especially the weak countries. And finally I 
conclude that the global economy needs a new international investment regime and a 
proper global regulatory framework to regulate international investment. ASEAN may 
gain advantages from this revised framework agreement and it could be used as an 
investment instrument by ASEAN countries in implementing the AIA substituting the 
current ASEAN BITs.
3.5.1 Background to the MAI
The MAI was developed by the OECD states, in particular the European 
Commission, EU member states, the US and other industrialised countries. They 
wanted more extensive rules on foreign investment than those recently agreed under 
TRIMS and GATS of the WTO. They were also keen to see the MAI extended to 
developing countries, and eventually being used as a model for future rules in the
70WTO . But many developing countries were highly critical of the MAI, as they saw it 
as an abrogation of their sovereignty. They are also strongly opposed to it being 
discussed in the WTO, which they see as being dominated by developed countries. 
They believe that, if investment issues are to be discussed, it should be done in a body 
in which the voices of developing countries are stronger, such as UNCTAD, because 
the mandate of this organisation is to discuss development issues, and has included 
regulation of investment and TNCs. It could also be done by a joint effort of 
UNCTAD and the WTO, or by setting up a new forum/institution.
The declared rationale for the MAI was to free foreign investment and to 
protect foreign investors by asserting national treatment and the most-favoured-nation
70. As a 1996 paper by the International Chamber o f  Commerce stated “The preponderance of 
restrictions on foreign investment is outside the OECD area....Business needs the benefits o f an 
international regime to include the fast growing countries o f Asia, central and eastern Europe and Latin 
America”.
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treatment so that foreign investors will be treated equally both among foreigners and 
between them and local investors. A comprehensive set of multilateral rules for 
investment provided for:
•  national treatment, both before and after establishment;
•  repatriation o f  profits, dividends, rents and the proceeds o f liquidated investment;
•  transparency o f regulations;
• a mechanism o f consultation to deal with complaints;
•  peer view to promote rollback o f remaining restrictions.
The MAI aimed to set standards for equal competitive opportunities and 
provided stable and consistent treatment of FDI across all sectors.
However, these objectives of the MAI that sounded good may turn out to be 
poisonous as the draft MAI had many gaps and loopholes to be corrected. Especially,
the MAI would have encountered problems if it were extended to developing
countries. Now I turn to discuss the content of the MAI and its implications.
3.5.2 The Content of MAI and its Implications
3.5.2.1 Definition of Investment and Investors
MAI defined investment very broadly to include any kind of property or 
contractual right to assets or money, owned directly or indirectly by the investor71. 
This would include, for example, claims to intellectual property, financial derivatives, 
and possibly real estate. Investors72 covered by MAI were nationals or residents of
71 Art. II scope and application, sub 2 investment means: (i) an enterprise (being a legal person or any 
other entity constituted or organised under the applicable law o f the Contracting Party, whether or not 
for profit, and whether private or government owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, branch, joint venture, association or organisation); (ii) shares, stocks or 
other forms o f equity participation in an enterprise, and right derives therefrom; (iii) bonds, debenture, 
loans and other form o f debt, and rights derived therefrom; (iv) rights under contracts, including 
turnkey, construction, management, production or revenue-sharing contracts; (v) claims to money and 
claims to performance; (vi) intellectual property right; (vii) rights conferred pursuant to law or contract 
such as concession, licenses, authorisations, and permits; (viii) any other tangible and intangible, 
movable and immovable property, and any related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and 
pledges.
72 . Art. 11, sub 1 investor means: (i) a natural person having the nationality of, or who is permanently 
residing in, a Contracting Party in accordance with it applicable law; or (ii) a legal person or any other 
entity constituted or organised under the applicable law of a Contracting Party, whether or not for
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member states, or any legal entities as companies formed under their laws. Assets 
would be protected if owned or controlled by such investors whether directly or 
indirectly owned. The inclusion of indirectly owned assets would cover capital routed 
through a company incorporated in a tax haven or an offshore financial centre, even 
one with lax regulation and strong secrecy. Thus, for instance, MAI would protect 
speculation in financial derivatives by hedge funds incorporated in tax havens, like the 
Bahamas, if its shareholders are residents of an MAI member country7-5.
Regarding investors' rights, the MAI strongly protected such rights in legally 
binding form, backed by direct access to international arbitration. Many considered 
that this would bring international law into the service of the powerful and 
economically strong, while the poor and economically weak were entirely neglected. 
It failed to balance the granting of rights with any acknowledgement of 
responsibilities for social improvement, human rights or the protection of the natural 
environment74.
3.5.2.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanism
MAI not only granted the rights for state to state arbitration of disputes but 
also for the corporations to bring claims against state governments over any breach of 
MAI provisions which caused loss or damage to the investors or an investment. 
However, there was no corresponding right provided for the governments, 
communities, or citizens to counter-claim for damages caused by the investor. In 
effect this gives the investor a status not just equal but superior to the governments 
and the people they are supposed to represent. National laws and regulation as well as
profit, and whether private or government owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association or organisation.
7j Oxfam (1997) Oxfam briefing paper “The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)”. 
Mimeograph.
74 See Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth (eds.) (1999) Regulating International Business B eyond  
Liberalisation. London: Macmillan Press. (See chapter 4, 5 and 6).
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economic policy legally and validly established will be overridden by the rights 
created by the MAI.
3.5.2.3 National Foreign Investment Laws and Regulations 
If MAI had been agreed, it would have removed virtually all remaining 
national policy tools for regulating foreign investment. Obviously, this would restrict 
the ability o f governments to regulate foreign investment for the common good in the 
same way as before, mainly geared towards supporting national economic policy and 
development plans as well as focusing on the development of key areas, both 
geographical and of business sectors. Moreover, unlike the GATT, MAI does not 
contain any general exceptions from MAI rules (general exceptions would exclude 
specific kinds of government measures, which in the MAI were mainly limited to 
national security and perhaps public order)71'. Instead, the MAI allowed only country- 
specific exceptions, which required contracting parties wishing to preserve their 
sovereignty to regulate specific area of laws to identify any such measures that deviate 
from the MAI’s NT and MFN obligation. These exemptions must be negotiated and 
agreed with the other contracting parties prior to signature or accession. Country 
specific exceptions are subject to “standstill” . Therefore MAI did not provide an 
effective “exceptions clause” for national laws to protect matters such as human rights 
and human or animal health and the environment77.
This is a very important issue for developing countries as they are weak vis-a- 
vis powerful TNCs78. Their ability to impose control is vital to prevent TNCs 
expropriating excessive economic benefits from investments in these countries and to
75. See Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth (eds.) (1999: 95-96).
76. See Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth (eds.) (1999: 95, 128).
77. See Picciotto, Sol and Mayne, Ruth (eds.) (1999) chapter 4, 5, 6, especially see the discussion on the
Country-Specific Exception and the Non-Lowering o f Standard clause p, 76.
78 . This is due to the high need of capital, and also their poverty may make them vulnerable to the 
problem such as corruption. Moreover, they might accept the “race to the bottom” policy to lax laws
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help them compete on more balanced terms in highly unequal global markets. Thus 
the abrogation of host developing countries’ sovereignty to regulate foreign 
investment could be a serious problem for their economies and particularly their 
people. Powerful TNCs can often escape from their responsibilities to victims of 
disasters from wrongful operations and evasion of domestic laws. The Bhopal case in
79India was an example .
In addition, the fierce competition for FDI among developing countries to 
attract inflow capital makes them relax laws and regulations to pamper foreign 
investors. It is even worse when this situation combines with corrupt officers who 
ignore the breach of laws and also the lax enforcement of laws and regulations80. All 
these factors could further exacerbate the poverty of developing countries.
3.5.2.4 National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
The declared objective of MAI was to ensure that governments treat foreign- 
owned and nationally-owned investors equally. The national and MFN treatment 
principles would apply to the acquisition, establishment and operational activities of 
all investors. This sounded fair, however MAI went beyond these principles and 
provided elaborate legal provisions giving special treatment for investors. They were 
to be given treatment "no less favourable than" nationals of the host state, this 
allowing the continuation of special privileges such as investment incentives and tax 
breaks.
A very sensitive issue was that the MAI would have eliminated most 
restrictions on foreign investors entering sensitive sectors. Almost all ASEAN
and regulations for attracting inflows of investment or in other words to pamper foreign investors.
79. Union Carbine Corporation, Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, in December 1984 (1987) 26 ILM 
1008 US 2nd Circuit Court o f Appeals. Also see Upendra, Baxi and Thomas, Paul (1986) M ass 
D isasters and M ultinational Liability: The BhopalCase. London: Maxwell Ltd., and see Upendra, Baxi 
(1986) Inconvenient Forum and Convenient C astastrophe: The Bhopal Case. London: Maxwell.
80 . Their poverty may make them vulnerable to problem such as corruption, which generally occurs in
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governments have restrictions on foreign ownership of key industries or sensitive 
sectors, or require approvals for such acquisitions, or insist that they be carried out as 
joint ventures with local investors or government bodies. And most FDIs are subject 
to screening measures to prevent entry of harmful FDI and to protect essential national 
interests, social values, culture and national heritage for the nation. These include 
preserving indigenous professions, fishing stocks, agriculture, natural resources, etc. 
that need to be carefully managed for the long term benefit of local people and not 
exploited for short term gain by TNCs. Even developed countries also protect their
o i
interests where they are considered to be harmed by FDI .
The MAFs provisions would have prevented governments from restricting 
foreign ownership, unless specific national exclusions were agreed by the other 
contracting parties. The MAI could also prevent countries from applying controls on 
foreign investors even if their activities conflict with a country's development 
objectives, or might be ecologically, socially or culturally damaging. Local health and 
environmental protection laws could also be questioned if they were considered 
discriminatory by foreign investors.
3.5.2.5 Performance Requirements
MAI prohibited performance requirements, especially imposed by developing 
countries, while some types of performance requirements implemented by developed 
countries would have been allowed, if made as a condition of an advantage given by 
the most government. Thus strong OECD members could be able to negotiate with 
foreign investors. In fact, performance requirements are designed to achieve minimum 
levels of local employment, investment, exports and proportion of locally-sourced 
materials, or to insist on joint ventures and technology transfer.
poor developing countries.
81. For example, the UK requested an exemption from the MAI on broadcast media and France sought
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On the other hand, foreign investors are to be given the right to bring in 
essential employees, which can be broadly interpreted to cover “who is essential to the 
enterprise”82. Investors can also employ whomever, regardless of nationality. This will 
override national labour and immigration laws. Presently, developing countries have 
requirements that investors must employ a certain proportion of locals or train local 
people to take over from foreign specialists, but such requirements would have been 
threatened by this provision. This alarmed developing countries of the potential threats 
of unemployment problems, and undermining of transfer of technology, management 
expertise, technical operation skills and other advantages that host countries should 
obtain from FDI.
3.5.2.6 Protection and Compensation
States would have been obliged to provide full and constant protection and 
security to foreign investors and also to provide compensation in the event of 
nationalisation or any kind of expropriation affecting property rights. The wide 
meaning of “measures having an equivalent effect” may cover taxation, and some 
environmental regulations. The right to compensation could override the state’s right 
to tax. Compensation was to be at full market value plus interest in convertible 
currency even though the assets may have been bought at below market prices. 
Foreign investors have the right to freely transfer any derivatives from investment 
including dividends, interest, and all types of payments. Absolute freedom for 
investors and speculators to move funds causes major problems for individual 
countries8-5 and can also be destabilising regionally and even globally. This needs 
more concerted international effort to restrict damaging flows of short-term and
protection from overseas investment, especially from Hollywood, in their film industries.
. MAI also grants the rights to “key personnel” to bring their family into host state and “grant 
authorisation to work to their family” too.
83. This is clearly evidenced by the financial crisis in Thailand and, some years ago, in Mexico.
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speculative funds. The regulation of financial markets and activities is essential. 
Developing countries with weak legislation and enforcement mechanisms are 
particularly vulnerable to unscrupulous investors.
3.5.2.7 Taxation and Restrictive Business Practice
The MAI left the taxation issue, such as international tax avoidance, entirely to 
each state acting alone. Thus it is developing countries, with their weak capacity and 
lack of access to information from parent companies, that are least able to challenge 
transfer pricing and other forms of tax avoidance. Also MAI contained no provisions 
relating to the avoidance of restrictive business practices. This would favour TNCs, 
which have superior commercial and technological capacity in relation to domestic 
competitors and may be able to abuse their dominant market position that includes 
predatory pricing and anti-competitive acquisitions.
3.6 Revision of the MAI
3.6.1 Voice from D eveloping Countries
Since MAI would have been a new form of global regulatory framework for 
conducting foreign investment in the integrated global economy, it inevitably involved 
nation states including developing countries. Despite the failure to reach agreement at 
the OECD, several states have now proposed a modified version to be negotiated at 
the WTO. It has been argued that the global integrated production systems and 
management of TNCs networks cannot function well in a fragmented regulatory 
framework. On the other hand, it is more difficult for nation states to control and 
regulate global TNCs with different standards of treatment. In addition, if TNCs from 
OECD countries, which govern more than 80% of world investment and cover more 
than 70% of world trade, can enjoy higher standards of protection and more freedom 
of establishment and operation in host developed countries, the proportion of FDI
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flowing to developing countries may decline even further. Given the power of TNCs 
and the need of developing countries for capital, it is not difficult to press those 
developing countries to accept a MAI. Under these circumstances developing 
countries should have more role in shaping the “agreed set of rules” in the 
international investment laws. The broadening of the MAI consultative process to 
include developing countries government and relevant non-govemmental actors is 
essential. This would allow representatives of those people affected by international 
investment decisions to voice their concerns directly.
3.6.2 Legal Right for Citizens and Com m unities, Responsibility o f TNCs
Liberalisation of trade and investment has been enshrined and it is well 
accepted that free trade and investment will bring about common interest to all 
countries. This ideology is established but nevertheless freedom must go together with 
responsibility and fair justification for development objectives. Freedom without 
limitation will cause a more vicious society. Then a MAI should not just provide 
guarantees for FDI protection and freer investment but should also include 
responsibility of TNCs to the host countries as well. The balance of freedom and 
responsibility should go together, or in other words the right of investors should be 
balanced by responsibilities. For instance, TNCs’ responsibility to comply with 
domestic laws on environment protection, labour laws, health and consumer 
protection. MAI should also place binding obligation on investors covering taxation 
and competition policy and restrictive business practices. Social and environmental 
obligations on TNCs are very essential to the host countries.
Moreover, a desirable MAI should protect the right of the people affected by 
investments such as workers, consumers and communities where factories are located. 
The reason MAI should protect these rights is because MAI should balance the rights
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and responsibility o f  TNCs, and the responsibilities o f  TNCs towards host states 
and/or their people affected by TNCs’ operation should be clearly defined in the MAI 
so that the victims can directly and equally exercise their rights based on the same 
legal instrument. If the victims need to seek solutions by other means or need to refer 
the case to other legal instrument or procedure, it would be difficult to jointly enforce 
such different legal instruments for the same case. And this would be a lopedsided
84legal development of MAI . Unsafe working conditions, dangerous products, and
pollution may be caused by the operations of TNCs, which need their responsibilities
to be properly dealt with. Since the MAI creates rights for investors enforceable both
under local law and by international arbitration, local people also need to be given the
right to bring claims directly against the investor. They should also be given the right
to present their cases to any tribunal considering a state-state or investor-state dispute,
either as affected persons or as representative organisations. This will ensure the right
of the person affected by foreign investment to seek remedy from investors.
3.6.3 Sovereignty o f G overnm ent to Regulate Foreign Investment for the 
Public Good
MAI should provide exemptions, which would guarantee the rights of 
governments to regulate investment in key sectors for the public good. No one can 
anticipate what will happen if foreign investors are allowed to control the whole 
economy of host countries without guaranteeing the right of government to oversee 
activities of such foreign investment.
3.7 Conclusion: How to Respond to the Changing Global Economy 
and Regulatory Regime
Foreign direct investment plays a particularly important role in facilitating an
international division of labour that takes advantage of international trade
84 However, for a contrary view see Henderson, David (1999).
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opportunities. It does this because it increases the mobility of factors of production; 
not only capital but also, probably more importantly, technology, managerial skills 
and other know-how. It also brings with it market access for exports of components to 
global production systems and for exports of finished products to distribution system. 
Thus, the global liberal international investment and trading regimes are a 
complementary and mutually reinforcing engine for the generation and distribution of 
wealth and incomes more evenly around the world.
The growth of inherited assets and technological progress, which are the main 
ingredients of economic growth, are raising the created-to-natural asset ratio of 
economic activity. Simultaneously, because of the imperfections in the markets for 
created assets, the relative significance of transaction costs to production costs 
(discussed in section 3.1.2) is increasing and because of the rising costs of creating 
new assets and the increasing competition for global markets, firms are being 
compelled to globalise their value-added chains, including the sourcing of their inputs 
and the sale of their final products.
The important concern here is how ASEAN states should respond to the 
changing global economy and regulatory regime for foreign investment: the emerging 
new WTO rules such as GATS and TRIMs, and especially the emerging MAI. This 
signals to ASEAN countries the need to re-evaluate their current national investment 
laws and economic policy to cope with the difficulties they might encounter. They 
have to consider these factors together.
The changing global economic and legal environment as well as its closed 
economic ties with the countries outside the region prompt ASEAN countries to 
liberalise investment at a regional level to accommodate the new pattern of the 
international integrated production system fuelled by the TNCs. In order to facilitate
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the implementation of ASEAN open regional investment area, ASEAN countries need 
to liberalise their investment regime correspondingly. Therefore, their national 
investment laws and regulations as well as ASEAN BITs, which are the international 
legal framework governing foreign investment, need to be changed/developed. 
Especially, ASEAN BITs, like other BITs, are lex specialis and their terms and 
conditions vary considerably. In this context, ASEAN countries retain considerable 
flexibility in deciding on the pace and extent of “opening” to foreign investment. 
However, the emergence of the proposed MAI implies that ASEAN may need to 
change their investment laws more dramatically to comply with it.
In conclusion, to respond to the changing global economy, ASEAN countries 
have to improve their “created” as well as “natural” assets because they are the 
determinants of FDI. To respond to the emerging global regulatory regime for foreign 
investment, ASEAN countries have to balance liberalisation, competition and 
responsibility of foreign investors.
In GATT/WTO, ASEAN countries need to take a greater role in the revision of 
the TRIMs and GATS as well as in the creation of international competition rules that 
would be included in WTO in the next round of multilateral negotiation. Seen from 
the global scenario in both legal and economic aspects, ASEAN countries need to 
strengthen their investment regime to include competition laws in order to ensure 
advantages from liberalisation (discuss in chapter 6). The next chapter will analyse the 
investment regime of ASEAN countries, bilateral and multilateral investment 
agreements concluded by these countries for evaluating legal environment for FDI in 
the region in order to improve ASEAN investment laws and regulations, also to 
consider how do national laws of ASEAN countries actually further the process of 
open regionalism.
Chapter 4
The Investment Regime in ASEAN Countries1
Introduction
The analysis in chapter 3 offers a clear picture of the interaction of legal and economic 
factors in FDI policy, and the international investment regime, focusing on BITs and 
the emerging concept to establish multilateral rules governing international investment 
in the form of a MAI. Within these episodes of evolution and development ASEAN 
countries have gone through the process of FDI policy changes and legal adjustments 
to accommodate the changing global legal and economic environment. The pace of 
investment liberalisation taken by these countries was clearly influenced and affected 
by the interaction of legal and economic factors in the international sphere, and by a 
combination of their economic relations outside the region and their own economic 
policies.
In this chapter, I will focus on analysing ASEAN countries’ investment 
regimes i.e. national investment laws, BITs, and regional investment agreement based 
on the theoretical background analysed in the previous chapter. This will show how 
national laws of the ASEAN countries actually further the process of open 
regionalism, or how they need to adjust their laws and policies in order to facilitate the 
achievement of such aims. I will firstly discuss the ASEAN countries’ national 
investment laws followed by the analysis of the actual ASEAN BITs entered into with 
the European countries and the US, the main home countries of inflow investment to 
the region, and compare them with the ASEAN regional investment agreement. The 
comparison among the ASEAN BITs, and also with ASEAN regional investment
1 The analysis in this chapter is by the author based on the compilation o f ASEAN laws by various 
sources i.e. CCH Asia, APEC, ESCAP and ASEAN Secretariat. There is a paucity o f  up-to-date
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agreement emphasises the nature of the BITs as a lex specialis that allows flexibility 
of ASEAN countries in liberalising investment. However, as mentioned in chapter 3, 
the feasibility of a MAI prompts ASEAN countries to adjust their laws and policy to 
comply with its standard if ASEAN countries would accept a MAI that would 
establish a new and higher multinational standard of investment liberalisation and 
protection. This might be seen as an instrument accelerating the process of open 
regionalism.
Since the 1980s ASEAN countries have embarked on significant reforms of 
their investment regimes. These investment liberalisation initiatives were undertaken 
unilaterally . They have occurred due to the recognition of the benefits of a degree of 
liberalisation and competition in response to change in the international climate, rather 
than due to the requirements of regional or international agreements. However, by 
1995 ASEAN countries were conforming to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) to eliminate trade-related performance requirements. 
Controls of FDI in ASEAN countries, however, remained quite extensive and 
complex'5. The policy instruments include the following:
secondary literature in this topic.
2. All ASEAN countries gradually liberalise investment regulations step by step, aspect by aspect, and 
sector by sector without entering into any agreement for each liberalisation at the time. For instance, 
Indonesia launched various liberalisation packages: the January package o f 1984: tax reform; the April 
package o f  1985: shipping and customs reform; the May package o f 1986: import and investment 
reform; the October package of 1986: sole importer and duty reform; the December package o f 1987: 
opened up the tourism sector to foreign investors and relaxing the extension o f divestment programme 
and relaxed the equity share of foreign investors in joint venture companies which export at least 65% 
of their production; the October and December package of 1988 : banking, capital markets, import and 
export reforms; the policy of May 1989: re-issued negative list which more open; the May o f 1990: 
simplification o f licensing and permit procedures; the June package o f 1991: trade and investment 
reform; the July package o f 1992: investment, trade, financial and manpower reform; the May package 
of 1993: banking reform; the June package o f 1993: trade, industry and investment reform; the October 
package o f 1993: trade, investment and environment; and the June package o f 1994: simplification o f  
the license and permit procedures.
3 The analysis in this section is based on national investment laws o f ASEAN countries, country study
on investment regime o f APEC member economies, and a study o f the relevant national laws, also a
study compiled in D oing Business in Asia. Published by CCH Asia Limited. The individual ASEAN  
country's laws in this loose-leaf are provided by (a) Indonesia: William A. Sullivan; (b) Malaysia: 
Yoong Nim Chor; (c) The Philippines: Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan; (d) Singapore: Drew & 
Napier; (e) Thailand: Baker & Mckenzie (Thailand)
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•  restrictions on entry and establishment;
•  restrictions on the level o f foreign ownership permitted;
•  special treatment o f foreign investors;
• operational restrictions such as local content requirements and minimum export levels;
•  investment incentives such as tax concessions.
In addition, there are many other policies that influence FDI such as tariff and 
other trade barriers, the lack of competition rules and policy, and the degree and type 
of protection of intellectual property rights.
Table 1 summarises the regulations of FDI in ASEAN countries and shows the 
main characteristics of investment regulations of these countries, on which the 
analysis of ASEAN national investment laws is based.
Table 1
Summary of the Regulations of FDI in ASEAN Countries




Restricted Sector P e r f o r m a n c e
Requirements
Tax Incentives
Indonesia subject to negative three types o f land 23 restricted local content priority sectors,
Law No. 1. 1967 lists rights available sectors and 12 requirements and Pioneer
Law No. 11,1979 prohibited sectors. export Industries
Law No.6,1968 (Law No. 1 of (Presidential including retail performance
Law No. 12, 1970 1967. Decree No. Decree No. 34 of and wholesale requirements in ( Law No. 6,
Govt regulation. 54 o f '.993, 1992) trade, radio and various sectors 1968, Act No.
Presidential Foreign television (Presidential 12, 1970,
Decrees, Investment Act broadcasting Decree No. 54, Guidelines o f
Ministerial 1994) 1993, Decree of the Capital
Regulations, (Presidential the Ministry of Investment Co­
Decision, Decree Decree No. 54 of Industry No. ordinating
o f Investment Co­ 1993. Foreign 114/M/SK/1993, Board
ordinating Board Investment Act Decree of the




Malaysia depending on No restriction certain parts or local content Pioneer Status,
The Promotion of proportion of components requirements in depending on
Investment Act production (except for some industries motor vehicles, local content
(PI A) o f 1986, exported threats to export linkages, value
The Industrial Co­ environment) (ICA 1975) requirement added, MTS
ordination Act (ICA 1975, M1TI depending on ratio, export
(ICA) of 1975, regulations) level of foreign oriented
revised in 1986, equity manufacture,
M1TI Regulations, technology,
The Foreign (ICA 1975, M1TI R&D and HRD








Philippines subject to negative Lease right, up to retail trade, mass local content Investment
Foreign lists 75 years, hold media, requirement, incentives
Investments Act (Foreign land subject to engineering, rice export Tax and Non-
o f 1991 R.A. 7042 Investment Act o f approval and and com performance Tax incentives
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ASEAN countries still maintain an approval procedure for foreign investment, 
but they have mostly introduced the ‘one stop service’ concept and implement strict 
time limits to process applications. Some have enacted new laws that explicitly 
welcome FDI. Indonesia eliminated the minimum capital requirement, introduced a 
‘one stop service’ and a greater regional autonomy for approval. Malaysia introduced
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a Promotion of Investment Act4. The Philippines enacted a new foreign investment 
law5, and Thailand has permitted the foreign ownership of land6. I will deal with the 
different types of controls separately, although there is inevitably some overlap in 
practice. The following sections will focus on ASEAN national investment laws, 
country by country, to provide the actual national laws and regulation governing 
foreign investment. The four main areas are discussed i.e. entry approval procedure, 
company administration and control; ownership limits and restricted sectors; 
performance requirements; and investment incentives. I will firstly make a survey of 
all actual ASEAN countries’ national laws and regulations. We will find that the 
pattern of ASEAN national investment laws, and the rationale behind such laws and 
regulations are all the same that are also based on the same economic theoretical 
approach (discussed below). I will provide an analytical conclusion at the end of these 
sections.
4.1 Entry Approval Procedures, Company Administration and 
Control
ASEAN countries have long had a policy of screening foreign investments in order to
4. The Promotion o f Investment Act 1986 provided an investment promotion package for foreign 
investors such as Pioneer Status for the company, Investment Tax allowance, Industrial adjustment 
allowance, Abatement of adjusted income, Export allowance, Export Credit Refinancing Scheme, 
Double deduction o f expenses for promotion o f exports, Double deduction o f export credit insurance 
premiums, Industrial building allowance, Incentives for research and development.
5. Foreign Investments Act of 1991 R.A 7042 as amended by R.A 8179.
6. Foreigners (and even Thai ladies married to a foreigner) may not own land outright, but only limited 
rights (e.g. a 30-year lease). However, the Land Code provides that aliens may acquire land by virtue o f  
the provisions o f a treaty giving the right to own immovable properties and subject to the provisions of 
this Code, and subject to limitations on rights over land for religious purposes. Under the 1999 
amended Land Code aliens may now acquire land for residence, commerce, industry, agriculture, 
burial, public charity or religion under the conditions and procedures prescribed in Ministerial 
Regulations and with the permission of the Minister. The Thai Cabinet recently approved (a) a draft 
amendment Bill to the Land Code that would allow foreigners to own not more than I Rai (1,600 sqm.) 
o f land for residential purpose with the approval o f the Ministry o f  Interior, and (b) a draft Bill on 
Condominium that would allow foreigners as much as 100% ownership o f condominium in certain 
projects, subject to various conditions. Also the Industrial Estate Authority o f Thailand Act allows 
aliens, at the Authority’s discretion, to own land within an estate area so as to enable them to carry on 
their business activities. There are two categories o f industrial estate: general industrial zone and export 
processing zones. Also under Petroleum Act o f 1971 oil concessionaires are allowed to hold land. 
There is also discretion available to the Board o f Investment (BOI) when granting a promotion 
certificate under the Investment Promotion Act to permit an alien to hold land for the purposes of
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ensure that all investments do no harm and fully contribute to their economies in 
accordance with their economic development plan (see Table 2 summary of ASEAN 
countries' investment measures, p. 270), so they stipulate approval procedures and 
require foreign investors to report or notify their business activities to the government. 
Registration of a company is sometimes required as a pre-requisite for seeking 
promotion approval from the government. Conversely, in some cases a corporation 
will be registered only if it is granted promotion approval from the relevant authority. 
There are some conditions to fulfil prior to receiving the approval.
4.1.1 Indonesia
Indonesia has an approval and investment review process applicable to foreign 
investors. The criterion for approving FDI will be considered by the types and forms 
of business. The first will be based on a negative investment list7 (the FDI must not 
engage in business prohibited by the negative list), the second will require foreign 
investors to form business firms in according to the laws which can be registered as a 
joint venture. Moreover, any company that wishes to do business categorised as 
important to the state and public services, such as port services, and generation and 
transmission as well as distribution of electric power for public use, 
telecommunications, atomic energy reactors and mass media, must do so through a 
joint venture where the share of the Indonesian partners shall be at least 5% of the 
entire paid up capital of the company at the time of establishment.
In Indonesia, a foreign-owned business must be incorporated under the 
Indonesian law8 in the form of PT (perseroan terbatas)9 and it is called a “foreign
carrying on business.
7 Law No. 1 o f 1967 concerning Foreign Investment, and established by the President Decree No. 54 of 
1993 which replaces the negative investment list year 1992. Also see APEC Committee on Trade and 
Investment (CTI) (1998) Guide to the Investment Regim e o f  the A PE C  M em ber Economies. Singapore: 
APEC.
8. Art. 3 o f  The Foreign Investment Act. And also Art. 7 o f the Compulsory Registration o f Companies
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company” (perusahaan penanaman modal asing) in order to distinguish it from
domestic companies. The formal requirements for the establishment of a subsidiary of
a foreign company is that it should be a joint venture10 with one or more national
corporations. A company in which the percentage of the foreign-owned equity is 51%
or more, has to appoint a local agent as its distributor11. Moreover, a foreign-owned
company cannot be registered under Indonesian law if it is involved in the business
12areas closed to foreign investors . The Capital Investment Co-ordinating Board 
(BKPM) has the authority to approve/reject all foreign investments. It will examine 
the investment proposal, then issue a temporary letter of approval to all relevant 
administrative or regulatory bodies. If any such body considers that there is a problem 
with the proposed foreign investment then it would be rejected. If not, a temporary 
approval letter will be submitted to the President, who then issues a decree of 
approval. Soon after the Presidential decree is issued, the BKPM will issue eight 
permits1'5 to the company which give it the opportunity to start its business. The
Act No. 3, 1982 provided that agents and subsidiaries o f foreign companies must comply with the same 
procedure for incorporation as local companies established under the Act.
9. The Ministerial Regulation and the Circular letter issued by the Ministry o f Justice on 26th April 1967 
“Establishment o f a PT”. Circular J.A. 5/31/24, 26th April 1967, and Art. 35 to 36 o f the Commercial 
Code, which regulated the fee for establishing a PT by a foreign company. However, there is no 
regulation which mentions how much money must be paid in total to the Indonesian government on 
incorporation o f such a company. The rule just provided that it has to form a PT. In practice, the most 
expensive component o f the whole cost is charged by the notary, who charges a fee on the basis o f a 
percentage p f the authorised capital o f the company to be incorporated.
10. For a foreign partner, the government’s guideline states that a minimum foreign capital investment is 
US$ 250,000 as long as the joint venture company is in the labour intensive export oriented economic 
sector and operates a large enterprise.
". There is a special restriction relating to foreign control o f business in Indonesia. Foreign controlled 
export or import business cannot exist in Indonesia. Thus foreign companies are not allowed to trade 
into or out o f Indonesia even trade within Indonesia is prohibited and they need to appoint a local agent 
for marketing. However, foreign companies established under the Foreign Capital Investment Act can 
import machinery, equipment or materials for their own use, but not for trade.
12. Art. 6 o f the Foreign Investment Act stipulates areas o f the economy which are closed to foreign 
investment if it involves full foreign control. These areas are those which are essential to the state and 
governing the life and the living condition o f the public such as: port, harbours; production, 
transmission and distribution o f electric power to the public; telecommunications; shipping; aviation; 
supplying of drinking water; public railways; development o f atomic energy; mass media; and 
industries performing a vital function in national defence, such as the production o f arms, ammunition, 
explosives, and war equipment.
13. The eight permits are as follows: the permanent letter o f approval; a licence for processing raw 
materials; an identification number for conducting limited import and export; a licence for limited
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regional BKPM or the regional government will issue four other permits which are a 
location or site permit; a land right (a right to build, or to use land); a building permit; 
and a permit to comply with regulations as required by the Public Nuisance Ordinance 
for all business. Foreign companies also have to comply with the Environment Act of 
198214. After that, general control13 of foreign investment is exercised by the Deputy 
for Supervision of Implementation Controls of the BKPM16.
Indonesia’s foreign investment legislation and regulations could be changed, 
amended or replaced at any time by other legislation or regulations, and theoretically, 
they could be changed retroactively. In most ASEAN countries this has never 
occurred. However, recent changes have been made in Indonesia in respect of tax 
holiday facilities for foreign investment, which have affected foreign investors who 
were running their business before the new legislation came into force.
Indonesian law requires divestment of foreign ownership of companies. 
During the first stage, the newly established foreign company may have foreign equity
domestic purchase; a product or services trading licence; a tax and duty exemption permit; a work 
permit for foreign expatriates; a right o f exploitation if the foreign venture involves agricultural and 
fishing activities.
14. The 1982 Act conferred authority for protection o f the environment on the Ministry o f Population, 
Management and Environment, which co-ordinates with the Ministry o f Health, the Ministry of 
Industry, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All o f these bodies will examine and assess the 
environmental impact of a proposal and provide input to the co-ordinating Ministry. Normally 
proposals are accepted subject to negotiation between the government and the investors. Regarding 
pollution standards, Indonesia has not promulgated any general standards in relation to air, land or 
water pollution. Discharges are allowed based on the negotiation between government and the 
polluters. It is notable that there are no incentives under Indonesian Law for establishing non-polluting 
plants or encouraging non-polluting activities. Since Indonesia lacks clear regulations on environment 
protection and control of emissions relies on negotiation between government and the polluters, the 
system is inefficient and may lead to bribery and corruption. D oing Business in Asia: Indonesia, 1998.
15. Apart from the general function of control and supervision stipulated by the Presidential Decree No. 
35, there are procedures for the control and management of the foreign investors through a policy of 
encouraging the gradual ‘Indonesianisation’ o f foreign investment companies. However, it is generally 
agreed that this policy has not been successful. D oing Business in Asia: Indonesia , 1998.
16. The President decree of the Republic Indonesia No. 35 o f 1985, Art. 15 provided that “It shall be the 
duty o f the Deputy of Implementation Controls to assist the Chairman in the control and supervision of 
the implementation o f investment which have been already approved by the government”. Art. 16 of 
this Decree provided that the BKPM can control and supervise the implementation of investments 
which are already approved by the government; the use o f facilities enjoy by the investors; resolve the 
problems appearing in the implementation o f investment; study and evaluate reports and input on 
foreign investment submitted to BKPM and investigate those report; and prepare executive reports of 
BKPM’s performance either regularly or occasionally for special purposes.
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up to 85% or 95% for a business with an export orientation. But the local equity has to 
be increased to 20% in the first five years of commercial operation and to 51% in the 
following ten years. This fadeout or divestment requirement is still in force but it is 
temporarily waived by the Short Term Measures which ASEAN countries allow 100% 
of foreign equity in the company (See chapter 5). It is also notable that according to 
the government regulation, foreigners may buy shares on the share market, but not 
shares of companies that sell goods directly to consumers. And finally, a foreign 
capital investment licence shall not, generally, exceed 30 years17.
At present, the Indonesia government will continue to review all regulations
1 9related to investment . By creating prudent macro economic policy, and highly stable 
economic growth, political and social stability and the commitment of the Indonesian 
government to continue deregulation, the Indonesian investment climate will be more 
favourable, attractive and conducive to accommodate FDI flows from around the 
world. Indonesian comparative advantages in natural and human resources, market 
potential, as well as its strategic location, can combine comfortably with foreign 
capital and technology to provide goods and services for mutual benefit.
4.1.2 M alaysia
The Malaysian government has launched the Second Outline Perspective Plan 
(1991-2000) and the Seventh Malaysia Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(1995-2010)19. These plans have one goal to make Malaysia a fully developed and 
industrialised nation by the year 2010. Toward this end, the manufacturing sector will 
assume the lead role in the nation’s economic growth and in this respect, private
17. Law No. 1 o f  1967 on Foreign Capital Investment and Circular J.A.5/31/24; 26thApril, 1967.
18 ASEAN Secretariat (1998) Compendium o f  Investment P olicies and M easures in ASEAN Countries. 
Jarkarta: ASEAN.
19 Malaysia, Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI) (1999) Information on Investment in 
M alaysia, government announcement, as o f December 1999.
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sector investment will be strongly encouraged20. A number of industrial policies have 
been introduced to promote rapid growth in manufacturing sector. These were mainly 
aimed at attracting foreign investments especially from the multinational corporations 
of developed countries. A Capital Issues Committee and the Foreign Investment 
Committee were established in 1968 and 1974 respectively, to co-ordinate local and 
foreign investment and facilitate the equal treatment of FDI. However, foreign 
investors have to undergo the process of registering their firms in accordance with the 
Malaysian laws.
In Malaysia, a foreign-owned company has to register as “a foreign company” 
under the Companies Act 1965 with the Registrar of Companies (ROC), and thereby
'y 1
establish a branch in Malaysia" . The registration of a branch is at the discretion of the
22  ^ROC. A wholly-owned subsidiary may be approved'J subject to a condition of future
partial divestment of equity to Malaysian shareholders24. It is the policy of the
Malaysian government to structure the ownership and control of companies and
business in Malaysia to ensure a balanced participation by Malaysians, in particular by
20 APEC (1998) Guide to the Investment Regim e o f  the A PE C  M em ber Economies. Singapore: APEC.
21. Before filing the application, the company must obtain the approval o f the Industries Development 
Division o f the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Generally, MITI rapidly approves 
projects o f foreign companies that follow on the branch’s first approved project.
22. Previously, branches of foreign companies were rarely registered because the Registrar of 
Companies (ROC) required a letter o f support from Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
which was only given if the foreign company was awarded a contract with a government body. In 1993, 
the ROC began to allow the registration o f branches without such letters o f support, but it was 
announced at the end of 1995 that branches for the purpose o f wholesale or retail trade would not be 
registered. Moreover, the immigration department still generally requires a letter o f support from MITI 
for employment passes for expatriate employees o f a branch. D oing Business in Asia: M alaysia , 1998.
2j. For instance, to promote the hotel and tourism industry, 100% ownership is allowed for five years 
after which the company is required to restructure with at least 49% ownership held by Malaysians 
including 30% reserved for Bumiputras.
24. Malaysia has a very strong policy to ensure that indigenous Malay citizens (Bumiputras) are well 
protected, not just from the competition of foreigners but also even from their own citizens who are 
non-Malay. And this is the main objective o f Malaysian government in approving and controlling 
foreign investment based mainly on the prescribed ratio o f Malay citizen participation in Malaysian 
economy, either the ratio of Malay equity, shareholder, employment, control o f business and 
administration. Foreign ownership is regulated not only by laws but also through extensive bureaucratic 
guidelines. Local and foreign equity ratios vary according to industry, technological level, export 
proportion and location of business. Ratios change according to the prevailing economic climate and 
government policy.
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bum iputras25 (ethnic Malay). This policy was enunciated in the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and the National Development Policy (NDP). The proportion of equity 
permitted to be held by foreigners may vary depending on several factors. Among the 
most important are whether the industry is of a type encouraged under Malaysian 
economic policy, and the proportion of products to be exported. Under the Industrial 
Co-ordination Act 1975 (ICA), all manufacturing companies with shareholders’ funds 
of RM 2.5 million and above or engaging 75 or more full-time employees need to 
apply for a manufacturing license. And all foreign investment proposals, irrespective 
of value of investment and sector, would therefore need to be licensed26. Any issue of 
a licence must be consistent with the national economic and social objectives, 
promoting the orderly development of manufacturing activities of Malaysia.
Particular business sectors will also be regulated by relevant Acts of 
Parliament or subsidiary legislation. For example, the telecommunications and power 
generation industries are regulated by the Telecommunications Act and Electricity 
Supply Act respectively, together with their subsidiary regulations. Foreign companies 
can establish a business presence in Malaysia either by acquiring control of a 
Malaysian company under the Companies Act 1965, or by incorporating such a 
company and carrying on business through such a company.
A separate regime applies to foreign companies who wish to use the Federal
25. A company has to have a Bumiputra equity participation generally at 51% or more, unless the 
foreign company has been granted MITTs approval. Moreover, all firms in Malaysia have to employ 
and train Malaysian personnel so that employment at all levels reflects the ethnic composition o f the 
country.
26. Applications for manufacturing licenses are submitted in prescribed form to the Malaysian Industrial 
development Authority (M1DA) for screening and evaluation. The agencies and ministries involved are 
MIDA and MITI and under the ICA, notification to screening authorities is mandatory. If the company 
undertakes manufacturing activities then it requires a manufacturing licence from MITI. Licences 
issued by MITI are inevitably accompanied by conditions. These conditions will usually specify the 
foreign ownership restrictions and may require that the approval o f MITI be obtained before any 
transfer o f share held by foreign parties may be affected. If the company is not a manufacturing one, 
then it will have to comply with the guidelines laid down by the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC). 
And in certain case o f a joint venture, it may require the approval o f both MITI and FIC.
201
Territory of Labuan27 as an offshore base: by incorporating an offshore company in 
the Federal Territory of Labuan under the Offshore Companies Act 1990 and carrying 
on business through such company; or by registering itself under the Offshore 
Companies Act 1990 as a foreign offshore company. In most cases, foreign investors 
may form a subsidiary company under such companies. If it is envisaged that the only 
activities carried out will be those of a regional operational headquarters, the 
establishment of an overseas headquarters company could also be considered.
Under Malaysian law, a foreign company is required to lodge with the 
Registrar the balance sheet and other documents, in such form and containing such 
particulars and accompanied by copies of such documents as the company is required 
to lodge in its place of incorporation or origin. Where the foreign company is not 
required by the laws of its country of origin to hold an annual general meeting or 
prepare a balance sheet, the company is required to file a balance sheet in the form 
required by a public company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965.
Every foreign company also has to lodge with the Registrar a prescribed 
document appointing one or more persons resident in Malaysia, not including a 
foreign company, authorised to accept on its behalf service of process and any notices 
required to be served on the company. It may also be possible to appoint agents in 
Malaysia to carry out the activities intended. As the Malaysian government has a 
policy to ensure the participation of indigenous people, there are also criteria to
control a Bumiputra company and requiring the disclosure of non-resident
28shareholdings of the foreign company .
11. Labuan is an island located off the state o f Sabah in Northern Borneo, a federal territory o f Malaysia. 
It became a special international offshore financial centre in 1990. The relevant legislation contains 
provisions for offshore companies, banking, insurance and trust companies, and special tax rules for 
qualifying companies engaged in qualifying offshore activities.
28. The Company Act 1965 compels disclosure o f  substantial shareholding by all natural person and 
bodies corporate. The annual return o f the company must include a list containing the names and
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Generally, foreign companies would be under the control and supervision of 
the FIC to ensure that foreign investors comply with the National Development Policy 
(NDP) and the New Economic Policy (NEP)29, and that foreign companies contribute 
to the improvement and enhancement of the Malaysian economy as well as to further 
stimulate trade and investment for Malaysia. FIC also administers the “Guidelines for 
the Regulation of Acquisition of Assets, Mergers and Takeovers, 1974”. These seek to 
ensure that proposed acquisitions of assets, interests or mergers result directly or 
indirectly in a more balanced Malaysian participation in ownership and control.
Despite the regulatory control on FDI (screening and approval process due to 
the economic development and planing policies), the Malaysian government continues 
to promote foreign investment, and aims to be flexible and more pragmatic in the 
implementation of its policies and programmes so as to create a favourable climate for 
private investment. They introduced the “one-stop” facility for interested investors 
that provide information on investment opportunities and procedures and assists in the 
review/notification and operational aspects of investing. The Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority (MIDA) was designated as the Co-ordinating Centre on 
Investment. Investors only need to approach MIDA to obtain most of the approvals 
required at the Federal level in respect of manufacturing and granting of tax 
incentives. MIDA’s present role is more encompassing, thus reducing the number of 
agencies and departments that investors have to approach and the time taken to get the 
relevant approvals^0. MIDA claimed that the greatest advantages to investing in 
Malaysia are the political stable climate, the solid infrastructure network, the high-
addresses o f all members o f the company showing the number o f shares held by each member, ratio of 
non-Malay citizen shareholders.
29. NEC’s declared two-pronged objective is to (i) reduce and eradicate poverty by raising income 
levels and increasing employment opportunities and (ii) accelerate the process o f restructuring 
Malaysian society so as to correct the economic imbalance and to eliminate the identification o f race 
with economic functions.
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skilled labour force and the availability of raw materials.
4.1.3 The Philippines
The emergence of a new leader (a transition of power from the government of 
Marcos to Aquino and now to Fidel Ramos) through free and democratic elections 
after more than two decades has inspired confidence not only among local but also 
foreign investors. The overall strategy of the government is to achieve a sustained and 
increasing rate of growth for the economy and that seeks an investment-led growth 
rate as well as export-led growth mode. The country is geared up for adjustments in 
investment-related policies all in the direction of liberalisation and simplification. 
Several specific steps are currently being undertaken in this regard. This includes the 
Foreign Investment Act (FIA) or R.A. 7042 which will further open new opportunities 
for foreign investors. Moreover, new legislation that would complement the Foreign 
Investment Law is being worked out. These are
first, a bill that seeks to increase the length o f leases to foreign investors;
second, a bill that applies the condominium concept on industrial estates, again 
to be able to improve the security o f tenure o f foreign investors over the lands 
that their facilities occupy;
third, a bill that gives national status on the equity investment o f  multinational 
financial institutions like the Asian Development Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation;
finally, a bill that would allow companies to obtain additional relief and 
incentives such as accelerated depreciation and net operating loss carryover.
(APEC 1998: Rp-3).
However, foreign investors still need to comply with national laws regarding 
registration and operation. In the Philippines, foreign firms may do business through a 
branch, a subsidiary, a representative office, or a joint venture. Except for professional 
firms, which are not normally allowed to incorporate, most business ventures adopt 
the corporate form of organisation, which are registered with the Securities and
30 Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, Trade Commission (Investment) (1999) Investment 
Policies. Malaysia: MIDA.
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Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC is the primary governmental agency 
exercising regulatory powers over foreign companies, which are subject to the 
provisions of various laws and regulations on investment31. The difficulty normally 
encountered by foreign investors is the filing of applications which includes full 
compliance with the criteria set up by the BOIj2, interpretation of the coverage of 
activities listed in the Investment Priority Plan, submission of the required 
applications, supporting documents and project studies, and possible opposition from 
sectors or enterprises that might be adversely affected by the proposed project. The 
BOI requires publication of the application and conducts a hearing if objections to the 
application are received. If approval is obtained, a list of general and specific terms 
and conditions3-5 is normally attached to the certificate of authority issued by the 
Board upon approval of the application for investment. Foreign companies must apply 
to the SEC for a licence to do business in the Philippines'54. After a licence has been 
granted by the SEC, the foreign company may commence to transact business in the 
country, subject to some additional requirements33. The SEC will also require the
31. They are the Corporation Code, the Omnibus Investment Code (exec. Order No. 226, 1987), the 
Foreign Investment Act (Rep. Act No. 7042, 1991 as amended by Rep. Act No. 8179, 1996) and other 
special laws.
j2. All BOI programs and policies are oriented towards raising the standard o f living o f the Filipino 
people through a more equitable distribution o f the benefits o f progress. In pursuit o f this goal, the BOI 
encourages Filipino and foreign investments in projects that will accelerate the development o f  
preferred industries; promote the exports o f manufactured goods; and encourages foreign capital to 
establish pioneer projects which are capital-intensive and which utilise substantial amount o f domestic 
raw materials.
j3. The general terms and conditions include certain management, financial, operations and marketing 
commitments which must be properly compiled with so as to avoid grounds for cancellation of  
registration; nationality, and reporting requirements vary depending upon the nature o f the business 
enterprise.
j4. However, after the amendment o f the Foreign Investment Act o f 1991, companies registered under 
the Foreign Investment Act are no longer required to secure approval from the Board o f Investments 
(BOI). Their investments are also automatically registered with the Central Bank after the registration 
with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Bureau o f Trade regulation and Consumer 
Protection (BTRCP) Also SEC and BTRCP are mandated to act on applications for registration within 
15 working days from the official receipt o f the application; otherwise, the applications will be 
considered automatically approved.
35. This includes the requirement to deposit security with the SEC, re-issuance or amendment o f a 
licence when a foreign company changes its name, objectives, or it becomes a party to any merger or 
consolidation.
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company to deposit additional securities if the actual market value of the securities on 
deposit has decreased by 10% or more of their actual market value at the time they 
were deposited .
In the Philippines, there are nationalisation laws'37 that affect the percentage of 
foreign ownership in a company. Also the provisions of the Constitution and other 
nationality laws impose minimum Filipino ownership requirements in certain areas of 
investment, especially under the Foreign Investments Act, which provides a negative 
list of areas closed to foreign investors or which require a minimum Filipino equity. 
Foreign-owned companies are also subject to certain reporting requirements^8.
Central Bank approval and registration of the foreign investment"39 is required 
to enable the foreign investor to repatriate investments returns out of the country, if 
the funds utilised for repatriation are to be sourced from the Philippine banking 
system. However, the foreign investors’ right of repatriation and remittance is subject 
to foreign exchange restrictions which the Central Bank may impose.
There are requirements that the majority of the directors must be residents of
36. A foreign company has to deposit with the SEC for the benefit o f present and future creditors of the 
company in the Philippines, securities with an actual market value o f at least 100,000 pesos within 60 
days after the issuance of the licence. And the company has to deposit additional securities equivalent 
in actual market value to 2% of the amount by which the company’s gross income for the fiscal year 
exceeds 5,000,000 pesos within 6 months after each fiscal year.
37. Certain areas o f business are reserved for Philippine nationals. Nationalisation laws and the 
minimum Filipino ownership requirements for different areas o f investment on the Philippines are as 
follows: retail trade (“the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act” prohibits aliens or foreign companies from 
engaging, directly or indirectly, in retail trade except those which produce goods for sale by 
commercial and industrial consumers, or that sell goods to customers who will use the goods to render 
services to the general public); banking and finance (rural banks must be 100% Filipino-owned. 
Commercial and private development banks generally require 70% Filipino ownership o f the voting 
capital stock, and finance companies require at least 60% Filipino equity); mass media (mass media 
corporations or associations must be 100% Filipino-owned); public utilities; public works and 
government contracts; public and private land (transfer o f assignment o f agricultural land, deposition, 
exploitation, development and utilisation o f agricultural, timber and mineral land; fishing and other 
aquatic rights); co-operative associations; geothermal energy; and coconut industry.
38. For controlling foreign investment, a foreign company has to report to the BOI and SEC as well as to 
the Bank Sentral (the Central Bank).
39. Foreign investment in enterprises registered under Books I (BOI) and VI (EPZA) o f the Omnibus 
Investment Code (E.O 226) are required to be registered with the Central Bank. Foreign investments in 
enterprises registered under the 1991 Foreign Investments Act (RA 7042) shall be deemed registered 
with CB after SEC registration.
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the Philippines and the secretary must be a Filipino citizen. For banks and banking 
institutions and domestic air carriers, at least two-thirds of the members of the board 
of directors must be Filipino. For public utility firms all executive and managing 
officers must be Filipino.
However, recently the Philippines government declared its aim to facilitate 
foreign investment, and to broadly reduce the differentiation between foreign and 
local investors, to be in line with policies on liberalisation and deregulation40. With 
the passage of the Foreign Investment Act in 1991 all activities that are not covered by 
the negative list are open to foreign investors who may wish to engage in such 
enterprises on a majority basis. Such activities may be entered into by foreigners 
following exactly the same procedures as a Filipino national would have to go 
through. There is also a move to further reduce the coverage of the negative list 
through the elimination of the specific laws that restricted foreign equity participation 
in the covered activities. Moreover, the Council for Investment (CFI) help promote 
and facilitate the FDI by acting as a “One-Stop” action centre for foreign and local 
investors with authority to act on any problem concerning the setting up of business or 
the making of investment41.
4.1.4 Singapore
The Singapore government actively provides businesses in Singapore the 
opportunities to operate within a free market economy. Most industries are open to 
foreign investors, and multinational corporations are viewed as valuable contributors 
to economic growth. They are constantly encouraged to use Singapore as an 
international business centre for their subsidiaries, associated companies or branches 
in other countries. Therefore, no restriction is generally imposed on the percentage of
40 BOI Philippines (1998) The N ew Investm ent P o licy  o f  the Philippines. Manila: BOI.
41 APEC (1998: RP-35).
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foreign ownership of business operating in Singapore. The investment promotion 
effort has been on higher value-added and skilled-intensive activities including 
services sector activities such as financial services, information technology services 
and offshore services. Moreover, there has been no trend in divestment required by the 
Singapore government. Therefore, foreign investors can confidently invest in this 
country and can fully own and operate their business without constraint. (APEC: 
1998, SIN_2).
There is no screening of foreign investment in Singapore. Every business in 
the country must be registered under both the Business Registration Act and the 
Company Act, which are administered by the Ministry of Finance. A foreign 
corporation must register with the Registry of Companies and Business (ROC) before
4 9
commencing operations in Singapore ". Foreign companies are subject to filing and 
reporting requirements, in particular they must periodically report their financial status 
to the Registrar of Companies43. Thus a foreign company can carry on business in 
Singapore either by registration as “a foreign company”44 or by incorporating a 
subsidiary43. A branch office must also register in accordance with Part XI of the
42. It should be noted that ROC has the power to refuse to register a foreign company with a name that 
is “undesirable”.
43. There are two specific requirements for foreign company to report to the ROC: firstly, a foreign 
company must lodge with ROC a report o f its annual general meeting, a copy of its balance sheet made 
up to the end o f its last financial year and it should be in the form required by the company’s country of 
incorporation. If the balance sheet does not sufficiently disclose the company’s financial position, ROC 
has the power to require further information to be provided to supplement the balance sheet delivered; 
secondly, a foreign company is required to prepare and lodge with the ROC an audited statement 
showing its assets used in and liabilities arising out o f its operations in Singapore as at the date to which 
its balance sheet was made up.
44. Section 4 o f the Companies Act defines "a foreign company” to include incorporated or 
unincorporated bodies formed outside Singapore which in their country o f origin may sue or be sued or 
hold property. Once such an organisation establishes a place o f business, or carries on business in 
Singapore it should register under Div. 2, Pt XI of the Companies Act. Registration under the 
Companies Act specifically exempts the foreign company from the requirement of registering also 
under the Business Registration Act, Sec 4 (j). The registration provisions o f the Companies Act require 
the foreign company to appoint at least two agents resident in Singapore for the purpose o f accepting 
service o f process and to establish a registered office in Singapore.
4\  If a foreign company wishes to establish a separate legal entity in Singapore, it can incorporate a 
company in any forms such as a company limited by share, a company limited by guarantee, or an 
unlimited company.
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Companies Act. If the foreign company intends to do business as a sole proprietor or 
as a partner, then the procedures referred to under “Sole proprietorship/partnership” 
have to be complied with, after the company has been registered as a foreign company 
under the Company Act. However, applications for the establishment of representative 
offices must be made in writing in prescribed forms to the Trade Development Board 
(TDB), which is a statutory board.
The Registrar has primary authority over the registration of a foreign company 
46. The Department of Trade, the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Trade 
Development Board (TDB) may also have jurisdiction in relation to the area of 
business in which the company wishes to operate. However, Singapore does recognise 
the possibility that representative offices may carry on strictly promotional and liaison 
activity in Singapore without the need to register, so long as such activity does not 
amount to “carrying on business”. Generally, the Singapore government actively 
encourages foreign investment and treats foreign investors the same as local ones. 
With the exception of national security and certain industries47, there is no restriction 
on foreign ownership of Singapore corporations, and there is no screening of foreign 
investment in Singapore as mentioned.
4.1.5 Thailand
Thailand recognises the contribution of foreign investment to the country’s 
overall economy. Thailand has always sustained favourable attitudes towards FDI, and 
the National Economic and Social Development Plan sets principal development
46. The ROC has primary jurisdiction over the activities o f foreign companies. It is important to note 
that under sec 369(1) the Registrar may refuse to register a company as a foreign company if it is being 
used or is likely to be used for an unlawful purposes prejudicial to the public peace, welfare or good 
order in Singapore or is acting or likely to act against the national security or interest. This goes beyond 
the role o f most Registrars of Companies in other countries.
47. A 40% limit is placed on foreign ownership o f locally incorporated banks, airlines and shipping 
companies are specifically restricted as to the amount o f foreign ownership, the manufacture o f arms 
and ammunitions is subject to government control, public utilities services electricity, gas and water are 
publicly owned, legislative control is exercised over the newspaper publishing industry.
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guidelines that the government must continue with liberalisation policies to facilitate 
private business operations both domestic and foreign investment (APEC: 1998, 
THA-1). The government will play only supporting, promotional and supervisory 
roles to investment in this country. The investment promotion policies clearly spell 
out the government’s intention to promote the role of FDI in Thailand, particularly in
40
areas where expertise is lacking . However, in order to gear development towards 
value-added industries and to promote remote areas, the government set some 
requirements to investors by granting incentives to investors, both domestic and 
foreign alike, in engaging the promoted industries.
Thailand has undergone a series of phases of evolution of the foreign 
investment regime. In the 1960s-1970s. the Thai government encouraged import- 
substitution industries so a significant volume of foreign investment was attracted to 
these industries. During the 1980s, a strong emphasis was placed on promoting 
exports to strengthen the country’s foreign exchange position. Therefore, efforts were 
geared towards encouraging foreign companies to use Thailand as a production base 
for exports. Most export-oriented activities were labour-intensive. The 1990s have 
seen a shift to industrial deepening and broadening. The export boom in the 1980s was 
accompanied by a surge in the imports of capital goods, intermediate goods and raw 
materials. The government thus attempted to encourage more localisation, particularly 
in export industries. Foreign investments in supporting industries, value-added 
industries, and high technology industries have been actively encouraged. Efforts 
relying on market mechanism have been geared towards the creation of industrial 
linkages. An important theme of Thai investment policies in 1990s is industrial 
decentralisation, investment incentives have been granted to both local and foreign
48 BOI Thailand (1998) The Foreign Investm ent Regim e: The ro le  o f  BOI. Bangkok: BOI.
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investors that accord their business in remote areas. Thai investment policy toward 
foreign investors is positive and encouraging, apart from the specific restricted 
business, foreign investors would be treated exactly the same as the domestic 
investors.
In Thailand, there are two major laws affecting foreign investment: the 
Investment Promotion Act of 197749, and the Alien Business Act of 1972^°. The BOI 
sets various minimum Thai ownership requirements and conditions for BOI grants. If 
the project produces for the Thai market, then generally at least 51% of the shares 
must be owned by Thai nationals. This does not apply to Zone III projects31 as they 
may produce for the Thai market regardless of the foreign shareholding. On the other 
hand, if the project exports at least 50% of its products, foreigners may hold a 
majority of the shares; if 80% or more of total sales is to be exported, a completely 
foreign-owned project will be considered for promotion. For projects in the 
agricultural, animal husbandry, fishing, mining, mineral exploration or services 
industries, Thai nationals must hold at least 51% of the shares. However, in a project 
with more than Baht 1 million investment capital, foreigners may initially hold a 
majority of, or wholly own, the venture, provided that Thai nationals hold at least 51%
49. The Investment Promotion Act o f 1977 provides the legal framework for investment incentives 
granted by the Office o f  the Board o f Investment (BOI). The BOI is given wide discretionary powers to 
encourage investment in the areas considered to be the most beneficial for Thailand’s economic and 
social development. BOI incentives include tax privileges, relaxation o f restrictions on foreign 
participation, business protection and a host o f others.
50. The most important law governing foreign participation in business in Thailand is the National 
Executive Council Announcement No. 281 B.E. 2515 (1972), which is generally referred to as the 
“Alien Business Law”. This law limits the maximum alien ownership in certain business to less than 
50% and requires certain licences before a 50% or more alien owned entity may engage in other 
activities.
51. In order to encourage industrial development in regional areas, BOI will grant promotion status to 
investments in remote areas that are classified as zone III. All approved projects located in zone III are 
entitled to various exemptions, such as import duty exemption on machinery, raw materials, and other 
essential inputs, corporate income tax exemption, and double deduction from taxable income o f water, 
electricity, and transport costs. Approved projects in zone III are also exempt from the minimum Thai 
national ownership requirement.
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of registered capital within five years from the date of operation52.
Foreign investors may choose any of several forms of business organisation: 
sole proprietorship, partnerships, limited companies, joint ventures, and representative 
or regional offices33. A foreign company can also register a branch in Thailand or 
incorporate a subsidiary in the country. Certain formalities need to be complied with 
according to the type of business to be conducted. Also certain licences and 
certificates of registration are required for specific activities. The licences or permits, 
which may well apply to a particular business are: factory licences34, commercial 
registration35, taxation registration36, foreign business37, and alien work permits38. But
52. The BOI was empowered to waive foreign ownership requirements during the years 1992-1996 for 
the following projects; transportation system infrastructure projects, public utility projects relating to 
the maintenance and restoration of environment, and projects related directly to the development of 
technology.
3j. Representative offices are intended to allow foreign companies to establish a liaison office to support 
and oversee activities o f its head office. There are three types o f representative offices provided for in 
the legislation: an international business office; a foreign bank office; and a finance, security or Credit 
Foncier office. Regional offices are intended to oversee activities o f branches or subsidiaries throughout 
Southeast Asia on behalf o f the head office. None o f  these types o f  offices may produce income. 
Regional offices are not allowed to earn income and they are exempt from Thai taxes and most annual 
filing requirements. But it is necessary to get approval from the Department o f Commercial 
Registration to establish these types o f offices.
54. Factory licences are regulated by the Factory Act o f 1992. Under the 1992 Act, it requires a licence 
to establish a factory in certain types o f factories while the others are subject to the notification issued 
under the Act.
55. The Department o f Commercial Registration o f the Ministry o f Commerce is responsible for 
monitoring the Alien Business Law. The Office o f the Board o f Investment is in charge o f monitoring 
the compliance o f promoted companies with conditions stipulated in investment promotion certificates. 
Promoted firms have to report regularly to the Office o f the Board o f Investment.
56. Taxation registration is required for all businesses that are required to collect VAT. Those 
enterprises must obtain a VAT registration certificate prior to commencement o f a business whose 
projected gross annual revenue will exceed 600,000 Baht or within 30 days o f the business exceeding 
this income. (Companies incorporated under Thai law' are also required to pay corporate income tax on 
their profits. They may also be required to pay specific business tax depending on the type o f business 
activity in which they engaged). Registered traders must file a monthly tax return and submit monthly 
remittances to the Revenue Department on or before the fifteenth day o f the following month. The 
amount o f VAT due must be remitted at the time o f submitting the monthly VAT return, and registered 
traders are entitled to a tax credit for VAT paid to another VAT trader.
5 7 Only those foreign legal entities engaged in business specified in the Alien Business Law are 
required to acquire an Alien Business Licence from the Ministry o f Commerce. The Alien Business 
Law is applicable to foreigners or juristic persons that: (1) have majority foreign shareholding; (2) have 
at least one-half o f the number of shareholders, partners or members o f which are aliens; (3) have 
limited partnership or registered ordinary partnership having an alien as manager or managing partner.
The Alien Business Law sets three categories o f business activities where foreign legal entities and 
foreigners are (1) prohibited in category A., (2) permitted only with the Board o f Investment promotion 
in category B. (3) implemented only with the permission o f the Ministry o f Commerce or Board of 
Investment promotion in category C. (Details o f these categories are stated in the section o f restricted 
sectors discussed below) The Alien Business Law does not apply to aliens engaged in business with the
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there are no technology licensing requirements tied to the process of applying for an 
Alien Business Licence or investment promotion.
In addition to the Alien Business Law, there are several statutes, which impose 
conditions of majority ownership and management by Thai nationals in specific 
business sectors: commercial banking59; finance and security business60; life insurance 
61; vessel operating62; and recruitment agency6j. For certain other sectors, such as 
hotel operation and pharmaceutical dispensing, it is required that the individual holder
permission o f the Royal Thai Government, or covered by an agreement between the Royal Thai 
Government and a foreign government which exclude certain activities, for instance under the 
agreement between Thailand and the US Thus American nationals, entitled to the protection under the 
Treaty o f  Amity and Economic Relations between the two, are not generally subject to the provisions of 
the Alien Business Law. There are , however, some business activities which the US-Thai Treaty does 
not cover, namely communications, transportation, fiduciary function, banking involving depository 
functions, the exploitation of natural resources and land, and domestic trade in indigenous agricultural 
products.
3S. Permission to work in Thailand is granted by the Alien Occupation Division o f the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare with the issuance of a work permits. On 30th June 1997, the Thai 
government established a ‘one-stop’ service centre to facilitate the issuance o f relevant work permits 
and immigration authorisations. The centre’s service can be extended to investors who meet certain 
investment criteria.
39. The Commercial Banking Act B.E. 2505 (1962) requires that Thai nationals must hold not less than 
three quarters o f the total issued shares in a commercial bank and that at least three quarters o f the total 
number o f directors must be Thai nationals.
60. The Act on the Undertaking of Finance Business and Security Business and Credit Foncier Business 
B.E. 2522 (1979) and the Security and Exchange Act B.E. 2523 (1992) stipulate that the Thai 
ownership and management requirements for finance and Credit Foncier companies are the same as for 
commercial banks. But there are no such restrictions on foreign participation in securities business 
under this Act, although they are subject to the Alien Business Law.
61. Life Insurance Act B.E. 2535 (1992) and the Casualty Insurance Act B.E. 2535 (1992) require that 
Thai nationals must hold not less than three quarters o f the total number o f shares sold and that at least 
three quarters o f the total number of directors must be Thai nationals.
62. Thai Vessel Act B.E. 2516 (1971) requires that: (i) at least 70% of the capital in a limited company, 
public limited company or partnership owning a Thai vessel be owned by a natural Thai person or by a 
wholly owned juristic entity, with all shareholders, directors, or partners o f such entity must be Thai 
persons, organised under Thai law where the subject Thai vessel will trade in Thai territorial waters, 
and ; (ii) where the Thai vessel will specifically be used in international marine transport, at least 51% 
o f  the capacity in the company owning the Thai vessel must be owned by a natural Thai person or at 
least 51% by a wholly Thai owned company organised under Thai law with all o f its shareholders and 
directors being natural Thai persons. The majority o f the directors of such vessel owning company, and 
all o f the unlimited liability partners in the case o f a limited partnership, must also be Thai nationals. A 
Thai national person who, for and on behalf o f an alien, holds title to a Thai vessel or capital o f a 
juristic person owning a Thai vessel, will be subject to a fine not exceeding Baht 500,000 and 
imprisonment not exceeding five years. The juristic entity owning the vessel must be organised under 
Thai law and have its principal office in Thailand. It can be seen that the Vessel Act o f 1971 has the 
most intricate method of imposing ‘real’ Thai ownership in a juristic owning a Thai vessel operating in 
Thai territorial waters. D oing Business in Asia: Thailand , 1998.
63. Employment Provision and Employment Seekers Provision Act B.E. 2528 (1985) provided that 
recruitment agency work is reserved for Thai nationals under the Alien Business Law. In addition, both 
the manager o f the establishment and any corporation formed as a recruitment agency must be o f Thai
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of the licence be an individual Thai national.
However, Thailand welcomes foreign investment and sustains favourable 
attitudes towards FDI, and the government continues with liberalisation policies to 
facilitate private business operation. Nevertheless, the government’s intention is to 
promote business areas where expertise is lacking, industries in remote areas, and 
industries that are important and beneficial to the country’s economic and social 
development and to national security64.
4.1.6 Overview
Approval procedures for FDI in ASEAN countries were fairly stringent until 
the late 1980s. Eligibility criteria were used in many countries to direct FDI inflows 
towards specific industries, such as sophisticated technological industries, heavy 
industries and chemical industries. They also restricted foreign competition in areas 
reserved for domestic investors. Government authorities strongly preferred minority 
ownership by foreign investors except in particular cases, for instance technology­
intensive projects and export-oriented industry.
In conclusion, ASEAN countries targeted FDI inflows in specific industries 
and encouraged specific forms of TNC engagement. At the end of the 1980s, a major 
wave of liberalisation began because ASEAN countries needed inflows of FDI to 
enhance their industrialisation in sophisticated technology industries, reflecting the 
emergence of a significantly less restrictive attitudes towards FDI in the region. Most 
importantly for foreign investors, the principle of equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic investors began to be widely accepted in the region, mainly through changes
nationality.
64. Under the Investment Promotion Act, BOI may approve the promotion o f investment projects in 
agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, mineral exploration and mining, manufacturing and services 
when it considers that the products, commodities or services are either unavailable or insufficiently 
available in Thailand or are produced by an outdated process; are important and beneficial to the 
country’s economic and social development, and to national security; and are economically and
in policy rather than the laws. Legal changes have been after 1998 under the Short- 
Term Measures and AIA (discussion in chapter 5 below). Industries previously 
considered “sensitive” have been gradually opened to FDI, and restrictions on profit 
remittances have been relaxed. Ownership restrictions have also become more 
liberalised; in particular, foreign majority ownership, extending up to 100% in certain 
industries, is now possible in most ASEAN countries, although a number of activities, 
especially in strategic industries, remain reserved for domestic enterprises (see chapter 
5, section 5.1.3.3 for more details). Furthermore, approval procedures have become 
less burdensome, with automatic approval now being used more widely. One-stop 
service agencies have reduced bureaucratic hurdles. As a result, FDI policies in 
ASEAN countries are beginning to converge around broadly similar international 
standards. Nevertheless, the perception of the private sector is that the FDI regimes of 
several ASEAN host countries need further improvement; it appears to be difficult for 
foreign investors to acquire a controlling share in ASEAN companies. Malaysia and 
Thailand are considered to be the most restrictive in this respect. Foreign investors are 
constrained in employing foreigners. Also investment in some ASEAN countries, e.g., 
Malaysia and Indonesia, continues to be directed by government to a considerable 
degree. Notably, regulatory obstacles were the most important factors in discouraging 
some investments65. However, to the extent that regulatory deterrents to FDI exist, 
they are faced by all foreign investors. They do not discriminate against any particular 
country.
technologically appropriate, and have adequate preventive measures against damage to the 
environment.
6S. These views are expressed in the results o f the survey o f  a number o f firms o f the European Round 
Table (ERT), an association o f large European TNCs, carried out for a 1995 study: out o f 25 factors 
discouraging investment, which were either explicitly considered in the survey questionnaire or 
identified by individual respondents.
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4.2 Ownership Limits and Restricted Sectors
Ownership limits and sectoral restrictions are the main control on FDI in ASEAN 
countries. The main purpose of these restrictions is to protect the interests of nationals 
from competition from foreign investors in those business areas which have been 
regarded as key sectors for their national economies or to protect “sensitive sectors”, 
and also business concerning national security and the public interest. In general, these 
controls are intended to encourage their nationals to participate in their economy and 
ensure a balance of controlling power in their economic activities.
4.2.1 Indonesia
In the case of Indonesia, limitation of ownership is subject to a 
negative list66. The Investment Negative List is valid for three years and subject to 
annual review. Now foreign investment is subjected to the new government regulation 
No. 20 of 1994 concerning share ownership in foreign capital investment enterprises, 
which allows 100% foreign equity ownership in all areas except those in negative list.
f t lThis clearly shows the more liberalised investment policy of Indonesia . The 
Indonesian government clearly declared that
“To maintain and speed up the momentum o f  national development, the 
deregulation of policies and measures and simplification o f investment 
procedures should be continued and implemented in order to enhance and 
improve the productivity and efficiency o f economic sectors. Besides that, due 
to the need o f Indonesian economic development, the presence o f  foreign 
direct investment should be encouraged to support economic development.”
(APEC, 1998: 1NA-1).
Therefore, foreign investors are encouraged to fully invest in this country except those 
in the negative list, which is transparent and limited only to the security and public 
interest. Accordingly, the Indonesian government expressed that it should take any
66. The Negative Investment List is enacted by the Law No. 1 o f 1967 concerning Foreign Investment, 
and established by the Presidential Decree No. 54 o f 1993 which replaces the Negative Investment list 
o f 1992. It is now replaced by the Government Regulation NO. 2/ 1994.
67 See ASEAN Secretariat (1998) Compendium o f  Investm ent P olicies and M easures in ASEAN  
Countries. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
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measures to create an attractive and conducive investment climate and should 
implement many new measures with transparency and consistency. (APEC: 1998: 
INA-1).
The negative lists have been classified into five categories as follows:
(1) sectors that are closed to foreign investment68;
(2) sectors that are closed to foreign investment, except for new projects that 
export at least 65% of the products69;
(3) sectors that are closed to new investment, except for projects exporting 
100% o f their production70;
(4) sectors that are totally closed to foreign investment71 are contracting 
services in forest logging, casino/gambling, utilisation and cultivation o f  
sponges, marijuana and the like, veneer, penta chlorophenaol, dichloro 
trichloro ethane (DDT), dieldrin. and chlordane;
(5) sectors that are reserved for small-scale industry in co-operation with 
medium and large scale industry72 are mainly in agricultural production such as 
dairy cow breeding, shrimp larva culture, coral fish catching, salted and dried 
fish, various flours from grain, brown sugar, soybean products, yarn-spinning, 
fabric printing, weaving, knitting, lime and lime products, and household clay 
ceramic goods.
Moreover, the Indonesian government has taken various specific actions to stimulate a 
large increase of foreign investment in the last five year, namely the continuity of 
deregulation and debureaucratisation efforts7^ . The new wave of investment 
liberalisation of Indonesia clearly facilitates the process of open regionalism,
68 Manufacturing o f aircraft, motor vehicles (except for manufacturing at least equal to the present 
degree o f  localisation implemented by existing motor vehicle manufacturers), utility boilers, explosive 
materials and the like, printing o f valuable paper (postage stamps, duty stamps, bank notes, passport) 
postcards, powder milk, palm oil, sawmills, plywood, mangrove wood products, block board, and ethyl 
alcohol (Negative list No.2/1994).
69 Manufacturing of cigarettes and medicine, including pharmaceutical formulation and traditional 
herbal drugs (Negative list No.2/1994).
70 Manufacturing o f artificial sweeteners, alcoholic beverages, fireworks, and disposable gas lighters. 
Service sectors that are closed to foreign investment are taxi/bus, local shipping, scheduled chartered 
flights, aircraft and components workshops located in the airport, retail trade, trade supporting 
services/advertising, private television broadcasting and radio broadcasting services, and any industry 
which involves the use of photographic equipment (Negative list No. 2/1994).
71 contracting services in forest logging, casino/gambling, utilisation and cultivation of sponges, 
marijuana and the like, veneer, penta chlorophenaol, dichloro trichloro ethane (DDT), dieldrin, and 
chlordane (Negative list No. 2/1994).
72 dairy cow breeding, shrimp larva culture, coral fish catching, salted and dried fish, various flours 
from grain, brown sugar, soybean products, yarn-spinning, fabric printing, weaving, knitting, lime and 
lime products, and household clay ceramic goods (Negative list No. 2/1994).
73 For example, liberalisation o f the financial sector, relaxation o f import and export procedures (the 
October Package o f 1998), harmonisation of import tariff codes, reduction o f import tariffs, and 
reduction o f the number o f business fields that were closed for investment (the June Package o f 1991), 
the simplification o f drawback system procedures, and intensification of investment promotion 
activities especially for facilitating the industrial relocation from NIEs and Japan (BKPM, Indonesia 
(1998) The N ew  Investment P olicies  Jakarta: BKPM).
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especially it conforms to the AIA in opening up industries to both ASEAN and non- 
ASEAN investors (discussed in chapter 5).
4.2.2 M alaysia
There are generally no restrictions on foreign participation in the 
manufacturing sector. However, there are guidelines on foreign equity participation in 
the manufacturing sector, which are governed by the level of exports proposed by the 
applicant companies. In Malaysia (which limits ownership depending on the 
proportion of production exported), foreign equity in any manufacturing company is 
required to be licensed74 under the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975 (ICA) by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)73. There may be equity conditions 
annexed to a licence. It is difficult for a branch of a foreign company to obtain a 
manufacturing licence, and therefore a foreign company wishing to establish a 
manufacturing operation must generally incorporate a subsidiary.
However, MITI allows up to 100% foreign equity for a manufacturing 
company that exports 80% or more of its products. Foreign investors may also hold up 
to 100% of equity if the products do not compete with those manufactured locally for 
the domestic market and at least 50% of the products are exported, and if it invests 
RM 50 million or more in fixed assets, or implements projects which have at least 
50% value added. Also 100% foreign equity may be allowed for companies producing 
high technology or priority products for the domestic market. Proportions of 30%, 
51% and 79% of foreign equity may be permitted, depending on the level of 
technology involved and the ratio of exports. The reason for these restrictions is to
74. Companies with shareholders’ funds o f less than RM 2.5 million or less than 75 employees are 
exempt from the licensing requirements o f ICA.
75. The National Development Policy o f the Malaysian government has the objective of ownership in 
the Malaysian economy, including share capital in any Malaysian company, being at least 30% by 
Bumiputras (the indigenous people o f Malaysia), 40% by other Malaysians and 30% by foreigners. 
Foreign ownership o f the Malaysian economy is controlled by legal and non-legal or administrative
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allow ethnic Malaysians to participate proportionately in business. These policies 
clearly show that Malaysia, like other ASEAN countries, has strongly employed the 
export-push policy and encouraged the development of high technological industries 
for up grading technology.
Generally, there are no restricted sectors for foreign investment, except those 
that produce supporting parts and components. These include plastic packaging 
material; plastic compound/masterbatch; plastic injection moulded components and 
parts for the electrical, electronics and telecommunications industry; paper packaging 
products; metal fabrication; and foundry products. However, these restricted sectors 
are open to foreign investment that complies with the specific equity policies and the 
requirements imposed on the projects granted manufacturing licences stipulated in 
ICA 1975.
In addition, in certain industries where local expertise and capabilities have 
developed to a satisfactory level, the government regulates the levels of foreign equity 
ownership. This is because the government has the objective to provide more 
opportunities for local manufacturers. This also shows the investment policy of this 
country to balance economic interest of domestic and foreign investors.
4.2.3 The Philippines
The Philippines, like other ASEAN countries, has limited ownership ratio of 
foreign investors with the objective to encourage domestic investors to take more part 
in business firms. The ownership restriction has been implemented relevant to the 
negative list (discussed below) where certain areas of investment require majority of 
local shareholder in the company. This also aims to secure such fields of business to 
be operated by local investors on the grounds of guarding national economic strength,
means, which is controlled by the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), through its guidelines. FIC 
guidelines are not law but they are enforced administratively.
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and less dependence on foreign investment especially in public consuming industries.
The Foreign Investment Act 1991 has deregulated the ownership restriction in 
companies catering to the domestic market, except for the areas of activity contained 
in the negative list (APEC: 1998, RP-8). There is a move to further reduce the 
coverage of the.negative list through the elimination of the specific laws that restrict 
foreign equity participation in the covered activities (ASEAN Secretariat: 1998, 34).
In the Philippines, the Constitution and other national laws impose minimum 
Filipino ownership requirements in certain areas of investments. These restrictions are 
embodied in the Foreign Investment Act, which provides a negative list having two 
component lists: A and B. List A includes all areas of investment in which foreign 
ownership is limited by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws. Under the 
Constitution, the ownership and management of the mass media is limited to citizens 
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations wholly-owned and managed by 
such citizens. Educational institutions, except those established by religious groups 
and mission boards, are limited to Filipinos or to corporations or associations at least 
60% of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. The advertising industry and pawnshops 
are limited to Filipinos, or corporations or associations whose capital is at least 70% 
owned by Filipinos. Also the operation of public utilities and financing companies are 
reserved for Filipinos for at least 60% of the investment. Some sectors, such as retail 
trade business, are totally reserved for Filipinos requiring 100% Filipino ownership.
List B consists of more sensitive areas of activities and enterprises concerning 
security that are completely closed to foreign investment. These include: defence- 
related activities, such as the manufacture and distribution of firearms and explosives; 
the manufacture and distribution of dangerous drugs, all forms of gambling, night­
clubs, bathhouses, massage parlours and other like activities, because of risks they
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may pose to public health and morals; small and medium sized domestic market 
enterprises with paid-up equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$ 200,000, 
unless they have paid-in equity capital of US$ 100,000 and (i) involve advanced 
technology as determined by the department of Science and Technology or (ii) employ 
at least 50 direct employees; and export enterprises which utilise raw materials from 
depleting natural resources, and with paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent 
of US$ 500,000.
Considering the areas of activities that are subject to the ownership restriction, 
the Philippines is mainly concerned for security, public order, health, and sensitive 
area of business, and does not employ this restriction as an instrument to prevent 
foreign investors from entering the Philippines economy. This rationale for ownership 
restriction is also applicable to all ASEAN countries.
However, the Ramos government has launched a new economic policy 
including:
(1) Liberalisation in many areas o f  economy (such as services sectors);
(2) Deregulation o f business and industry;
(3) Privatisation o f most government owned and controlled corporations (such
as power and energy);
(4) In the long term, reduce dependence on the IMF and the World Bank for
the financing o f  the requirements for development.
(The Philippines BOI: 1998, economic policy)
This new economic policy of the Philippines is more liberalised and opens 
more industries to foreign investors, especially it offers more opportunities to foreign 
investors to invest in the areas that presently have been privatised. This process of 
national liberalisation is consistent with the regional liberalisation: open regionalism.
4.2.4 Singapore
In Singapore, there is no restriction on foreign ownership of business, except 
for national security reasons and in certain specific areas such as air transport, public 
utilities, newspaper publishing and shipping. Singapore has very few restrictions
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because it has been an “entrepot port” free trade country for centuries, and it has 
developed into an open economy. Singapore welcomes and encourages trade and 
investment into the country, and opens almost all industrial sectors to foreign 
investors so that there are only few restrictions, as mentioned above. There are 
presently no plans to expand the list of restricted sectors, and the basic objective of the 
Singapore government is to encourage free market policy. Also there are no laws or 
policies stating performance requirements. The Singapore government treats all 
contracts as commercial dealings (APEC: 1998, SIN-2).
Regarding the restricted sectors, the Singaporean government has a monopoly 
in the manufacture of arms and ammunition. There are also certain restrictions on 
foreigners acquiring equity interests in locally incorporated banks. The MAS has 
imposed a 40% ceiling on foreign ownership in local banks. The supply of public 
utility services such as electricity, water and gas is currently confined to the public 
sector, but public control is gradually being relaxed. Telecommunications are already 
privatised, while power supply has been separated from the supply of other utilities 
and is provided through a corporatised vehicle that many see as being a prelude to 
privatisation of power supply.
Since Singapore has already liberalised its investment regulations and adopted 
“Free Market Economy” it is complementary to the implementation of the open 
regionalism, and Singapore is more ready to open its industries to foreign investors, 
also to extend national treatment to foreign investor under the AIA.
4.2.5 Thailand
In Thailand, certain business activities are subject to the shareholding 
requirements stipulated in the Alien Business Law. The company, which production is 
mainly designed for domestic consumption or distribution, Thai shareholding must
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equal not less than 51% of the registered capital76. But export-oriented projects with at 
least 50% production for export could be majority owned by foreigners. If 80% or 
more of the output is exported, foreigners can own 100% of the shares.
The Alien Business Law (No. 281) of Thailand prohibits aliens from 
conducting certain types of business. The scheme of this law is to divide all prohibited 
business into three categories, A77, B78 and C79. Categories A and B are prohibited to 
Aliens, but for category C business aliens must obtain a permit. In certain exceptional 
cases the Director-General of the Department of Commercial Registration, Ministry of 
Commerce may allow an alien to conduct a business that falls within Category B, 
should such business obtain privileges from the BOI80.
Considering the case of Thailand, we can see the two main purposes of 
ownership restrictions. Firstly, they are related to the export-push policy, by 
encouraging foreign investors to invest in export-oriented industries so that they can
76. The required percentage of Thai interests in Thai-foreign joint ventures in agriculture, livestock, 
fisheries, mining and services used to be 60%, now it is reduced to 51% as other sectors produce for 
domestic consumption.
11. Category A includes: agriculture (1) rice farming, (2) salt farming except rock salt; commerce (1) 
internal trade concerning local agriculture products, (2) trade in real property; Services (1) accounting,
(2) Law, (3) Architecture, (4) Advertising, (5) Brokerage or agency, (6) Auction, (7) haircutting, hair 
dressing and beauty treatment; other business (1) building construction.
78 Category B includes: agriculture (1) farming, (2) gardening (3) livestock farming & silk warm 
raising (4) forestry (5) fishery; industry (1) rice milling (2) manufacture o f flour from rice & field 
crops, sugar, beverage, ice, drug, cold storage, wood processing, manufacture o f casting o f images of 
Buddha, wood carvings, lacquer ware, all type o f matches, lime, cement, ply wood, wood veneer, chip­
board or hard board, garments or shoes except for export, product from silk, cold storage, wood 
processing, stone blasting or crushing, printing press operation, newspaper publication; commerce (1) 
retailing excluding items in category C, (2) trade in ore excluding items in category C, (3) sale o f food 
and beverage excluding items in category C, (4) trade in antique, heirlooms and fine art objects; 
Services (1) tour agency, hotel business, business under the law on services-providing establishment, 
photography, laundry, tailoring and dress-making; other businesses(l) internal transportation by land, 
water or air.
79. Category C includes: commerce (1) wholesaling o f all types o f products within the country except 
those specified in category A. (2) export o f all types o f products (3) retailing o f machines, engines and 
tools (4) sale o f food and beverage for the promotion o f tourism; industry and handicrafts (1) 
manufacture o f animal feed (2) extraction of vegetable oil (3) manufacture o f embroidered and knitted 
products including weaving, dying and pattern printing (4) manufacture o f  glass containers including 
light bulbs (5) manufacture of crockery (6) manufacture o f writing and printing paper (7) rock salt 
mining (8) mining; services , all service business except for those specified in category A. and category 
B and other construction except as specified in category A.
80. Even though in theory an alien can ask for permission to engage in business listed in Category C, in 
practice permission is only feasible after the designated business activity obtains BOI privileges.
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fully-own or have a majority control over the company. This also facilitates the 
equilibrium of the balance of payments. The Thai government is concerned about the 
excess importation of intermediate inputs and raw materials from abroad by foreign 
investors, so that if the foreign owned company intends to export a higher proportion 
of its product, this can be used to offset the importation of inputs. Therefore, the Thai 
government allows a high ratio of foreign equity in such a case. The second objective 
is, like other ASEAN countries, to balance the economic interests of domestic and 
foreign investors, to secure public order, health, and securing sensitive business 
sector. Thai investment policy is actually influenced by “the trade-oriented investment 
pattern” (discussed below). This investment pattern is complementary to the open 
regionalism that relies on market driven factors more than regulatory function.
4.3 Performance Requirements
Almost all ASEAN countries apply performance requirements to foreign investment 
but many requirements are equally applied to local industries as well. Only Singapore 
does not have any performance requirements imposed on any investments.
The main purpose of the imposition of performance requirements is to gear 
industries toward national economic development schemes or plans. For instance, 
local content requirements are needed to promote domestic industries and to ensure 
that foreign firms do not just operate a ‘screwdriver’ plant by importing all parts and 
intermediates or inputs from abroad. Therefore a certain level of local content is 
generally required. Export performance requirements are also used to promote the 
export-oriented policies of ASEAN countries and to ensure equilibrium in the balance 
of payments. Thus governments require a balanced proportion of exports to imports or 
a higher proportion of exports to maintain the countries’ international reserves.
The Malaysian government has applied a local content programme for motor
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vehicles which is encouraged through administrative measures. The objective of this 
local content stipulation is to develop industrial projects including supporting 
industries to strengthen the industrial structure and enhance linkages between Small- 
and Medium-scale Industries (SMI) and larger firms. The programme was introduced 
for passenger and light commercial vehicles in 1991. So the rationale for the 
programme is to achieve an upgrading of engineering and technical skills in the infant 
component-parts industry.
The other three main economies: Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have 
used performance requirements as follows:
In Indonesia, there are three outstanding decrees81 in effect which stipulate 
local content requirements for motor vehicles industries. The reason for this measure 
is to support and encourage the development of the automotive industry in Indonesia 
by regulating the local content rates of domestic motor vehicles or components with 
the incentive of differentiated import duty rates. The decrees are also designed to 
strengthen domestic industrial development by fostering technological advancement 
as well as the enhancement of industrial design and engineering ability in this sector.
The Indonesian government also stipulates local content requirements in
82 83certain industries, such as the utility boiler industry , soyabean cake manufacturing ,
81. Presidential Decree No. 54 dated 10th June 1993 regarding the list o f sectors that are closed for 
capital investment, which requires that all new investments in the motor vehicles sector comply with 
the local content rates in effect as implemented by existing manufacturing; Decree o f the Minister of 
Industry No. 114/M/SK/1993 date 9th June 1993 regarding the determination o f local content rates o f 
domestically made motor vehicles or components; and Decree o f the Minister o f Finance No. 
645/KMK..01/1993 dated 10th June 1993 regarding the relief o f import duty on import o f certain parts 
and accessories o f motor vehicles for the purpose o f assembling and/or manufacture o f motor vehicles.
82. The utility boiler industry is normally closed to foreign investment, except those that comply with 
the local content requirement as implemented by existing manufacturing. This is stipulated in the 
President Decree No. 54 dated 10lh June 1993.
8j. A ratio o f domestically produced soybean cake to imported cake is specified to 3 weight units to 7 
units, and applied to all cattle feed processing industries recognised as imported producers who are 
allowed to import and produce soybean cake. Decree o f the Minister o f Trade No. 126/KP/V1/1994 




and the milk processing industry . Compliance with these measures is mandatory for 
all enterprises, including those domestically-owned, and is enforceable under 
domestic law. Even though there was no formal provision for phasing out these 
requirements in the decrees, the government of Indonesia declared its intention to 
progressively eliminate the local content requirements in motor vehicles and 
components, utility boilers, soyabean cake and fresh milk over five years from 1993, 
consistent with Art. 5.2 of the Agreement on TRIMs.
In the Philippines, Local Content and Foreign Exchange Requirements have 
been applied under the Car Development Programme (CDP), Commercial Vehicle 
Development Programme (CVDP), and the Motorcycle Development Programme
85(MDP) , which aim to develop a viable automotive parts and components 
manufacturing sector. Participants in the CDP, CVDP and MDP are required to 
comply with the local content requirement in order for them to remain in the 
programme. From a list of locally produced automotive parts and components, the 
automotive assemblers can select which automotive parts they wish to manufacture 
for themselves or source locally in order to meet the local content requirement.
Automotive assemblers are also required to earn foreign exchange through 
exports of automotive parts and components to finance a proportion of their imports of 
completely knocked down (CKD) and semi-knocked down automotive parts and 
components for the assembly of motor vehicles .
84. In order to ensure the availability o f raw material supply for this sector and to ensure the absorption 
o f the domestic fresh milk production, the Indonesian government has applied mixing ratio between 
imported raw material o f milk and the production o f domestic fresh milk. The ratio of domestic fresh 
milk is applied for the processing milk industries and state-trading companies were appointed to import 
of milk raw material. Decree o f the Minister o f Trade No. 58/KP/IV/1995 regarding the ratio between
imported fresh milk and absorption o f domestically produced fresh milk.
85 •The measures are covered by the following Executive Order (EO) and Presidential Memorandum
Order (MOS) and are applied to new entrants and all existing participants in the CDP, CVDP and MDP
that are registered with the BOI.
86. The local content requirement extends participation in CDP to ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture 
(AIJV) project proponents, for projects endorsed by the Government. The Memorandum Order 242
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Thailand has applied local content requirements to both local and foreign 
investment in certain industries. These performance requirements are provided in the 
Factory Act (B.E.2535) and the Investment Promotion Act (B.E.2520). Section 32 of 
the Factory Act (B.E.2535) empowers the Minister of Industry to determine, upon the 
approval of the Cabinet of Ministers, product items, quality, ratio of raw materials, 
sources of raw materials, and factors and/or the kinds of energy to be used in the 
production of certain finished goods. To date, administrative rulings in the form of 
Ministry Announcements have been issued under this authority imposing only a local 
content requirement for domestically assembled motor vehicles, with the objective of 
establishing and developing the domestic automotive parts industry in Thailand.
Even though Thailand maintains the application of these performance 
requirements for the existing promoted projects which operated before the issuing of 
the new law, Thailand has abolished local content requirements from 1st April, 1993 
for new projects after the five-year transitional period provided in Art. 5.2 of the 
Agreement on TRIMs.
Section 20 of the Investment Promotion Act (B.E.2520) authorises the Board 
of Investment to grant special investment incentives to industries and firms that agree 
to comply with certain production conditions. One of those conditions is that the firms 
use pre-determined proportions of locally produced raw materials in the production of 
certain product items. The types of raw materials or inputs and the percentages of 
local content requirement are fixed for each industry, and may be changed from time 
to time, to encourage the establishment of different industries for economic 
development purposes.
Local content requirements are currently applied to 13 products: passenger
further requires participants under the AiJV scheme to earn 100% of their foreign exchange 
requirements for imports o f CKD units for assembly.
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cars, vans and other types of passenger cars, small vans and trucks, motorcycles, milk 
and dairy products, coated aluminium sheets for printing, television picture tubes, 
transformers, gas pressure thermostats, polystyrene sheet and film, transmission 
assembly, compressors for air-conditioners and passenger cars and pick-up trucks with 
chassis and windshield, which are subject to excise tax exemption.
So we can see that all ASEAN countries have the same main investment 
policies: to promote export-oriented industries by using export-performance 
requirements; to promote and upgrade specific local industries by imposing local 
content requirement; and to maintain a trade balance by restraining investors from 
importing more than an equivalent amount or some proportion of exports.
As discussed in chapter 1.2.2, the TRIMs agreement as part of Uruguay Round 
package establishing the WTO required member states to phase out certain trade- 
related performance requirements. TRIMs agreement requires the elimination of any 
TRIM which is inconsistent with article III or XI of the GATT, and the Annex to the 
agreement provides an “illustrative list” of such measures. It cover both mandatory 
measures and those “necessary to obtain an advantage”, and includes
• local sourcing;
• trade balancing;
•  import restrictions;
•  foreign exchange balancing;
•  export restrictions.
Developing country members were given a 5-year transitional period to comply. As 
mentioned above, ASEAN countries declared their intention of complying with 
TRIMs within this timescale. However, in August 1999 some ASEAN countries, i.e. 
Malaysia, expressed the necessity to extend the deadline, and this is still under
0 7
consultation .
87 Under Art. 5.3 the Council for Trade in Goods may, on request, extend the transition period for the
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4.4 Investment Incentives
Most ASEAN countries grant both tax and non-tax incentives extensively in order to 
attract foreign investment. However, incentives must be approved by the relevant 
authority, thus foreign investors are subject to registration or licensing as well as the 
approval process discussed above. General features of incentives granted by ASEAN 
countries are tied to particular commodities, geographical areas, or export of goods 
produced, and generally based on discretion. Thus besides the objective of attracting 
FDI, incentives have also been used as tools to enhance economic development. The 
main objectives of the ASEAN countries in promoting investment are: to strengthen 
ASEAN’s industrial and technological capability, to use domestic resources, to create 
employment opportunities, to develop basic and support industries, to earn foreign 
exchange, to contribute to the economic growth of regions or remote areas, to develop 
infrastructure, to conserve natural resources, and to reduce environmental problems88. 
Therefore investment promotion is always in line with the investment regime, and 
promotion of trade. For instance, the promotion of the electronics industry is to 
support the export of electronic goods to world markets. The following is a brief 
summary of incentives provided by ASEAN countries.
4.4.1 Indonesia
In Indonesia, the efforts in investment promotion are always in line with 
promotion in trade, thus the investment regime and policies on trade are
elimination o f  TRIMs in the case o f a developing country which demonstrates particular difficulties in 
implementing the provisions o f the Agreement.
88. It is worth noting that in fact ASEAN countries all encourage a high standard o f environmental 
protection, evidenced by the requirements for investors to comply with environmental law. If any 
investors, both local and foreign investors, comply strictly with environment law or have special 
environmental protection technology they would be entitled to special incentives. Moreover, if any 
investors fail to comply with environmental law or are involved in activities dangerous to the 
environment they might be refused the right to operate or even be denied incorporation.
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complementary . Indonesia, like most ASEAN countries, promotes manufacturing 
industries aiming at increasing exports, and also enhancing investment. In order to 
ensure the security of foreign investment, the Indonesian government not only 
provides investment incentives to investors but also guarantees the free transfer 
abroad of all company profits, proceeds from sale of shares, compensation in the case 
of nationalisation and repatriation of remaining investment capital in the case of 
liquidation as well as fees and payments to expatriates without any restriction (this 
protection has been provided in the BITs as discussed in section 4.5.2 below).
The government of Indonesia provides investment incentives in various ways. 
They are:
(1) exemption or reduction o f import duty on importation o f main machinery, 
equipment, spare parts and auxiliary equipment, and raw materials;
(2) exemption or reduction from income tax on the importation of capital 
goods and raw materials;
(3) exemption from transfer o f ownership fee for ship registration 
deed/certification made for the first time in Indonesia, but not more than 
two years after commercial operation;
(4) deferment o f payment o f  VAT on the importation o f capital goods directly 
related to the production process;
(5) postponement o f VAT and sales tax on luxury goods and materials needed 
to manufacture export products.
(ESCAP: 1995)
For firms which export no less than 65% of their production, additional 
incentives are permission to import whatever materials which are required regardless 
of the availability of comparable domestic products, and drawback of import duty and 
surcharges of imported goods and raw materials used in production, or on imported 
components of identical goods and materials purchased locally from an importer or 
another local producer. The same facility also applies to imports that are exported 
without processing. The Indonesian government also provides non-tax incentives. 
Losses may be carried forward for 5 to 8 years and the depreciation rate for
89 ESCAP (1995) Publication o f the Regional Seminar on “Investment Promotion and Enhancement o f  
the role o f the Private Sector in Asia and the Pacific”, held on 26-30 January, 1993, at Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. Bangkok: ESCAP.
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depreciable assets ranges from 5% to 50%.
Considered from the incentives provided and the requirements for obtaining 
such incentives, it clearly shows that the Indonesian investment regime aims to attract 
FDI in particular areas, as mentioned, export-oriented industries, manufacturing 
industries and sophisticated technology industries in order to up grade the country’s 
technology. This, in return, promotes industrialisation of the country.
4.4.2 M alaysia
Malaysia has given investment incentives in manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors, as well as the tourism industry. This means Malaysia promotes more general 
industrial sectors. In Malaysia, many tax and non-tax incentives may be granted to a 
promoted investment. These include exemption from income tax90 for “the pioneer 
status” company, an investment tax allowance, a reinvestment allowance, an export 
credit refinancing scheme, double deduction of export credit reinsurance premiums, 
double deduction for promotion of exports, and an industrial building allowance. 
There are also packages of incentives granted to research and development in 
industry. There are various allowances and deductions as well as tax exemptions. 
Other incentives are deduction for capital expenditure on approved agricultural 
projects, incentives for the tourism industry, and tariff protection.
In the sector of manufacturing industries, exemption from import duty on raw 
materials, machinery, components; drawback of excise duty on parts, ingredients or 
packaging materials; drawback of sales tax on materials used in manufacture; 
exemption from import duty and sales tax on machinery and equipment, as well as 
drawback of import duty, are granted.
90 For the manufacturing sector, a company given pioneer status will be granted partial exemption from 
the payment o f income tax. It will only have to pay tax on 30% o f its statutory income (APEC: 1998, 
M AS-15). High technology industries given pioneer status will be entitled to full tax exemption. 
Malaysia, Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI) (1999) Information on Investment in
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All incentives granted would facilitate the operation of business/industry so 
FDI in Malaysia would gain advantages from these varieties of incentives in addition 
to other comparative advantages of this country such as low-cost labour and natural 
resources. Malaysia emphasises a technological up-grading policy and recently has 
created and promoted a “Mega-City”91 which is well equipped with sophisticated 
technology providing superb infrastructure for industry and commercial business. 
These efforts Malaysia also facilitate regional investment liberalisation, and provide a 
favourable investment environment to foreign investors who intend to invest in the 
region.
4.4.3 The Philippines
The Philippines government adopts two major thrusts for the country i.e. 
global excellence and competitiveness and people-empowerment and human
Q?development . The Philippines BOI has set as its objective the development of 
internationally competitive industries in order to attain these twin goals. Thus 
emphasis is being given to increasing the production capacity and enlarging the 
markets of export products. Additionally, the Philippine government is identifying and 
promoting new export products that would take advantage of the country’s strategic 
location to attract foreign investment. Therefore, many investment incentives have 
been granted to foreign investors.
M alaysia, government announcement, as o f December 1999.
91 For instance, investment in the multimedia super corridor located in Mega City will be granted tax 
and non-tax incentives: be provided a world-class physical and information infrastructure; allowed 
unrestricted employment o f knowledge workers from overseas; ensured freedom of ownership of  
companies; allowed freedom of sourcing capital globally for MSC infrastructure and freedom of  
borrowing funds; provided competitive financial incentives including no income tax for up to 10 years 
or an investment Tax Allowance, and no duties on the import o f multimedia equipment; become a 
regional leader in intellectual property protection and cyberlaws; ensured no censorship o f the Internet; 
provided globally competitive telecommunication tariffs; tendered key MSC infrastructure contracts to 
leading companies willing to use the MSC as their regional hub; and provided a high-powered 
implementation agency to act as an effective one-stop super shop to ensure the MSC meets company 
needs (MITI: 1999).
92 See Far East Bank and Trust Company (1999).
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In the Philippines, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 grants preferential
tax and other benefits to all companies in preferred areas of investment, as identified
in the investment priorities plan (IPP). Additional incentives are available to projects
locating in less developed areas, to enterprises registered with the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA), and to multinational enterprises establishing headquarters in
the Philippines . Fiscal incentives include:
an income tax holiday, tax and duty free importation o f capital equipment,
deduction for labour expenses, tax credit on domestic capital equipment,
exemption from contractor’s tax, tax credit on domestic breeding stock and 
genetic materials, access to bonded manufacturing and trading warehouse 
systems, exemption from taxes and duties on imported supplies and spare parts 
for consigned equipment, exemption from wharfage dues and any export tax, 
duty imposed and fees (APEC: 1998, RP-26).
Non-fiscal incentives provided include the simplification of custom procedures, 
unrestricted use of consigned equipment, and employment of foreign nationals. 
Additional incentives for less developed areas enterprises are granted to those 
companies located in such areas. 100% of the cost of necessary and major 
infrastructure and public facilities constructed can be deducted from taxable income, 
and deductions may be carried over to subsequent years until the total amount is 
deducted. Deduction for labour expenses is also doubled.
Firms registered with the EPZA are entitled to all the incentives given to firms 
registered with BOI, and they are also entitled to special tax treatment on merchandise 
within the zone; exemption from local taxes, licences, and fee; exemption from real 
estate taxes on production equipment and machinery not attached to real estate;
exemption from the 15% branch profits remittance tax on profit remitted by a branch
to its head office; exemption from SGS inspection.
93. TNCs establishing headquarters in the Philippines are entitled to a withholding tax o f only 15% on 
gross income received from the regional or area headquarters, tax and duty free importation o f personal 
and household effects, travel tax exemption, multiple-entry visa o f the foreign expatriates. The regional 
headquarters are entitled to exemption from income tax and contractor’s tax, exemption from all kinds 
o f  local licences, fees, and duties, tax and duty free importation o f training and conference materials, 
importation o f motor vehicles for expatriate executives and their replacement every three years.
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The Philippines government has adopted a new investment policy to encourage 
the entry of foreign investment into the country by allowing non-Philippine companies 
and individuals to invest in almost any type of business (subject only to negative list, 
which is gradually reduced)94. For those who invest in preferred and pioneer 
industries, there are incentives such as income tax breaks, tax free importation of 
equipment, and additional labor expense deduction, among others. These more 
favourable regulations clearly facilitate the implementation of open regionalism.
4.4.4 Singapore
The government of Singapore actively encourages foreign investment. The 
principal investment incentives are consolidated in the Economic Expansion 
Incentives Act and are administered primarily by the Economic Development Board 
(EDB) (APEC: 1998, SIN-5). EDB was set up in 1961 as a one-stop agency to 
spearhead Singapore’s industrialisation drive through investment promotion in 
manufacturing. Presently, Singapore is more advanced than any other ASEAN country 
in its industrialisation and its high technology industries. TNC networks from all over 
the world have established in this country so that further its economic progress and 
encourage inflows of trade and investment into the country even more. Being a free 
economy, Singapore has already liberalised its investment regulations and 
comprehensively provides investment incentives to both local and foreign investors.
In Singapore, as mentioned, the Economic Development Board (EDB) 
administers tax incentives under the Economic Expansion Incentives Act, which 
provides incentives in various categories. A pioneer status company is entitled to the 
exemption of 27% tax on profits arising from pioneer activities and the tax relief 
period is 5-10 years. Expansion incentive gives exemption of 27% on profits in excess
94 Far East Bank and Trust Company (1999) D oing Business in the Philippines. Manila: Far East Bank 
and Trust Company.
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of the pre-expansion level, and the tax relief period is up to 5 years, with provision for 
extension. The investment allowance incentive exempts taxable income of an amount 
equal to a specified proportion of new fixed investment (up to 50%). Operational 
headquarters will be granted the incentive that income arising from the provision in 
Singapore of approved services will be taxed at 10%, and other income from overseas 
subsidiaries and associated companies may also be eligible for effective tax relief, and 
this incentive will be up to 10 years with provision for extension. Export of services 
will be entitled to 90% of the qualifying export income being exempted from tax and 
the tax relief period is 5 years, with provision for extension. Post-pioneer incentives 
will be granted to the company by reducing the corporate tax rate to 15% for up to 10 
years. The venture capital incentive is that if losses are incurred from the sale of 
shares, up to 100% of equity invested can be offset against the investor’s other taxable 
income. The international direct investment incentive is that if losses are incurred 
from the sale of shares or liquidation of the overseas company, up to 100% of equity 
invested can be offset against the investor’s other taxable income. The approved 
foreign loan scheme gives exemption from withholding tax on interest, and the 
approved royalties provision gives full or partial exemption of withholding tax on 
royalties. Also, double deduction for research and development expenses is granted to 
approved projects.
Actually, investment incentives granted by Singapore are similar to those 
given by other ASEAN countries but with a more open economy and more liberalised 
investment regime without restriction on FDI entry and foreign equity, Singapore 
gains more advantages in attracting foreign investors. This can be seen from the huge 
inflows of FDI and the trade volume of this country (Asia Pulse Pte Ltd: 1999) despite
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its small size. The economic success of Singapore helps encourage other ASEAN 
countries to follow suit, especially when the AIA has been fully implemented. A 
country with a more liberalised investment regime, like Singapore, will attract non- 
ASEAN investors to establish themselves in the country (discussed in chapter 5, 
section 5.3.6).
4.4.5 Thailand
Two major laws affecting foreign investment are the Investment Promotion 
Act of 1977 and the Alien Business Law of 1972. The Thai government has 
consistently maintained favourable attitudes towards foreign investment. There are no 
prohibitions or restrictions on foreign investment per se. But foreign investors may be 
subject to the Alien Business Law when it is applicable9^
Under the Investment Promotion Act, the Board of Investment (BOI) may 
approve the promotion of investment projects in agriculture, animal husbandry, 
fishery, mineral exploration and mining, manufacturing and services when it considers 
that the products, commodities or services:
(1) are either unavailable or insufficiently available in Thailand or are 
produced by an outdated process;
(2) are important and beneficial to the country’s economic and social 
development, and to national security; or
(3) are economically and technologically appropriate, and have adequate 
preventive measures against damage to the environment.
(Investment Promotion Act 1977, Art. 16)
Apart from the Alien Business Law Act 1972, all industries are open to foreign 
investors, and if they reach the criterion set forth by the BOI they will be approved to
95 The Alien Business Law is applicable only to natural persons and juristic persons who are: (1) a 
juristic person with majority foreign shareholding; (2) a juristic person, at least one-half o f the number 
o f shareholders, partners or members o f which are aliens; (3) limited partnership or registered ordinary 
partnership having an aliens as managing partner or manager. The Alien Business Law sets three 
categories o f business activities where foreign legal entities defined above are (1) prohibited (category 
A); (2) Permitted only with the Board o f Investment promotion (category B); (3) implemented only 
with the permission o f the Ministry o f Commerce o f Board of Investment promotion (category C). 
However The Alien Business Law does not apply to aliens in business with the permission o f the Royal 
Thai Government, or covered by an agreement between the Royal Thai Government and foreign 
government which excludes certain activities. (BOI, 1999: 10), Alien Business Law Act 1972, Annexes
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be “promoted projects” entitled to incentives. In Thailand, tax incentives are available 
to both local and foreign investors. Major incentives include tax holidays, exemption 
or reduction of import duties on machinery, and exemption or reduction of taxes on 
imported raw materials.
The magnitude of incentives granted depends on the location of investment 
projects in order to implement the industry decentralisation policy. Decentralisation is 
one of the aims of the Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan of 
Thailand. Thailand has encountered the problem of urbanisation, and all development 
has centred in Bangkok and the central area. Therefore, the decentralisation policy has 
been adopted, and this can be realised through the creation of job and the allocation of 
industries to peripheral and remote areas for bringing in those areas of technology, 
jobs, and a high standard of living so that development would be evenly distributed 
throughout the Kingdom. BOI has implemented this policy by encouraging the 
location of investment in peripheral and remote areas, in doing so investment will be 
given more privileges and incentives (The Council of Ministers, 1997: The National 
Social and Development Plan).
In order to encourage industrial decentralisation, the country is divided into 
three zones with varying degrees of incentives. Remote areas are granted more 
incentives. In Zone I, Bangkok and neighbouring provinces, the promoted investment 
is entitled to 50% of import duties on machinery for projects exporting not less than 
80% of production, exemption of corporate income tax for three years for projects 
exporting not less than 80% of output and located in industrial estates or promoted 
industrial zones, and exemption of import duties on raw materials for one year for 
projects exporting not less than 30%. In Zone II, provinces in the central part of
attached to the Announcement o f the National Executive Council (Alien Business Law Act 1972).
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Thailand outside zone I, promoted investment is entitled to 50% reduction of import 
duties on machinery, and exemption of corporate income tax for three years, 
extendable to 7 years for projects located in industrial estates and promoted industrial 
zones, and exemption of import duties on raw materials for one year for projects 
exporting not less than 30%. In zone III, which is the rest, the promoted investment is 
entitled to exemption of import duties on machinery, exemption of corporate income 
tax for 8 years, exemption on import duties on raw materials for five years for projects 
exporting not less than 30%, and 75% reduction of import duties on raw materials 
used in manufacture for local distribution for 5 years.
In order to encourage industrial development in underdeveloped regional 
areas, the BOI offers tax incentives to existing activities, which may or may not have 
been promoted, if they relocate from the central to other regional areas. Relocating 
operations will receive the standard non-tax and tax incentives, exemption from 
corporate income tax, double deduction from taxable income of water, electricity and 
transportation costs, and deduction from net profit of 25% of the cost of installation or 
construction of the project’s infrastructure facilities. As technological development is 
one of the most important policy objectives, additional tax incentives are granted to 
projects that invest in research and development activities.
This clearly shows that the investment policy of Thailand is geared towards the 
national economic and development policy. Therefore, the government encourages 
both appropriate and high technological industries, export-oriented industries, 
investment with high standard of environmental protection measures, and investment 
located in remote areas. Considering from these conditions we can see that a certain 
level of screening is maintain in this country. However, the Short-term Measures and 
the AIA scheme that Thailand has committed will ensure that Thailand will liberalise
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its investment regime further and open up all industries to both ASEAN and non- 
ASEAN investors. This is evidenced by the passages of new regulations by Thai 
government such as to reduce negative list in the Alien Business Law Act96; to allow 
100% of foreign equity shareholding97; dramatically open industries98, especially 
services sector such as banking, insurance, telecommunication99; This shows that 
Thailand further liberalises investment regime to implement the open regionalism. 
4.4.6 Overview
ASEAN countries have used investment incentives to attract FDI. Moreover, 
they use them as instruments to compete with each other among ASEAN countries to 
attract FDI as well. This encourages foreign investors to take advantage of incentive 
shopping. Generally, however, these have taken the form of tax benefits rather than 
government grants (which are more often available in the richer developed countries). 
Competition in the granting of incentives among ASEAN countries may distort the 
efficient allocation of investment and further distort trade and investment flows in the 
region, or at least such incentives are just a windfall fortune for foreign investors since 
they are likely to invest in that country no matter whether incentives are granted or 
not. Also the use of operational restrictions is usually done as a condition of 
investment incentives.
In the area of market access, the liberalisation process of ASEAN countries 
has been selective and is focused mostly on export-oriented industries. A number of
96 The Foreign Investment Law 1999 has replaced the Alien Business Act Law 1972, and it reduces the 
negative list prohibited to foreign investors, mainly in commercial and service sectors (11 business).
97 Thailand’s commitment under the Short-term Measures is incorporated into national law by the 
Decree on relaxing ratio of foreign equity holding, 1 December 1998 (The Office o f the Board o f
Investment, BOI Announcement).
98 Thailand’s commitment under AIA is incorporated into national law by the Decree on open up 
industries to foreign investors, 1 December 1998. The Office o f the Board o f Investment, BOI
Announcement).
99 Enforced by the Financial Institutions Law 1999 (Ministry o f Finance, Announcement as of 
December 1999) also see Memorandum o f Economic Policies o f the Royal Thai Government.
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countries have increased the level of foreign participation in certain sectors and 
allowed foreign participation in previously restricted or sensitive sectors. For instance, 
Indonesia changed to a negative list, reduced the sectors subject to the requirement of 
100% equity, and substantially relaxed divestment requirements. The Philippines also 
increased the number of sectors open to foreign investment, and now allows foreign 
investors to lease private land for 50 years, and has suspended the nationality 
requirement in the case of ASEAN Projects or investment by ASEAN nationals. 
Thailand now allows wholly-owned foreign businesses to operate investments in basic 
infrastructure, public utilities development and transportation systems (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 1998a; CCH Asia Limited, 1998).
In the area of operational restrictions, governments have not been too eager to 
act unilaterally on this issue. However, some of the operational restrictions, such as 
local content requirements, are included in the TRIMs provisions, which require 
changes to national laws. In response to obligations under the TRIMs, restrictions 
have been reduced. In addition to the notification of investment measures, which all 
ASEAN countries have to comply with under the TRIMs agreement, they have also 
liberalised other aspects. Malaysia reduced its withholding tax on technical fees and 
royalties from 15% to 10%, and allowed exporters to keep a portion of export 
proceeds in a foreign currency account in Malaysia. The Philippines allowed greater 
participation by foreign investors in domestic economic activities, and also liberalised 
the land lease restriction and foreign exchange controls. Thailand abolished 
restrictions on the establishment of assembly plants and liberalised foreign exchange 
controls.
In conclusion, the investment regimes of ASEAN countries clearly show that 
all ASEAN countries carefully screen foreign investment, especially in controlling
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equity and ownership participation of foreign investors. Generally, they prefer a 
minority of foreign investors100, and particularly certain business areas have been 
closed to foreign investment or subject to approval from authority in certain industries 
that reach the set requirements. Investment incentives are granted under terms and 
conditions that comply with the countries’ economic and development plans. So the 
policy of ASEAN countries is to welcome foreign investment as long as it meets the 
set requirements of the countries. ASEAN countries open the door but hang curtains to 
prevent dust and flies from entering. Thus investment liberalisation in ASEAN 
countries before the Asian crisis was subject to domestic laws and regulations as well 
as economic policy. Therefore, under such circumstances it was unlikely that ASEAN 
countries would unilaterally extend national treatment to foreign investors. It was not 
until recently when ASEAN launched the AIA scheme that NT and MFN treatment 
could be granted to both ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors (see chapter 5). Also the 
short-term measures dramatically alter national laws (see chapter 5) especially in two 
areas, i.e. allowing 100% foreign equity ownership and providing attractive 
investment incentives, both tax and non-tax incentives.
Considering the actual national laws and the development of investment 
regulations of ASEAN countries, it can be seen that ASEAN countries have cautiously 
liberalised their investment regimes. They still maintain FDI entry-screening 
measures, while encouraging inflow of foreign investment in particular areas by 
granting investment incentives. Under such circumstances, it seems that the process of
10°. This means that indeed ASEAN countries as well as many developing Asian countries relied on FDI 
only to a moderate degree in the past. Investment was mainly financed by domestic savings, which 
were exceptional high by international standards (ranging from 25 to 35% o f GDP), perhaps caused by 
the restriction of foreign ownership. Nevertheless, the rise o f foreign investment flows into the region 
has increased the need for capital on the part o f local investors in the increasing projects that 
encountered the restriction of foreign equity. Therefore local investors had to turn to offshore loans 
since onshore loans bear higher interest than offshore ones. This in the end increased foreign debt to 
ASEAN countries in the private sector. The financial crisis in ASEAN countries was partly caused by 
the heavy offshore loans of investors in these countries.
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open regionalism would progress at a slow pace if it relied solely on investment 
liberalisation at a national level. However, the Asian crisis in 1997 prompted ASEAN 
countries to actively liberalise investment regulation. This can be seen from the 
adoption of the Short-term Measures and the AIA scheme that dramatically changes 
the ASEAN countries’ investment policy and laws (discussed in chapter 5). 
Consequently, the national and regional investment liberalisation complementarily 
facilitates and reinforces the process of open regionalism.
It is important to understand the pattern of investment liberalisation of 
countries in this region that is based on the trade-oriented investment approach101, 
which means compensating the propensity for foreign investment to generate an 
excess demand for imports, by increasing exports. Trade-oriented FDI is welfare 
improving in both home and host countries because trade-oriented FDI implies 
investment in industries in which the home country has comparative disadvantages, so 
that investment has been shifted to a host country which has comparative advantages. 
The host country can be viewed as a production base (where cost of production is 
lower than in home countries), and the products can be distributed at a lower price 
both in the local and global market. This would accelerate trade between the two 
nations, and promote beneficial industrial restructuring in both countries. This can 
explain the pattern of FDI in ASEAN countries from developed countries, which was 
initially directed towards natural resource development in which home countries have 
comparative disadvantages, and towards some manufacturing sectors in which home 
countries have been losing their comparative advantages. FDI from developed 
countries in ASEAN countries has been regarded as export-oriented, occurring in less 
sophisticated and more labour-intensive industries, and with a higher share of local
101 See Lizondo, Saul (1992: 15).
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ownership. This FDI pattern interacted with the development of ASEAN countries’ 
national investment laws, which facilitated the export-push policy of these countries. 
Therefore, ASEAN countries have employed a targeted industry strategy to screen 
FDI, and offered incentives to promote export-oriented industries. Investment 
liberalisation in these countries thus accompanies this policy, i.e. enhancing exports 
and encouraging trade flows from within and outside the region. This process fits well 
with open regionalism and also it fits well into the market mechanism and investment 
patterns.
Now I will discuss bilateral investment agreements concluded by ASEAN 
countries to analyse the protection of foreign investment in this region, and also to 
analyse whether or not ASEAN BITs help to liberalise the investment regime in these 
countries.
4.5 ASEAN Bilateral Investment Agreements
In this section, I will focus on the ASEAN BITs by comparing terms and conditions of 
each ASEAN countries’ BITs that vary considerably. The variation is based mainly on 
the BIT model of some developed countries such as the UK model, the US model, the 
German Model, or Switzerland’s, on which each ASEAN country has based its BIT. 
Moreover, each ASEAN country may also have its own bargaining position causing it 
to deviate from such models. Therefore, it appears that one ASEAN country may 
adopt various models of BIT according to who is its contracting party and under what 
circumstances they entered into the BITs.
The most important characteristic of ASEAN BITs, like other general BITs, is 
that they are based on national laws of the contracting parties, especially on pre-entry 
and establishment control on FDI (discussed below). Thus most BITs do not affect 
national laws and leave this issue to the host country’s discretion. Even post-entry
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national treatment allows the host country to impose non-discriminatory regulations 
and requirements to ensure the conformity of the FDI operation to the laws of the host 
country. These characteristics appear in all ASEAN BITs (see Table 6). Moreover, 
national treatment and MFN treatment are also subject to the national policy so that 
under certain circumstances foreign investors that are generally granted national 
treatment still are subject to some reservations. The purpose of BITs is to ensure the 
protection of foreign investment at least on the basis of an international standard. 
Therefore, it is clear that ASEAN BITs do not override or affect their existing 
investment laws. This is in contrast with the US model BIT, which grants national 
treatment or MFN treatment whichever is more favourable at both pre-entry and post­
entry stage to foreign investors (discussed in chapter 3) which however no ASEAN 
country has yet accepted. Therefore, all ASEAN BITs remain their investment control 
model (discussed in chapter 5). Now I turn to discuss the ASEAN BITS, which are 
based on various models.
4.5.1 The US BIT Model
Firms from European countries and the US. have long invested in ASEAN 
countries and ASEAN countries entered into bilateral investment agreements with 
these capital-exporting countries after the 1960s, initially with a few countries such as 
Germany, the Netherlands and France. The US also concluded investment protection 
agreements with ASEAN countries in the 1960s but based mainly on the old model of 
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN). Recently ASEAN 
countries have also endeavoured to conclude BITs with other capital-exporting 
countries (see Table 3 below).
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Parties S ignatu re E ntry  into Force
Australia Nov. 17, 1992 July 29, 1993
Belgium-Luxembourg Jan. 15, 1970 June 17, 1972
China Nov. 18, 1994 Apr. 1, 1995
Denmark Jan. 30, 1968 July 2, 1968
Egypt, Arab Republic of Jan. 19, 1994
France June 14, 1973 Apr. 29, 1975
Germany Nov. 8, 1968 Apr. 19, 1971
Hungary May 20, 1992 Feb. 13, 1996
Italy Apr. 25, 1991 June 24, 1995
Korea, Republic o f Feb. 16, 1991 Mar. 10, 1994
Kyrgyz Republic July 18, 1995
Lao People’s Democratic Republic Oct. 18, 1994
Malaysia Jan. 22, 1994
Netherlands Apr. 6, 1994 July 1, 1995
Norway Nov. 26, 1991 Oct. 1, 1994
Poland Oct. 6, 1992 July 1, 1993
Singapore Aug. 28, 1990 Aug. 28, 1990
Slovak Republic July 12, 1994 Mar. 1, 1995
Spain May 30, 1995
Sweden Sep. 17, 1992 Feb. 18, 1993
Switzerland Feb. 6, 1974 Apr. 9, 1976
Tunisia May 13, 1992
United Kingdom Apr. 27, 1976 Mar. 24, 1977
Vietnam Oct. 25, 1991
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (10)
Parties Signature Entry into Force
Australia Apr. 6, 1994 Apr. 8, 1995
China Jan. 31, 1993 June 1, 1993
France Dec. 12, 1989 Mar. 8, 1991
Germany Aug. 9, 1996
Indonesia Oct. 18, 1994
Korea, Republic o f May 15, 1996
Malaysia Dec. 8, 1992
Mongolia Mar. 3, 1994
Thailand Aug. 22, 1990



































Korea, Republic o f Apr.
Kuwait Nov.
Kyrgyz Republic July




















21, 1988 Mar. 31, 1990
16, 1994
6, 1992 Sep. 18, 1992
15, 1985 Jan. 3, 1988
24, 1975 Sep. 1, 1976
22, 1960 July 6, 1963
19, 1993 July 8, 1995
3, 1995
22, 1994
4, 1988 Oct. 25, 1990
2, 1994




27, 1995 Jan. 14, 1996
12, 1994
15, 1971 Sep. 13, 1972




21, 1993 Mar. 23, 1994
26, 1982 July 20, 1984
4, 1995 Feb. 16, 1996
16, 1982 Oct. 31, 1985
3, 1979 July 6, 1979
1, 1978 June 9, 1978
30, 1994
11, 1991





Parties S ignatu re  E ntry  into Force
Australia Jan. 25, 1995 Dec. 8, 1995
Canada Nov. 9, 1995
Chile Nov. 20, 1995
China July 20, 1992
Czech Republic Apr. 5, 1995
(France* June 14, 1976 July 1, 1976)
France Sep. 13, 1994
Italy June 17, 1988 Nov. 4, 1993
Korea, Republic o f Apr. 7, 1994
Netherlands Feb. 27, 1985 Oct. 1, 1987
Spain Oct. 19, 1993 Sep. 21, 1994
Thailand Sep. 30, 1995
United Kingdom Dec. 3, 1980 Jan. 2, 1981
Vietnam Feb. 27, 1992
* This treaty will terminate on the entry into force o f  the new treaty between France and the Philippines, signed on September 13, 
1994.
S in g ap o re (13)
Parties S ignature E n try  into Force
Belgium-Luxembourg Nov. 17, 1978 Nov. 27, 1980
China Nov. 21, 1985 Feb. 7, 1986
Czech Republic Apr. 8, 1995
France Sep. 8, 1975 Oct. 18, 1976
Germany Oct. 3, 1973 Oct. 1, 1975
Indonesia Aug. 28, 1990 Aug. 28, 1990
Mongolia July 24, 1995 Jan. 14, 1996
Netherlands May 16, 1972 Sep. 7, 1973
Poland June 3, 1993 Dec. 29, 1993
Sri Lanka May 9, 1980 Sep. 30, 1980
Switzerland Mar. 6, 1978 May 3, 1978
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United Kingdom July 22, 1975 July 22, 1975











Korea, Republic o f Mar.












12, 1985 Dec. 13, 1985
12, 1994 May 4, 1995
18, 1994
13, 1961 Apr. 10, 1965
18, 1991 Oct. 18, 1991
24, 1989 Sep. 30, 1989
22, 1990
6, 1972 Mar. 3, 1973
15, 1991 Nov. 15, 1991
30, 1995
18, 1992 Aug. 10, 1993
30, 1993 Aug. 20, 1994
28, 1978 Aug. 11, 1979
30, 1991



























* Signature date unavailable.
S ignatu re E n try  into Force
— , 1993




2, 1992 Sep. 1, 1993
25, 1993 Aug. 7, 1994
13, 1993
26, 1992
3, 1993 Prov. In force
26, 1994 June 16, 1995
25, 1991
18, 1990 May 6, 1994
13, 1993 Sep. 4, 1993
27, 1995
21, 1992
10, 1994 Feb. 1, 1995
27, 1992
31, 1994 Nov. 24, 1994
1, 1994 Aug. 15, 1995
16, 1994
29, 1992
8, 1993 Aug. 2, 1994
3, 1992 Dec. 3, 1992
30, 1991
Source: ICSID Compilation o f Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties as o f  November 1999 Oceana Publications, Inc. 
also available
at website http:// w w w .Worldbank.org/icsid/treaties.treaties.htm.
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It is notable that the US has not re-concluded any new BITs102 with ASEAN 
countries, although the US already had agreements based on the older FCN model 
protecting foreign investment with some of these countries. For instance, the US 
concluded a Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand in 1966103 and 
Vietnam in 1957104, and also had a very old Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation with Brunei in 18501(b. With the Philippines, the US concluded an 
Agreement relating to entry of nationals of either country into the territories of the 
other for purposes of trade, investment, and related activities106. The Philippines is 
also a signatory to the Convention establishing the Multilateral Guarantee Agreement. 
Since this country adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part 
of the law of the country, the generally accepted principles of international law on the 
protection of properties owned by the aliens are therefore considered part of the
• 107Philippines law. The rest had concluded Economic Co-operation Agreements with
102. The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Program supports the key US government economic policy 
objectives o f promoting US exports and enhancing the international competitiveness o f US companies. 
The BIT program’s basic aims are to protect US investment abroad in those countries where US 
investors’ right are not protected through existing agreements such as treaties o f Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation; encourage adoption in foreign countries o f market-oriented domestic policies that treat 
private investment fairly; and support the development o f international law standards consistent with 
these objectives. See http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/7treaty.html.
103. Treaty o f Amity and Economic Relations between The Kingdom of Thailand and the United States 
o f America, signed at Bangkok on 29th May 1966. Entered into force on 8th June 1968. 19 UST 5843; 
TIAS 6540; 652 UNTS 253.
104. Exchange o f  notes constituting an agreement relating to the guaranty o f private investments 
between the United States o f America and Republic of Vietnam, signed at Washington DC, on 5th 
November 1957. Entered into force on the same day. 8 UST 1862; TIAS 3931; 300 UNTS 11.
I(b. Treaty o f Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States o f America and 
Brunei signed in Brunei on 23rd June 1850. Entered into Force on 11th July 1853. 10 Stat. 909; TS 33; 5 
Bevans 1080.
106. Agreement relating to entry of nationals o f either country into the territories o f the other for purpose 
o f trade, investment, and related activities between the US and the Philippines. Exchange o f notes at 
Washington, on 6th September 1955. Entered into force on 6th 1955. 6 UST 3030; TIAS 3349; 238 
UNTS 109.
107. Economic co-operation agreement between Burma and the United States o f America signed at 
Rangoon 2 1st March 1957. Entered into force on 9th October 1957, Economic co-operation agreement 
between Indonesia and the United States o f America signed at Djakarta 16th October 1950. Entered into 
force on 16th October 1950, Economic co-operation agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
United States o f America, signed at London 6th July 1948; applicable to the Federation o f Malaya 
(Malaysia) and Singapore 20th July 1948. Economic co-operation agreement between Laos and the 
United States o f America, with annex and exchange of notes, signed at Vientiane 9th September 1952. 
Entered into force 9th September 1952.
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the US. However, the US did conclude investment guarantee agreements with some of 
the ASEAN countries, but unlike BITs they were mainly focusing on the purpose of 
investment protection excluding the liberalisation of investment regulations. The US 
entered into an investment guarantee agreement with Indonesia108, Malaysia109, the 
Philippines110, and Singapore111. The areas covered by the agreements are: protection 
against unlawful nationalisation and expropriation; prompt, effective and adequate 
compensation in the event of nationalisation or expropriation, and of losses owing to 
such events as war or insurrection; free transfer of profits or capital and other fees; 
and settlement of disputes under the Convention on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes. These various agreements were not unique, and particularly the old model 
of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the Economic Co-operation 
Agreements broadly covered all economic issues, not just investment. According to 
these agreements, investment protection accorded by ASEAN countries was mostly 
based on international law and also guaranteed fair and equitable treatment. They also 
provide National Treatment or Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in certain respects to 
US investors112. However, the entry of foreign investors and any pre-entry 
requirements were subject to domestic laws and regulations. And this is a very 
common criterion that also applied to all ASEAN BITs concluded with European and 
other countries.
108. The Exchange o f Notes constituting an Agreement between the United States o f America and 
Indonesia relating to Investment Guaranties signed and entered into force on 7th January 1967.
109. Exchange o f Notes constituting an agreement between the United States o f America and the
Federation o f Malaya relating to the Guaranty o f Private Investments, signed and entered into force on 
21st April 1959.
n0. Exchange o f  Notes constituting an Agreement between the United States o f America and the 
Republic o f  the Philippines relating to Guaranties under section 111 (b) (3) o f the Economic Co­
operation Act o f 1948, as amended, signed and entered into force on 19th February, 1952. 
m . Investment Guarantee Agreement between the United States o f America and Singapore signed and 
entered into force on 25lh March 1966.
ll2. This was linked to the close relationship between the US and some ASEAN countries on political 
grounds: for instance, the Philippines was a colony o f the US and Thailand had American military 
bases on its territory according to the Manila accord to protect the region from a communist invasion 
into the region as Thailand has borders with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam which have been
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The new model of US BITs, adopted in 1980, went beyond those of other 
countries in requiring pre-entry National Treatment, which in effect requires a treaty 
partner (see Tables 4 and 5) to allow free entry of foreign investors, subject only to a 
negative list of exceptions negotiated and offered at the time of the agreement. 
Moreover, the new model of US BITs, unlike the old one, provides US investors with
i i ' i
six basic guarantees :
1) to ensure that US companies will be treated as favourably as their competitors114;
2) to establish clear limits on the expropriation o f investments and ensure that US investors 
will be fairly compensated;
3) to ensure free transfer o f funds"3 into and out o f  the host country using the market rate o f  
exchange;
4) to limit the ability o f the host government to require US investors to adopt inefficient and 
trade distorting practices116;
5) to ensure the right of US investors to submit an investment dispute with the treaty 
partner’s government to international arbitration117;
6 )  to give US investors the right to engage the top managerial personnel o f  their choice, 
regardless o f nationality.
In fact, the US BITs aimed to set the policy groundwork for broader multilateral 
initiatives in the OECD, and perhaps eventually in the WTO.
endangered by communism in the past.
"3. Press Release by the Bureau o f Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, 14th January 1998.
"4. This includes when the US investors seek to initiate investment and throughout the life o f that 
investment, subject to certain limited and specifically described exceptions listed in annexes or 
protocols to the treaties.
"5. This covers all transfers related to an investment, including interest, proceeds from liquidation, 
repatriated profits and infusions o f additional financial resources after the initial investment has been 
made. This is to ensure the right to transfer funds creates a predictable environment guided by market 
forces.
"6. From the U S’s point o f view, performance requirement such as local content requirement or export 
performance requirements all are prohibited. This provision may also open up new markets for US 
producers and increase US exports. Thus the US investors protected by BITs can purchase US- 
produced components without restriction on inputs in their production o f various products. They can 
also import other US-produced products for distribution and sale in the local market. They cannot be 
forced, as a condition of establishment or operation, to export locally produced goods back to the US
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Table 4
The new US Bilateral Investment Treaties
(As o f  14th January 1998)
C ountry Date o f Signature Date Entered into Force
Albania January 11, 1995 January 4, 1998
Argentina November 14, 1991 October 20, 1994
Armenia September 23, 1992 March 29, 1996
Azerbaijan August 1, 1997 --------------
Bangladesh March 12, 1986 July 25, 1989
Belarus January 15,1994
Bulgaria September 23, 1992 June 2, 1994
Cameroon February 26, 1986 April 6, 1989
The Congo February 12, 1990 August 13, 1994
Croatia July 13, 1996
Czech Republic October 22, 1991 December 19, 1992
Ecuador August 27, 1993 May 11, 1997
Egypt March 11, 1986 June 27, 1992
Estonia April 19, 1994 February 16, 1997
Georgia March 7, 1994 August 17, 1997
Grenada May 2, 1986 March 3, 1989
Haiti December 13, 1983
Honduras July 1, 1995
Jamaica February 4, 1994 March 7, 1997
Jordan July 2, 1997
Kazakhastan May 19, 1992 January 12, 1994
Kyrgyzstan January 19, 1993 January 12, 1994
Latvia January 13, 1995 December 26, 1996
Lithuania January 14, 1998
market or to third-country markets.
I17. This is to ensure that there is no requirement to use that country’s domestic courts.
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Moldovia April 21, 1993 November 25, 1994
Mongolia October 6, 1994 January 1, 1997
Morocco July 22, 1985 May 29, 1991
Nicaragua July 1, 1995
Panama October 27, 1982 May 30, 1991
Poland March 21, 1990 August 6, 1994
Romania May 28, 1992 January 15, 1994
Russia June 17, 1992
Senegal December 6, 1983 October 25, 1990
Slovakia October 22, 1991 December 19, 1992
Sri Lanka September 20, 1991 May 1, 1993
Trinidad & Tobago September 26, 1994 December 26, 1996
Tunisia May 15, 1990 February 7, 1993
Turkey December 3, 1985 May 18, 1990
Ukraine March 4, 1994 November 16, 1996
Uzbekistan December 16, 1994
Zaire August 3, 1984 July 28, 1989
Source: Bureau o f Economic, Business and Agricultural Affair, US. Bilateral Investment Treaty
Table 5
An Example of the US Bilateral Investment Agreement Model
Contracting Scope of application Admission Expropriation Disputes Other
Parties and and and settlement main




The US and Nationals and Investment Admission Expropriation Dispute (l)M F N  and
Lithuania Legal persons means every Pre-entry
and
and settlement Nationallegally kind of Compensation treatment
14 January 
1998
constituted investment in will not
under the territory of Post-entry Investment ( l )  initially extend to the
applicable laws one party shall not be seek solution other party
and regulations owned or Most-favour- expropriated or through because the
of a party controlled nation nationalised consultation other party
whether or not directly or treatment or either directly and accorded to
organised for indirectly by national or indirectly negotiation any regional
pecuniary gain, nationals or treatment, through (2) submit the arrangement,
or privately or companies of whichever is measures dispute to the free trade
govemmentally the other party the most tantamount to court or area, custom
owned or favourable, expropriation or administrative union or
controlled. except the nationalisation tribunals o f multilateral
agreed annex except the party that international
issues for a public 
purpose, in a




non- in accordance (2) the treaty
discriminatory with the shall not
manner, upon agreed dero gate
payment o f procedure from laws,
prompt, (3) submit to regulations








Source: compiled from the BIT between the US and Lithuania by the author.
It is interesting to note that all ASEAN BITs, either concluded with European 
countries or with the US as well as others, were all subject to domestic law regarding 
the establishment and control of foreign investment. However, ASEAN countries do 
accept the principles of international law regarding investment protection. This 
common feature clearly signals that ASEAN countries preserve their sovereign right 
in the liberalisation of investment regulations that they see fundamentally affecting 
their economy and security. They still need to make sure that foreign investors 
admitted are well controlled and contribute economic progress to their economies 
according to their plans and policies. But once they have accepted any foreign 
investors they are committed to grant protection to them at a level reaching the 
requirements of international laws and principles to ensure the security of foreign 
investors. This shows the firm commitment of ASEAN countries to the protection of 
foreign investors, and BITs have been regarded as an instrument to attract foreign 
investment in this sense. It is very important to emphasise that ASEAN countries 
prefer not to have their territorial jurisdiction removed by the liberalisation of foreign 
investment in absolute terms. There are far more factors to be taken into account in 
relation to foreign investment than just liberalisation. Social problems, security, 
environment, employment and culture may be affected by foreign investment in the 
host countries. These have been regarded and taken into consideration in the 
liberalisation of investment. Now I will discuss the ASEAN BITs concluded with
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European countries, which also show the dichotomy between the restriction of foreign 
investment entry and the guarantee of protection of foreign investment.
4.5.2 ASEAN BITs concluded with European Countries
In most of their relationships, ASEAN countries are the recipients of inward 
capital flows and are agreeing to conditions of investment protection in the hope that 
more capital would flow into their territory from the traditional capital-exporting 
countries. They considered that a BIT could be a measure for attracting investment, 
since the existence of a BIT may be regarded as a guarantee of protection for foreign 
investors. In particular, uncertainties about the content of customary international laws 
on foreign investment, as well as the difficulty of concluding a binding multilateral 
investment agreement to protect foreign investors, are the main reasons for states to 
turn to bilateral investment agreements. Developed countries hoped that the 
guarantees in an intergovernmental agreement might be higher and more reliable than 
the domestic laws of the host countries. However, the vast majority of BITs actually 
concluded were not instruments for investment liberalisation but rather for protection 
of foreign investors from illegal expropriation/nationalisation and unfair 
compensation. BITs mainly leave the matters of entry and establishment to national 
discretion (Muchlinski, 1995: Ch. 17; UNCTAD, 1999: 16). This can clearly be seen 
in all ASEAN BITs that are subject to domestic laws and regulations as well as 
economic policy, ranging from admission requirements, treatment after establishment 
(e.g. the Malaysia divestment rules), transfer of profits and other returns from 
investment, and especially the pre-requisites for entitlement to investment promotion. 
Thus BITs do not affect the investment regimes, laws and regulations of ASEAN 
countries as discussed above. Even though all BITs of ASEAN countries include the 
National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation principles, the applicability of those
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principles varies in particular instances and is still subject to domestic laws. If 
ASEAN BITs are regarded as one factor among many which may affect a potential 
investor’s decision to invest in ASEAN countries, it is to ensure the stability and 
security of foreign investment in these countries but not for the reason that ASEAN 
uses BITS for investment liberalisation. Other factors are very important, such as the 
economic profitability of an investment, political stability of the host country, the 
legal framework, the investment climate or the favourable environment for investment 
that facilitates profit making by foreign investors. Political, economic and legal 
stability are the main investment determinants. From the legal aspect, investment law 
reform may nevertheless be important, particularly to strengthen regional economic 
integration to gain advantages from economies of scale through the enlargement of the 
regional market for trade and investment.
To show that ASEAN BITs are subject to domestic investment laws and 
regulations, and that in fact BITs do not interfere with the policies of ASEAN 
countries to screen foreign investment for economic development, the following 
section will analyse BITs between ASEAN countries and some European countries by 
making a comparison of these ASEAN BITs.
4.5.2.1 The comparison of the ASEAN B IT s118
Table 6 shows that all bilateral investment agreements concluded between 
ASEAN member countries and the Western capital-exporting countries conform to a 
general pattern (discussed in chapter 3), although the terms used in the agreements 
were divergent. All ASEAN countries share the same common principle that 
admission of foreign investment is based on the domestic laws and regulations of the 
host countries, so that all foreign investments may be subject to a government
118 The discussion in this section is the original analysis o f the author based on the comparison o f  the 
ASEAN BITs in Table 6, which is compiled by the author.
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screening process. This can be seen from the terms and conditions regarding this
issue, in all ASEAN BITs. Thus, the BIT between Philippines and Germany stated in
the attached Protocol that:
“Either Contracting Party reserves the right to require as a pre-requisite to the 
admission o f an investment within its territory a “certificate o f  admission” 
which it shall issue to investments it considers admissible pursuant to Art. 1”
Art. 2 (I) of the BIT between Indonesia and Britain also provided that:
“This Agreement shall only apply to investments by nationals or companies o f  
the United Kingdom in the territory o f  the Republic o f Indonesia which have 
been granted admission in accordance with the Foreign Capital Investment 
Law No. 1 o f 1976 or any law amending or replacing it”
Art. 1 (b) of BIT between Malaysia and Britain similarly stated that:
“ in respect of investments in the territory o f Malaysia, to all investments made 
in projects classified by the appropriate Ministry o f  Malaysia in accordance 
with its legislation and administrative practice as an “approved project”.
Art. 2 of the BIT between Philippines and Netherlands provided that:
“This Agreement shall apply only to investment brought into, derived from, or 
directly connected with investments brought into the territory o f  one 
Contracting Party by nationals o f the other Contracting Party in conformity 
with the former Party’s laws and regulations, including due registration with 
the appropriate agencies o f the receiving Contracting Party, if so required by 
its laws”.
Protocol (1) to Art. 1 of BIT between Thailand and Germany provided that:
“in respect o f investments in the territory o f the Kingdom o f Thailand the term 
“investments” wherever it is used in this Treaty, shall refer to all investments 
made in projects classified in the certificate o f  admission by the appropriate 
authority o f the Kingdom o f Thailand in accordance with its legislation and 
administrative practice as an “approved project”.
The Singapore BITs clearly stated that the scope of agreement or the protection of 
foreign investors would cover only investments approved in writing. For example the 
BIT between Singapore and Germany119 provided that:
“in respect o f investment in the territory o f the Republic o f  Singapore, to all 
investments approved in writing by the Government o f  the Republic o f 
Singapore irrespective o f whether these investments were made before or after 
the coming into force o f the present Treaty”.
“ 9. Art. 1 (ii) o f BIT between Singapore and Germany.
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This can be seen also in BIT between Singapore and France120, which provided that:
“The provision of this Agreement shall only extend to investments whether 
made before or after the coming into force o f  this Agreement which are 
specifically approved in writing by the contracting party in whose territory the 
investment have been made or will be made.
Also the agreement between Singapore and Germany further specifies that the 
admission of investment must be in accordance with the economic policy of the host 
countries121. BITs made by Indonesia with Britain, Norway and Belgium122 state that 
investment must be subject to foreign investment laws and regulations (see Table 6) 
which are distinct from the general national law provided for the constitution of 
domestic companies (discussed in chapter 3).
Moreover, all ASEAN countries’ BITs cover only investment made directly in 
the territory of the contracting party (see Table 6). Specifically, the BIT between 
Malaysia and Germany clearly defined the term “companies” as follows:
“The term “Companies” referred to in paragraph (4) o f Art. 1 shall not include 
a branch or branches o f any juridical person, company or association which has 
its seat or is incorporated or constituted in the territory or by or under the laws 
o f a third party”l2j.
Generally, the objective of admission criteria for foreign investment of 
ASEAN countries is to screen out the entry of harmful foreign investments and also to 
seek to ensure that foreign investment which enters the ASEAN countries will 
continue to benefit the host countries, even after the commencement of the operation. 
The requirements to comply with internal laws and regulations of the host countries 
would cover performance requirements provided in such laws, which are usually
120 Art. 9 o f BIT between Singapore and France.
m . Art. 2 (i) o f BIT between Singapore and Germany provided that “Each Contracting Party shall 
endeavour to admit investment by nationals or companies o f  the other Contracting Party in accordance 
with its legislation and administrative practice within the framework o f the general economic policy 
and to promote such investment as far as possible”.
122 See Art. 2 (1) o f BIT between Indonesia and the Great Britain, Art. II o f BIT between Indonesia and 
Norway, and Art. 2 o f BIT between Indonesia and Belgium.
123 Paragraph (1) o f the Protocol attached to the BIT between Malaysia and Germany, dated 22nd
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applied in conjunction with investment incentives packages (see ASEAN investment
regime, laws and regulations discussed above). These usually require the export of an
agreed-upon percentage of the production, compliance with planning and
environmental controls, conditions for hiring local labour and also requirements
related to repatriation of profits of the foreign investment.
Regarding post-entry treatment of foreign investors, even though all BITs
guarantee the free transfer or repatriation of profit derived from the investment, they
all subject this to the rules and regulations of the host countries, which allow for
controls due to the balance of payment conditions or financial situation. For instance,
Art. IV of the BIT between Thailand and Netherlands provided that:
(1) Each Contracting Party is prepared, within the limits o f its legislation, to 
facilitate the delivery o f capital goods to, or the carrying out o f public works 
for and (2) In pursuance o f  transactions entered into under paragraph (1) 
above, each Contracting Party shall authorise, within the limits o f its 
legislation the transfer, when due, o f money owing to nationals o f the other 
Contracting Party”.
Also the BIT between Indonesia and Norway provided in Art. VII that:
“Each Contracting Party guarantees, subject to and to the extent permitted by 
its laws and regulations, to the investors o f the other Contracting Party, in 
respect o f their investment, without delay the transfer o f : ......
The existence of these requirements, and the administrative mechanisms which 
supervise foreign investment to ensure that it complies with the conditions imposed, 
guarantee that foreign investment functions within a tightly regulated sphere of the 
host ASEAN countries’ laws.
Even though all ASEAN BITs provided Most-Favoured-Nation treatment 
(MFN) and some BITs even grant National Treatment, the protection is subject to or 
under the limitation of the domestic laws of the host countries. For instance, Art. 2 (3) 
of BIT between Indonesia and Belgium provided NT/MFN treatment to investors
December 1960.
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from the contracting parties but this is subject to the stipulations contained in the 
P rotocol attached to the present Agreem ent124 And Art. 2 of the Protocol attached to 
this BIT provided a reservation for Indonesia that:
“For the purpose o f protecting the Indonesian national economy, the 
Government o f the Republic o f Indonesia may grant some facilities to 
Indonesian concerns which do not fully apply to Belgian concerns”.
Therefore, Indonesia need not extend some rights to investors from Belgium on the 
grounds of protecting the Indonesian national economy. Even though the Protocol 
further stated that MFN treatment still applies, nevertheless national treatment granted 
in the BIT is affected by this reservation.
Some agreements provided both MFN and national treatment, but the two 
treatments were applied to different cases and conditions or different fields of 
protection. The BIT between Thailand and Netherlands provided both National and 
MFN treatment for protection of foreign investment but each applies to different fields 
of protection, in Art. V, in respect of the payment of taxes, fees or charges and to the 
enjoyment of fiscal deduction, MFN treatment is required. But in Art. VI the 
protection of industrial property, national treatment is expected while Art. VII 
provides for MFN treatment for the protection of investment, goods, rights and 
interest of the investors of the other Contracting Party.
Foreign investment that does not comply with the conditions on which it was 
permitted entry can be subjected to fines, diminution of the rights that had been 
granted, and even to termination. Therefore, the admission of foreign investment on 
the basis of fair and equitable treatment, and even the treatment after the entry of such 
investment on the MFN basis or national treatment, is fundamentally based on laws
l24. Art. 2 (3) o f BIT between Indonesia and Belgium provided that “the investment o f nationals or legal 
persons o f either Contracting Party in the territory o f the other Contracting Party shall be accorded by 
such other Party, a treatment no less favourable than that which it accords in its territory to any similar 
investment owned by it own nationals or legal persons or by nationals or legal persons o f third States 
with due regard to the stipulations contained in the Protocol attached to the present Agreement and the
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and regulations as well as policies of the host ASEAN countries.
However, the ASEAN BITs do provide protection against nationalisation and 
expropriation, and also compensation in case expropriation takes place. Regarding 
expropriation and compensation, ASEAN countries accept the minimum standard rule 
that nationalisation or expropriation will take place only for public purposes and with 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Nevertheless, some agreements have 
divergent provisions; for instance, Thailand can apply the rules and regulations of the 
Bank of Thailand and also large transfers can be required to be made on an instalment 
basis125. Some agreements apply the rule of market value to the affected investment126. 
These variations are closely related to the internal policies, investment laws and 
investment regimes of each ASEAN country.
The dispute settlement measures provided in the ASEAN’s BITs mainly refer 
to ICSID, but some BITs provide for preliminary measures for seeking amicable 
settlement between the parties, or by seeking remedies from local tribunals before 
bringing the case before an arbitration tribunal (see Table 6).
This comparison of the ASEAN BITs clearly shows that they do not over ride 
or affect ASEAN countries’ national laws, and especially the entry of FDI may be 
subject to screening procedures and other requirements. Post-entry treatment of FDI is 
also still under control of ASEAN host coimtries. Next I compare the ASEAN 
Investment Agreement, which is entered into among the ASEAN countries 
themselves, with the ASEAN BITs to see whether or not it is different from the
Protocol”.
125. Protocol (4) (b) o f BIT between Thailand and Germany reads that “in the case o f transfers from 
Thailand under Art. 4 the Bank o f Thailand may, when considerations regarding exchange market 
stability and balance o f payments necessitate the introduction o f measures to assure the availability o f  
foreign exchange specify that large amounts shall be transferred in instalments o f  ”.
126. For instance, BIT between Indonesia and Britain, Art. 5 read that “...Such compensation shall 
amount to the market value o f the investment expropriated.” and BIT between Indonesia and Norway 
also provided in Art. VI that “Such compensation shall amount to the market value o f the 
investment....”.
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ASEAN BITs, and its implications.
4.5.3 The ASEAN A greem ent for the Prom otion and Protection of 
Investments Agreem ent
The ASEAN Investment Agreement for the promotion and protection of
investment, the only regional investment agreement in this region, was signed in 1987
between the six ASEAN countries. It was amended in 1996 when Vietnam became a
member of ASEAN and acceded to the agreement. The ASEAN Investment
Agreement is no different in form from the usual BITs. It requires that the
investments, which are covered and protected under the agreement, must be
specifically approved in writing and registered by the host country subject to such
conditions as it deems fit for the purpose of the agreement. This is not only to ensure
that investment admitted in the territory of ASEAN contracting parties is beneficial to
the host countries and under the existing investment screening legislation, but also to
meet the objective of the agreement to facilitate the industrial co-operation scheme
under the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. There is also a provision that conditions
may be imposed to ensure that the laws and regulations applying to foreign investment
in each country are preserved.
In the ASEAN investment agreement, the treatment of foreign investment is
based on the MFN standard. Art. IV (2) of the agreement provided that:
“All investments made by investors o f any Contracting Party shall enjoy fair 
and equitable treatment in the territory o f  any other Contracting Party. This 
treatment shall be no less favourable than that granted to investors of the most­
favoured-nation”
However, the agreement provides that two or more parties may negotiate to accord 
National Treatment, but such agreement shall not entitle any other party to claim 
national treatment under the MFN principle127. So it can be seen that even under the
127 Art. IV (4) provided that “ Any two or more o f the Contracting Parties may negotiate to accord 
national treatment within the framework o f this Agreement. Nothing herein shall entitle any other party 
to claim national treatment under the most-favoured-nation principle”.
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ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, ASEAN 
countries were generally not willing to grant National Treatment to other countries, as 
they did not give National Treatment, even to their partners in ASEAN. Indeed, it is 
not until the launch of the AIA in 1998 that NT and MFN treatment has been extended 
to ASEAN and all investors (see chapter 5 below).
On expropriation and compensation, the agreement also applies the minimum 
standard principles, which requires the payment of adequate compensation based on 
market value, paid without unreasonable delay, and requires expropriation to be based 
on the non-discrimination principle, for the public interest and under due process of 
law. The dispute settlement clause can refer to ICSID if the parties desire. The 
agreement also provided an alternative of setting disputes by submitting to 
UNCITRAL or other regional arbitration bodies. Also, in the first instance, the parties 
should attempt to settle their disputes amicably between them before submitting the 
case to the arbitration tribunal.
Table 6
Comparison o f some Investment Agreements concluded between ASEAN countries and some 
European countries, and the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments
Contracting Scope of application Admission Expropriation Disputes Other
Parties and and and settlement main
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Source: Compiled and compared by the author from ASEAN countries’ bilateral investment agreements 
and the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection o f Investments
4.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be seen that ASEAN BITs and the ASEAN regional investment 
agreements are not different either in form or in principle, as regards the treatment of 
foreign investors, who are generally subject to domestic investment laws and 
regulations. This shows that ASEAN countries have maintained a very strong position 
in preserving their sovereignty in policy making and governing foreign investment to 
comply with their economic development plans, as well as strictly controlling their 
economic activities that are geared towards the economic master plans. In other 
words, governmental intervention has been very important in this region in terms of
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investment concerns.
However, after the crisis took place in Asia in 1997, ASEAN launched many 
new framework Agreements including a framework agreement on the ASEAN 
Investment Area, which has dramatically changed ASEAN policy in restricting entry 
and establishment of foreign investment. How far the AIA has generalised investment 
liberalisation will be discussed in chapter 5.
Initially, the likelihood that ASEAN countries would accept the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, which had been negotiated in the OECD, was not strong. 
However, the negotiation of MAI in OECD was ended after it encountered a wave of 
anti-MAI opposition from developing countries, and also from NGOs from developed
1 7 ^countries. However, MAI may proceed in WTO ~ in the millennium round instead. 
Even so, it seems difficulties lie ahead unless the substance of MAI is altered and 
developing countries take part in the negotiation process.
This raises the question of what is a new direction for ASEAN in economic 
development, especially in the regulation of investment, which has been the main 
engine propelling economic growth in ASEAN? Whether ASEAN will further 
liberalise trade and investment to establish an open door policy, or strengthen intra- 
ASEAN economic integration, which could mean preferential treatment among 
ASEAN members, is the main issue. However, to attract foreign investment is still the 
major policy of ASEAN. Therefore, the assurance of attractiveness of the investment 
environment in the region, legal, political, and economic stability and predictability, 
are essential, especially for foreign investors who require a high standard of 
investment regulations and protection. Since more than 70% of the inflow of FDI is 
from the OECD countries, they might use this leverage against ASEAN countries in
128. The EU and Japan have proposed bringing the investment issue under the umbrella o f WTO.
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making decisions on their investment regulations.
ASEAN countries now need to re-think their strategies in attracting foreign 
investment. The establishment of the ASEAN Investment Area has been regarded as a 
new policy option of ASEAN to move toward closer economic integration within the 
region and more liberalised investment intra-ASEAN. AIA would also encourage the 
inflow of foreign direct investment due to the economies of scale generated by the 
enlargement of the ASEAN market through regional economic integration and intra- 
ASEAN investment liberalisation. Crucially, this may lead to enhanced regional 
ASEAN investment laws and regulations. Harmonisation of ASEAN investment laws 
at a certain level will ensure the certainty and unity of the ASEAN investment regime 
and practices. Harmonious ASEAN investment laws may conceitedly guarantee 
foreign investment protection against expropriation and award compensation based on 
international law. Moreover, harmonisation of investment laws may enhance the 
system of investment-related laws and regulations, such as regulations on foreign 
employment, labour standards, environmental protection, taxation, and competition 
rules. A favourable legal environment for foreign investment in ASEAN is an 
important determinant in the allocation of foreign investment in addition to a 
favourable economic environment.
Once ASEAN implements intra-regional trade and investment liberalisation, 
there is a necessity to ensure that fair competition among firms is firmly established, 
as deregulation and the elimination of previous restrictive laws would take place. This 
is to ensure that unfair competitive practices among private firms such as 
monopolisation, anti-competitive mergers & acquisitions, and restrictive business 
practices would not replace restrictive government laws and regulations. Therefore, 
the more liberal the ASEAN economy becomes, the greater the necessity to regulate
firms and enterprises that operate freely in the region under competition rules. The 
discussion of competition policy, laws and regulations will be in chapter 6. The next 
chapter will analyse the recently launched ASEAN framework agreements that aim to 
move towards deeper regional integration and intra-ASEAN liberalisation, which will 
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A New Direction for ASEAN: Open Regionalism1 and Deeper
Integration
Introduction
Over the past three decades ASEAN has shown a reluctance to move towards deeper
2 3regional integration . A lack of political will is the main reason for this low-key 
implementation of regional institutions. Moreover, it has been said that the specific 
nature and culture of "the ASEAN way or ASEAN Style” in regionalisation is based 
on the indigenous political culture of the region, which it is claimed to have served 
ASEAN well.
The “ASEAN way” has its foundation in the “M usyawarah” practice, which 
has been generally used in Southeast Asia for centuries and it has been adapted to be 
“the ASEAN way” (Kemapunmanus,Lawan: 1985), at all levels, from the local, 
national, to international level, to conduct their relationship among themselves. 
Musyawarah is based on the “consensus” practice that all issues concerned would be 
discussed and debated until reaching a final resolution with mutual recognition. This 
no-vote system has long been implemented in ASEAN. This is regarded as a flexible 
method and it has been claimed that the Musyawarah practice has saved ASEAN from 
conflict and confrontation. Moreover, as ASEAN has played an important role in
1 . This chapter is originally analysed by the author especially on the issue o f legal aspect of open 
regionalism: how ASEAN balances regional preferential treatments and the generalised liberalisation. 
Therefore, there are very few references to the bibliographical literature as the topic is very original and 
other literatures are not available. The author gratefully acknowledges Prof. Sol Picciotto for his 
profound stimulation o f this thinking and analysis.
1. As ASEAN has no supranational institution, the highest decision-making body is the Heads of 
Government Meeting that provides policy, guidelines, supervision and decision leading to the ASEAN’s 
direction. And it is the Heads of ASEAN Governments that always declare the political will o f ASEAN 
that it would maintain the flexibility of “the ASEAN way”.
3. Chng Meng Kng has pointed out that “the basic reason for this lack o f progress was not (only) 
institutional inadequacy (or bad program) but a lack o f political will” Chng Meng Kng, 1992: 134 and 
Pelkmans stated that ... “institutions can and should facilitate but they cannot replace political will” 
Pelkmans, 1992.
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APEC, APEC has also been influenced by “the ASEAN Way” in its implementation of 
the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area by setting up the scheme without legal-binding 
pattern but based on concerted unilateral liberalization and a “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement”4.
However, the circumstances have changed: the altered global economic and 
legal environment, the close interaction and interdependence of trade and investment, 
the move towards regional economic integration in Latin America and Africa, the 
political changes in Eastern Europe, the deepening and enlargement of the EU. Above 
all, the 1997-8 Asian crisis was a major turning point. Thus, The Statement on Bold 
Measures resulting from the ASEAN Heads of Investment Agencies Meeting on 24th 
July 1998 asserted that:
“The financial crisis and economic crisis has severely affected the ASEAN 
economies and business dynamism in the region. In order to regain business 
confidence, enhance economic recovery and promote growth, the ASEAN Leaders 
are committed to the realisation o f the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In 
addition, the Leaders agreed on special incentives and privileges to attract foreign 
direct investment into the region. To enhance further economic integration o f the 
region, the Leaders also agreed to further liberalize trade in services”.
The AHIA also noted that “it is even more important now, in the light of the present 
financial crisis besetting the region, to strengthen regional co-operation in promoting 
greater direct investments into and within the region”5. All these circumstances 
emphasise the urgent need for policy changes in ASEAN countries.
There have been calls for strengthening regional co-operation. The Secretary- 
General of ASEAN on 30th April 1999, calling for regional integration in response to 
the Asian crisis and global economy, emphasized that:
“One painful but invaluable lesson from the current economic difficulties is that in 
this age o f globalisation, nations can thrive and flourish only if  they band together 
for common purposes. Through internal reforms, active cooperation and 
purposeful integration, ASEAN will certainly overcome the difficulties, as it has 
already begun to do so. ASEAN will be stronger and ready for sustainable growth
4 . See the B ogor D eclaration on A sia-Pacific Trade Liberalisation. APEC Leaders' Declaration 
Bogor, Indonesia, 15 November 1994 .
T See Statement on Bold Measures in Annex 11.
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and development in the new millennium. With half a billion people in ASEAN and 
a combined GDP o f nearly US$ 700 billion, ASEAN remains an important market 
and platform for production”. (Statement by the Secretary-General o f  ASEAN 
welcoming the Kingdom o f Cambodia as the Tenth Member State o f ASEAN30 
April 1999, ASEAN Secretariat)
ASEAN started strengthen its closer regional co-operation in the AFTA 
scheme that clearly signals ASEAN countries to move up to the level of 
regionalisation by launching Free Trade Area: free movement of intra-ASEAN trade 
by realising that:
“tariff and non-tariff barriers are impediments to intra-ASEAN trade and 
investment flows, and that existing commitments to remove these trade barriers 
could be extremely improved upon”. (Preamble o f the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing Economic Co-operation, Singapore, 28 January 1992)
z *1
Some plans of ASEAN imply moves towards deepening regional integration . 
Nevertheless, the links between individual ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries are still 
stronger than those regionally, and ASEAN is committed to the policy of “Open 
Regionalism”.
ASEAN's direction and development are very much based on social, economic, 
and political factors and circumstances. This chapter will discuss legal aspects of
Q
ASEAN integration, i.e. deeper integration and “Open Regionalism” , by analysing the 
feasibility of closer ASEAN integration following the recent initiatives when ASEAN 
has launched important new framework agreements for this purpose. The discussion of 
these new framework agreements of ASEAN and their implications for regional
6. The new framework agreements o f ASEAN imply the moves towards deeper regionalisation of 
ASEAN such as to enhance free movement o f  service suppliers intra-ASEAN under the Framework 
Agreement on Services. Also the ASEAN investment area, when fully implemented, it facilitates the 
codification o f ASEAN investment laws and regulations or at least the mutual recognition o f laws or 
regulatory coordination in order to implement the A1A and facilitate intra-ASEAN investment. This 
process involves various aspects o f laws such as taxation, investment laws, company law, and other 
related laws and regulations.
7. This is especially emphasised in The Hanoi Action Plan, which accelerated all new framework 
agreements o f ASEAN to realise the objectives set forth in the agreements and clearly considered to 
enhance regional economic integration, which provided the action plan in section “II. ENHANCE 
GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: To create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive 
ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free flow o f goods, services and investments, a freer flow 
o f capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities”.
8 . The concept of “open regionalism” as developed and applied in these new ASEAN arrangements has 
not yet been discussed or analysed by scholars, so this chapter is based largely on primary sources.
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integration emphasises how far these agreements entail intra-ASEAN preferential 
treatment or more generalised liberalisation, and the balance between these.
5.1 The New Framework Agreements of ASEAN
Although ASEAN has been established for three decades, since 1968 (just ten years 
after the creation of the EEC), it has not yet reached any significant level of regional 
integration. It could hardly be claimed that the economic co-operation programs 
implemented in ASEAN were a full success. ASEAN remains just a loose regional 
grouping, with no supranational institutions to provide common policy, or to stipulate 
any laws and regulations governing ASEAN economic activities. Each member 
country still maintains its own independent law and policies, its legal system, and its 
sovereign right to control and regulate internal activities as well as conduct external 
relationships, except those mutually agreed in the economic, social and political co­
operation programs. Every program implemented in ASEAN has been agreed among 
the member countries on a consensus basis.
It was only in 1992 that ASEAN began to develop the idea of establishing the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area, a scheme for strengthening intra-regional economic co­
operation to respond to global change9. Resulting from the Fourth Summit Meeting, 
the Framework Agreement on enhancing economic co-operation, better known as the 
Framework Agreement on ASEAN Free Trade Area, was signed on 28th January 1992.
5.2 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
The 1992 framework agreement of AFTA bound ASEAN states to the establishment 
of an ASEAN Free Trade Area initially within 15 years, beginning 1st January 1993.
9. This was clearly stated in the preamble o f the Framework Agreement on enhancing economic 
cooperation: “conscious o f the rapid and pervasive changes in the international political and economic 
landscape, as well as both challenges and opportunities yielded thereof, which need more cohesive and 
effective performance o f intra-ASEAN economic co-operation”.
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The implementation of AFT A was subsequently accelerated10. ASEAN recognises the 
close interdependence of trade and investment, and is aware that it can only attract 
inflows of trade and investment into the region by its sound economy. Therefore, to 
strengthen intra-ASEAN trade by accelerating the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade within the region to gain economies of scale would also help to induce 
inflows of investment as well. It has been claimed that the AFTA scheme conforms to 
the GATT11. However, the practical legal issues of GATT compatibility of AFTA 
must be carefully considered, and will be further discussed below.
Under AFTA, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)12 is the main 
instrument to encourage intra-ASEAN trade. The CEPT Agreement allows ASEAN 
member Countries to reduce their tariffs to 0-5% on a MFN basis among ASEAN 
members. Although this establishes a preferential arrangement within ASEAN, it may 
nevertheless be acceptable to other countries because of the benefits the larger regional 
market will create. So AFTA encourages not just intra-ASEAN trade but also trade 
and investment from other countries. From this point of view, AFTA can be regarded 
as “Open Regionalism”, i.e. economic integration within the region while welcoming 
outsiders.
However, at the outset, the implementation of AFTA to ensure closer regional 
economic integration was still far from real. There were so many categories of
10. See ASEAN Update vol. 1/1999, 1st quarter o f 1999. See also Statement on Bold Measures, the Heads 
o f ASEAN countries agreed to accelerate the AFTA, the original six countries would advance the 
implementation o f AFTA by one year from 2003 to 2002. They also agreed to achieve a minimum o f  
90% o f their total tariff lines with tariffs o f 0-5% by the year 2002, which would account for 90% of  
intra-ASEAN trade.
n . “AFTA is a GATT-consistent and an outward looking arrangement. No trade barriers are raised 
against non-ASEAN economies as a result o f the formation o f AFTA. Give the open structure o f  
ASEAN economies, the expansion o f production in an ASEAN regional market would enhance 
ASEAN's linkages with the world and generate greater opportunities for exporters outside the region”. 
Press Statement, The Third AFTA Council Meeting, Indonesia, 11th December 1992.
I2. Art. 1 o f the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme for ASEAN  
Free Trade Area states that “CEPT” means the Common Effective Preferential Tariff, and it is an agreed 
effective tariff, preferential to ASEAN, to be applied to goods originating from ASEAN Member States, 
and which have been identified for inclusion in the CEPT Scheme in accordance with Arts. 2 (5) and 3.
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products excluded from the list as an exclusive list. Agriculture has been regarded as 
sensitive and therefore been put aside. There were also protests from within the 
affected countries where products were included in the list for tariff reduction by the 
affected producers. For instance, the palm growers and palm oil industry in the South 
of Thailand and in Malaysia feared to lose their dominant market share, and their tariff 
protection to the free entry of product from neighboring countries once AFTA is fully 
implemented.
It was more like a special scheme for mutual economic co-operation than a 
general regional economic integration. Even though in 1994 ASEAN adopted the 
acceleration of the AFTA time frame, it was only at the 6th ASEAN Summit, in Hanoi 
in 1998, that the ASEAN leaders adopted measures to accelerate the region’s 
economic integration and the completion of the AFTA even faster13. Initially only 
fifteen categories of products14 identified in the AFTA Frame work Agreement to be 
included in the CEPT scheme13 were subject to the fast track tariff reduction towards a 
nil tariff. The fast track is to reduce tariff rates above 20% to 0-5% by 1st January 
2000, and to reduce tariff rates at or below 20% to 0-5% by 1st January 1998. The 
normal track is to reduce tariff rates above 20% to 20% by 1st January 1998 and 
subsequently from 20% to 0-5% by 1st January 2003, and to reduce tariff rates at or 
below 20% to 0-5% by 1st January 2000.
13. See Statement on Bold Measures in Annex 11.
14. They are vegetable oils, cement, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, plastics, rubber products, 
leather products, pulp, textiles, ceramic and glass products, gems and jewelry, copper cathodes, 
electronics, and wooden and rattan furniture.
15. Agreement on the Common Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), ASEAN Documents series 1991-1992 (Notified to the GATT in L/7111). CEPT is the primary 
instrument for implementing AFTA. However, all products under the PTA (Preferential Trading 
Arrangement) which are not transferred to the CEPT Scheme shall continue to enjoy the MOP (Margin 
o f Preference) existing as at 31st December 1992 (CEPT Agreement, Art. 2 (6). PTA was the initial 
agreement providing for economic cooperation in ASEAN. This agreement provides that the member 
states o f the ASEAN are to extend trade preferences to each other in accordance with the provisions o f  
the agreement and the rules, regulations and decisions agreed within its framework.
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The time frame16 for fully implementing AFTA has been set at 10 years for the
17more advanced economies of ASEAN and 15 years for the new ASEAN members. 
However, in 1998 the ASEAN countries agreed to further enhance the realisation of 
AFTA and they agreed that each individual country would commit to achieve a 
minimum of 85% of the inclusion list with tariffs of 0-5% by the year 2000, and a 
minimum of 90% of the inclusion list in the 0-5% tariff range by the year 2001. By 
2002, 100% of items in the inclusion list would have tariffs of 0-5%. They also agreed 
to implement, as soon as possible, tariff reductions to 0% and to accelerate the transfer 
of products which are currently not included in the tariff reduction scheme into the 
inclusion list. The new members of ASEAN also agreed to reduce their tariff lines 
between 0-5% by 2003 for Vietnam, and 2005 for Laos and Myanmar; to expand the 
number of tariff lines in the 0% category by 2006 for Vietnam, and by 2008 for Laos
1 O
and Myanmar . This shows the impact on ASEAN economic integration of the Asian 
crisis, as all these developments have taken place due to the action plan of ASEAN for 
recovery from the crisis.
In fact, ASEAN vigorously reviewed its institutional mechanism (Tan Sri et al, 
1991; Chng Meng Khng, 1991) in the fourth ASEAN Summit, at the same time as 
launching the AFTA scheme, and many attempts had been made to streamline its 
institutional mechanism. However, at that time the development did not have the clear 
aim of deepening regional integration but rather of strengthening its function as it
16. The time frame o f  15 years for implementing AFTA specified in the original framework agreement 
adopted in 4th ASEAN Summit has been changed at the Meeting in September 1994. AFTA members 
agreed to implement AFTA over 10 years instead and to include unprocessed agricultural goods, which 
were originally excluded from the agreement. See “Ministers accelerate implement o f AFTA”, ASEAN  
UPDATE, October 1994, pp. 1-3.
17. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
18. The Hanoi Plan o f Action agreed upon on 15th December 1997. The acceleration of the time-frame 
of AFTA implementation was provided in Section II. 2.1 o f the Action Plan.
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should be in those circumstances. This reflects the lack of a political basis for 
supporting integration at the initial stage of AFTA19.
In the past, the rationale for maintaining a loose organisation was that ASEAN 
countries did not have the political will20 to enhance regional integration, to establish 
regional regulatory regimes and supranational institutions in ASEAN. Consequently, 
most of the co-operation programs were agreed in a loose framework-agreement form 
and they have been implemented individually rather than on a common policy basis. 
This includes the initial Framework Agreement on AFTA. But after the Asian crisis, 
we have seen various changes and accelerations take place to realise the ASEAN free 
trade area.
The main progress, even before the Asian crisis, for the improvement of AFTA
was facilitated by two protocols: The Protocol to amend the Agreement on the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (1995) 
21 and The Protocol to Amend the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading
22Arrangement (1995) . The first enlarges product coverage to include all manufactured 
products and processed agriculture products, which were previously excluded from the 
list , and also accelerates the time frame to fulfil AFTA by re-setting the schedule of 
tariff reduction in various sectors24. The latter amends the rule of origin by substituting 
the rule of origin under the agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement 
for the rule of origin under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for
19. Previously, the concept o f a free trade area or custom union within the ASEAN was rejected and 
other methods o f more limited economic co-operation were adopted such as the Preferential Trading 
Arrangement, ASEAN Industrial Projects, ASEAN Industrial Complementation, ASEAN Industrial 
Joint Ventures.
20. Pelkmans pointed out that “Initially, the word ‘integration’ is a taboo in ASEAN. It is only recently 
that ASEAN countries endeavour to implement regional integration”. Pelkmans 1997: 216.
21. Done at Bangkok on 15th December 1995.
22. Done at Bangkok on 15th December 1995.
23. Art. 2 o f the Protocol to amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme 
for the AFTA (1995) provided that “This Agreement shall apply to all manufactured products including 
capital goods, and agricultural products”.
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AFTA25. Because the CEPT is the instrument for implementing AFTA and replaces 
the PTA , which is the instrument for preferential trading arrangement prior to the 
launch of AFTA and will be gradually eliminated and replaced by the CEPT under 
AFTA. Prior to the establishment of AFTA, the measures mostly adopted were the 
extension of tariff preferences. Under PTA, an effective ASEAN margin of tariff 
preferences was to be accorded on a product-by-product basis and where tariff 
preferences were to be negotiated on a multilateral or bilateral basis, the concessions 
so agreed would be extended to all parties on an ASEAN MFN basis, except where 
special treatment is accorded to products of ASEAN Industrial Projects. The main 
differences between the PTA and CEPT are that under the former, preferences are 
granted only by the nominating country and there is no reciprocity. Under the latter, 
there is reciprocity in that goods must be accepted to be under CEPT by all countries 
so that all must give the preferential tariff. CEPT is, therefore, potentially more 
encompassing (Davidson, 1997b: 83-95). This development implies a shift toward 
economic integration of ASEAN. Moreover, it reflects the conditions and factors 
affecting ASEAN development that fundamentally lie in political appetite and 
economic circumstances.
24. Art. 3 o f the Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme 
for the AFTA (1995).
25. Art. 1 o f the Protocol to Amend the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (1995) 
provided that “Annex 1 of the Agreement on "Rules o f Origin for the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements", previously amended by the Protocol on Improvements on Extension o f Tariff 
Preferences under the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements signed in Manila on 15th December 
1987, and the “Operational Certification Procedures for the Rules o f Origin o f the ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangements” shall be substituted with the “Rules o f Origin for the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT)” Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the “Operational Certification 
Procedures for the Rules of Origin of the ASEAN Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area” set out in ANNEX 1 and ANNEX 2 respectively which shall form an integral 
part o f  this Protocol”.
26. Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement was signed on 24th February 1977 resulting 
from the resolution o f the Declaration o f ASEAN Concord. The Agreement provided that ASEAN 
members are to extend trade preferences to each other in accordance with the provisions o f the 
agreement and the rules, regulations and decisions agreed within its framework. PTA is not aimed at 
creating custom union or free trade area within the meaning o f Art. XXIV o f GATT but rather to create 
a preferential trading area based on the exception o f MFN obligation under the “enabling clause” agreed
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Additionally, in the past, ASEAN neither sought to regionalise the financial 
system nor to strengthen intra-ASEAN capital flows, to facilitate economic flows 
within the region. There was no objective of facilitating the free movement of capital,
97one of the main production factors . Only after AFTA was established was there a 
policy of implementing the free movement of capital provided in the aforementioned
9 QFramework Agreement for enhancing economic co-operation" . Only after the 
financial crisis took place in Asia, did ASEAN countries think about the launching of 
an ASEAN currency exchange and payment system for intra-ASEAN trade29. This 
policy would help promote regional currencies and enhance financial stability in the 
region, and also help cushion the negative impact of financial turmoil from outside the 
region. It will also facilitate and stimulate intra-ASEAN trade and investment by 
reducing risk from the loss caused by the fluctuation of currency exchange rates in 
world markets. All these new policies are dictated by current circumstances, which 
further influence political support from each member.
5.2.1 AFTA and the GATT/WTO
In legal terms the ASEAN Free Trade Area is a preferential trading 
arrangement30. AFTA was not established under the provision of Art. XXIV of GATT
to by the Contracting Parties at the Tokyo Round o f the GATT to allow developing countries to enjoy 
preferences extended to each other.
27. The principle o f free movement of capital is included in the preamble and objectives o f the 
Framework Agreement for enhancing economic co-operation, which facilitates and strengthens 
liberalisation o f trade and investment in the region. ASEAN Free Trade Area is one o f the objectives of 
this Framework Agreement.
28. Section C. 2 o f the Framework Agreement provided that “2. Member States shall encourage and 
facilitate free movement of capital and other financial resources including further liberalization o f the 
use o f  ASEAN currencies in trade and investments, taking into account their respective national laws, 
monetary controls and development objectives”.
29. Paragraph 13 o f the Hanoi Declaration of 1998, at the sixth ASEAN Summit Meeting, in Hanoi on 
16th December 1998. The paragraph states that “We encourage wider use o f ASEAN currencies in intra- 
ASEAN trade settlement”. It has been emphasized in the Hanoi Plan o f Action to introduce an ASEAN 
currency and exchange rate system. The Hanoi Plan o f Action is the blueprint covering the first six 
years o f the ASEAN Vision 2020 that the ASEAN leaders issued at the Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia.
30. The Common Effective Preferential Treatment (CEPT) under AFTA is also preferential trading 
arrangement. However, the CEPT mainly differs from the initial PTA in its applicability that is on
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*5 1
. Rather, AFTA was based on the permission given to developing countries to enter 
into preferential trading arrangements by the Tokyo Round “enabling clause”32. The 
Enabling Clause provides in its paragraph 1 that:
“Notwithstanding the provisions o f Art. I o f the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties”.
Paragraph 2 further clarifies that “The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the 
following:
“(c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination o f  tariffs and, in 
accordance with the criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
Contracting Parties, for the mutual reduction or elimination o f non-tariff measures, 
on products imported from one another”.
ASEAN members have been regarded as developing countries so that they can 
accord among themselves differential and more favourable treatments, without 
according such treatment to other GATT/WTO contracting parties. This preferential 
treatment provision is different from the free trade area arrangement under Art. XXIV
■>-3
, under which the members of the free trade area are subject to the obligation not to 
apply higher duties or other regulations more restrictive to non-members than the ones 
applicable prior to the formation of the free trade area. Therefore, from its legal basis, 
currently AFTA is not obliged to conform to Art. XXIV of GATT. However,
across the broad basis while the PTA was applied on a product-by-product basis and specified by agreed 
terms.
j l . AFTA was not notified by ASEAN to GATT under Art. XXIV but the Agreement on ASEAN 
Preferential Trade Arrangements was notified under the Enabling Clause on 1st November 1977, 
examination concluded in 1979. Http://www.wto.org/develop/webrtasb.htm.
32. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation o f Developing 
Countries, Decision of 2811’ November 1979 (L/4903), paras 1 and 2 (c). The Preferential Trading 
Arrangement was approved initially by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES in Decision o f 29th 
January 1979 (L/4768): Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements; notification under 
Enabling Clause in 1982 (L/5243). The protocol on Improvements on Extension o f Tariff Preferences 
Under the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements was approved by notification in 1989 (L/6569) 
See GATT (1995) G uide to GATT L a v  and Practice. 2 Volumes. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
33. Art. XXIV paragraph 5 (b) o f GATT provided that “with respect to a free trade area, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area, the duties and other regulations o f commerce 
maintained in each o f the constituent territories and applicable at the formation o f such free trade area or 
the adoption o f such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or 
not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and
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ASEAN's practice does raise questions concerning GATT/WTO compatibility, 
paradoxically because in practice AFTA does not create any higher barriers to trade 
from non-members but rather implements an open and outward-looking policy 
towards outsiders. Furthermore, the CEPT under AFTA encompasses all new ASEAN 
industrial co-operation schemes'34. Under the AICO scheme, ASEAN could even grant 
favourable treatment to non-membersj:) if they reached the requirements and 
conditions set forth under various schemes^6; now its preferential arrangements were
T7transferred to and encompassed by the CEPT for AFTA in order to qualify for the 
available preferences, as AFTA covers all trade in manufactured products in ASEAN
Art. 3 o f AFTA provided that “This Agreement shall apply to all manufactured 
products, including capital goods, processed agricultural products, and those 
products failing outside the definition o f  agricultural products as set out in this 
Agreement.......
Moreover, the ASEAN rules of origin also allow up to 60% of non-members' 
originating input incorporated in the ASEAN products entitled to the CEPT under 
AFTA. Rule 3 (ii) of the ASEAN Rule of Origin provides that:
“(ii) Subject to Sub-paragraph (i) above, for the purpose o f implementing the 
provisions o f Rule 1 (b), products worked on and processed as a result o f  
which the total value o f the materials, parts or produce originating from non- 
ASEAN countries or o f undetermined origin used does not exceed 60% o f the 
FOB value o f the product produced or obtained and the final process o f the 
manufacture is performed within the territory o f the exporting Member State”.
other regulations o f commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the 
free trade area, or interim agreement, as the case may be”.
34. The new form o f ASEAN Industrial Co-operation (AICO scheme) will replace the BBC and AIJV 
schemes and shall be based on the CEPT under AFTA. The Basic Agreement for the ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation Scheme was signed on 27th April 1996 in Singapore.
35. Although the national equity condition is imposed as a criterion; under the AICO Scheme, a national 
equity holding o f one ASEAN member country in each o f the participating company is sufficient. Since 
two companies are required to form an AICO Arrangement, each company must have its own national 
equity holding. For companies that cannot meet the equity condition, a waiver is possible if  the 
proposing company meets other criteria imposed by the participating country in lieu o f the 30% national 
equity.
36. Preferences granted under the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements now transfer to the 
ASEAN Common Effective preferential Treatments under AFTA, and other preferences granted under 
AICO, AIJV, AIP, AIC also now come under the CEPT scheme for AFTA.
37. The AICO agreement stated that “The new ASEAN industrial cooperation scheme shall be based on
the CEPT Scheme for AFTA”.
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Also ASEAN applies a cumulative ASEAN original input for CEPT products, 
so that in practice the ‘net’ cumulative regional content may be lower than the 40% 
and the eligibility for ASEAN-origin is still valid38. Hence, ASEAN is indirectly able 
to grant preferences to non-members in practice. ASEAN is able under AFTA to grant 
preferences to non-members including even developed countries, although under 
GATT such preferential treatment has to be accorded among member countries that 
are developing countries only. Although AFTA is legally based on the “Enabling 
Clause” but it practically complies with Art. XXIV.
Thus ASEAN practice raises questions about the compatibility of ASEAN 
schemes with GATT/WTO obligations since AFTA was notified under the “Enabling 
Clause”. One is concerning the status as developing countries of some ASEAN 
members39 and the other is the reverse grant40 of preferences to GATT/WTO 
contracting parties. ASEAN should resort to Art. XXIV of GATT in the 
implementation of AFTA instead of the Enabling Clause, since in practice ASEAN 
has already implemented AFTA according to Art. XXIV of GATT rather than 
according to the “Enabling Clause”. The implementation of AFTA under Art. XXIV 
may enable ASEAN countries to realise intra-ASEAN integration while they also 
integrate themselves into the world economy by implementing “Open Regionalism” or 
in the other words, to balance regional preferences with generalised liberalisation. An
j8. For instance, if  product A has a value o f 100, o f which 40% is local content in Singapore, it may be 
exported to Malaysia at a CEPT rate, where 5% local content is added for a total value-added in 
Malaysia o f  100. Upon export to Thailand it is considered to have 45% ASEAN content even though 
"net" cumulative content is 22.5% of 200. Example adapted from Pelkmans, 1997, p. 211. 
j9. Singapore has been regarded as more developed than the other ASEAN members and Singapore has 
been graduated from GSP due to the fact that its developing country status is untenable.
40. Davidson has pointed out that “The question becomes one o f the role o f a developed country 
participating in such scheme with developing countries. The enabling clause provides for the regional or 
global arrangements entered into among less developed contracting parties. Although the enabling 
clause also enables a developed country to give preferences to trade coming from developing countries, 
it does not permit the reverse, that the preferences to be given by developing countries to trade coming 
from developed countries. Moreover, such preferences have to be on a non-discriminatory basis in 
accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences”. Thus it would appear that a developed country 
couldn't enter into a free trade area on the basis o f  the enabling clause. See Davidson, 1997b.
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FT A under Art. XXIV needs to be compatible and consistent with the GATT 
principles that encourage global liberalisation. Therefore, regionalisation under Art. 
XXIV is complementary and interactive with generalised liberalisation. This is, in fact, 
the main aim of ASEAN's regionalisation, in balancing regional integration with the 
strengthening the integration of ASEAN economy into the global economy. This point 
leads to the consideration of the critical ASEAN policy changes, which would result in 
the strengthening of the ASEAN legal and institutional framework for the proper form 
and pattern of regionalisation in ASEAN. It is clear that ASEAN is committed to 
“Open Regionalism” because its economic interests lie outside the region. In fact the 
deepening and widening of ASEAN regionalisation is almost entirely inspired and 
promoted by the achievements of the WTO (Pelkmans, 1997: 230).
Most recently, the launching of the Framework Agreement on ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and 
the Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights aims to liberalise trade and 
investment in the region, and signal the crucial turning point of ASEAN to achieve 
closer economic co-operation that even goes beyond AFTA. I now turn to a 
discussion of these new agreements.
5.3 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)
5.3.1 Background and Nature of the Agreement
The Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area was signed on 8th 
October 1998 aiming at the establishment of “the ASEAN Investment Area”. This was 
a result of the decision made in the fifth ASEAN Summit41, which called for the 
establishment of a regional investment arrangement to enhance the attractiveness of 
the region for direct investment flows. The establishment of AIA also pursues the
4I. The fifth ASEAN Summit was held in December 1995, in Bangkok, Thailand.
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objective of the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Co­
operation signed in Singapore on 28th January 199242.
The objective43 of the Framework Agreement on AIA is to establish a 
competitive ASEAN Investment Area in order to “attract greater and sustainable levels 
of FDI into the region and to realise substantially increasing flows of FDI from both 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources by making ASEAN an attractive, competitive, open 
and liberal investment area”44. The agreement binds the member countries to 
“progressively reduce or eliminate investment regulations and conditions, which may 
impede investment flows and the operation of investment projects in ASEAN”43 and to 
ensure the implementation of AIA within the agreed time frame. The agreement on 
AIA provided three pillars of broad-based programs for encouraging investment in the 
ASEAN region:
1) co-operation and facilitation;
2) promotion and awareness;
3) liberalisation46.
5.3.2 The First Two Pillars: Co-operation and Facilitation, and Promotion  
and Awareness
The ASEAN Plan of Action on Co-operation and Promotion of Foreign Direct 
Investment and Intra-ASEAN Investment was initially endorsed at the fifth ASEAN 
Summit in Bangkok 1995 when the decision to establish AIA was adopted. It was 
further elaborated by the AHIA Meeting in July 1998. The plan of action contains 
various measures for investment facilitation and promotion. They include joint
42. The preamble o f Framework Agreement on AIA reaffirms the importance o f sustaining economic 
growth and development in all member states through joint efforts in liberalizing trade and promoting 
intra-ASEAN trade an investment flows enshrined in the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN  
Economic Co-operation.
43. Art. 3: Objectives o f the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.
44. Joint Press Release, Inaugural Meeting o f the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council, 8th October 
1998, Manila, the Philippines.
45. Art. 3 (iv) o f the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.
promotional seminars and activities to attract foreign direct investment; joint 
promotion to attract FDI in higher technological-based industries and high value- 
added activities; joint publications on investment regulations, policies, procedures and 
opportunities to further enhance the transparency of ASEAN’s investment regime; 
simplification of ASEAN countries’ investment procedures; joint training programs 
for ASEAN’s investment officials on investment promotion; and closer co-operation 
among ASEAN investment agencies through exchange of investment data and 
information; and updates on any policy changes. ASEAN Investment co-operation 
work programs47 will help to implement the ASEAN Plan of Action on Co-operation 
and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment and intra-ASEAN Investment. Among 
these work programs are the linking of ASEAN member countries’ homepages to the 
ASEANWEB; joint promotion events within and outside ASEAN, and human 
resource development. The Taskforce on the collection and reporting of FDI statistics 
was set up by the AHIA, to provide a comparable approach to measuring, collecting 
and reporting of FDI statistics for monitoring the progress and development of the 
ASEAN Investment Area. The Work Programs also include a compilation of measures 
taken and incentives provided by member countries in promoting FDI that will be 
published to assist the private sectors in their investment decision-making processes. 
In conjunction with the signing of the Framework Agreement on AIA and to facilitate
40
FDI flows into the region, the AHIA agreed that three major projects be launched :
46. This results from the Meeting o f  the 4th ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies, 24th July 1998, 
Singapore, Joint Press Statement, paragraph 6. They are incorporated in the Framework Agreement on 
AIA Art. 6 (1 )  (a), (b), (c).
47. This results from the Meeting o f  the Fourth ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies, 24th July 1998, 
Singapore, Joint Press Statement. Paragraph 8.
48. Joint Press Statement, Meeting o f the Fourth ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies, 24th July 1998, 
Singapore.
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1) ASEAN Supporting Industrial Database (ASID) for supporting industries for
manufacturers and suppliers o f  ASEAN countries 49;
2) Directory o f ASEAN-owned Technology Suppliers for facilitating intra-ASEAN 
sourcing o f technology, enhancement o f investment match-making, promotion o f joint 
venture operations and to provide opportunities to technology suppliers in the region to 
supply technology to third countries;
3) Compendium on investment Policy and Measures o f ASEAN countries for providing 
general information on investment policies and measures o f  the members.
The work programs include, among others, joint training programs, high level 
strategic planning meeting, a protocol to amend the ASEAN Agreement for the 
promotion and Protection of Investment30, and a comprehensive survey on the
promotion of FDI into and within ASEAN. Furthermore, it established the
ASEANWEB, which links the websites among its member countries’ investment
networks, to provide investment information in order to enhance the transparency of 
ASEAN investment regime and for better access to investment information for 
investors. This helps investors gain access to the overall investment policies in 
ASEAN countries to facilitate their decision-making in investment. The AHIA 
convened a conference, where the ministers of ASEAN countries met up with world 
corporate leaders to encourage private sector companies to meet, interact, and to 
explore the opportunities present in the region31. It was also agreed that individual 
ASEAN countries should also consult the private sectors in their respective countries 
on what specific measures could be adopted to improve the investment climate. In this 
connection, they urged the private sectors to participate actively in these
C'y
consultation .
49. The ASEAN Supporting Industry Database will assist ASEAN investors seeking to source parts, 
components or raw materials from ASEAN rather than importing such products from outside the region, 
thereby enhancing ASEAN’s industrial linkage.
50. The revised Protocol includes of provisions on transparency and predictability, the simplification o f  
investment procedures and approval process, a dispute settlement mechanism, and accession o f new 
members. The agreement is aimed at increasing the confidence o f investors to invest in the ASEAN 
region.
51. Decision made by the ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies Meeting, Manila, Philippines,
July 1997. The conference took place in conjunction with the 30th ASEAN Anniversary in 1998.
52. This resulted from the Meeting o f the forth ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies, 24th July 1998,
Singapore.
288
5.3.3 The Third Pillar: the Liberalisation Program
Under the AIA, ASEAN agreed to promote itself as “a single investm ent 
region”33 through joint investment promotion efforts, aiming at the full realisation of 
the ASEAN Investment Area. Under AIA, national treatment will be applied to both 
ASEAN investors and all other investors. ASEAN member countries hope that this 
will increase the confidence of investors in investing in the ASEAN region. The 
financial crisis34 provided a further impetus for the move to liberalise the investment 
regime in the form of “bold measures”.
The Sixth ASEAN Summit agreed to launch “Bold Measures” for speedy 
recovery from the crisis. Statement on Bold Measures paragraph 1. provided that
“1. The financial and economic crisis has severely affected the ASEAN 
economies and business dynamism in the region. In order to regain business 
confidence, enhance economic recovery and promote growth, the ASEAN 
Leaders are committed to the realization o f the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). In addition, the Leaders agreed on special incentives and privileges 
to attract foreign direct investment into the region. To enhance further 
economic integration o f the region, the Leaders also agreed to further 
liberalize trade in services”. The special incentives and privileges are 
provided in the “Short Term Measures to enhance ASEAN Investment 
Climate”.
These include the “Short Term Measures to enhance ASEAN Investment Climate” 
that accelerates the implementation of AIA33. The short term practical measures cover 
the following areas56: minimum three years corporate income tax exemption or a
Joint Press Statement of the ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 
3rd-4th July 1997, Paragraph 7.
The Heads o f Investment Agencies have noted that foreign direct investment and intra-ASEAN 
investment flows have declined dramatically since the beginning o f the crisis. In this regard, they agreed 
that there is a need to take collective actions and measures in addition to those taken in the individual 
member countries. They called on the various private sector organizations in ASEAN to provide 
suggestions on meaningful, immediate and specific measures that will help in the economic recovery 
process. See Joint Press Statement of the Meeting o f the Fourth ASEAN Heads o f Investment Agencies, 
24lh July 1998, Singapore, Paragraph 3.
55. These “short-term measures” are applicable to all applications received from 1st January 1999 to 31st 
December 2000, and those approved thereafter. Each ASEAN country has agreed to extend additional 
special privileges to qualified ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors in the manufacturing sector. The 
“Short Term Measures” were agreed as part of “the ASEAN Investment Bold Measures” agreed upon 
by the ASEAN Leaders at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi on 16th December 1998.
i6. Section 1: Privilege Granted to new Investments/Projects or Expansion o f Existing Investment 
Operations o f the “Short-term Measures to Enhance ASEAN Investment Climate”, Annex to the
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minimum 30% corporate investment tax allowance; 100% foreign equity ownership; 
duty-free imports of capital goods; domestic market access; minimum industrial and 
leasehold period of 30 years; employment of foreign personnel; and speedy customs 
clearance. All these measures are applicable to all investors37.
The specific measures and privileges extended by ASEAN member countries 
provided in section 3 of the Short Term Measures are as follows:
•  Brunei will allow 100% foreign equity ownership in high-technology manufacturing and 
export-oriented industries.
• Indonesia offers wholesale and retail trade up to 100% foreign equity ownership to 
qualified investors, in addition to 100% foreign equity in all areas o f the manufacturing 
sector. Indonesia has also reduced the processing time for approval in principle, for 
investment less than US$ 100 million, to 10 working days. In the banking sector, listed 
banks are open for 100% foreign equity ownership;
• Laos allows duty exemption on imported capital goods required by the promoted 
investment projects;
• Malaysia offers 100% foreign equity ownership in the manufacturing sector with no 
export conditions imposed on all new investments, expansions and diversifications, except 
for seven specific activities and products. Foreigners can also own land in Malaysia 
subject to certain limitations;
•  Myanmar will extend a minimum of three years corporate tax exemption to all investment 
projects in all sectors. In addition, they will also extend the duty free import of raw 
materials to all industrial investments for the first three years o f operation;
• The Philippines will open retail trade and distribution business to foreign equity. In 
addition, the Philippines has opened private construction in the domestic market to foreign 
companies;
• Singapore has substantially reduced business costs as part o f a cost reduction package that 
amounts to S$ 10 billion in saving in addition to extending 30% corporate investment tax 
allowance on a liberal basis to industrial projects and to selected service industries in 
respect o f productive equipment. These activities include manufacturing, engineering or 
technical services and computer-related services;
• Thailand allows 100% foreign equity ownership for manufacturing projects regardless o f  
location. Furthermore, agricultural projects, which export 80% of sales, will receive 
import duty exemption on machinery, regardless o f location;
•  Vietnam extends duty exemption on imported capital goods for all projects in respect o f  
the import o f raw materials for production for especially encouraged investments and for 
projects located in mountainous or remote regions for the first 5 years o f operation. The 
issuance o f investment licenses for several types o f projects has been reduced to 15 days
Statement on Bold Measures, agreed upon by the ASEAN Leaders at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in 
Hanoi, in December 1998.
57. Joint Press Statement, First Meeting o f the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council, 5th March 1999, 
Phuket, Thailand. The statement declared that “all ASEAN countries are implementing the “bold 
measures” agreed upon by the ASEAN Leaders at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in December 
1998. The privileges cover manufacturing investment applications received and approved by the 
respective ASEAN investment agencies in 1999 and 2000. The privileges under the “bold measures” are 
to be extended to all investors, ASEAN and non-ASEAN. The Council encouraged investors to take full 
advantage o f the investment privileges offered under the bold measures during the promotion period.
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from the receipt o f  proper simplified documents. In addition, investment licensing for 
projects under US$ 5 million has been decentralised to all provinces and cities.
However, all privileges granted by ASEAN countries are subject to specific 
conditions: investors must meet the minimum investment level specified by the host 
country, if any; the industry must be in the published priority list for tax incentives to 
enjoy this particular privilege; the industry must not be in any negative list, if any; and 
the investor must show proof that foreign funds have been brought in for the entire 
amount of the investment, if required by the host country38.
However, the AIA goes much further than these short term measures. It binds 
the member countries to eliminate investment barriers, liberalise investment rules and 
policies, grant national treatment and open up industries, initially in the manufacturing 
sector and later to cover other sectors under the agreement. Under the Framework 
Agreement on the AIA, national treatment will be made fully available within six 
months after the date of signing (7th October 1998) of the Agreement for ASEAN 
investors59 in the manufacturing sector, subject to certain exclusions60. Initially, Art. 4 
of the AIA agreement provided that national treatment is extended to ASEAN 
investors by 2010 but the “Bold Measures” agreed upon by the ASEAN Leaders at the 
sixth ASEAN Summit in December 1998 accelerated the time frame from 2010 to 
within 6 months after the date of signing the agreement or the date the agreement 
enters into force. Art. 21 of the Framework Agreement on AIA provided that “This
58. Section 4: “Conditions” of the Short Term Measures to Enhance ASEAN Investment Climate.
59. In defining an ASEAN investor, a liberal definition has been adopted: an ASEAN investor is defined 
as equal to a national investor in accordance with the equity condition requirement o f the respective host 
member countries.
60. The Council tasked the Coordinating Committee on Investment (CCI) to begin work on AIA, 
especially on the submission of the Temporary Exclusion List and Sensitive List for opening up of 
sectors for investment and the granting o f National Treatment. The initial package o f TEL and SL were 
be submitted within six months after the signing o f the AIA Agreement for opening up investment in 
manufacturing sector for ASEAN investors. The other sectors would be gradually open and all 
industries would be opened by the year 2003 for ASEAN investors and by the year 2010 for all 
investors. Therefore, even though AIA provided for the opening up o f all industries for investment to 
ASEAN investors by 2003 (initially 2010) and to all investors by 2010 (initially 2020), they are subject 
to the Temporary Exclusion Lists (TEL) and Sensitive List (SL).
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Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General of ASEAN. The 
signatory governments undertake to deposit their instruments of ratification or 
acceptance within 6 months after the date of signing of this agreement. This means 
national treatment extended to ASEAN investors is fully implemented immediately 
when the agreement enters into force, but subject to the exception provided for under 
the agreement.
The exclusions will be progressively phased out61 by the six ASEAN countries 
62 by the year 2003 instead of waiting for 20106j as initially agreed. Myanmar will also 
join the six ASEAN countries to fully implement the obligation in 2003 instead of the 
year 2015. Vietnam and Laos will exert their best efforts to achieve the early 
realisation of AIA in 2010 instead of 2013 and 2015 respectively. The AIA aims to 
promote the freer flow of capital, skilled labour and professionals, and technology 
among the member countries.
In relation to the AICO Scheme, ASEAN countries agreed to waive the 30% 
national equity requirement under the AICO Scheme during the period 1999-2000 to 
respond to the AIA short term measures. Moreover, the AIA arrangement affirmed 
their commitment to the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment and its 1996 Protocol to enhance investor confidence in investing in 
ASEAN. The AIA also facilitates the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
towards the ultimate goal of sustaining economic growth and development in all 
members, which would be a crucial turning point for ASEAN.
61. The implementation o f the Framework Agreement will be reviewed every two years to ensure that 
the objectives o f the AIA are met.
62. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
63. Art. 4 (a) o f the Framework Agreement on AIA.
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The AIA is a step forward to a higher level of regional integration. However, 
since ASEAN member countries are members of GATT/WTO, it poses the question 
about its generalised liberalisation commitment to other countries, or in other words 
how ASEAN balances its intra-regional integration with global liberalisation. In AIA, 
the investment liberalisation scheme combines the strengthening of regional 
integration by intra-ASEAN investment liberalisation with generalised liberalisation 
by gradually opening up ASEAN investment to all investors. This will be discussed in 
the next section, which focuses on the legal aspects of the AIA Agreement and its 
implementation.
5.3.4 Legal Aspects of the AIA Agreement and its Implications
Provisions under the AIA, especially the extension of national treatment64 and 
opening up of industries, greatly modify the previous constraints on foreign investors 
relating to these significant issues: restricted areas of investment, restricted entry and 
establishment, restricted foreign shareholding/equity, and other screening processes as 
well as controls on the operation of foreign investors65. These are the techniques 
employed by ASEAN countries in restricting the entry and establishment of foreign 
investors, or the screening of foreign investors into their territories (discussed in 
chapter 4 above). The Framework Agreement on AIA mainly focuses on liberalising 
such constraints to assure the ‘open door’ policy of ASEAN to a greater extent than 
ever before. Therefore, the decision to establish the ASEAN investment area as a 
single investment area that needs to eliminate all such barriers and constraints to 
investors, regardless of nationality and sources of investment, is a radical move toward 
investment liberalisation and closer economic integration in the region. Consequently,
64 . See UNCTAD (1999c) N ational Treatment: UNCTAD Series on issues in International Investment 
Agreem ents. New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication.
65. For detailed analysis on control o f inward investment by host states, see Muchlinski, 1995: chapter 6, 
p p .172-203.
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national treatment66 will be granted concurrent with the opening up of industries67 to 
dismantle the main barriers to foreign investment in ASEAN countries. Even though 
the timetable for implementation of NT provides a 10-year differential between 
ASEAN investors and non-ASEAN investors, it is set as a transitional period for 
ASEAN countries to prepare their readiness for fully opening up the door, shifting to 
another level of liberalisation.
From a legal point of view, this move shows that ASEAN countries conceitedly 
restrain their discretion and refrain from fully exercising their sovereign rights to 
control and screen foreign investment that previously were jealously guarded by all 
ASEAN countries. States, especially developing countries, have traditionally 
preserved their absolute rights, recognised in international law, to control the entry and 
establishment of foreign investors within their territory (Muchlinski, 1995: chapter 6; 
UNCTAD, 1999: 3). This policy change in ASEAN reflects the balance of interest 
generated by economic integration and the surrender of economic sovereign rights of 
the ASEAN member countries. This is the price to be paid for encouraging intra- 
regional economic development by liberalising investment. This further implies that 
the policy options and choice of the regulatory regime of ASEAN are centrally based 
on balancing the interdependence of the regional and global economic environment. 
However, the extent to which the AIA would fruitfully enhance intra-ASEAN 
preferential treatment by implementing the mutual National and Most-Favoured- 
Nation treatment among them, the extent to which AIA is generalised liberalisation, 
and what the balance is between them, will be analysed below.
66. Art.4 (b) o f the Framework Agreement on ASEAN investment Area.
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5.3.5 Theoretical M odels and Policy O ptions for Investm ent Liberalisation
The Framework Agreement on the AIA indicates that ASEAN countries are 
moving toward closer economic integration. This may be usefully analysed using the 
framework suggested by the UNCTAD, which proposes that investment regulations 
used among host states concerning entry and establishment of foreign investment may
c o
be categorised into five models :
1) investment control model;
2) selective liberalisation model;
3) regional industrialisation program model;
4) mutual national treatment model;
5) combined national treatment/most-favoured-nation treatment model.
I will briefly discuss theses five models that countries generally choose to apply to 
their investment regime or investment agreement/arrangement together with their 
economic policy options. The actual provisions in particular agreements may involve a 
combination of characteristics and may be formed as a hybrid.
1) Investm ent control m odel is a model which the country preserves full state control 
over entry and establishment. This model is followed in most BITs, except the US and 
Canada BITs69. BITs recognise the restrictions and controls on the entry and 
establishment of FDI that leave the matter to national discretion. This approach is also 
favoured by certain regional instruments70. This model suggests a policy option that 
accepts complete state discretion through investment controls that preserve the general 
power to screen proposed investment.
2) Selective liberalisation model offers limited rights of entry and establishment, i.e. 
only in industries that are included in the positive list by the agreement of the
67. Art. 7: Opening up o f Industries and National Treatment, Framework Agreement on the ASEAN  
Investment Area.
68. For a detailed analysis on country approaches to entry and establishment, policy options and the five 
models see UNCTAD, 1999.
69 . The US and Canada model BIT stipulate NT and MFN, whichever is the more favourable to foreign
investors from the contracting parties.
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71contracting parties . Rights of entry and establishment may be enjoyed but may be 
subject to restrictions that the host country is permitted by the agreement. Moreover, 
the contracting parties may make commitments to undertake further negotiations over 
liberalisation in specific industries at an agreed future date. This model suggest the 
policy option to liberalise cautiously through the adoption of a selective basis by 
opening up one or more industries at a time.
3) R egional industrialisation program model offers full rights of entry and 
establishment based on national treatment for investors from the members of a 
regional economic integration organisation only. This model encourages cross-border 
investment by way of regionally integrated enterprises and projects72. This model 
suggests the policy option to follow the regional industrial programme and the 
establishment of regional multinational enterprises therefore setting up a supranational 
form of business organisation aimed at encouraging intraregional economic 
development.
4) M utual national treatment model offers full rights of entry and establishment 
based on national treatment for all natural and juridical persons engaged in cross- 
border business activities from member countries of a regional economic integration 
organisation. This model establishes a common regime for entry and admission for
70 . For example the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection o f Investment (see discussion 
in chapter 4), the Framework of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the Agreement on 
Andean Subregional Integration (ANCOM) [see UNCTAD (1999a: 18-9)].
71 . For example the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which is the “bottom up” 
approach liberalisation. The Contracting parties liberalise their service sectors only in the committed 
Country Schedule or Specific Sector Schedule, and they also can have limitation either on market
access or NT treatment or both. See UNCTAD (1999a: 20).
72 . ASEAN also uses this approach for intraregional investors in the Revised Basic Agreement on 
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures of 1987, the ASEAN Industrial Co-operation Scheme (AICO). Other 
agreements have followed this model are the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) 9see UNCTAD (1996c) Vol III, p. 103., and the Revised Treaty o f the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) [see UNCTAD (1999a: 21].
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7investors from member countries . MFN treatment for investors from non-members is 
generally not available. This model is different from the previous one, in that a right of 
entry and establishment is not limited to only a particular industrial programme. This 
model suggest the policy option to grant full liberalisation of entry and establishment 
on the basis of mutual national treatment allowing such a right to exist between states 
aimed at encouraging common interest in regional integration.
5) Com bined national treatm ent/m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent m odel offers 
full rights of entry and establishment (pre- and post -entry) based on the better of NT 
or MFN, subject only to reserved “negative lists” of industries to which such rights do 
not apply. The US and Canada BITs also follow this model. The aim of this model is 
to widen the entry and establishment rights as far as possible to enable investors from 
member countries to obtain the same rights of access as the investors from national or 
third countries. In this model, MFN treatment is not available to investors from non­
members. This model suggests the policy option to follow the full NT/MFN model and 
open up entry and establishment for investors from the contracting countries on the 
basis of the better of these two standards, subject only to “negative lists” of reserved 
industries74. The existence of negative lists of excepted industries emphasises that 
certain strategic industries may be beyond the reach of liberalisation measures.
Considered from this perspective, the AIA applies a hybrid model combining 
model 4’s “mutual national treatment” and model 5’s “combined NT/MFN treatment
73 . The most significant example o f this model are the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(EC), also the Code o f Liberalisation o f Capital Movements and the Code o f the Liberalisation o f  
Current Invisible Operations o f the OECD. Several regional organisations also adopted this model such 
as the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Treaty for the Establishment o f  
the Economic Community o f Central African States (ECCAS). Also the AIA o f ASEAN which 
combines this model with the combined NT/MFE model. See UNCTAD (1999a: 22-25, 1996c:44-5).
74 . The most significant example o f this model is the NAFTA agreement, the 1994 Treaty o f  Free 
Trade between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, the MERCOSUR agreement, and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation (APEC) Non-Binding Investment Principle. See UNCTAD (1996c Vol. 111:73- 
77, Vol. II pp. 513,520,536).
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with negative lists”. This is because AIA extend NT to all investors, not only investor 
from member countries, (immediately to ASEAN investor and to non-ASEAN by 
2020) subject only to negative lists (Art. 4 (b), 7). Moreover, all industries are opened 
for investment to ASEAN investors by 2002 (initially by 2010), and to all investors by 
2020 (Art.4 (c), 7). MFN is not, in principle, extended to non-ASEAN firms (Art. 8 
and 9) unless they meet the criterion of “ASEAN Investor” (discussed below). 
Furthermore mutual NT is extended to ASEAN investors [Art.7(2)]. I will analyse this 
legal aspect of AIA and its applicable models in the following sections.
5.3.6 The Opening up of Investment under AIA 
In the AIA for the first time ASEAN grants National Treatment to both ASEAN 
investors and all other investors73. However, ASEAN investors will be granted both 
NT and MFN treatment (under Arts. 7 and 8), while MFN treatment will not be 
extended to non-ASEAN investors. Because even though ASEAN has impiemented 
the “Open Regionalism”, AIA is still a regional integration agreement. Therefore, in 
principle, it confines the preferences provided under AIA only to member countries, 
as this can waive the MFN treatment on the ground of Art. XXIV of GATT. Thus 
MFN will not be extended to non-ASEAN investors, except such investors meet the 
criterion to be regarded as an “ASEAN Investor”, as such non-ASEAN investors can 
be entitled to all preferences provided under AIA. And this is the main thrust of the 
“Open Regionalism” where both regionalisation and generalised liberalisation are 
reinforced and balanced. (In other words, if MFN treatment is generally and 
unconditionally granted to non-ASEAN investors, AIA is not a regional integration 
arrangement but it is just a general investment liberalisation, part of globalisation).
75. Art. 4 (b) o f  the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area provided that “national 
treatment is extended to ASEAN investors by 2010, and to all investors by 2020, subject to the 
exceptions provided for under this Agreement;”. However, the ASEAN Leaders agreed to accelerate the 
time frame: See Bold Measures. Section 6.1.3.3 above.
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AIA attempts a combination of model 4 and 5 (discussed above) by extending 
NT and MFN to ASEAN investors first and then extending NT to non-ASEAN 
investors by the year 2020. However, MFN is only extended to the ASEAN-based 
investor (meeting the criterion of “ASEAN Investor”) not to non-ASEAN investor 
directly. Thus a transitional phase approach is used from one model to another76. 
Moreover, the implementation of NT is subject to a 10-year differential between 
ASEAN investors and non-ASEAN investors. Therefore, it is clear that ASEAN
investors are given priority. All industries [subject to the temporary exclusion list
(TEL) and the sensitive list (SL)] are to be opened for investment to ASEAN investors 
immediately, and to non-ASEAN investors, although not until the year 201077. 
However, NT/MFN treatment and opening up all industries for investment are also
7 0
subject to the exceptions in the TEL and SL , as well as other exceptions under Art. 
13 (General Exceptions), Art. 14 (Emergency Safeguard Measures), and Art. 15
(Measures to Safeguard the Balance of Payments).
The removal of restrictions or control on foreign investment is done by 
extending national treatment to the admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, operation, and disposition of investment (AIA Art. 7(1 )(b)). Previously, 
such regulations on screening and restricting entry and establishment were extensive 
in the ASEAN investment regime (see chapter 4). Under AIA, the ASEAN countries 
committed themselves to “progressively reduce or eliminate investment regulations
76 See UNCTAD (1999: 43).
11. Art. 4 (c) o f The Framework Agreement on AIA provided that “all industries are opened for 
investment to ASEAN investors by 2010 and to all investors by 2020, subject to the exceptions 
provided for under this Agreement;” The time frame for opening industries for investment to ASEAN 
investors was accelerated from 2010 to 2003. See Bold Measures above.
78. Art. 7 (2) o f the Framework Agreement on AIA provided that “Each Member State shall submit a 
Temporary Exclusion List and a Sensitive List, if any, within 6 months after the date o f signing of this 
Agreement, o f any industries or measures affecting investments (referred to in paragraph 1 above) with 
regard to which it is unable to open up or to accord national treatment to ASEAN investors. These lists 
shall form an annex to this Agreement. In the event that a Member State, for justifiable reasons, is 
unable to provide any list within the stipulated period, it may seek an extension from the AIA Council”.
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and conditions, which may impede investment flows and the operation of investment
7Q
projects in ASEAN” and not to create any new restrictions. Restrictions, which still
remain, under the TEL and SL, are also subject to the stand still and roll back
principles80. With the commitment to the stand still and roll back principles, ASEAN
countries bind themselves not to create new restrictions, and to progressively eliminate
existing regulations that impede investment flows or restrict foreign investment.
The combined NT/MFN treatment model with a negative list of exceptions
implemented under AIA still allows ASEAN countries to maintain negative lists,
which may be provided under their existing legislation. Even though ASEAN
countries have deregulated and eliminated much of their investment controls, they still
reserve some crucial strategic industries, indigenous and cultural industries, mostly for
national security, health, public, cultural and safety reasons. This approach recognises
that certain areas may be beyond the scope of liberalisation. However, ASEAN
countries have to submit their TEL and SL to the AIA Council within 6 months after
the date of signing the agreement and the TEL shall be reviewed every 2 years and
81progressively phased out by the year 2003 . Therefore, most industries reserved on 
TEL will be opened by the year 2003 and the SL will be reviewed by 1st January 2003. 
The AIA Council may decide a further review of the SL so that all negative lists might 
be lifted.
In addition, the Short-Term Measures to Enhance the ASEAN Investment 
Climate82 also provided special privileges and measures for accelerating investment
79. Art. 3 o f the Framework Agreement.
80. For instance, the TEL and SL that need to be gradually eliminated and phased out are mostly the 
restricted industries previously closed to foreign investors.
81. Initially the time frame for phasing out the TEL was set in the year 2010 but was later accelerated to 
the year 2003. Section 8 o f the Statement on Bold Measures.
See http://www.asean.or.id/economic/invest/sum_bold.htm.
82. Section 33 o f the Hanoi Declaration provided that "As a step to enhance ASEAN's investment and 
trade environment, a package of bold measures and privileges will be granted to traders and investors. 
In this regard, we ask our Ministers to commence implementation o f the package o f bold measures
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liberalisation (discussed above). This includes a suspension of laws regulating equity 
joint ventures between foreign and local enterprises and 100% foreign equity is now
o-j
allowed . Laws restricting foreign shareholders in national companies are also 
deregulated84. However, since the 100% foreign equity and other special privileges 
granted in the short-term measures are not set as permanent measures, they are subject 
to change and may alter in the future or be extended depending on later circumstances.
Consider in relation to the models suggested by UNCTAD (discussed in 5.3.5 
above), the AIA agreement may be considered to be a hybrid model, as it binds 
ASEAN member countries to grant mutual national treatment to ASEAN investors and 
then to extend NT to non-ASEAN investors later, by the year 2010. Mutual national 
treatment involves a greater commitment to full liberalisation among member states 
aiming at attaining regional integration, in order to offer a larger geographical area 
within which globally competitive industries can be established. Under mutual 
national treatment, the right of entry and establishment are offered to investors located 
in member states that either possess the nationality of such state and/or are resident for 
business purpose in a member state. The aim is to establish a common regime for entry 
and admission for investors from member states (UNCTAD, 1999: 17). ASEAN 
countries also extend the combined NT/MFN treatment to ASEAN investors. This 
means ASEAN countries commit to offer each other NT and MFN treatment, 
whichever is more favourable to investors from any member country, at pre-entry and
starting from 1st January 1999". The Statement on Bold Measures, which provides several measures 
accelerating trade and investment liberalization further provides details o f Short-Term Measures To 
Enhance ASEAN Investment Climate. The Hanoi Declaration was done on 16th December 1998 at 
Hanoi, Vietnam. On the same day, the Statement on Bold Measures and the Short-Term Measures to 
Enhance ASEAN Investment Climate were adopted.
83. Section 6 (ii) Short Term Measures to Enhance ASEAN Investment Climate.
84. This can be seen from the privatisation schemes implemented in ASEAN countries, especially after 
the crisis, under the supervision and requirement o f IMF that come along with the IMF help package. 
For instance, Thailand has to implement privatisation in various national companies, such as the 
Petroleum company, electricity enterprises (Electricity Generation Authority o f Thailand: EGAT), and 
Telecommunication Authority of Thailand. Government allows foreign investors to hold shares in those
301
post-entry stages of investment. The aim is to widen entry and establishment rights as 
far as possible, to enable investors from other ASEAN countries to obtain the same 
rights of access as the national or most-favoured third country investor. Under AIA 
(Art. 8) “any preferential treatment granted under any existing or future agreements or 
arrangements to which a Member State is a party shall be extended on the Most- 
Favoured Nation basis to all Member States”. Therefore, any advantages accorded to 
third parties, either under existing or future agreements will be extended to all ASEAN 
countries. However, any ASEAN country can confer special treatment or advantages 
to adjacent countries under growth triangles and other sub-regional arrangements
85between member states , which need not be extended to others under the MFN 
requirement.
Consequently, implementation of AIA based on mutual NT and combined 
NT/MFN treatment is enhancing intra-ASEAN liberalisation or regional integration 
while it encourages the inflow of foreign investment from outside the region. 
Therefore, a combined model is implemented in AIA: NT/MFN treatment is initially 
granted to ASEAN investors until the transitional period elapses, then NT is granted to 
non-ASEAN investors. This reflects the transitional approach in investment 
liberalisation of ASEAN, firstly prioritising intra-regional investment liberalisation, 
and later closer integration with the world.
5.3.6 ASEAN Investor
Central to this model is the definition of “ASEAN investor”. The status of 
ASEAN investor enables such an investor to be entitled to immediate NT/MFN 
treatment. Under AIA Art.l, an ASEAN investor is defined as:
companies and also allows foreign investors to make takeover bids for the collapsed financial firms that 
had been taken over by the government after the crisis.
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1) a national o f  a Member State; or
2) any juridical person o f a Member State,
making an investment in another Member State, the effective ASEAN equity o f which 
taken cumulatively with all other ASEAN equities fulfils at least the minimum 
percentage required to meet the national equity requirement and other equity 
requirements o f domestic laws and published national policies, if  any, o f the host 
country in respect o f that investment..............
For the purpose of this definition, equity o f nationals or juridical persons o f any Member State 
shall be deemed to be the equity o f nationals or juridical persons o f  the host country:
“effective ASEAN equity” in respect o f an investment in an ASEAN Member State 
means ultimate holding by nationals or juridical persons o f ASEAN Member States in 
that investment..............
“juridical person” means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organised 
under the applicable law o f a Member State,...................
“national” means a natural person having the citizenship o f a Member State in 
accordance with its applicable laws.
Therefore under AIA, a national or any juridical person of a member state who 
invests in any ASEAN country is regarded as an ASEAN investor. Since Art. 1 refers 
to a juridical person constituted in a member country, it is not limited to locally-owned 
entities. Thus, it does not exclude non-ASEAN investors who have formed a company 
in a member country, and they may be entitled to “ASEAN investor” status, provided 
it also meets the conditions for “effective ASEAN equity” on a cumulative basis. If 
Art.l intended to exclude foreign-owned companies from the meaning of “juridical 
person of a member state”, it should be clearly defined as “an ASEAN national 
juridical person”, just like definitions in national investment laws which make a 
distinction between foreign-owned companies and national companies86. Accordingly, 
this definition of “ASEAN investor” enables any company legally formed in any
85. Art. 8 (4) “Nothing in paragraph 1 shall prevent any Member State from conferring special treatment 
or advantages to adjacent countries under growth triangles and other sub-regional arrangements between 
Member States”.
86. For instance, Malaysian law defines a company as a foreign company or non-resident company 
where 50% or more o f its paid up capital is held by non-residents; or it is branch o f a company which is 
incorporated outside Malaysia; or the majority shareholding is held by residents but the ultimate right of 
control is held by non-residents. Under Thai Law, foreign company means a juristic person o f which 
half or more o f the capital is owned by aliens; a juristic person o f which half or more o f the 
shareholders, partners or members are aliens, irrespective o f the amount invested by such aliens; a 
limited partnership or registered ordinary partnership o f which its managing partner or manager is an 
alien. Under Indonesian law, investment where foreign investor is directly bears the risk o f the 
investment is foreign investment. Also under the Philippines law, if a company or juristic person that
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ASEAN country to be regarded as an ASEAN investor and entitled to NT/MFN 
treatment under AIA. For instance, a foreign-owned company duly constituted in 
Singapore may be entitled to the status of ASEAN investor and hence to benefit from 
both NT and MFN treatment. Consequently, the AIA provisions also indirectly 
encourage individual ASEAN countries to lower their national equity requirement or 
to eliminate discrimination between national and foreign investors at national level.
However, it needs to be made clear here that national equity requirements are 
also relevant to the existing national negative list, as a foreign-owned company 
(classified by its foreign-owned equity) cannot access certain industries that are closed 
to foreigners. Thus foreign-owned companies are still subject to the negative lists of 
each ASEAN country that are still allowed under AIA.
Nevertheless, for an ASEAN juridical person to be entitled to NT as an 
“ASEAN investor” it must also meet the requirements of “effective ASEAN equity”. 
This enables it to comply with the local equity requirements of any ASEAN member 
country by counting the local equity participation in all other ASEAN countries on a 
cumulative basis towards that local requirement. The definition refers to “ultimate 
holdings”, this means that indirect holdings in related entities can be included in the 
cumulative total87. For example, if a hypothetical US company Computech has a 
Singapore subsidiary with local Singapore investors owning 10%, it would need only 
an additional 40% of local shareholdings to meet the requirement in Malaysia for 50% 
local equity; and then only further 1% to meet the Thai minimum of 51%.
Therefore, non-ASEAN investors can enjoy free mobility intra-ASEAN if they 
have “ASEAN investor” status under the AIA, by virtue of the NT/MFN treatment
foreign shareholders, partners that own more than 41% equity will be regarded as a foreign entity. Only 
under Singapore law is there no definition o f foreign investor.
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under AIA. Moreover, as discussed above, the short-term measures bind ASEAN 
countries to allow 100% foreign equity holding in a company submitted for approval 
from 1st January 1999 to 31st December 2000. This even further accelerates the 
elimination of discrimination against foreign investors and encourages them to invest 
in ASEAN immediately, within 1999-2000, in order to be entitled to the special 
privileges and NT/MFN treatment under AIA.
Regarding the implementation of NT with the 10-year differential between 
ASEAN investor and non-ASEAN investors, in fact, the rationale behind this time 
frame is not only specified as a grace period for fully implementing AIA, but also to 
stimulate foreign investors to invest immediately in any ASEAN country. If they do so 
now, they can be regarded as ASEAN investors and immediately be entitled to the 
NT/MFN treatment. Once they invest in any ASEAN country they are regarded as 
juristic persons of an ASEAN country and are able to move freely intra-ASEAN, 
because ASEAN countries have committed themselves to mutual NT, subject only to 
the TEL and SL. So non-ASEAN investors, if  they invest in an ASEAN country now, 
need not wait till the year 2010 when NT will extend to all investors.
5.3.7 AIA and Industrial Schemes
In conjunction with the launch of the AIA, other industrial schemes (both 
revised and new schemes) are to be implemented based on preferential treatment. Prior 
to the launch of AIA, ASEAN had implemented some other industrial programs such 
as the Revised Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures of 1987, the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Brand-to-Brand Complementation Scheme of 
1988 (discussed in Chapter 2), and the ASEAN Industrial Co-operation Scheme 
(AICO) of 1996. These programs are based on preferential regimes extended among
8?. A technical issue could be made of the term “ultimate holding” if the entities formed in ASEAN are 
all subsidiaries o f a non-ASEAN entity, so that local investors in one have no “ultimate holding” in
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ASEAN members. For instance, the AICO scheme88 is to encourage companies 
located and operating in different ASEAN countries to co-operate with one another in 
the manufacture of approved AICO products. A minimum of two companies in two 
different countries is required to form an “AICO arrangement”. The major privilege of 
AICO is that approved AICO products will enjoy preferential tariff rates of 0-5% for 
all ASEAN countries immediately upon approval of such an AICO arrangement. The 
immediate application of the 0-5% preferential tariff rate will provide a head start to 
AICO products compared to non-AICO products, since the general reduction of tariff 
to the 0-5% range will not occur under the CEPT until 2003. Other incentives include 
local content accreditation where applicable, and other non-tariff incentives to be 
provided by the participating member countries. The preferential tariff rates of 0-5% 
will also be applicable to the importation of intermediate products and/or raw material 
inputs for the manufacture of AICO Final Products and/or AICO Intermediate 
Products. The scheme is open to any company that fulfils the criteria: incorporated and 
operating in any ASEAN country; having a minimum 30% ASEAN national equity89; 
and undertaking resource pooling, industrial complementation or industrial co­
operation activities.
These ASEAN industrial programs implement the regional industrialisation 
program model as they involve regimes for encouraging intra-regional investment by 
the setting up of regional enterprises with capital from more than one member country. 
They encourage cross-border investment by way of regionally integrated enterprises 
and projects (UNCTAD, 1999: 16-17).
another. To avoid doubt, they could be structured as sub-subsidiaries.
88. See explanation o f AICO Scheme at the ASEAN website, http:/www.aseand.or.id.
89. However, this requirement is exempt during the implementation o f short-term measures between 1st 
January 1999 to 31st December 2000 for encouraging foreign investment into the region. Therefore, 
100% foreign equity holding in a company established in any ASEAN country is allowed and entitled to 
the preferences provided.
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Thus, ASEAN has concertedly liberalised trade and investment intra-ASEAN 
so that all projects implemented are interactive and responsive to each other90. While 
the intra-ASEAN market has been growing91 and becoming increasingly liberalised, 
ASEAN has been liberalising investment that will further enhance trade flows from 
within and from outside the region. ASEAN responded to the crisis by pursuing 
financial and economic reforms and boosting the region’s competitive edge through 
accelerated implementation of its economic liberalisation policies and programs, such 
as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the ASEAN Investment Area and the ASEAN 
Industrial Co-operation Scheme (AICO).
With the interactive implementation of AIA, AFTA, AICO, and the short-term 
measures, foreign investors have been signalled that if they invest in ASEAN now 
they can be entitled to all privileges granted under such agreements, even NT/MFN 
treatment and the advance preferential tariff rate of 0-5% under AFTA. Foreign 
investors responded immediately to the privileges offered by ASEAN. For instance, in 
January 1999, Siemens AG established a regional trade and investment centre in 
Thailand and increased its equity in Siemens (Thailand) from 49% to 74.5% of the
90 . See Short term Measures in Annex 12, which ASEAN countries allow 100% equity owned by non- 
ASEAN investor, and under AIA, "ASEAN investors" are entitled to national treatment, and all 
industries are opened to them (subject only to negative lists) have facilitated liberalised investment, and 
these measures have also facilitated service trade through commercial presence so that non-ASEAN 
service providers can establish themselves in ASEAN countries and can freely mobile within the 
region. See section 3. o f the Short Term Measures for individual ASEAN country liberalisation. Also 
IMF rescued packages include privatisation scheme, open financial sector, telecommunication, and 
other service sectors o f ASEAN countries. Also see Table 6 GATS-Plus Commitments o f ASEAN 
Countries showing ASEAN countries liberalised services extensively. AICO Schemes which reinforce 
trade and investment liberalisation by providing 0-5% tariff rate to all products produced under AICO 
Schemes. All these measures function in a way that they are all complementary, and facilitate both 
trade and investment lberalisation. Moreover, as I pointed out the four main areas that ASEAN 
countries generally restrict FDI: entry restriction; equity limitation; performance requirement; and 
investment incentive. Now ASEAN countries have deregulated them, as mentioned above, allow 100% 
equity holding by foreign investor, open industries that closeed to foreign investor, committed to lift out 
performance requirement and coordinate among ASEAN members in providing investment incentives. 
See ASEAN Secretariat (1998a) Compendium o f  Investment P olicies and  M easures in ASEAN  
Countries. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat. Also see ASEAN Secretariat (1998b) H andbook o f  
Investm ent Agreem ents in ASEAN. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat.
91. ASEAN is now composed of 10 countries and has a total population o f about 500 million, a total area 
o f 4.5 million square kilometers, and a combined gross national product o f US$ 685 billion.
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company's equity92. Fujitsu also launched its biggest production base of hard disc 
drives in Thailand in 199993. Also US oil giant Caltex relocated its global operational 
headquarters to Singapore in March 199994. The Messer Group made its largest-ever 
single investment outside Germany, in Singapore95. 3 COM has opened its company's 
largest production base in Singapore with a US$ 70 million investment96.
AIA thus indicates a new direction for ASEAN to balance deeper regional 
integration and “Open Regionalism”. While it enhances intra-ASEAN economic 
integration, it also opens the door to non-ASEAN investors. Moreover, individual 
ASEAN countries have also unilaterally liberalised their trade and investment regime, 
by keeping their margin of preference as low as they can so that market access is more 
available for non-ASEAN enterprises97.
5.4 The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
5.4.1 Introduction
The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) was signed on 15th 
December 199598 resulting from the 5th ASEAN Summit Meeting, pursuing the 
objectives of the Singapore Declaration of 1992, which provided that ASEAN shall 
move towards a higher plane of economic co-operation and regional integration.
92. The centre would support the activities o f Siemens AG joint ventures in the whole region, 
particularly in the telecommunications, transport, medical systems and power generation sectors. BOI 
Thailand Announcement, No. 18/2542 (0 .10) 27lh January 1999.
9j. BOI Thailand announcement, No. 18/2542 (0 .10) 27th January 1999.
94. Singapore Investment News, January 1999.
95 Messer Griesheim GmbH of Germany and Texaco Nederlands B.V., a subsidiary o f Texaco Inc of 
White Plains, NY, will build a USS 200 million synthesis gas production facility on Singapore Jurong 
Island. Singapore Investment News, January 1999.
96. With the opening o f the company's largest production facility in Singapore, 3Com becomes the first 
global networking company with a manufacturing presence in Asia. Singapore Investment News, 
January 1999.
97. For example, Indonesia has reduced tariff rates beyond WTO commitments, see 
http:/www.wto.org/wto/reviews/indonesia.htm, WTO-TPRP report on Indonesia, meeting date 3rd-4th 
December 1998.
98. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services was done at Bangkok, Thailand on 15th December
1995 and The Protocol to Implement the Initial Package o f Commitments under the ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services was done at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 15th December 1997.
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AFAS thus aim s" to liberalise trade in services in the region to facilitate the 
realisation of AFTA by substantially eliminating restrictions on trade in services100 
among ASEAN countries in order to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the provision of services in the region.
Since the majority of the ASEAN countries101 are members of GATT/WTO 
and they individually have to comply with GATT/WTO rules, they conceitedly agreed 
to commit to the rules and principles of GATS at a regional level102. Art. V of GATS103 
permits any WTO member to enter into an agreement to further liberalise trade in 
services with other countries, provided that such agreement has “substantial sectoral 
coverage”, and aims at the elimination of substantially all discrimination among the 
members in the sectors covered through the stand still and roll back principles. Art. V 
is an exemption to the MFN requirement under the GATS, in addition to services 
specified in individual MFN exemption lists (which are subject to a review and time 
limit under the Annex). Its rationale is to encourage regional economic integration and 
it is modelled on Art. XXIV of the GATT, recognising that implementation of regional
" . Art. 1 o f the Framework Agreement on Services stated its objectives that “(a) to enhance cooperation 
in services amongst Member States in order to improve the efficiency and competitiveness, diversify 
production capacity and supply and distribution of services o f their services suppliers within and outside 
ASEAN; (b) to eliminate substantially restrictions to trade in services amongst Member States; and (c) 
to liberalize trade in services by extending the depth and scope o f liberalization beyond those 
undertaken by Member States under the GATS with the aim to realise a free trade area in services”.
10°. Art. 1 (a) and (b) of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services stated its aims as “to enhance 
cooperation in services among ASEAN member countries in order to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness, diversify production capacity and supply and distribution o f services o f their suppliers 
within and outside ASEAN”, and “to eliminate substantially restrictions to trade in services among 
member countries”.
,01. Only Vietnam and Laos are not members o f GATT/WTO.
102. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services provided in the preamble that “Reiterating their 
commitments to the rules and principles o f the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘GATS’) and noting that Art. V of GATS permits the liberalizing o f  trade in services 
between or among the parties to an economic integration agreement”.
103. Art. V o f GATS permits the liberalizing of trade in services between or among the parties to an 
economic integration agreement provided that such agreement “(a) has substantial sectoral coverage, 
and (b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sectors covered 
under subparagraph (a) through: (i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or (ii) 
prohibition o f new or more discriminatory measures, either at the entry into force o f that agreement or 
on the basis o f a reasonable of time frame, except for measures permitted under Arts. XI, XII, XIV and 
XIV bis.”
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liberalisation of trade in services may well form part of a wider process of economic 
integration and further integrate a regional market into the global market (World Trade 
Organisation, 1999: 166). Therefore, the AFAS is intended as a GATS-Plus scheme, to 
liberalise trade in services by expanding the depth and scope of liberalisation beyond 
the commitments undertaken by the member countries under the GATS, with the aim 
of realising a free trade area in services in this region104. Thus, ASEAN countries 
affirm to extend one another preference in trade in services.
The AFAS can be regarded as the selective liberalisation model, which offers 
right of entry and establishment only in specific sectors committed by member 
countries, since AFAS, like GATS, is a ‘bottom up’ approach. Therefore, a right of 
entry or establishment of service suppliers in receiving countries, either in the mode of 
commercial presence or presence of natural person, may exist only where member 
countries make specific commitments on market access. In service sectors for which a 
member country undertakes market access commitments, the member country must 
specify any condition or limitations which it wishes to maintain, either on ‘(i) market 
access, or (ii) on (post-entry) national treatment. Thus, in the absence of an express 
reservation, member countries cannot restrict or require, for instance, specific forms of 
legal entity or joint venture through which a service must be provided, or impose 
limits on participation of foreign capital or limits on foreign shareholding. The 
receiving countries therefore have considerable discretion in determining the extent of 
the market access, and they may expressly reserve powers to limit the mode of supply 
(UNCTAD, 1999: 20). Under AFAS, ASEAN countries committed themselves to 
offer market access in more specific sectors and sub-sectors than they did in GATS 
and also fewer limitations on market access and national treatment.
104. Art. I (c) o f the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services.
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The commitments on market access involve the liberalisation of the pre-entry 
stage, and under GATS and AFAS, are subject to the limitations or conditions made 
by member countries. At the post entry stage, the non-discrimination principle of 
national treatment applies if a member country bind itself to grant such a right. 
However, even if a state agrees to grant market access the NT obligation may remain 
"unbound", which means that no post-entry NT commitments are made. Even if a state 
does bind itself on NT, this can be subject to conditions and exclusions.
5.4.2 Liberalisation of Trade in Services
Under the AFAS, ASEAN countries commit themselves to liberalise trade in 
services in a substantial numbers of sectors within a reasonable time-frame through the 
principles of stand still and roll back103. Under Art. IV, they will negotiate to liberalise 
the specific service sectors beyond the commitments already made under GATS by 
each individual member country (see Diagram 1 summary of ASEAN country 
schedules under GATS, p. 350). AFAS involves market access commitments that are 
preferential in nature, as Art. IV (1) specifies that ASEAN countries will accord 
preferential treatment to one another on a MFN basis. However, MFN exemptions are 
still available under GATS-Plus, even though there was no MFN exemption clause as 
such in Art. IV or in the AFAS Framework Agreement itself. It appeared in the 
Protocol to Implement both the initial and Second Package of Commitments under the 
AFAS and they are integral parts of AFAS Framework Agreement106. Therefore, MFN
105. Art. Ill o f AFAS provided that “Pursuant to Art. 1 (c), Member States shall liberalize trade in 
services in a substantial number of sectors within a reasonable time-frame by: (a) eliminating 
substantially all existing discriminatory measures and market access limitations amongst Member 
States; and (b) prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures and market access limitations”.
106. Section 3 o f the Protocol to implement the second package o f  commitment under the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services reads: The Annexes to this Protocol shall consist o f the Horizontal 
Commitments, Schedules of Specific Commitments and the Lists o f Most-Favoured-Nation 
Exemptions. And Art. VIII o f the AFAS agreement provided that: Schedules o f  Specific Commitments 
and Understanding arising from subsequent negotiations under this Framework Agreement and any 
other agreements or arrangements, Action Plans and Programmes arising thereunder shall form an
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exemptions also exist in the GATS-Plus scheme. Nevertheless, there is neither a 
provision for reviewing the MFN exemptions nor a period for phasing out such 
exemptions. This seems to leave them to be eliminated under Art. Ill which envisages 
that all existing discriminatory measures and market access limitations are subject to 
stand still and roll back principles, so that MFN exemptions should be phased out 
eventually. MFN exemptions also can be regarded as included in each negotiation 
round of the specific commitment package. ASEAN countries can be flexible in 
negotiating their specific sector commitments and exemptions, as liberalisation of 
trade in services is a ‘bottom-up’ process. However, any limitations are subject to the 
general obligation and commitment under Art. Ill of AFAS to be progressively phased 
out. Preferential treatment under GATS-Plus and all commitments under GATS will 
be extended to all ASEAN member countries including those that are non-WTO 
members (Laos and Vietnam).
The first round of negotiations of ASEAN services liberalisation began in 
1996 and ended in 1998 in the initial seven priority sectors, which have been identified 
at the 5th ASEAN Summit: air transport, business services, construction, finance, 
marine transport, telecommunications, and tourism. Under the Hanoi Action Plan of 
December 1998 for accelerating the implementation of AIA and AFAS, ASEAN 
countries agreed to extend the sector coverage in GATS-Plus to cover all services 
sectors and all modes of supply107, and the second round of negotiations began in 1999 
and will end in 2001.
5.4.3 ASEAN Com m itm ents under GATS
Since commitments under AFAS must be beyond those under GATS, a 
review of the reservations and exclusion from GATS commitments of ASEAN
integral part o f this Framework Agreement. Therefore, section 3 o f  the Protocol is part o f AFAS 
agreement.
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countries will indicate the kinds of preferential commitments that may be negotiated in 
this GATS-Plus scheme. Looking first at the ASEAN country schedules under GATS 
for horizontal commitments108 (see Tables 1 and 2, p. 347-8), the most common 
limitations imposed are in the areas of market access involving both commercial 
presence and the presence of natural persons. Particularly, commercial presence is 
often restricted by requiring foreign service providers to enter through joint ventures 
whose ownership must still be retained by domestic nationals who can serve as 
members of the board of directors of the company109. This requirement is dominant in 
all ASEAN countries' investment regimes, as commercial presence involves foreign 
direct investment. Additionally, most ASEAN countries have restricted the entry and 
duration of stay of foreign managers, executives and technical specialists. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand impose restrictions on ownership of land by 
foreign service providers. Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore impose restrictions 
on the number of foreign nationals who can be members of the Board of Directors of a 
company.
Regarding specific sectoral commitments, ASEAN countries made 
commitments in air transport, business services, construction, finance, marine 
transport, telecommunication and tourism under which they made limitations on 
market access specific to particular service sub-sectors, and limitations on the NT 
principle. These limitations covered the four modes of supply: cross-border supply, 
consumption abroad, commercial presence, and the presence of natural persons (see
107. Statement on Bold Measures, para 10. See http:/www.asean.or.id/economic/invest/sum_bold.htm.
108. Horizontal commitments refer to commitments that are common or run across all service sectors o f  
contracting parties.
109. ASEAN Secretariat's Information Paper: Member Country Commitments under the GATS. 
Document No. 8. Second Meeting o f the Ad-Hoc Working Group on ASEAN Co-operation in Services, 
17th. 19th January 1995, Makati, the Philippines.
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detailed specific sectoral commitments and exemptions of ASEAN countries made 
under GATS in Tables 4 and 5, p. 351-4).
In particular, the banking service sector includes the sub-sectors of acceptance 
of deposits, lending, trading of financial instruments (which includes foreign 
exchange), and financial asset management. The major limitations consist of 
branching restrictions, and ownership restrictions such as requirements that foreign 
service providers enter in joint ventures with local banks. In the insurance sector: life 
insurance, non-life insurance, reinsurance and broking and other agency services, the 
main limitations are on market access ranging from requiring prior approval for the 
establishment of new companies to limiting foreign shareholding in such companies. 
Malaysia imposes an economic needs test before allowing insurance companies into 
the domestic market. Indonesia requires higher paid up capital for foreign companies. 
Other common limitations are restrictions on the membership in the Board of 
Directors as well as on the hiring of managerial or technical personnel.
In maritime transport: passenger services, freight services and maintenance and 
repair of vessels, there are fewer limitations on market access and national treatment in 
this sector compared to the others. Brunei has no limitation at all on market access; 
Singapore has limitations on market access only on the presence of natural persons; 
Thailand has restrictions involving freight traffic between Thailand and Vietnam as 
well as Thailand and China that may be not fully participated in by third countries.
As regards the air transport sector, Indonesia and Singapore have no specific 
schedule of commitments in air transport, and the others made commitments but 
subject to limitations on market access. On leasing of aircraft, Brunei and Malaysia 
allow commercial presence only through a representative office while the Philippines 
allows lease contracts subject to approval by its air transport authority (the Civil
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Aviation Board). The Philippines has no limitations on commercial presence in case of 
maintenance and repair of aircraft, while Thailand's measures with regards to 
commercial presence are unbound. In the case of general sales and cargo sales, 
distribution through CRS is allowed by Thailand only for airline offices and one 
general sales agent office. In addition, such providers must use the Thai public 
telecommunication network.
Finally, as regards MFN exemptions (see Table 3, 349), ASEAN countries 
have extensive MFN exemptions under GATS. These exemptions include limitations 
on foreign equity participation and the entry of semi-skilled or unskilled workers. All 
ASEAN countries have MFN exemptions in their financial and transport sectors. 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore have MFN exemptions covering all 
sectors. Also Brunei and Singapore have exemptions in legal sen/ices. Singapore has 
exemptions in broadcasting, computer reservation systems, reinsurance and 
retrocession, Malaysia has an exemption in advertising, and Thailand has exemptions 
in business services, and computer reservation systems. Most of these sectoral MFN 
exemptions are the result of broad national policies (e.g. limitations on equity 
participation of foreign investors) or the result of bilateral agreements involving 
reciprocal favourable treatment that are allowed under the GATS (Art. II. 2)110. For 
instance, Thailand has restrictions involving freight traffic as mentioned above, based 
on bilateral agreements made between Thailand and Vietnam, and Thailand and China.
From this review, ASEAN countries need to consider, under GATS-Plus, to 
improve the coverage of service sectors to be liberalised, both horizontal and specific 
sectoral service commitments and mode of service supply as well as to refrain from 
MFN exemptions in such service sectors. Since Art. V of GATS permits preferential
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treatment among members of a regional economic integration agreement, provided 
that such arrangements have substantial sector coverage and eliminate substantially all 
discrimination among the members, AFAS cannot be implemented on a piecemeal or 
selective basis. Therefore, ASEAN countries need to liberalise service sectors on a 
broad base of both horizontal commitments and specific sectors.
5.4.4 Preferential Treatments Extended to A SEAN Countries under 
GATS-Plus Packages
ASEAN countries' offers under GATS-Plus scheme (see detailed offers in 
Table 6, p.355-8) are an improvement on their commitments under GATS in some or 
all of the seven sectors and sub-sectors involving modes of supply, market access and 
national treatment. The service sectors in which individual ASEAN countries offer 
preferences over GATS are summarised in Table 7.
Table 7
Summary of GATS-Plus Commitments of ASEAN Countries 





































A i r  T r a n s p o r t X X X - X X X X X
B u sin ess  S e rv ices X X X X X X X X X
C o n s tru c tio n X X X X X X X X X
F in a n c ia l  S erv ices - X X - X X X X X
M a r in e  T r a n s p o r t X - X - X X X X X
T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n s - X X X X X X X -
T o u ris m - X X X X X X X X
Source: Compiled by the author from ASEAN countries schedules under GATS-Plus as at 
September 1998.
It needs to be made clear here that offers made by each individual ASEAN 
country summarised in Table 6 and 7 are the GATS-Plus commitments. So if an
no. WTO reported that “MFN exemptions have been claimed by most current and prospective WTO 
Members. Roughly 350 measures are involved, mainly bilateral or plurilateral agreements without a
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individual ASEAN country did not make further offers in a particular sector here it 
does not mean that the country did not commit in such sector at all, but rather that it 
may already have made offers in such sector under GATS quite extensively (see 
Tables 1-5). On the other hand, where ASEAN countries made offers under GATS- 
Plus it does not mean offers have not been made at all under GATS, but rather that the 
additional offers were made in more sub-sectors of that sector under GATS-Plus.
Laos and Vietnam111, who are non-WTO members, made offers in all sectors 
because they did not commit under GATS before. Malaysia did not make further 
offers in financial sectors other than those made under GATS, because after the 1997 
crisis Malaysia has been cautiously overseeing its financial sector. Scholars112 also 
widely accepted that before liberalising the financial sector there should be a 
strengthening of the legal infrastructure, and of supervision and prudential measure, 
and this increasing scrutiny may entail a slow-down in liberalisation or deregulation 
for a time. In some cases, like the financial sector, it is possible that activities that have 
never been regulated will become regulated because of greater attention to prudential 
concerns. The restructuring of the financial sector in Asia after the crisis shows that 
adequate prudential measures, supervision and legal framework should be established 
before further liberalisation.
fixed termination date”. See World Trade Organization, 1999: 193.
111 Vietnam did not commit to liberalise its telecommunication sector in this schedule because the 
country has modest telecommunication infrastructure and it needs to develop this service sector before 
welcoming foreign service providers.
112 See, for example, Raghavan, Chakravarthi, (1997) “Financial Liberalisation” Third W orld  
Resurgence. No. 86, October. Also UNCTAD's Secretary-General, Rubens Ricupero has advised the 
countries o f the South to retain a degree o f flexibility on measures to control movements o f  capital until 
a satisfactory international agreement is reached on this issue. He further suggested that “you need to 
take into your level o f development, the financial institutions o f each country, the current state o f  
domestic supervisory capabilities, the current state o f your financial system as a whole”. The situation 
varies from country to country, and it is difficult to generalise. But I hope each country will make its 
decisions in the light o f their own situations, and this will be seen as a valuable contribution to the 
liberalisation o f the financial services sector.’ (TWR, No. 86, October, 1997).
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5.4.5 ASEAN Service Providers
A key question is who can be entitled to the offers under AFAS. AFAS is a
regional economic integration agreement implemented under Art. V of GATS, and
therefore preferential treatment under AFAS would in principle be given to service
providers of the ASEAN member countries or “ASEAN service providers”. Although
AFAS did not define “ASEAN service providers”, it did provide for the denial of
benefits in Art. VI of AFAS:
The benefits o f this Framework Agreement shall be denied to a service supplier 
who is a natural person of a non-Member State or a juridical person owned or 
controlled by person o f a non-Member State constituted under the law o f A 
Member State, but not engaged in substantive business operations in the territory 
o f Member State(s).
Even though Art. VI of AFAS is a denial of benefits clause and not a definition 
clause, the statement in Art. VI of AFAS was partially taken from the definition clause 
of Art. XXVIII of GATS, so it may be said that Art. VI of AFAS implies a definition 
of legitimate service providers who are the ones not denied by Art. VI. This 
presumption is reinforced by the fact that AFAS reiterated ASEAN countries' 
commitments to the rules and principles of GATS and the provisions of GATS are 
enshrined in AFAS, particularly as mentioned above.
Art. VI denies benefits or privileges to a juridical person owned or controlled 
by non-ASEAN persons only if such a juridical person is not “engaged in substantive 
business operations” in an ASEAN country. Therefore, a company duly constituted 
under the laws of an ASEAN country (which is, in principle, an ASEAN juridical 
person) if it engages in “substantive business operations” in an ASEAN country is thus 
entitled to the benefits and privileges offered under AFAS as an ASEAN service 
provider. Consequently, non-ASEAN nationals who establish a company in an 
ASEAN country, which genuinely engages in substantive business in that country, are 
able to enjoy benefits under AFAS. Since there are no other limitations or specific
318
conditions under AFAS, such a foreign-owned company can gain advantages from the 
more liberal establishment rule to benefit from the liberalisation in intra-ASEAN 
services trade, subject only to limitations or conditions made by each individual 
ASEAN country under GATS-Plus, which are also generally applied to all ASEAN 
service providers alike.
Thus, as with the AIA, the AFAS offers opportunities for non-ASEAN-owned 
entities to benefit from the more rapid liberalisation of the intra-ASEAN market. Like 
the AIA also, it will put pressure on each ASEAN country to liberalise its national 
entry requirements, since a foreign-owned service provider once admitted to an 
ASEAN country may thereby gain access to the whole ASEAN market. Indeed, AFAS 
potentially goes further than the AIA, since it has no cumulative equity requirements 
(although each country may still retain some foreign shareholding limitation).
The key issue is the meaning of “substantive business” which must be engaged 
in by the foreign-owned company. The meaning of substantive and the meaning of 
business should be considered together. Substantive means real or genuine thus 
substantive business should mean a real or genuine business engaged by a company. 
The company can be entitled to privileges under AFAS only if it has already engaged 
in such real or genuine business operations in one ASEAN country (the one where it is 
established) before it can provide such services in other ASEAN countries. A further 
issue is whether such business can be any kind of business, or needs to be an actual 
services business which will be provided in the other ASEAN countries. This has to be 
interpreted in conjunction with the earlier interpretation of substantive business, which 
means a real business. If a company engages in one business operation but seeks to 
provide another business service elsewhere, the company obviously is not already 
engaged in such substantive or real business service. So substantive business should
mean a real or genuine business, which it seeks to provide throughout the ASEAN 
region. For instance, a foreign-owned company established in Singapore engaged in 
the construction service business would be entitled to the rights and benefits offered 
under AFAS by other ASEAN countries to gain market access in the countries which 
have offered such rights in the construction service sector. But if this company 
engages in insurance business in Singapore and seeks to provide construction services 
in other countries, it could not do so since it is not engaged, at that time, in a real or 
genuine business in construction services, even though it has a real business in 
insurance. Since the liberalisation of services intra-ASEAN aims to strengthen and 
enhance trade in services in the region in order to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of their service industries, ASEAN countries would allow non- 
ASEAN owned providers only if they are part of the ASEAN economy and really 
contribute economic value to the ASEAN economy. Therefore, ASEAN countries 
welcome non-ASEAN nationals to establish a company and operate substantive 
service businesses in ASEAN countries and enjoy the rights and privileges offered by 
ASEAN countries under GATS-Plus. In this way, ASEAN fulfils the dual objectives 
of intra-ASEAN liberalisation in services and encouraging market access by service 
providers from outside the region through the establishment of foreign-owned 
companies in ASEAN countries. This means further enhancing FDI flows into the 
region.
Tables 6 and 7 show that the ASEAN countries' offers in GATS-Plus go 
beyond those committed under GATS in various sectors and sub-sectors, particularly 
in telecommunications, construction, financial and business service sectors. Tourism is 
booming in the ASEAN region because all ASEAN countries are liberalising regional 
tourism services. Maritime transport, which is generally closed under GATS, is more
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liberalised under GATS-Plus. Laos opened her maritime transport to all modes of 
supply and granted both market access and national treatment. Even though Laos is a 
land-locked country, her liberalisation of maritime transport in ASEAN is useful at the 
regional level because any country, whether or not it has a coastline, has the right to 
have ships navigating on the high seas. For instance, Austria and Switzerland are land­
locked countries but they have shipping interests (UNCTAD, 1989: 152). Therefore, if 
Laos established a shipping registry and introduced a Laos flag it would be open to all 
ASEAN ship-owners. On the other hand, such a registry could permit ship-owners 
anywhere in the world to register their vessels in Laos hence undertaking 
transportation FDI in the country and in the region. This is another example of 
complementary regional and international liberalisation.
Vietnam granted national treatment and market access to service providers 
under business service sectors for both commercial presence and presence of natural 
person, in the sub-sectors of engineering services, in accounting and auditing services, 
and in legal taxation services. This is due to Vietnam's new emerging market and the 
lack of such specialists and professionals caused by the prolonged Vietnam War. The 
inflows of trade and investment to Vietnam came mainly from Asian and ASEAN 
countries, and have been accompanied by service providers in business service sectors. 
For instance, there are many Thai law firms1 lj and lawyers who provide legal services 
in Vietnam because Thai investors114 in Vietnam need legal services from their
113 . For example Tilleke & Gibbins R.O.P. established in Thailand in 1893 by Pha Yod Muang Kwang, 
a Thai governor and Mr. William Alfred Tilleke, a Ceylonese, later joined by Mr. Raph Gibbins. It is 
now the oldest and largest independent law firm in Southeast Asia, composed o f more than 70% Thai 
lawyers, and providing legal services in Vietnam and other Southest Asian countries. Boonchoo 
Blumenthal & Richter Ltd, an international law firm based in Bangkok composed of 35 %  Thai lawyers 
is also providing legal services in Vietnam and also other countries in the region, and Baker & 
Mckenzie (Thailand), the biggest network law firm, is also well established through a branch in 
Vietnam providing legal services by Thai lawyers in.
114. Investors from Thailand have engaged in services trade and investment in Vietnam since the very 
beginning when Vietnam was transformed from the “battle field” to “trading field” initiated business 
relation between the two countries by the Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhawan in 1989. Since
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national lawyers who are trained in both Thai and Vietnamese law. Also accountants, 
auditors, and engineers are needed by Thai investors in Vietnam. The cases are the 
same for Singaporean or Malaysian investors. Therefore, Vietnam welcomes these 
business service providers. Since Vietnam endeavours to attract FDI and trade into the 
country, the opening of related service sectors may help facilitate business operations 
and promote FDI through the service providers who give advice and professional 
services to their customers.
Construction services, especially on-site construction work, are also opened in 
all ASEAN countries under GATS-Plus. This sub-service sector was not offered under 
GATS because it mainly involves commercial presence or the presence of natural 
persons of service providers in the territory of the country where services are provided. 
ASEAN countries' offers in this sub-sector enable service providers from other 
ASEAN countries to gain market access in the host country through local presence 
that also facilitates construction investment intra-ASEAN.
In particular, ASEAN countries liberalise their financial sector under GATS- 
Plus, in compliance with national policies to restructure and reform financial markets 
that have resulted in more generally liberal ASEAN financial market. Under GATS- 
Plus, Indonesia allows ASEAN banks to open branches in three new locations: 
Padang, Manado, and Ambon. Myanmar allows ASEAN banks' representative offices 
to be established in the country. The Philippines allows ASEAN commercial banking 
generally to gain market access, and especially Thailand allows 100% foreign-owned 
securities companies operating in the market in all modes of supply (lb, 2a, 3a, and 
4b). Vietnam also allows 100% foreign equity in all insurance companies operating in 
the market. Singapore is liberalising the insurance sector in both life and non-life
then Thai investors have continued investing in this country mainly in manufacturing industries but also 
in service investment such as hotel, restaurant and legal professional (Ministry o f Commerce, Bangkok,
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insurance sub-sectors. These improvements mainly involve commercial presence that 
previously was unbound under GATS.
The GATS-Plus improvements over GATS are in fact reinforcing generalised 
liberalisation of services in ASEAN. For example, ASEAN countries committed 
themselves under GATS to liberalise market access to their financial markets via 
commercial presence, but subject mainly to restriction on foreign shareholding in a 
finance company, insurance company, security company or commercial bank, 
generally at a maximum of 25-30%. Under GATS-Plus, ASEAN countries allowed 
(even foreign-owned) ASEAN companies to have an equity holding up to 49%I1:>, 
60% '16 or even 100%'17 of paid-up capital in a financial company, insurance company, 
commercial bank, or securities company. Under GATS, ASEAN countries bound 
themselves to only existing companies but left unbound the granting of new licenses, 
which remain subject to approval; but under GATS-Plus ASEAN countries have 
agreed to grant more new licenses in the financial services sector. For instance, 
Thailand agreed to grant 50 licenses for opening new commercial banks, the 
Philippines bound itself to grant 10 new licenses for establishment by ASEAN banks. 
Therefore, if a non-ASEAN service provider initially entered into the ASEAN market 
under GATS, once it is established in one ASEAN country it can enjoy access to the 
whole region under GATS-Plus, including the right to establish in other ASEAN 
countries. Recently Prudential, a British insurance company, established itself in 
Thailand under GATS. Prudential Insurance can now also move into other ASEAN
Thailand : Thai Investment in Vietnam , mimeograph).
115. Indonesia allows acquisition o f local existing bank through the purchase o f up to 49% o f the shares 
o f locally incorporated banks listed in the stock exchange.
116. The Philippines allows acquisition o f up to 60% o f the voting stock o f  an existing domestic bank or 
investing in up to 60% of the voting stock o f a new banking subsidiary incorporated under the laws o f  
the Philippines.
"7. Thailand allows 100% foreign equity participation in securities companies and in asset management 
companies. Vietnam allows 100% foreign-owned company providing services in life, accident and
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countries under GATS-Plus. Similarly, if any foreign insurance company becomes 
established in Vietnam where 100% equity is allowed, it can further enter into other 
ASEAN countries as a Vietnamese company.
5.4.6 M utual Recognition under AFAS
Since border barriers (tariffs and other controls) imposed by nation states have 
been gradually eliminated or reduced, flows of trade and investment appear to be 
increasing, facilitating the openness of the world economic system. Since then, 
regulatory differences and variable internal requirements among nation states have 
come to be regarded as “non-tariff barriers” hindering, cross-border trade flows, even 
though they are not intended to be protectionist (Mathis, 1998: 7). Non-tariff barriers 
are much more difficult to eliminate. In the international sphere, under GATT, there 
were initial discussions of the measures to combat non-tariff barriers since the 
international negotiations in the Tokyo Round. However, it was only in the Uruguay 
Round that measures for eliminating or reducing non-tariff barriers have been formally 
agreed, especially in the TBT and SPS agreements, and also under GATS Art. VII, by 
encouraging the approach of mutual recognition as well as common international 
standards applicable by WTO Member States.
The principle of mutual recognition (MR) has been generated, initially in the 
EU, to facilitate the implementation of regional liberalisation due to the complexity 
and diversities of national laws, as an alternative to harmonisation. MR has been
1 1 Rdeveloped by the ECJ, especially in the Cassis de Dijon case , in which the Court 
decided that national regulatory requirements, even if formally non-discriminatory 
('indistinct'), could constitute barriers to trade that is contrary to the Treaty of Rome.
health insurance services, non-life insurance, reinsurance, services auxiliary to insurance and financial 
leasing services.
So, in principle, the ECJ ruled that what is legally produced and sold in one country 
should be legally marketed in another. Therefore, internal national regulations and 
requirements may not be excessively imposed on imported products, and such 
regulations can be regarded as having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
that are invalid measures applicable to imported goods under Art. 30 of the Rome 
Treaty. This gave rise to the ‘new approach’ of the EU towards harmonisation, which 
encourages mutual recognition and its mandated recognition of other Member States' 
regulations, so that harmonisation of standards is only undertaken when and to the 
extent it is considered necessary. Member countries may still maintain their internal 
rules and regulations applicable to their domestic products, while permitting 
importation of “qualified” or “validly produced” products from other member 
countries. However, the Court also accepted that compliance with the importing 
country's rules may be necessary for specified reasons, especially health and safety 
and consumer protection119. This brings pressure on the EU member countries to agree 
on minimum harmonised standards or regulatory requirements, leading to the further 
harmonisation of rules or common standards. Consequently, the new approach 
enhances the complementarity and interaction between national rules and regional- 
level harmonised regulations. So in the EU mutual recognition operates in conjunction 
with some level of harmonisation (Bratton, William; McCahery, Joseph; Picciotto, Sol 
& Scott, Colin; 1996: 32). MR is therefore becoming a crucial instrument enhancing 
free trade either at regional or international level and it is now pursued by various
" 8. The judgment delivered by the Court o f Justice in Case 120/78 (1979) ECR 649, (1979) 3 CMLR 
494. (the 'Cassis de Dijon’ case) on 20th February 1979. European Community Court o f Judgement 
Report 1979 No. 1 -3, Part 2, S.V6.9.
"9. In the Cassis de Dijon case the Court accepted that “Obstacles to movement within the Community 
resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing o f the products in question 
must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating to particular to the effectiveness o f fiscal supervision, the protection of  
public health, the fairness o f commercial transactions and the defence o f the consumer”. Judgement of
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contracting parties at regional, bilateral, and plurilateral level, such as the MRA 
between the EU and the US signed in 18th May 1998120. MR has also been adopted by 
ASEAN in AFAS, as discussed below.
MR is also now encouraged by the WTO agreements i.e. the Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) agreement and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). The 
TBT refers to mutual recognition both for testing procedures and for substantive 
product regulations. MFN and NT are both required to be granted to other WTO 
Members in regard to access to domestic conformity assessment procedures. For 
instance, if a member state has eliminated the requirements of domestic conformity 
assessment, this would form the basis for a level of internal treatment that must then 
be accorded to imported goods on the basis of NT. However, the waiving of internal 
assessment procedures in favour of another's procedure suggests that whether this can 
be done depends upon one party's receipt of sufficient assurances as to the quality of 
the other party's procedures. Thus, on this ground, it appears that mutual recognition 
may be based on member-by-member agreements or autonomous recognition, and 
need not be extended automatically to all other members under the MFN clause. WTO 
agreements ensure only that equal opportunity is granted to all member states to enter 
into such agreements or arrangements, so as to encourage member states to adopt the 
mutual recognition. This may lead to standardised national procedural requirements or 
to the development of further common international standards or minimum standards, 
which is an alternative to mutual recognition. WTO member countries are pressed to 
use applicable International Standards where there are such standards available121.
the Court o f 20lh February 1979, Case 120/78. European Community Court o f Judgement Report 1979 
No. 1-3, Part 2, S.V6.9.
120. OJL 031, 04/02/1999 p. 3-80 and amendment adopted by 399 D0078 (OJL 031 04.02.99 p .l)
121. Arts. 2 and 4 and also Arts. 5 and 6 o f the TBT agreement. Legal text o f TBT can be downloaded 
from WTO website http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/finalact.htm.
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Under GATS, recognition of educational or other qualifications may be 
achieved through harmonisation, or may be accorded autonomously or based on 
agreements or arrangements enter into by Member States, bilaterally, regionally, or 
plulilaterally. Art. VII encompasses recognition for both conformity-assessment and 
equivalency aspects (further discussed below). WTO agreements also adopted the 
origin-designated recognition agreement and recognition of equivalent foreign product 
regulations, which means Member States may recognise not only their respective 
capacities to provide for assessment, but further acknowledge the other country's 
substantive internal requirements to be sufficiently equivalent to permit access without 
application of the importing country's domestic regulation122. Mathis states that the 
MR agreement negotiated between the EU and the US also accepted this principle.
“In such a case, an acceptance o f the other party's standard has been made, the 
domestic product regulation has been waived as to those goods, and the non-tariff 
barriers issue presented by differing standards between countries has been 
effectively bypassed” (Mathis, 1998: 20).
This recent development clearly shows the positive trend in the adoption of 
mutual recognition in facilitating free flows of trade and investment at both 
international and regional level. It also implies that since mutual recognition is 
becoming accepted, a convergence of internal requirements would develop since 
regulatory competition would encourage the adoption of prudential and high 
standards.
Within the EU, mutual recognition has gone further than the WTO agreements, 
since it covers both equivalent-recognition aspects together with conformity- 
assessment aspects, a prospect that still does not appear to be entertained by the TBT 
agreement. John Clarke mentioned the experiences of the EU that:
l22. Art. 2.7 TBT provided that "Member shall give consideration to accepting as equivalent technical 
regulations o f  other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are 
satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives o f their own regulations”.
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“In order to permit a genuinely free circulation o f goods throughout the European 
Community, it was necessary for the individual Member States o f the Community 
to reciprocally recognise not only the equivalence o f the product standards o f  other 
Member States, but also the validity o f the tests and certificates o f compliance 
issued by the bodies in those Member States” 123.
This advancement may need a certain level of regulatory development such as 
in the EU, especially the crucial role of the ECJ in developing the mutual recognition 
approach, that took 20 years to establish the principle and another 20 years to 
implement. Now I turn to discuss the MR in the case of ASEAN, as adopted in AFAS 
(although the level of development is still far behind the EU's).
In order to facilitate liberalisation of services intra-ASEAN, Art. V of AFAS 
provided that:
“Each Member State may recognise the education or experience obtained, 
requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in another Member State, 
for the purpose o f licensing or certification o f services suppliers. Such recognition 
may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with the Member State 
concerned or may be accorded autonomously”.
Art. V encourages ASEAN countries to enter into agreements or arrangements 
to recognise education or experiences obtained, requirements met, or licenses or 
certifications granted in another ASEAN country, the country of residence of the 
service providers. Thus the conditions made by all ASEAN countries regarding 
qualifications or requirements of service providers would be mutually recognised for 
their qualifications, provided that such qualifications meet the requirements of the 
receiving country (substantive standard). Mutual recognition among ASEAN countries 
may be accorded autonomously or based upon an agreement or arrangement with the 
member countries concerned. However, this provision is not mandatory as Art. V 
stated that:
“Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be so construed as to require any Member State to 
accept or to enter into such mutual recognition agreement or arrangement”.
123. Clarke, John (1996) “Mutual Recognition Agreements”, in International Trade Law and  
Regulations, Vol. 2, p. 35. C ited  in Mathis, op., Cit., p. 21.
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From a legal point of view, this is a weak point of the AFAS, as mutual 
recognition is not made a mandatory requirement. Nevertheless, ASEAN countries 
tend to conceitedly adopt the principle of mutual recognition and some ASEAN 
countries such as Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia have already extensively recognised 
each other's national qualifications. This is probably because of their proximity in 
culture, education, legal systems, religion and general social standards. These 
developments were validated under Art. VII GATS.
A key issue of mutual recognition in service provision is whether to recognise 
that the “standard” or “qualifications” of service providers and services provided 
complies with the substantive standards and the procedural requirements of each 
individual country which has adopted the principle of mutual recognition. The host or 
importing country may wish to retain its own substantive standard, but maybe willing 
to accept certification by the exporting country that an item/service provider complies 
with that standard. Alternatively, countries may be willing to agree a common 
standard, e.g. for a professional qualification, but may wish to retain certification in 
their own hands so that they can assure that the certification granted really reaches 
their standard requirements compliance, or the agreed common standard. For instance, 
according to Thai regulations, a medical doctor can carry out surgery only if he/she 
has passed certain procedural requirements tests and may be granted a certificate for 
surgery even though he/she may hold a medical degree from somewhere else. Also, a 
lawyer can practice in court and provide legal services only if he/she reaches a 
substantive standard. This has a series of requirements: having a law degree, passing a 
bar exam, being in legal practice for two years and being granted a certificate from the 
Thai Lawyers Society, be aged above 25 years, being of sound background, prudence 
and of good behaviour (these qualifications will be scrutinised by the Committee), not
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being physically handicapped, and having Thai nationality. Those not able to comply 
with all these requirements may apply for a license from the Thai Lawyers Society as 
international lawyers who can provide legal services in business but cannot practice in 
court. Therefore, if Thailand adopted and was bound by a MRA, medical doctors or 
lawyers who hold their degree from their home country may be accepted by Thailand, 
but they may nevertheless need to satisfy procedural requirements such as passing a 
test to obtain a surgery certificate or passing a bar exam to obtain the certificate for 
practising in court.
Another key issue is whether MR is subject to MFN treatment or not. For 
example, if Thailand entered into a MRA with Singapore, the question is whether the 
commitment under such agreement will extend to other ASEAN countries 
automatically on a MFN basis, or even might extend to other WTO Members. On this 
issue, Art. V AFAS has narrowed down the applicability of such agreements so that 
they bind only ASEAN Members. Art. V reads:
“These agreements or arrangements are concluded for Member State only. In the 
event a Member State wishes to join such agreements or arrangements, it should be 
given equal opportunity to do at any time”.
Therefore, MRAs concluded between ASEAN countries will not automatically 
be extended to other WTO Members, or to other ASEAN countries that did not enter 
into such MRA. Art. V AFAS, like Art. VII GATS, allows Members to treat service 
providers of other Members differently depending on the type of qualifications granted, 
in their country of origin. However, it does not allow Members to discriminate in the 
application of their substantive standards or criteria for authorisation, licensing or 
certification of service suppliers. In other words, there is a distinction between 
allowing services suppliers of certain Members to have access to the market through a 
fast track on the basis of a recognition arrangements on the one hand, and applying 
different substantive requirements to service suppliers on the other hand: an individual
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who can meet the substantive standards should be allowed to qualify whatever his 
country of origin124. Since MR is either unilateral (autonomous) or based on country- 
by-country agreements, a MRA will not automatically extend to all WTO or ASEAN 
Members on a MFN basis. However, members who are parties to recognition 
agreements are required under Art. VII GATS to afford adequate opportunity for other 
interested Members to negotiate their accession to such agreements or to negotiate 
comparable ones with them. If recognition is granted on an autonomous basis, the 
Member concerned must give adequate opportunity for any other Member to 
demonstrate that qualifications acquired in its territory should be recognised123.
The further issue to be considered is whether the ASEAN limitation restricting 
parties to the MRA is valid since, Art. VII GATS bound WTO Members to grant 
adequate opportunity to negotiate MRA on similar terms. Also, Member States need to 
notify the Council for Trade in Services of their existing recognition measures and to 
state whether such measures are based on agreements or granted autonomously. 
However, Art. IV of GATS allows WTO Members to implement regional integration 
and grant preferences among the member countries of such agreements, and may be 
considered to apply also to MRAs that give preferential recognition to member 
countries of the regional agreement. As mentioned above, GATS allows states to treat 
services providers of other Members differently depending on the level of 
qualifications granted in their country of origin. Therefore, states are likely to prefer to 
negotiate MRAs with countries that may already have levels o f qualification 
equivalent to their own qualification. It should be noted that GATS is based on a 
bottom-up or positive list approach that, in principle, allows a certain level of 
discretion for the recipient country to commit itself in market access. Since Art. V
124. See GATS: Recognition, WTO web site: http://www.vvto.Org/eol/e/wto06Avto6_19.htm.
125. See GATS: Recognition, WTO web site: http: www.w to.org eol e wtoOb wto6_19.htm.
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permits WTO Members to enter into regional agreements for preferential treatment
among some other Members for trade in services, thus to implement such regional
integration, preferences such as MR limited to member countries of the regional
agreement should be accepted as valid.
However, GATS Art. VII calls upon Members, wherever appropriate, to base
recognition of qualifications on multilaterally agreed criteria. It also calls upon
Members to work in co-operation with relevant international intergovernmental and
non-governmental organisations towards the establishment and adoption of common
international standards and criteria for recognition. Nevertheless, the WTO itself does
not play any role in the formation of standards or development of criteria for
recognition. In fact, the development of self-regulation and prudential measures, such
as in financial and banking service, also indicates the trend towards interaction
between national and international regulatory networks propelled by professionals in
each fields of services (Picciotto, 1996: 89-123; Picciotto, 1998: 731-768).
The WTO encourages Members to develop multilateral disciplines
relating to market access in order to put immediately into effect paragraph 4 of Art. VI
of the GATS on domestic regulation which provided that:
“ With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, 
through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines.
Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia:
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and 
the ability to supply the services;
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality o f the 
service;
(c) in the case o f licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on 
the supply o f the services”.
These powers could be used by the GATS Council to ensure that MRAs 
contribute to the development of internationally agreed standards. This could also
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occur if some ASEAN members also conclude MRAs with non-members so that 
MRAs so concluded would be complementary and interactive between ASEAN and 
international MR.
What ASEAN countries should consider is to strengthen their national 
substantive standards and procedural requirements to adequately assure the quality of 
services and of service providers, but bear in mind the need to apply such 
requirements transparently and avoid unnecessary burden on ASEAN service 
providers. An ASEAN Council for Trade in Services should be established to facilitate 
the co-ordination of ASEAN countries in negotiating MRA and help promote the 
development of agreed ASEAN standards and requirements where there are no such 
common international standards.
5.4.7 Co-operation in Service Trade among ASEAN Countries
The liberalisation of service trade under AFAS also goes beyond the GATS in 
that it encompasses co-operation in service trade among ASEAN countries126. The 
four areas of co-operation, provided in Art. II (2) are:
1) establishing or improving infrastructural facilities;
2) joint production, marketing and purchasing arrangements;
3) research and development; and
4) exchange o f information.
This co-operation aims to promote the harmonisation of legal and economic policy 
as well as the enhancement of transparency of internal regulation of service provision 
among ASEAN countries in order to improve their efficiency and competitiveness, 
diversity of production capacity and supply and distribution of services suppliers 
within and outside ASEAN.
126 AFAS Art. I (a) to enhance cooperation in services amongst ASEAN States in order to improve the 
efficiency and competitiveness, diversify production capacity and supply and distribution o f  services o f  
their service suppliers within and outside ASEAN.
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In particular, the crucial obligation under AFAS is the commitment of ASEAN 
countries to the principles of stand still and roll back that guarantee the progressive 
liberalisation intra-ASEAN. The 1998 ASEAN Summit decided to extend service 
sector coverage to all sectors and all modes of supply in principle, so that the 
implementation of this decision along with the stand still and roll back principles 
would reinforce extensive liberalisation in service trade intra-ASEAN.
The liberalisation of service trade under AFAS has reinforced the attractiveness 
of the ASEAN region in service sectors, as it results in an enlarged ASEAN market for 
such services. In particular, ASEAN's openness to welcome outsiders into the region 
through their establishment in ASEAN countries enables non-ASEAN firms to gain 
advantages both from the privileges offered under AFAS and from economies of scale 
generated by intra-ASEAN integration. The liberalised ASEAN market might further 
induce inflow of investment associated with service trade in the region.
1 7 7In addition, AFAS ~ provides that it shall neither affect existing agreements 
nor constrain the right of members to enter into agreements not contrary to the 
Framework Agreement. This apparently tautologous provision seems to aim at 
preserving the benefits to ASEAN or non-ASEAN countries of bilateral agreements 
extending special liberalisation privileges. Such benefits, which would normally be 
required to be extended to other states under the MFN clause, may be preserved if 
notified under the GATS Art. II MFN exemption lists. However, it should be noted 
that these are in principle subject to review and roll-back. An example is the bilateral
178agreement between Thailand and the USA , which allows the US maritime transport 
of cargoes the rights to carry all products. This privilege does not extend to all other 
WTO members.
127. Art. IX o f the Framework Agreement on Services.
128. Treaty o f Amity and Economic Relations.
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The 1998 Heads of ASEAN Summit Meeting also agreed to initiate a new 
round of negotiations beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001, to expand AFAS beyond 
the seven priority sectors, identified at the fifth ASEAN Summit, to cover all services 
sectors and all modes of supply129. This clearly shows the commitments made among 
ASEAN member countries to liberalise trade in services beyond their commitments 
under the GATS, under which they have made more reservations than they did under 
GATS-Plus. However, the liberal interpretation of the “ASEAN services provider” 
provision encompassing eligible non-member service providers who meet the criteria 
or requirements for being regarded as an ASEAN service provider to be able to enjoy 
preferences under AFAS, facilitates and complements the generalised liberalisation of 
services into ASEAN from third countries.
Moreover, individual ASEAN countries are unilaterally liberalising service 
trade and services FDI. In particular, the measures implemented130 by individual 
ASEAN countries after the crisis have dramatically opened the ASEAN services 
market to foreignersljl. Despite the Asian crisis, the inflow of services FDI into 
ASEAN in 1998, in the aftermath of the crisis, was surprisingly impressive132. The 
increased FDI flows to the region were directed mainly to the services sector notably 
banking, insurance and telecommunications (UNCTAD (Overview), 1998a: 17-18).
I29. Statement on Bold Measures paragraph 10.
Ij0. The restructuring o f certain service industries in the countries affected by the crisis is providing 
opportunities for foreign investors, and the liberalisation o f policy in respect o f M&A makes the entry 
of foreign investors through the acquisition o f assets easier than before. In addition, a factor conducive 
to increasing FDI in the most affected ASEAN countries is the improvement in their international cost 
competitiveness due to depreciation in ASEAN countries. This seems the crisis was turn to be positive 
for the long-term development of ASEAN countries to adjust and streamline their legal infrastructure, 
institutional framework, prudential measures, adequate supervision and effective policy implemented in 
the region. This includes the well planned liberalisation in trade and investment. See UNCTAD, 1999: 
52-58. Also see UNCTAD Press Release TAD/INF/2779, 2 November 1998.
131 . See UNCTAD (1999) World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Challenge o f Development, pp. 52-58.
Ij2 See UNCTAD (1998) W orld Investment R eport 1998: Trends and D eterm inants, chapter VII stated 
that despite the crisis, foreign investment remained positive and continued to add to the existing 
investment stock. Net inflows are estimated to have increased from US$ 77 billion in 1996 to US$ 80
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5.4.8 D ispute Settlem ent under AFAS
Regarding dispute settlement, the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
for ASEAN is generally referred to and applied with respect to any disputes between 
member countries concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement. A 
specific dispute settlement mechanism may be further established. However, there is 
no mechanism for settling disputes between private sectors under AFAS. Compared to 
the NAFTA, which provides the mechanism for settling disputes between private 
sectors, and between private sectors and government, ASEAN does not concern itself 
with this issue, and leaves it open for future circumstances without referring to any 
further solution either relying on domestic court or arbitration or other procedures133. 
This appears to be a problematic issue in practice since private sectors and business 
are the main engines propelling the implementation of AFAS and indeed, disputes 
between them may inevitably occur in business life. So a mechanism for amicably 
settling such disputes is necessary.
The Institutions specified for carrying out functions to facilitate the operation 
of this Framework Agreement134 is the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM), 
and the ASEAN Secretariat will assist SEOM in providing support for supervising, co­
ordinating and reviewing the implementation of the Agreement. In practice, the 
ASEAN Council for Trade in service may be necessary. For instance, the Council may 
help promote the harmonisation of rules and regulations in the region, enhance the co­
billion in 1997. And especially inflows of service investment to Thailand even increased ten times from 
the 1997. (UNCTAD, 1998: 197-242)
133. Even though AFAS Art. VII (2) provided that “2. A specific dispute settlement mechanism may be 
established for the purpose o f this Framework Agreement which form an integral part o f this 
Framework Agreement”. This provision does not refer to private sectors directly. It is probably due to 
the fact that AFAS is a regional framework agreement and thus ASEAN countries may leave private 
issue to the national level. Alternatively, they may regard that Art. VII (2) is valid for further 
establishing a specific mechanism for settlement of private dispute.
134. This includes the organization o f the conduct of negotiations provided under this Agreement.
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operation in service trade among ASEAN countries, facilitate the process of mutual 
recognition in ASEAN as well as scrutinise practices of the Members.
5.5 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property 
Co-operation
The objectives of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Co­
operation are to strengthen ASEAN co-operation in the field of intellectual property 
through an open and outward looking attitude. The co-operation extends to the private 
sectors and professional bodies of ASEAN. Member countries of ASEAN agreed to 
explore the possibility to set up an ASEAN patent and trademark system, as well as an 
ASEAN patent and trademark office if feasible. This aims at creating ASEAN 
standards and practices in the development of their intellectual property regimes to be 
consistent with international standards, and to enhance the promotion of technological 
innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology in the region135. ASEAN 
agreed to implement intra-ASEAN intellectual property arrangements in a manner in 
line with the objectives, principles, and norms set out in the Agreement on TRIPS and 
the relevant conventions. ASEAN countries shall abide by the principle of mutual 
benefits in the implementation of measures or initiatives aimed at enhancing ASEAN 
intellectual property co-operation.
The scope of co-operation includes the field of copyright and related rights, 
patents, trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, undisclosed 
information and layout designs of integrated circuits. To implement the objectives of 
this agreement, ASEAN countries agreed to enhance intellectual property protection 
and enforcement, by networking of judicial authorities and intellectual property 
enforcement agencies, and to strengthen cross-border measures of co-operation as well 
as intellectual property administration. They will explore the possibility of creating an
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ASEAN database for intellectual property registration, and automation to improve the 
administration of intellectual property. Moreover, they intend to strengthen intellectual 
property legislation by making a comparative study of the procedures, practices and 
administration of ASEAN intellectual property offices. They will exchange IP 
personnel and experts, network IP training facilities or centres of excellence on IP, 
establish a regional training institute for IP, and establish the ASEAN Intellectual 
Property Association membership of which will be open to all specialists in the IP 
field. ASEAN will provide arbitration services or other alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms for the resolution of IP disputes and exchange information on IP.
The ASEAN mechanism on IP comprises representatives from member 
countries, with support from the Secretariat. This forum is to review the co-operative 
activities under the agreement by meeting on a regular basis and submitting its 
findings and recommendations to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meeting 
(SEOM). Any disputes arising from differences concerning interpretation or 
application of the agreement are to be settled amicably between the parties. If such 
differences cannot be settled amicably, they shall be dealt with by the SEOM and 
finally by the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting136. However, the Agreement did 
not provide for any dispute settlement mechanism for the resolution of disputes arising 
between private sector entities or between private sector entities and the government.
No reservation may be made with respect to any of the provisions of this 
agreement. However, the agreement is stated to be without prejudice to any existing or 
future bilateral or multilateral agreement entered into by member countries or the 
national laws of each member country relating to the protection and enforcement of
135. Art. I: Objectives o f the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation.
136. Art. 5: Consultations o f  the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Co-operation.
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1 ^7intellectual property rights . This provision weakens the agreement, and it seems to 
be inferior both to national laws and international agreements concluded by ASEAN 
countries. The agreement has no MFN provision, but ASEAN countries are in any 
case bound by the MFN obligation in the TRIPs agreement.
A Programme of Action was agreed for 1996-1998 to begin to implement the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on IP Co-operation, through ASEAN Working Group 
on Intellectual Property Co-operation (AWGIPC) under the purview of SEOM. 
Activities in the Programme of Action include studying the feasibility of utilising the 
ASEAN WEB for IP, setting up ASEAN electronic database on patent, design, 
geographical indication and trademark, facilitation of information exchange on the 
procedures, practices and administration among ASEAN IP offices, networking of 
institutes offering IP training course and exchange of personnel.
This summary of the IP agreement reflects its legal weakness. The agreement 
is a co-operation scheme, it is not p er  se a legal binding instrument for implementation 
of ASEAN harmonised regulations on IP even though the agreement aims to develop 
co-operation among ASEAN countries on IP laws.
In fact, the agreement is only a statement of intention of the ASEAN countries 
to co-operate on IP laws and enforcement and protection of IP rights. The loose form 
of the agreement is typical of all ASEAN agreements. There is no specific time-frame, 
nor any detailed provisions for implementing the agreement.
The second point is that the agreement has no priority, as it does not affect 
either existing or future agreements of ASEAN member countries. Furthermore, the 
agreement is subordinate to national law138. This shows the reluctance of ASEAN 
countries to regionalise this area of laws.
137. Art. 6 o f the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Co-operation.
138. Art. 6 o f  the Agreement on IP co-operation.
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The third point is the lack of sufficient mechanisms and institutional 
arrangements. The implementation of the agreement relies on temporarily set up 
forums, a Group of experts and a Forum of representatives of the member countries, 
and they report to the SEOM and the ASEAN Secretariat. There is no permanent 
institution or mechanism to operate and implement the agreement officially. No 
officials or specialists have been appointed to help facilitate the process of 
harmonisation or mutual recognition of the ASEAN countries' laws on IP, so it is 
unrealistic to expect the development of an ASEAN system of such laws or of ASEAN 
standards and practices on IP.
The fourth point is the lack o f a dispute settlement mechanism. The agreement 
just relies on amicable settlement and consultation between the member countries for 
disputes arising from the differences in interpretation and applications of the 
agreements.
Therefore, ASEAN needs to elaborate more specific and detailed agreements 
with specified time-frames and efficient mechanisms. ASEAN needs to further 
strengthen its institutional and legal framework for implementing the objectives of 
these new agreements. The most important issue is to cultivate political will 
supporting regional integration. ASEAN should be more realistic than rhetorical, as it 
has been over the past decades. The following section and chapter will discuss patterns 
of regionalisation and consider the direction of ASEAN integration.
5.6 The Complementarity between ASEAN Regionalism, APEC 
Liberalisation, and Global Liberalisation
ASEAN regionalism is quite different from the conventional regionalism implemented 
elsewhere. As stated earlier and also in various studies on this issue, such as Pelkmans 
(1997: 199-243), ASEAN integration schemes are not about integration among 
ASEAN members for forming a “closed or discriminatory trading bloc”, but rather a
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way for ASEAN countries to co-operate to increase their international competitiveness 
and integration with the world. In this sense, the ultimate objective of ASEAN 
regionalism is to increase the region's competitive edge as a production base geared 
toward the global market (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995: 1). On the other hand, ASEAN 
integration is a means to create an enlarged regional market for attracting inflows of 
trade and investment. This is because the economies of scale generated by ASEAN 
integration have enhanced its attractiveness as an investment location or a production 
platform for global markets as well as the regional market. Economic integration in 
ASEAN is largely market driven, so ASEAN does not focus solely on the region but is 
also globally oriented. It is clear that AFTA, AIA, and AFAS are driven primarily by 
the recognition by ASEAN of the necessity to continue to sharpen its international 
competitiveness. Therefore, ASEAN states are integrating among themselves in order 
to integrate with the world, and AFTA, AIA, as well as AFAS would be a means for 
achieving this.
Thus, it is not surprising that the rationale of ASEAN integration is not 
primarily to pursue a rising share of intra-regional trade in its total trade, but rather to 
develop the free flow of goods and mobilisation of investment intra-ASEAN. In 
consequence, it facilitates a further degree of market integration so that ASEAN would 
be increasingly attractive as an area of trade and investment in the global economy. 
This is the meaning of the “Open Regionalism” approach adopted by ASEAN. 
Pelkmans explains the term as follows:
“Open Regionalism means that regional economic intercourse is to be promoted if 
and only if it is consistent with GATT/WTO and not to the detriment o f  other 
economies” (Pelkmans, 1997: 226).
AFTA, AIA and AFAS would be major instruments to facilitate the trade and 
production linkage within the region and with the world through TNC networks 
located regionally and globally. As discussed earlier in relation to each ASEAN
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scheme, liberalisation is realised regionally and internationally through liberal rules of 
establishment under AIA, and for commercial presence (ASEAN service provider) 
under AFAS, as well as the ASEAN rule of origin under AFTA that facilitates trade 
flows from outside into ASEAN. These new ASEAN schemes clearly facilitate and 
balance ASEAN regional integration and globalisation. Therefore, ASEAN integration 
is implemented consistently and complementarily with the WTO rules and obligations 
as it encourages free trade and liberalises investment at regional and international 
level.
In practice, even though intra-ASEAN liberalisation under AFTA, AIA, and 
AFAS would strengthen and enhance intra-ASEAN trade and investment, ASEAN 
countries are still furthering generalised liberalisation internationally. Moreover, the 
implementation of ASEAN integration schemes is interactive with and complementary 
to each other that goes beyond intra-regional integration. This can be justified, for 
instance, from the results of the implementation of ASEAN liberalisation in
investment regimes that also contribute to the elimination of ASEAN countries' most 
common limitations under GATS, i.e. equity restriction. As discussed above, 
commercial presence of service providers in ASEAN countries is subject to the 
existing domestic laws that generally require foreign service suppliers to enter into 
joint ventures with domestic nationals with limited equity. Therefore, under
investment regime liberalisation, ASEAN countries would allow a 100% foreign- 
owned company to freely move intra-ASEAN that directly helps promote 
liberalisation in service trade and FDI, not just from within, but also from outside 
ASEAN. This would result in phasing out ASEAN limitations on market access
involving commercial presence under GATS. Since many services are intangible and
non-storable, they can only be delivered to foreign market if foreign affiliates can be
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established to produce and sell those services in the host countries, or if at least a right 
of commercial presence is granted to facilitate transactions. Therefore, ASEAN 
countries' liberalisation of investment regime, i.e. domestic laws on equity restriction 
and the opening up of industries closed to foreigners, also helps service trade 
liberalisation. For example, the opening up of service sectors in banking, insurance, 
and telecommunications in ASEAN, along with the elimination of equity restriction, 
would greatly help enhance liberalisation in service trade at international level because 
non-ASEAN service providers would be able to gain market access in ASEAN 
countries and also enjoy ASEAN preferences. So under AFAS and AIA, preferential 
treatment among ASEAN countries and generalised liberalisation would be balanced. 
This would also fruitfully enhance AFTA as a free trade area since the reduction in 
tariff and non-tariff is comprehensively implemented under the three schemes in an 
interactive way complementarily. In fact, ASEAN liberalisation is a training ground at 
the regional level before moving ASEAN towards an open multilateral trading system 
at the global level.
ASEAN's relationship with the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 
forum has also linked ASEAN economy with the Asia-Pacific region. The 
interdependence between the two reinforces broader and generalised liberalisation as 
ASEAN countries are members of APEC, and they also have commitment to 
implement liberalisation in trade and investment under APEC. Even though APEC 
focuses on unilateral action139, concerted unilateral liberalisation has occurred, for
139. The APEC Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) has developed the formulation o f APEC 
Non-binding Investment Principles, which was adopted in the Second Leaders' Meeting in Bogor, 
Indonesia. This document outlines the principles for regional investment based upon liberalization and 
fairness that even non-APEC investors should be treated equally with APEC investors and with 
indigenous investors under the principle o f non-discrimination and national treatment. See Kodama, 
1996: 375-76, also see Davidson, 1997a: 1.
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instance, in service sectors among APEC economies140. ASEAN member countries 
have actively implemented the Bogor Declaration141 aiming at liberalising trade and 
investment in the region by the year 2020 for developing member countries, and 2010 
for developed members. This has resulted in the resolution of ASEAN Vision 2020142 
responding to the commitment under APEC. Thus, even though the APEC 
commitments are non-legally binding, APEC members including ASEAN countries 
have “concerted unilaterally” liberalised trade and investment fruitfully. Consequently, 
ASEAN liberalisation in trade and investment also reinforces generalised liberalisation 
internationally consistently with GATT/WTO, responding to the commitment to 
liberalisation under APEC based on Open Regionalism. Therefore, ASEAN 
liberalisation is complementary and balanced with broader regional and global 
liberalisation.
5.7 Conclusion
The most important issue of ASEAN regionalisation is to generate a common political 
will o f ASEAN countries to agree to the implementation of deeper integration in the 
region. Over three decades, ASEAN countries have preferred to have their
140. PECC's Survey o f impediments to Trade and Investment in the APEC Region found that most 
APEC economies impose few barriers on foreign providers o f computer services, value added 
telecommunications services and tourism services. Quoted in Findlay, Christopher and Warren, Tony. 
“The General Agreement on Trade in Services and Developing Economies in Asia-Pacific”. A report 
prepared for the UNESCO, May 1998. Also an analysis o f the individual Action Plans o f APEC 
member economies highlights the barriers on service trade that are to be removed unilaterally within 
APEC process even in the areas traditionally ‘untouchable’. There has been significant action such as 
the pace o f  reform in electric power generation distribution and marketing. For instance the 
privatization reform in Thailand including EGAT (Electric Generation Authority o f Thailand) that 
allows foreign investors to take part in the privatization.
141. The Second APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994 signed the Bogor Declaration to 
commit APEC members to liberalization o f trade and investment that goes beyond GATT as an Open 
Regionalism o f the Asia-Pacific. As APEC is not created as a bloc or formalized a closed regional 
integration, APEC members concerted unilaterally liberalize trade and investment, and non-APEC 
would be treated equally under the principles o f nondiscrimination and national treatment. APEC's 
Bogor Declaration has set the target o f trade and investment liberalization and binds member countries 
to achieving this goal in the region by the year 2010 for developed members and 2020 for developing 
member countries.
142. Hanoi Declaration o f 1998, the result o f the Sixth ASEAN Summit, 16th December 1998. ASEAN 
countries called for “a concerted o f Southeast Asian Nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability
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commitment based on “consensus” and have provided loose framework-agreements 
with flexible practice rather than a concrete legally binding regime. This is the main 
obstacle to the upgrading of ASEAN regional integration, as evidenced by the modest 
success in economic co-operation of ASEAN in the past.
From a legal point of view, ASEAN needs to take implementation of all new 
schemes seriously, and institutional, legal, and administrative requirements are needed 
to ensure implementation. Davidson has pointed out that “As has been said, in 
international economic law, the economist tells us what should be done while the 
lawyer is left to figure out how to do it” (Davidson, 1992: 139). To construct regional 
economic integration is largely a problem of managing interdependence. Governments 
may be limited in their choices by sets of rules, procedures and principles. Even 
though at present, each ASEAN country is free to regulate economic transactions that 
take place within its boundaries, its international economic relations are governed by 
an international legal framework, which comprises multilateral, plurilateral and 
bilateral agreements. Such laws establish parameters within which international trade 
in goods and services and foreign investment is conducted. An international 
framework is necessary in order to promote increased order and predictability in 
international transactions. Therefore, private sector entities that participate in the 
ASEAN scheme need a clear rule system that ensures stability and predictability to 
potential investment and trade. This can take place only if ASEAN members enter into 
binding agreements and implement the agreed framework through domestic 
legislation.
The success of ASEAN in economic integration is very crucial for sustaining 
economic growth and development in the region. Also the success of ASEAN will
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community o f caring 
societies”.
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contribute to the global economy. This is evidenced by the recession of global trade in 
1998 soon after the crisis took place in Asia. According to the report of World Trade 
Organisation: “world trade growth slowed in 1998 after unusually strong growth in 
1997”, the rate of growth in the volume of world merchandise exports slowed to 3.5% 
in 1998 from over 10% in 1997, due largely to continuing economic contraction in 
much of Asia”143. The trend of global trade reflects the interdependence of the world 
market and the ASEAN country economies. This further implies the need for a global 
regime that also encourages economic growth of regions of the world, especially the 
sustainability of Asia and ASEAN economic growth, which would help to contribute 
to the global economy, since this region’s trade accounts for a quarter of global 
trade144.
Finally, a new direction of ASEAN regional integration is the emergence of new 
approach to balance regionalism and globalisation. ASEAN has adopted “Open 
Regionalism” and is moving toward deeper regional integration based on a 
harmonious legal system and the mutual recognition principle. Open economic 
integration can be consistent with globalisation and the worldwide liberalisation of 
trade and investment, as this integration process does not create an economic bloc 
against non-member of the group. ASEAN has been implementing deeper economic 
integration in the region while opening its market to outsiders. This is a new direction 
of ASEAN regional integration. However, to implement Open Regionalism ASEAN
143. WTO reports on 16lh April 1999. The report further stated that Trade contraction in Asia has been 
the biggest factor in the global trade slowdown, imports into Asia fell by 8.5%. This also results in 
global exports o f commercial services recorded the first annual decline in value terms since 
comprehensive statistics became available in the mid-1980s. World GDP and trade growth slowed in 
1998 as the Asian crisis deepened and its repercussions were felt increasingly outside Asia (these are the 
countries that were most immediately affected by the financial crisis that broke in mid-1997 Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, the Republic o f Korea and Thailand.)
See http://www.wto.org/wto/intltrad/internat.htm.
144. World Trade Report of WTO in April 1999. Total global trade amounted to US$ 10,635 billion and 
the Asian trade is recorded at US$ 2,384 billion, which is the lowest level o f stagnation for the region in 
history.
still needs a certain level of legal and policy harmonisation or mutual recognition 
among ASEAN member countries. Therefore, legal and institutional frameworks for 
implementing “Open Regionalism” are required even though the system is not 
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Competition Laws and Economic Integration in ASEAN 
Introduction
The analyses in the previous chapters have shown that in the face of the dynamic 
global economy and economic crises encountered by ASEAN, these countries need to 
develop their regional market. To create and strengthen a single ASEAN market 
replacing the current separate national ASEAN markets, a regionalisation of ASEAN 
laws and regulations, especially relating to trade and investment, is required to 
facilitate the free flow of goods, capital, services, and labour for achieving such an 
aim. A more liberalised trade and investment regime in ASEAN will better enhance 
their free economies and create a more favourable trade and investment climate in the 
region.
Consequently, ASEAN countries need to develop effective legal systems for 
encouraging and overseeing increasingly competitive business activities in the region. 
The necessity of eliminating barriers to entry of trade and investment creates a need to 
provide, at a regional level, an effective protection against unfair competition1 to 
govern the economic activities and transactions of those TNCs located in the ASEAN 
region. As more liberal trade and investment regimes are established in ASEAN 
countries, there is an increasing requirement for competition rules to regulate fair 
competition among business players, as well as to supervise their behaviour . There
'. As stated by UNCTAD the main objective o f  competition laws is “to preserve and promote 
competition as a means to ensure the efficient allocation o f  resources in an economy, resulting in the 
best possible choice o f quality, the lowest prices and adequate supplies for consumers”. UNCTAD 
(1996e) “Competition Policy and Legislation: Information Note 21”. Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat 
to the Intergovernmental Group o f Experts on Competition Law and Policy, UNCTAD document 
TD/B/RBP/INF.37, mimeo.
2. The liberalisation o f FDI policies can lead to an increase in competition in national or regional 
market. See UNCTAD, 1997: chapter IV.
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would be very little point in eliminating various barriers and national boundaries 
imposed by ASEAN countries if these governmental restraints were replaced by 
concentrations and other restrictive business practices as well as concerted practices 
among private firms (Korah, 1997a: 1). Therefore, agreements restricting competition 
as well as the abuse of dominant positions of market power should be controlled3 
under competition laws. This is the rationale for regional competition law for 
strengthening economic integration in ASEAN.
This chapter will analyse the scope and basis for a comprehensive competition 
law in ASEAN for implementing economic integration in the region. Section 6.1 
focuses on competition law and policy as the reinforcement function of ASEAN 
investment regime and regulations. Since ASEAN will develop its integrated regional 
market, it requires a regulatory regime that can facilitate free movement of trade and 
investment intra-ASEAN. Competition law is compatible with “open regionalism” 
because it is basically neutral and non-discriminatory. Moreover, the development of a 
regional competition law and policy that enhances fair competition among firms doing 
business in the region might also provide a basis for evaluating the economic benefit 
to ASEAN of entry by a foreign investor on competition grounds, rather than the 
discriminatory criteria used in screening procedures. Therefore, ASEAN regional 
competition laws and policies play a multifunctional role, i.e. to encourage the free 
flow of trade and investment, to monitor the behaviour of firms, and to evaluate the 
economic role or potential dominance of extra-ASEAN TNCs in the region. A single 
ASEAN competition law, rather than separate competition laws in each ASEAN 
country, would ensure that competition is evaluated on a regional basis, thus
3. To control here means to check, to verify, and to vet; in substantive rules o f  the competition laws. It 
means to exercise restraint or direction on the free action o f another, to command those to comply with 
the rules in order to keep the market open and refrain from the abuse o f  dominant market power.
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maintaining the principle of open regionalism in ASEAN. I will discuss this topic in 
section 6.5.
Unlike the assumptions of neo-liberalism (Picciotto, 1998: 738)4, competition 
law and policy accepts the important role of states and good governance institutions in 
regulating firms’ behaviour. This perspective is also more compatible with the new 
approach of positive integration ideology (Picciotto, 1998: 739)5. Moreover, 
competition law generally takes a pro-consumer policy perspective that takes into 
account the public good and social welfare. This ensures that the advantages of 
liberalisation within ASEAN resulting from economic integration would directly 
contribute to the general public wealth through consumers.
Section 6.2 surveys existing ASEAN laws relating to unfair competition and 
considers how they function and whether they are effectively enforced. Section 6.3 
focuses on the rationale for a regional ASEAN competition law. The rationale for 
implementing regional competition law and policies is that the removal of internal 
barriers should not be allowed to result in companies creating territorial exclusivity 
through cartels or the abuse of dominant position. Control of restrictive business 
practices in the process of liberalisation is a key element in the new approach to 
positive integration (Picciotto, 1998: 735-8). This approach is unlike neo-liberalism, 
which tends to assure that the free market needs no control, regulation or restriction, 
either by government or public bodies.
4. Neo-liberalism regards regulation as an unnecessary burden; as Picciotto stated, the perspective o f  
neo-liberal ideologues toward economic integration is that “...international integration means the 
creation o f  open markets, which requires only strong provision for the protection o f  property rights, the 
maintenance o f public order, and not much else”. See Picciotto, 1998: 738.
5. Picciotto argues that the current phase o f restructuring o f the global political economy needs the 
creation o f  positive linkages across regulatory regimes, to facilitate a shift from negative to positive 
integration. This can also be applicable to economic integration at a regional level. See Picciotto, 1998: 
739.
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6.1 Competition Law as a Reinforcement Function of ASEAN 
Investment Regime and Regulations
6.1.1 W hy does ASEAN require Com petition Law?
Firstly, since ASEAN aims to strengthen economic integration in the region, it 
needs laws and institutions to support the implementation and elaboration of trade and 
investment liberalisation within the ASEAN market. The interaction between 
government, consumers, and producers results in the concern that a rules-based system 
needs to be strengthened. How the competitive process actually works and to what 
extent the government should regulate the relationships between producers and 
consumers is significant. In this sense, competition law is essential as an instrument to 
regulate fair competition because, as I mentioned earlier, it is compatible with 
liberalisation since it is basically neutral and non-discriminatory.
Secondly, in an emerging ASEAN free market economy, monopolies and 
restrictive business practices are viewed as undesirable because they are likely to 
distort prices and the efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, contestability has to 
be realised, so that free entry and the competitive pressure of new competitors will 
function and balance market power and structure in the ASEAN market. The goal of 
market contestability and undistorted competition is to create an ultimate public 
benefit for the consumers, to enable great varieties of product ranges at the minimum 
price (UNCTAD, 1997). Competition law generally takes a pro-consumer policy 
perspective that fundamentally strengthens consolidation of social wealth and of 
general consumers.
In addition, competition law and policy enables small and medium sized 
enterprises to enter the market, therefore it can be implemented as an alternative to 
industrial policy based on strategic policy, which has been regarded as non-neutral
363
government intervention. Hence, competition law not only enhances consumers' 
interest, it also helps small and medium sized firms to compete equally with other 
firms in the regional economy, again while complying with the principles of 
liberalisation on a non-discriminatory basis. Additionally, the state still plays an 
important role in preventing market failure so that ASEAN countries may feel 
confident in their roles of monitoring the behaviour of the private sectors as they still 
prefer to play their part in overseeing economic transactions, and do not leave the 
private sectors alone to interact with each other as in neo-liberal ideology. Therefore, 
since ASEAN countries generally lack national competition laws (as will be discussed 
in section 6.2), it would be advantageous for ASEAN countries to launch an effective 
comprehensive competition law into the region, in parallel with the implementation of 
the trade and investment liberalisation process.
As regards foreign investment, the implementation of competition laws in 
ASEAN countries would ensure the realisation of more advantages from liberalising 
the entry, establishment, and operation of foreign investors, because competition laws 
would regulate and control mergers and acquisitions and the abuse of dominant market 
power in the ASEAN economy. The fear of economic conquest by powerful foreign 
TNCs might be better dealt with in this way rather than by the investment screening 
process employed by all ASEAN countries until now. The implementation of 
competition laws and policies in the ASEAN region could essentially help to eliminate 
the currently somewhat restrictive investment laws and regulations, even though 
actually some investment restrictions are in fact employed in almost if not all countries 
(Geist, 1995: 673-717)6, not only in ASEAN. The implementation of competition laws
6. Geist surveyed national investment laws in 11 countries from every region o f the world and found that 
every country, including the US and the UK, which are most liberal, employ common restriction on 
entry o f foreign investors in specific areas that affect economy or security o f the country: restricted
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in ASEAN countries along similar lines to those implemented in other countries may 
help bring their laws into alignment with a possible future general agreement on the 
regulation of foreign direct investment7.
6.1.2 The Interaction between Com petition Laws and Investm ent Laws of 
ASEAN Countries
The analysis in chapter 4 showed that all ASEAN countries have employed a 
screening process and applied pre-entry requirements to all foreign investors. There 
are also some regulations to control foreign investors/firms from being a dominant 
firm in the economy, for instance, limitations on foreign equity/ownership, and 
divestment requirements. These laws and regulations can be used to prevent foreign 
investors,-from merging with or acquiring a local firm, as they cannot own shares 
above a specified limit8. Foreign firms also cannot merge with or acquire other foreign 
firms if their equity in the new company is beyond the equity ratio set by the laws. 
Obviously, under this condition, ASEAN countries need competition law to control 
mergers & acquisitions. Even though ASEAN countries have been relaxing some 
regulations concerning the equity ratio of foreign investors, this has been applied on a 
case-by-case basis under specific conditions. Nevertheless, these regulations do not 
control local firms, or prevent them from merging with or acquiring other local or 
foreign firms. Indeed, local companies have sometimes established a monopoly 
position in the market in specific sectors. For instance, in telecommunications, 
Chinnawat Co., Ltd., a Thai company, monopolises the Thai market in mobile phones 
and related products; Telecom Asia is a monopoly telephone network provider in
industries. Geist further found that the convergence o f FDI policy has led to significant similarities in 
the standards and procedures applied to the admission o f FDI internationally. The countries surveyed 
have adopted general policies of permitting FDI subject to certain exceptions. The almost uniform uses 
o f a notification and/or prior approval procedure are widely used.
7. Geist, 1995: part III the framework for a General Agreement on the regulation o f foreign direct 
investment.
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Thailand, and Sammart Telecom Co. Ltd is the only provider of satellite dishes.
ASEAN countries also reserve some business sectors and exclude foreign 
investors from investing in those specific fields of business. But all these laws and 
regulations have to be phased out. All industries will be opened for investment to 
ASEAN investors by 2010 and to all investors by 2020 subject to some exceptions, as 
discussed in chapter 5 above. Therefore, if ASEAN countries liberalise their 
investment regimes, they may be concerned that they are moving from a system of 
screening all takeovers by foreign firms of national firms to screening none. They may 
see risks of foreign firms acquiring dominant positions. To replace these investment 
laws by competition laws may not only prove to be more effective than the screening 
process, but also a more efficient way to assess the competitive effects of foreign firms 
at the time of entry and after entry.
Competition laws and policies thus have a major role to play in the process of 
ASEAN liberalisation. This is also to ensure that the ASEAN market is kept as open 
as possible to new entrants, and that firms do not frustrate this by engaging in anti­
competitive practices. In this manner, the vigorous enforcement of ASEAN 
competition law can provide a reassurance that investment liberalisation will not leave 
the government powerless against anti-competitive transactions or subsequent 
problems.
Competition laws may replace the restrictive investment laws and regulations, 
with principles based on non-discrimination in the control of restrictive business 
practices among firms, regardless of the origin or the nationality of enterprises. 
Competition laws normally apply to all firms operating in given national or regional
8. Generally foreign ownership or share equity cannot excess 49% of the total share, except in the case 
that the company is granted promoted status under promotion scheme.
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territories, whether through domestic sales, imports, affiliates or non-equity forms of 
foreign direct investment. They do not, in principle, discriminate between national and 
foreign firms, or between firms from different national origins. In this manner, 
competition law monitors the competitive behaviour of TNCs having effects in host 
ASEAN countries. This is to ensure that all firms do not abuse dominant market 
power, and to prevent inefficiencies stemming from market allocation agreements 
which might lessen trade and investment. Therefore, competition law strengthens the 
principle of national treatment and enhances investment liberalisation, to comply with 
the objectives of the ASEAN investment area and economic integration in ASEAN.
Now I will assess the existing ASEAN laws relating to unfair competition, to 
consider to what extent ASEAN needs a comprehensive competition law at a regional 
level and in what respect competition law could replace the current foreign investment 
laws in ASEAN countries.
6.2 Survey of ASEAN Laws Relating to Unfair Competition
Currently, ASEAN countries do not have systematic competition laws and policies. 
Some ASEAN countries do have some elements of anti-trust law or anti- monopoly 
laws. In this section, I attempt to survey, country by country, the ASEAN laws relating 
to unfair competition and to analyse whether those laws are effectively enforced to 
control anti-competitive business practices.
In Indonesia, there are no laws relating to unfair competition, monopolisation, 
or passing off which may affect rights in relation to industrial property in this country 
(this was probably due to the Soeharto regime during which the majority of business 
was under the control of and owned by the Soeharto family). Currently, unfair 
competition is controlled under Art. 1365 of the Civil Code, which provides that a
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wrongdoer whose conduct injures other people is obliged to pay compensation, and 
under article 382 bis of the Criminal Code:
Art. 382 bis o f the criminal Code provides that: “Anyone who deceives the public 
or someone else with a purpose to obtain, maintain or add to his own benefit or that 
o f his or another person’s company, will be punished because o f his unfair 
competition, with imprisonment for a maximum 16 months or fine o f a maximum 
nine hundred rupiahs, if such acts injure his competitors or another competitor who 
competes with his competitor”.
However, the penalty recorded here is plainly ineffective: a fine of 900 
Rupiahs is approximately 0.07 pounds, which really means nothing for a dominant 
company, and the imprisonment sentence of 16 months is inappropriate and 
unrealistic. Especially, the compensation under Civil Code is not clearly defined so it 
can be minimal because the firms that committed the offence can exercise their 
powerful influence on the courts concerned.
In Malaysia, there are no specific laws against unfair trading practices. There 
are piecemeal provisions in particular statutes such as The Hire Purchase Act 1967, 
The Price Control Act 1946, and The Control o f  Supply Act 1961 that provide some 
limited protection to the consumer in specific situations or transactions. In particular, 
Sec. 28 of the Malaysian Contract Act 1950 renders all covenants in restraint of trade 
void. However, there is no criterion for judging whether the covenants in question are 
reasonable, or if they are harsh or onerous or too wide. Apart from the above 
restriction, there are no controls or regulations over contracts relating to exclusive 
dealing, monopolisation, franchises or resale price maintenance. Where mergers are 
concerned, there are various requirements to be complied with in takeover and 
mergers, but these relate to the regulation of the shareholdings of a corporation in 
Malaysia. Section 179 of the Companies Act 1965 prescribes a panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers to provide guidelines on the acquisition, takeover and merger of a 
company. There is no significant imposition of fines or punishment on the firms
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involved in unfair competition. Contracts dealing with these types of conduct, insofar 
as they do not infringe any of the specific laws mentioned, are valid and enforceable. It 
is notable that Malaysian laws on takeover and mergers do not apply to contracts made 
or performed outside Malaysia unless the contract expressly states that the laws in 
Malaysia will apply (CCH Asia Limited, 1998).
However, these Malaysian laws relating to unfair competition are obviously 
not systematically enforced and might inadequately deal with anti-competitive 
business practices of modem global firms, since these laws are very old and 
fragmented. They also do not apply to contracts made or performed outside Malaysia 
that might have an effect on market stmcture or power within the Malaysian economy 
and injure other competitors. Moreover, there are no controls or regulations over 
contract relating to exclusive dealings, monopolisation, franchises and price fixing. So 
there is no doubt that existing laws would ineffectively and inadequately control 
restrictive business practices of firms if they occurred as a result o f the increasing 
competition among firms operating in ASEAN flowing from liberalisation.
In the Philippines, there are some laws regulating or prohibiting monopolies 
and restraint of trade or unfair competition. The Philippines 1987 Constitution 
provides that “the State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest 
so requires, no combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be 
allowed”9. There are also other general and special laws that prohibit and provide for 
the consequences of acts in restraint of trade. In particular, Art. 186 of The Revised  
Penal Code punishes monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade:
The revised Penal Code imposes a penalty of imprisonment or a fine or both
upon:
9. Sec. 29 Art. XIII o f the Constitution.
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•  Any person who enter into any contract or agreement, or takes part in any conspiracy or
combination in the form o f  a trust or otherwise, in restraint o f trade or commerce or to
prevent by artificial means free competition in the market.
•  Any person who monopolises any merchandise or object o f trade or commerce, or
combines with any other person or persons to monopolise that merchandise or object in
order to alter price by spreading false rumour or making use o f  any other artifice to
restrain free competition in the market.
•  Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, processor o f any merchandise or object 
of commerce from any foreign country, either as principal or agent, wholesaler or retailer, 
combines, conspires, or agrees in any manner with any person likewise engaged in the 
manufacture, production, processing, assembling or importation o f such merchandise or 
object o f commerce or with any other persons not so similarly engaged for the purpose of 
making transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce, or o f increasing the market price in 
any part of the Philippines, o f any such merchandise or object of commerce manufactured, 
produced, processed, assembled in or imported into the Philippines, or o f any article in the 
manufacture o f which such manufactured, produced, processed, assembled, or imported 
merchandised or object o f commerce is used.
If the offence affects any food substance, motor fuel or lubricants or other articles o f prime 
necessity, the maximum penalty will be imposed. In addition, the object o f any o f the above 
contacts will be subject to forfeiture by the government. When the offence is committed by a 
corporation, the directors or managers o f the corporation o f the agent or representative in the 
Philippines, in the case o f a foreign corporation, who knowingly permitted or failed to prevent 
the commission o f such offences, will be held liable as principals.
The Penal Code gives a right of action to any person who suffers damage as a result of 
any act by any person involving unfair competition in agricultural, industrial or 
commercial enterprises or in labour, through the use of intimidation, force, deceit, 
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method. Art. 188 of the 
Code punishes the substitution and alteration of marks and trade names, and Art. 189 
of the Code provides criminal sanctions for unfair competition; fraudulent registration 
of marks or trade names; fraudulent designation of origin; and false description. 
Furthermore, Secs. 29 and 30 of the Trademark Law  provides civil remedies against 
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description. Also The 
Business Names Law A ct10 punishes certain acts where no proper registration of the 
firm or business name or style is effected with the Department of Trade or Industry. 
The Republic Act No. 623 (1951) prohibits certain acts if performed without the
10. Act No. 3883 (1931).
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written consent of the manufacturers, bottlers, or sellers of duly stamped or marked 
bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels and other similar containers.
There are also special laws that regulate monopolies. Among them is Press 
D ecree No. 576-A, which prohibits the ownership by one person or corporation of 
more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city, or of more than 
five AM and five FM radio stations or of more than five television stations in the 
country. Any violation is punishable by imprisonment or a fine or both, and will result 
in the cancellation of the franchise and the confiscation of the station and its facilities 
without compensation. The Price Act 1992 (Republic A ct No. 7581) imposes a penalty 
of imprisonment and a fine upon persons habitually engaged in the production, 
manufacture, importation, storage, transport, distribution, sale or other methods of 
disposition of goods, who shall organise a cartel11. When a violation is committed by a 
corporation, its officials or employees, or in the case of a foreign corporation or 
association, its agent or representative in the Philippines who is responsible for the 
violation, shall be held liable. Alien offenders shall, upon conviction and after service 
of sentence, be immediately deported without need for any further proceedings.
The Philippines laws, even though there are several relating to unfair 
competition, mainly focus on trade, and do not cover investment. There is no 
regulation of mergers and acquisitions. Most laws do not clearly stipulate the amount 
of a fine or compensation in cases where competitors are injured. There are no criteria 
to justify the behaviour of firms, which might be regarded as unfair competition, and
u . The Price Act defines a cartel as a combination o f or agreement between two or more persons 
engaged in the production, manufacture, processing, storage, supply, distribution, marketing, sale or 
disposition o f any basic necessity or prime commodity designed to artificially and unreasonably 
increase or manipulate its price. There shall be prim a  fa c ie  evidence o f engaging in a cartel whenever 
two or more persons or business enterprises, competing for the same market and dealing in the same 
basic necessity or prime commodity, perform uniform or complementary acts among themselves which 
tend to bring about artificial and unreasonable increase in the price o f any basic necessity or prime
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there is no measure to assess how the public interest would be affected. Also there is 
no clear procedure provided in the Philippines law for dealing with firms involved in 
unfair competition. Therefore, the existing laws are inadequate to cope with the 
problems that may occur when the ASEAN Investment Area is implemented.
In Singapore there is The M ulti-Level Marketing and Pyram id Selling 
Prohibition Act. This Act makes it an offence for any person to promote or participate 
in a multi-level marketing scheme, which essentially embraces schemes, or 
arrangements, which recruit participants in pyramid selling on the chain-letter 
principle. However, apart from this, there is no Anti-competition law in Singapore. Its 
open economy and liberalised investment regime have been considered sufficient to 
guarantee free competition in Singapore.
In Thailand, there is The Prescription o f  Prices o f  Goods and Anti-Monopoly 
Act o f  1979, and The Investment Promotion Act 1977 that includes a guarantee against 
state competition, against competition by state monopolies selling or dealing in similar 
products, against price control by the state, against export restriction, and against 
importation by the state or its agencies and enterprises. However, the practice of 
imposition of import bans on competing products to protect the activities of the 
promoted enterprise counteracts the guarantee of fair competition in this case. This is 
an example of the ineffective implementation of unsystematic competition rules.
All ASEAN countries also have Anti-Dumping laws and a Consumer 
Protection Law. But none of them has a systematic competition law that could regulate 
the rivalries of firms and control the potential restrictive business practices of 
producers in global networks. It is important that ASEAN countries should introduce a
commodity or when they simultaneously and unreasonably increase prices on their competing products 
thereby lessening competition among themselves.
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comprehensive regime of investment liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and 
competition law enforcement rather than only relaxing laws on the spot and lifting 
barriers item by item, which is not effective and is likely to confuse foreign investors. 
Foreign investors usually feel burdened by tons of laws and regulations that sometimes 
counteract each other. Regulatory differences in the investment field are obstacles to 
foreign investors (Trisciuzzi, 1983)12. Consequently, comprehensive regionalisation of 
competition laws could effectively enhance the favourable legal environment for 
attracting foreign investors (Geist, 1995; Baker & Holmes, 1991: 30)13.
6.2.1 M erger Regulations for Replacing Regulations on Restriction of 
Foreign Equity in ASEAN Investm ent Laws
In this section I propose to focus on merger control in ASEAN. Even though a 
comprehensive regional system of merger control does not yet exist, it is in the 
interests of ASEAN to establish merger control in the region. Since ASEAN will have 
to implement national treatment in the near future and eliminate investment laws, 
which are incompatible with the objectives of the ASEAN Investment Area (see 
chapter 5), merger regulations are needed to replace those laws used to function as a 
screening instrument. This is to ensure that there would be no emergence of cartels, 
trusts, oligopolies, concentrations or dominant market positions to harm the ASEAN 
economy, when the screening process and regulations of ASEAN investment laws are 
eliminated.
12. Trisciuzzi (1983) says: “Perhaps the most important potential benefit would be the harmonisation of 
currently diverse systems o f national laws and regulations. For example, harmonisation could reduce the 
high costs borne by multinational corporations in dealing with widely divergent regulatory regimes in 
different countries”.
13. Geist (1995) pointed out that it is not surprising to find that investors encounter and become 
discouraged with the potentially confusing and time-consuming regulations established by individual 
states. Also Professor Mark Baker noted in a 1991 review of Latin American FDI codes that “the 
greatest disincentive to direct foreign investment was dealing with local authorities. Foreign investors 
do not like to deal with foreign authorities because their application and approval procedures are 
unclear and cause substantial delays”, see Baker &Holmes, 1991: 30.
One of the main restrictions on foreign investment found in all ASEAN 
countries’ investment laws and regulations is the limitation of foreign investors’ 
share or equity in a company established in these countries. One rationale for 
limiting foreign equity in a firm established in these countries is to ensure that 
foreign investors can not dominate the market and abuse their market power. A 
foreign company also cannot merge with or acquire another local or foreign firms, 
since its equity will exceed the specified legal limit. But this kind of restrictive 
investment law has been regarded as being discriminatory and impeding foreign 
investors. Moreover, it has resulted in negative effects in ASEAN countries’ 
economy. For instance foreign investors cannot generally hold more than 49% of 
shares in a company located in ASEAN countries, except in a particular case where 
the company has been promoted under a promotion scheme or is entitled to a specific 
status, such as pioneer status. Therefore, the majority of shares are held by domestic 
investors who have to seek capital by various methods. They mostly turn to loans and 
because domestic loans incur very high interest due to the financial policy of 
ASEAN governments to encourage domestic saving, they turn to offshore loans. 
Ironically, the inflow of capital in this case is short-term foreign debt instead of an 
inflow of direct foreign investment. Consequently, the more foreign investment 
projects take place in ASEAN countries, especially with a huge capital fund project, 
the more offshore loans increase. This is an example of the negative impact of wrong 
policies implemented in ASEAN countries, where at first, each policy seems good 
but the way they interact with each other eventually results in a negative impact on 
the overall economy. In my view this can be regarded as one of the important causes 
of the Asian financial crisis.
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Moreover, merger regulations are also needed to control the abuse of a 
dominant position by domestic companies that nowadays does occur in ASEAN 
countries. Therefore all firms, whether domestic or foreign, would be subject to the 
same regulations and control, so complying with the national treatment principle and 
the implementation of the ASEAN Investment Area.
6.3 Rationale for a Regional ASEAN Competition Law
The removal of internal barriers among ASEAN countries to implement regional 
economic integration should not be allowed to result in companies creating territorial 
protection through cartels as well as the abuse of dominant position. While investment 
liberalisation in ASEAN can help promote the free entry of firms, and enhance the 
contestability of the ASEAN market, it is not a sufficient progress; competition laws 
become necessary to ensure that former statutory obstacles to contestability are not 
replaced by anti-competitive practices of firms, thus negating the benefits that might 
arise from liberalisation. The reduction of barriers to FDI in ASEAN and the 
establishment of positive standards of treatment for TNCs need to go hand in hand 
with the adoption of measures aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of the market, 
and measures to control anti-competitive practices by firms. The 1997 World 
Investment Report suggested that:
“The culture o f FDI liberalisation that has grown world-wide and has become 
pervasive, needs to be complemented by an equally world-wide and pervasive 
culture o f competition, which needs to recognise competing objectives” 
(UNCTAD, 1997).
This statement could be truly applied to the ASEAN practical regulatory 
regime. Now I will discuss anti-competitive business practices that may occur among 
the international firms and to deal with the substance of competition laws designed to 
effectively regulate those unfair practices.
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6.3.1 Anti-Com petitive Business Practice and Substance o f Competition  
Laws in ASEAN
Anti-competitive business practices that generally occur among international 
firms, and hence may also happen in ASEAN countries, include the following14:
1) Horizontal restraints or the hard-core cartels among firms in an oligopolistic market, 
engaging, for example, in price fixing, output restrictions, market division, customer 
allocation, and collusive tendering and other anti-competitive co-operation between 
firms selling competing products. All these business practices distort prices and the 
allocation of resources as well as resulting in a dysfunctional market that causes 
consumer disadvantages15. Fair competition would exist if no single supplier or 
consumer could influence the market price. Competition laws and policy may play an 
important role not only in prohibiting the formation o f cartels but also in balancing the 
competitive effects o f each firm in the market.
2) Vertical restraints or distribution strategies between manufacturers, suppliers or 
distributors, such as: tying the sale o f one good as a condition for the purchase of 
another good; exclusive dealing (the seller requires the buyer to purchase the products 
only from the seller); territorial restraints (the seller requires the buyer/distributor to 
resell the product within a limited geographical area); and resale price maintenance (the 
seller requires the buyer to resell the product only at a specified price). Resale price- 
fixing also tends to be generally prohibited. The pro- and anti- competitive effects of 
such vertical restraints need to be evaluated and where necessary' controlled.
3) Abuse o f intellectual property rights (1PR), for example where technology-licensing 
arrangements abuse the monopoly position o f IPR holders, such as through non­
competition clauses and the so-called ‘grantback’. This means the licensee is required to 
assign inventions made in the course o f working on the transferred technology back to 
the licensor. Another aspect o f IPR abuse, “non-contestation clauses”, is that the 
licensee is prevented from contesting the validity o f the IPR or other right o f the 
licensor. IPR abuses might be subject to general competition rules on horizontal and 
vertical restraints.
4) Abuse o f market dominance: dominant firms accounting for a significant market share 
may attempt to monopolise a market, for instance through excess prices, price 
discrimination, predatory low prices, refusal to deal, or vertical restraints. Rules against 
the abuse o f a dominant position may be conduct-oriented, in other words, a general 
prohibition against monopolising and foreclosure o f competition. Another approach is 
result-oriented, with a prohibition for example o f predatory pricing only if the losses 
can be recouped.
5) Mergers and acquisition policies, where horizontal, vertical or conglomerate mergers, 
may reduce competition or decrease efficiency. Merger policies may be designed to 
ensure the contestability o f markets by preventing monopoly or price-setting by a single 
seller and price-taking by a single buyer, as well as oligopolistic or monopolised market 
power. On the other hand, acquisition policies also overlap with industrial policy 
instruments.
6) Public undertakings and enterprises with special privileges, which are not required to 
behave according to market principles, (Art. XVII o f the GATT and Art. 90 o f the EC 
Treaty) in view o f their market power or financial independence. This includes firms 
with exclusive trading rights and monopolies.
14 Compiled from various sources: UNCTAD, 1997; Petersman, E.U., 1993, 1996a; Schoenbaum, 
Thomas J., 1996.
15. If market prices are distorted either through cartels or monopolies, they are likely to distort also the 
allocation, co-ordination and distribution functions o f market competition so that consumer welfare will 
be reduced by higher prices, fewer products and less freedom o f choice.
In the new era, ASEAN countries do need to regulate these anti-competitive 
business practices to attain fair competition conditions. However, what ASEAN 
countries have to be aware of is the balance of market failure and government failure. 
If governments intervene so as to correct market failure or supply public goods, the 
risk of market failure has to be weighed against the risk of alternative government 
failure, because government intervention may lead to additional distortions. Therefore, 
fair competition conditions require rational behaviour of market participants or firms, 
perfect information, perfect mobility of the market, stable preferences and 
technologies, and reflection of all costs in the prices of good and services (Petersman, 
1996a). All these requirements need a comprehensive set of competition laws and 
regulations among ASEAN countries. Current national laws and policy on restrictive 
business practices differ among these countries and the law focuses on different 
aspects such as anti-monopoly, anti-dumping, protection against state competition, etc. 
As seen in the previous section, there are no systematic competition laws in ASEAN 
countries. For instance, Singapore has refrained from adopting competition laws on 
the grounds that its liberal trade policies and its rather liberal investment regime are a 
significant guarantee of the contestability of its open economy. But now ASEAN 
countries need to introduce comprehensive competition laws and policies, and enforce 
them effectively. In fact, the general infrastructure and other economic comparative 
advantages of ASEAN countries still appear good; the only important thing that 
ASEAN countries lack is good governance and a rule-based system. Therefore, the 
combination of a sound ASEAN legal and economic systems can be viewed as 
favourable created factor endowments16 that can affect ASEAN’s competitiveness 
positively in the international trade and investment sphere.
16. International competition among firms is influenced not only by “natural” production factor
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6.4 The Bases of ASEAN Regional Competition Law
In the modem globally integrated world economy it is not only private enterprises but 
also governments that engage in competition (Porter, 1990). In ASEAN countries in 
particular they have widely implemented strategic policies in the trade and investment 
sphere (see chapter 1). In this respect, government plays an important role, as 
Petersman (1993: 35) pointed out:
“By means o f industrial policies aimed at enhancing economies o f scale and 
positive externalities o f national industries, strategic trade policies aimed at shifting 
rents away from foreign to domestic industries, or by means o f investment policies 
designed to attract scarce foreign capital through tax incentives and favourable 
investment conditions.”
Therefore markets are imperfect in many ways. Two different kinds of 
competition laws are thus required. The one is competition law for private restraints of 
competition and market failures, which are abuses of market power, externalities and 
asymmetries in information. The second is competition law for governments so as to 
limit government failures, which may affect the supply of public goods and created 
endowments/comparative advantages.
Fair competition should aim to protect less-organised firms, such as small and 
medium firms, in entering the market while protecting public interest and consumers 
in a liberal economy. Competition rules may need to be evaluated to determine how 
far or to what extent competition rules should regulate the behaviour of firms. For 
instance, in some business areas merged lines of business or operators might provide 
more adequate and effective operation, more varieties of products, more available 
services, including advanced research and technological development that individual
endowments, but also by government-determined conditions o f competition as discussed the “created” 
and “natural” endowments in chapter 3.
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separate smaller firms/operators are unable to undertake17. Therefore there is a 
concern that competition rules may be applied so as to protect smaller firms at the 
expense of larger, irrespective of efficiency. It is a very difficult decision whether 
collaboration or competition in a particular market leads to a better use of resources. 
While competition is desirable in lessening economic power, businessmen believe that 
in some industries resources are put to better use if competition is limited. Therefore 
collaboration or natural monopolies may sometimes occur responding to the 
achievement of economies of scale. For instance, if a firm has merely expanded its 
plant in good time to meet an expected increase in demand, so that it is unprofitable 
for other firms to enter the industry, there is no objection to its monopoly (Korah, 
1968: 64)18. Many markets can be supplied only after considerable capital investment 
is made or technology developed.
On the other hand, if capital requirements are a hindrance to the entry of small 
and medium firms into the market and one goal of competition is to enable small firms 
to compete in the market, then entry barriers exist on the ground of financial 
constraint. Hence there are not barriers to the entry of an equally efficient firm in this 
case where a huge investment is required, but obviously small and medium firms are 
unable to compete with bigger firms. Is this regarded as unfair competition? Therefore 
the evaluation of whether there is unfair competition requires the consideration of the 
public good: an enhanced distribution system, provision of goods and services, 
reduced cost of operation, a technological lead or reduced capital requirements of 
those fields of business considered. It is noted that a small firm protected only for such
t7. For instance if a single plant or a merged enterprise that can process all the spent nuclear fuel in the 
region substantially more cheaply than could smaller plants, it would be unprofitable for a second firm 
to establish a smaller plant. Also see the fact in KEWA (1976) Cc.M.L.R.D15.
I8. Korah, 1968: 64, she also concluded that “it is so much cheaper to produce a product in a large plant 
that can be continuously used than in many smaller ones, that one or two plants o f  the minimum
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reasons is not in a position to hold its customers or suppliers to ransom except in the 
short term (Korah, 1997a). Therefore to control the conduct of firms with such fragile 
protection of small firms may discourage large firms from making investments to 
enable them to compete aggressively. This implies that regulation of restrictive 
business practice is not only to ensure fair competition, but also to maximise the 
public good and sound resource management.
There is a dichotomy between market function and government role that lies at 
the heart of competition law. On the one hand, a liberal law of the market implies that 
it needs no barriers, no intervention, and no control, and that the market should be left 
to itself to function based on the rule of supply and demand. On the other hand, fair 
competition means that there should be no dominant enterprise, restrictive business 
practices, predatory pricing, or mergers and acquisitions that impede competition. All 
these behaviours may need regulatory control through competition laws to adjust the 
behaviour of firms. However, if there is absolute freedom from constraints, or in other 
words there is no regulation at all for fair competition, dominant firms could conquer 
the market so no one can compete. Hence, the proposed criteria for regulating the 
behaviours of firms may need to consider the type of business, size of business, 
competitive position, range or category of firms that the same level of undertakings 
may be treated fairly under the same conditions, rules and laws as well as the 
economic environment.
International competition laws for the private sector have actually been 
developed in various previous attempts, such as part of the 1948 Havana Charter for 
an International Trade Organisation, the UN Codes of Conduct and the OECD 
Decisions and Guidelines (Petersman, 1992: 627), The Set of Multilaterally Agreed
efficient size can supply the expected demand and there is room for only one or two suppliers”.
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Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices19, and 
the Resolution adopted by the Conference Strengthening the Implementation of the Set 
20. However, these are “soft-law rules” rather than international/multilateral treaty law. 
Their aim generally is to avoid mutually harmful competition policy conflicts21 and 
overcome the vision gaps and jurisdictional gaps between national competition laws 
(Petersman, 1993: 37). The reasons for regulatory differences in competition laws and 
the decentralised administration of competition policies are mainly due to the 
particularity of national conditions. For instance, the final decision on whether the 
costs of restraints of competition may be outweighed by economies of scale and by 
positive externalities will require case-by-case analysis with due regard to that 
particular national condition. Conflicts between national regulations can also entail 
market access barriers, market distortions and harmful international externalities.
Since there is no single agreed set of competition laws available at the moment 
and not even a competition law model, ASEAN countries need to develop a regional 
consensus on this issue. They can also refer to general basic rules of conduct
19. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1981). “The Set o f  M ultilaterally  
A g reed  E quitable Principles and Rules fo r  the C ontrol o f  R estrictive Business P ra c tic e ” United Nations 
Document TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev. 1 New York, United Nations. The Set o f Multilaterally Agreed 
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control o f Restrictive Business Practices was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on 5th December 1980 by its resolution 
35/36. The Second United Nations Conference to Review all Aspects o f the Multilaterally Agreed 
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control o f Restrictive Business Practices was held in Geneva 
from 26th November to 7th December 1990. That Conference adopted a resolution on “Strengthening the 
implementation o f the Set” at its sixth meeting on 7th December 1990. A third review Conference took 
place on 13th-21st November 1995. This Conference adopted a resolution calling for a number of 
concrete actions to give effect to the implementation o f the Set. The Set o f Principles and Rules was 
also adopted by United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices as an annex to its 
resolution o f  22nd April 1980.
20. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1991). “Resolution A d op ted  by the 
Conference Strengthening the Implementation o f  the S e t”. Report o f the Second United Nations 
Conference to Review all Aspects o f the Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the 
Control o f  Restrictive Business Practice. United Nations document TD/RBP/CONF.3/9. Geneva, United 
Nations, Annex, pp. 48-51.
21. Since the over two hundred international sovereign states have differing resources, preferences, 
comparative advantages, political system, and regulatory system, the national competition laws also 
differ in many respects such as exclusion o f regulated sectors, exemption o f exporters, rule-of-reason
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established in those various codes/guidelines that have common features. However, 
the main aim of a regional competition law for ASEAN could be to facilitate the 
development of a strengthened regional market, as envisaged in the 1998 agreements 
setting up AIA, AFAS and AFTA.
6.5 Regional competition law and policy and open regionalism
The development of an ASEAN regional competition law and policy would be a new 
approach in this region, and even national competition law in each individual ASEAN 
country has not yet effectively and efficiently developed. Hence, a regional law can be 
justified from the inadequacy of the national competition law of the ASEAN members 
as discussed in section 6.2 above. I will not discuss here in detail the contents of a 
regional competition policy per se, as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. But I will 
discuss here the link between an ASEAN regional competition law and the concept of 
open regionalism.
I have already pointed out the functions of a feasible ASEAN regional 
competition law and policy (see introduction) that should include:
(1) to facilitate the liberalisation o f trade and investment in ASEAN;
(2) to enhance free and fair competition among firms in ASEAN by 
monitoring behaviour o f firms engaging business in the region, and;
(3) to ensure a proper competitive balance between intra- and extra-ASEAN 
business enterprises.
These three functions of a feasible ASEAN regional competition law and policy will 
play an important part in facilitating ASEAN open regionalism. It will, firstly, ensure 
that ASEAN keeps its regional market open for both intra- and extra- regional trade 
and investment (the first two functions). These have been discussed above in sections 
6.1, 6.2.1, 6.3 and 6.4. The third function is fundamental to open regionalism, to 
ensure a proper competitive balance between intra- and extra- ASEAN firms.
exceptions, focus on corporate conduct or market structures, support o f “crisis cartels” and small
Competition law and policy should help promote the growth of small and 
medium enterprises22. The liberalisation of trade and investment based on fair 
competition grounds will enable local small and medium firms to develop their 
economic strength, upgrade their technological production processes, and improve 
managerial systems and commercial skills, in order to compete with the foreign firms. 
Competition law will ensure that firms, local or foreign, cannot engage in restrictive 
business practices, abuse a dominant position, or form a cartel or any form of unfair 
practice that might damage other firms. Therefore, under such fair competition 
circumstances every firm either small or large can compete with each other in their 
relative market, size and field of business. Furthermore, competition law would permit 
ASEAN countries to evaluate the economic benefit from the influx of foreign firms, 
on the basis of whether they will damage local small and medium firms, so that they 
could employ competition policy in protecting local firms. This can be done through, 
for example, a merger control regulation so that TNCs cannot merge or acquire 
another company to create or strengthen their commercial dominance in the market. 
This would encourage foreign investment to be made on a “green field” basis that can 
contribute to the regional economy, ensuring that it competes with other firms (local 
or foreign) on the same fair basic grounds and conditions.
Since there are many small and medium firms in ASEAN countries, and these 
firms fear that an ASEAN regional market open to powerful TNCs might significantly 
affect local smaller firms, to protect the competitive position of such local companies 
and to ensure fair competition will increase their confidence in doing business in the
businesses, actual enforcement and judicial review o f the “law on the books”.
22 See Whish, Richard and Sulffin, Brenda (1993) C om petition Law. 3rd edition London/Edinburgh: 
Butterworths.
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single ASEAN open market23. A regional competition law and policy could fulfil this 
task.
Competition law could also allow each country to protect its indigenous 
enterprises or national/cultural industries to preserve country specific values or to 
maintain the country’s specific renown for its own competitiveness globally24. In the 
Czech Beer Case, the American firm, Anheuser-Busch, brewer of the American 
Budweiser lager beer, wanted to acquire a stake in Czech Budvar, famous for 
Budweiser Budvar lager beer, so far unsuccessfully. Both companies produce the same 
brand name of “Budweiser” beer and they have had disagreement over the brand 
name, but neither of them have exclusive right to use the brand name internationally, 
so they settled the dispute by allocating the use of the name in different markets25. 
However, a conflict occurred when they both entered the European markets, where the 
agreement did not clearly define the territory of the use of the name by each party. The 
American firm thus wanted to merge the two companies so that it could produce and 
sell the product world-wide without any constraint. However, Czech Budvar has been 
regarded as the distinct producer of the real Czech Budweiser lager beer, and the 
consumers, both within the Czech Republic and in other countries, favour this typical 
and unique beer, and prefer the Budweiser beer to be originally produced by Czech
23 In fact, ASEAN countries have been aware o f this sensitive issue and have already promoted the 
small and medium firms in the region preparing them to be ready in competing with extra-ASEAN 
firms. See Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation, 28 November 1999, Manila, The Philippines. 
Also each individual ASEAN country has set up Small and Medium Firm Networks to promote and 
strengthen S&M enterprises, for example, Malaysia set up the Small and Medium Industry Development 
Office, The Philippines set up the Bureau o f Small and Medium Business Development to help promote 
S&M enterprises.
24 See Muchlinski, P. T. “A Case o f Czech Beer: Competition and Competitiveness in the Transitional 
Economies” (1996) The Modern Law Review. Vol. 59: 5 (September), pp. 658-675.
25 The dispute was settled by the agreement o f 4 September 1911, whereby the US brewfer was granted 
exclusive use o f “Budweiser” name in North America, while the Czech brewer was granted the name for 
the rest o f the world. But it did not confer any right or imposed any restrictions on any part with the 
regard to the use o f the name in Europe, nor did it prevent any party from establishing an exclusive right 
to use the Busweiser trade name as part o f its trading style in any European country.
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Budvar. They wanted to preserve Czech Budvar as the national indigenous industry 
and had active movements and campaigns to stop the acquisition by the American 
firm.
Muchlinski argued, in relation to this case, that since the Czech Republic, the 
only one among the transitional economies, has abolished specialised foreign 
investment laws and has actively liberalised investment, only privatisation and 
competition law could act as vehicles for the close screening of foreign investment. 
The EU law as a source of principles for the regulation of foreign investment would 
also be justified, because the Czech Republic and the EU have had an agreement26 to 
bring the Czech’s commercial and economic laws into line with EU law as a prelude 
to possible future membership of the EU. Therefore, EU competition law, which 
concerns the anti-competitive and concerted practices, abuse of a dominant position 
and preferential state aids that distort competition, must be taken into account 
regarding any business practices in the Czech Republic. Competition law could 
provide an alternative screening procedure for foreign investment to examine any 
threat of damage to national industry by means of merger or acquisition. In this 
perspective, the protection of indigenous industries could be based on the ground of 
the concern for consumers and the availability of a range of choice of products, which 
can include cultural diversity.
ASEAN countries follow an “Open Door” policy and thus liberalise 
investment so regional competition law, which is consistent to liberalisation, would 
play an important role in protecting domestic firms from damage such as in the Czech 
Beer case. ASEAN can thereby reconcile a positive approach to foreign investors,
26 The Czech Republic has become a party to an EU Europe Agreement (EA), which entered into forced 
on 1 February 1995 to ensure greater convergence between EU economic laws and the national law o f  
the non-EU contracting states, as a precondition for any future application for membership.
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justified by the lack of regulatory control, while at the same time exercising control 
over undesirable market and social effects of FDI through laws that apply to foreign 
and domestic firms alike, notably competition law, merger & acquisition control 
regulation, and anti-monopoly control27. In this way control over foreign investors and 
the preservation of the equal treatment of foreign investors and domestic investors in 
the same area of industry can be reconciled.
Therefore, ASEAN indigenous industries could be protected under the ASEAN 
regional competition law and policy, and by a regional merger control regulation. 
Moreover, consumer and local interest group opinion concerning some particular 
business or industries can be taken into account by the authority concerned28.
In conclusion, the function of regional competition law and policy and the 
regional merger control regulation would be to ensure the review of mergers in 
ASEAN countries lacking effective domestic controls and lacking experiences in 
dealing with mergers and acquisitions so that member countries would be able to 
engage the support of the Regional Merger Task Force where concentration occurs 
that has significant actual or potential anti-competitive effects within any member 
countries. An ASEAN regional competition law and policy could ensure that regional 
economic strength would be enhanced and strengthened and that the regional open 
market that welcomes non-ASEAN trade and investment would not allow foreign 
firms to entirely dominate the regional economy. This complies with the main concept 
of open regionalism to enhance both intra- and extra- ASEAN trade and investment,
27 Muchlinski argued that “Maximum foreign shareholding limits in national laws have tended to be 
relaxed. The most promising avenue for regulation in competition law, in that a level o f foreign 
ownership that may create an anti-competitive concentration can be legitimately challenged without 
upsetting the logic o f free market policies. See Muchlinski (1996: 59).
28 For instance, the issue can be brought to the Regional Merger Task Force, within the spirit o f the 
Regional Merger Regulation, consumer groups can request that the Task Force review a concentration 
where FDI creates or strengthens a dominant position or merge & acquire such domestic firms.
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so regional competition law and policy can be the suitable instruments facilitating the 
achievement of this goal.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Institutional Implications of ASEANfs New
Direction
7.1 Balancing Generalised Liberalisation with Deeper Regional 
Integration
The changing global economy and legal framework for trade and investment has 
implications for closer economic integration within ASEAN. But ASEAN faces 
dilemmas in its integration. There are several major challenges facing the region. 
Trade and investment are the main issues which concern all of the countries in the 
region, not just in their economic aspects, but also in revising policies, laws and 
regulations to comply with global regulations for trade and investment. For instance, 
there will be no tolerance for export subsidies. Trade-related investment measures 
have to be eliminated. Almost all East Asian countries have to graduate from the GSP. 
The role of government intervention, ranging from controls over the financial sector, 
promoting targeted industries with government investment and/or subsidised credit, 
subsidising declining industries, protecting domestic import substitutes by providing 
investment incentives, developing export marketing institutions, are all to be 
eliminated.
ASEAN countries have been aware of this situation and of the future they will 
face, and have been attempting to adapt their strategies to sustain and even to develop 
economic growth in the region. Regional economic integration has been seen as an 
essential process for reaching this goal. They can gain advantages from the 
enlargement of their intra-regional market and the exploitation of economies of scale. 
This will in turn attract more foreign investment and is favourable to the location of 
TNCs network in the region. Therefore, with the presence of global firms and
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networks in East Asia, the region can maintain its economic linkage with the rest of 
the world and its integration with the global economy. The intra-firm and intra­
industry trade made by TNCs within the region will enable East Asian countries to 
become more integrated.
Consequently, a new approach of balancing “Open Regionalism” and deeper 
regional integration, based on a harmonious legal system and the mutual recognition 
principle, needs to be implemented in the region. Open economic integration is 
consistent with the globalisation and the world-wide liberalisation of trade and 
investment, as this integration process does not create an economic bloc excluding 
non-members of the group. ASEAN has been implementing deeper economic 
integration in the region while opening its market to outsiders. This is a new direction 
for ASEAN in balancing generalised liberalisation with deeper regional integration.
Thus the rationale for implementing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
linked with the liberalisation of investment (AIA) and trade in services (AFAS) as well 
as co-operation in IP, is to develop the Southeast Asian region as one market 
generating economies of scale which will benefit firms doing business in the region.
However, unlike the EU single market which is based on a supranational legal 
system facilitated by centralised regional institutions nurtured by a common political 
will, ASEAN does not have a regional supranational legal and institutional 
infrastructure. In practice, they concertedly implement liberalisation arrangements, 
which are based on the regional consensus achieved by the “Musyawarah” method 
(discussed in chapter 2). Therefore, at this stage, ASEAN does not intend to generate a 
regional centralised/supranational legal and institutional infrastructure. Rather, 
individual ASEAN countries opt to unilaterally liberalise their trade and investment 
regime, based on the consensus mutually agreed by the member countries.
However, regarding internal integration, ASEAN must bear in mind that 
continued regulatory differences, divergent interpretations of regional legal issues, and 
the different economic policies of ASEAN members, may burden and distort economic 
flows. To facilitate such regional economic attractiveness inevitably requires a certain 
level of legal and institutional integration. This raises the question of what degree and 
type of institutionalisation should be appropriate for ASEAN and what areas require 
such integration. Regarding the pattern of integration, what form of integration might 
be properly implemented in the ASEAN region? Generally, treaties or agreements 
aimed at economic integration begin by emphasising the elimination of barriers to 
regional trade. However, economic integration entails not only the free movement of 
products but of factors of production between a group of countries. This in turn means 
a degree of harmonisation or co-ordination of national economic policies, as well as of 
a range of internal rules and regulations. Therefore the removal of barriers at the 
border is only one aspect of effective regional economic integration. Hence, various 
issues become critical to the effectiveness of a regional organisation. As Fitzpatrick 
has stated:
“An often ignored central determinant is the breadth o f  substantive regulation and 
the level o f integration sought to be established by the regime in relation to the 
efficacy o f supranational legal institutions” (Fitzpatrick, 1996: 2).
From this point of view, ASEAN now needs to decide which pattern of 
integration and what mechanisms are suitable and would function well for ASEAN’s 
new direction. It is important to consider the level of integration, what degree of 
diversity is optimal in ASEAN integration, and what forms and mechanisms of 
harmonisation should be implemented. Thus, the mechanisms, structural organisation 
and even the decision-making bodies as well as “the ASEAN way”, which were 
appropriate for the earlier stage might now be inappropriate and ineffective in the
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implementation of the new schemes. It is certainly arguable that ASEAN needs a more 
effective and efficient legal and institutional framework for implementing these new 
agreements.
Once the member countries of ASEAN have removed the border barriers to 
economic transactions among them and implemented the free circulation of trade and 
investment within the region, most of the discrimination formerly caused by different 
national requirements also have to be eliminated. It is essential for them to go beyond 
the removal of border barriers. If they are to deal with the problems that result from 
this freedom of transactions, and to make the most of the opportunities for increasing 
welfare that are offered by the larger market, they must co-ordinate their national 
policies and/or form common policies that go well beyond the mere removal of overt 
discrimination (Pinder, 1972: 125). This is because it is not only border barriers that 
create obstacles to the free flow of economic transactions, but also distortions caused 
by disparities between internal rules and regulations of those countries, especially the 
high degree of disparity among ASEAN laws discussed below. The regulatory 
differences encountered by the economic actors and their transactions result in 
different practices and applications. These disparities and differences might burden the 
flows of business among ASEAN members. Thus, economic integration needs a legal 
and institutional framework for implementing regionalisation at a certain level.
The reasons for the failure of regional economic integration are diverse 
(Fitzpatrick, 1996), but the common thread among them is the weakness and 
insufficiency of legal co-ordination arrangements and institutions for facilitating the 
implementation of those regional groupings.
Even though ASEAN as well as APEC claims to aim at an open regionalism 
that needs less formalisation, nevertheless a degree of harmonisation and co-ordination
of laws and regulations is still essential because regulatory differences may ultimately 
decrease the potential benefits of free trade and investment, and may create conflict 
between contracting parties. The harmonisation of laws and regulations need not cover 
all areas of law nor at all level but at what level and in what areas that need to be 
harmonized, and in what form or by which mechanism depends on the level of 
integration and also on what purpose and scope of integration. This issue has been 
vastly debated and it is problematic in practice. Even in the EU, it has taken more than 
40 years to develop processes for harmonisation of laws and regulations. Experience 
has shown that an international economic organisation with neither the authority to 
develop and modernise a comprehensive and harmonised legal regime relating to 
regional economic issues, nor the power to enforce compliance with regional laws, 
will be incapable of integrating the economies of the member states (Del Duca, 1993: 
485, 489; Ndulo, 1993: 101, 104). Nevertheless, ASEAN may not need the same 
model and approach in legal and institutional harmonisation as for example the EU, 
but has alternatives such as regulatory co-operation and co-ordinated legal networks 
that now are increasingly proven to be necessary at an international level (Picciotto, 
1998). This emergent approach is probably more suitable in the case of ASEAN where 
open regionalism is implemented, based mainly on concerted unilateral liberalisation.
An example of the problematic implementation of ASEAN's new schemes 
where an effective mechanism is lacking is the AIA. It advocates the elimination of all 
legal and related barriers to investment flows; however, various aspects of restriction 
on foreign investment still exist and different legal systems remain. Therefore, the 
current loosely binding organisation of ASEAN may be inappropriate to implement the 
objectives of the AIA due to the regulatory differences, restricted investment sectors, 
screening processes, limited ratio of foreign share holding, and other requirements
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stipulated in individual ASEAN countries’ investment laws and regulations. Thus the 
mere stated aim and intention of attracting foreign investment and of facilitating an 
investment area in the region, without providing any mechanisms, institutions, and 
processes of legal harmonisation for attaining the achievement of the ASEAN 
Investment Area, may have limited results. Therefore, ASEAN should institutionalise 
its integration effort regionally, through initiatives such as the harmonisation of 
standards, common rules of fair competition, removal of internal non-tariff barriers, 
and macroeconomic consultation. The idea of harmonious laws1 does not require a 
fully unified or harmonised system of laws. Harmonious laws might remain national 
provided they have regional consistency and impartiality. The limited implementation 
arrangements have already proven to be insufficient and ineffective in the realisation 
of regional economic integration in previous ASEAN economic co-operation schemes 
(Haas, 1994: 809, 812-20). Therefore, ASEAN needs to strengthen its legal and 
institutional framework for effectively implementing ASEAN regional integration, and 
this is ASEAN’s dilemma in choosing the best integration pattern that fits with the 
open regional approach.
ASEAN needs to elaborate measures to facilitate ASEAN regionalisation. 
These include:
•  the development o f the administrative and legislative infrastructure necessary for the 
functioning o f a market economy;
•  the fixing o f a calendar for the adoption o f the ASEAN “one regional market”, which is 
important in helping the realisation of deepening integration;
•  the strengthening o f economic co-operation;
•  support for private investment;
•  facilitation and improvement o f intra-regional trade concession;
•  measures in the field o f  free movement o f  workers, capital, and goods;
•  development o f a regional competition law and policy;
'. Harmonious musical notes produce a pleasant sound when play together just as same as the 
harmonious laws that effectively enforced consistently when they apply together harmoniously.
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•  facilitation o f  the transfer o f  technology and managerial skills, and a better involvement o f  the 
private sector;
• private sector participation in public infrastructure network projects.
ASEAN now needs to consider which pattern of integration suits the ASEAN way. 
Even though “Open Regionalism” means ASEAN does not create barriers to non­
members, the realisation of a single ASEAN market could be achieved only through a 
realistic and effective pattern of integration.
Pinder (1972: 126) has defined Positive Integration as the formation and 
application of co-ordinated and common policies in order to fulfil economic and 
welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination, while Negative Integration 
consists of the removal of discrimination between the economic agents of the member 
countries. Tinbergen defines negative integration as “the elimination of certain 
instruments of international economic policy”, and the “positive policy of integration 
as entailing supplementary measures in order to remove inconsistencies that may exist 
between the duties and taxes of different countries”, plus “positive action in the field 
of production” in order to put through a “re-organisation programme” (Pinder, 1972: 
126). Tinbergen bases his distinction between the two terms on whether policy 
instruments are to be eliminated or new policies formed. On the other hand, Pinder 
bases his on whether the purpose is to remove discrimination or to maximise welfare 
in other ways.
From the above definitions of positive and negative integration, ASEAN 
integration is likely to be regarded, at its current stage of development, as negative 
integration. ASEAN has been eliminating barriers to economic transactions or has 
been removing discrimination within member countries, but has not yet formed or 
applied co-ordinated and common policies. Therefore, ASEAN has not yet shifted to 
positive integration. All ASEAN framework agreements state a broad integration
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policy, or simply declare the intention of ASEAN countries, while the implementation 
of the framework agreements, is left to be done by each individual ASEAN country 
through laws and regulations at the national level. Thus, if ASEAN needs to maintain 
this characteristic of a co-ordinated regulatory network among ASEAN members, it 
might need to strengthen the pattern of the emergent concept of a regulatory network 
(Picciotto, 1996) and the concept of layer governance (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 
1994: 95-117) at a regional level. This new approach is also facilitating the new age of 
globalisation. ASEAN practice appears to fit within a combined pattern that is based 
on negative integration facilitated by the new approach of regulatory networks and 
layered governance, both of which ASEAN is required to develop.
7.2 Alternative Institutional Models
Now ASEAN also needs to choose a mechanism for its integration. The main options 
are:
1) institutionalised with regional suprainstitutions as implemented in the EU, facilitating the 
harmonisation o f laws, based on mutual recognition, and a degree o f  regulatory 
competition;
2) federalist regulatory system as implemented in the US;
3) decentralised regulatory networks with regulations enforced nationally but co-ordinated 
through regional government-to-govemment procedures.
Consideration of the possible institutional models that might be suitable for 
ASEAN must be related to the historical back ground and current legal systems as well 
as political basis of ASEAN. As mentioned earlier, there is a high degree of disparities 
among ASEAN countries. The differences in legal and political systems were 
influenced by their previous colonial masters, which had different legal and political 
systems. The legal systems of member countries of ASEAN differ greatly, ranging 
from common to civil law systems, and to hybrids of both. Common law forms the 
basis for the legal systems of Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore. Spanish and US laws
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significantly influence the Philippines’ legal system. The Indonesian legal structure 
follows the basic constructs of the Dutch legal system and the Thai legal system 
derives from the amalgamation of continental and common law structures (Winslow, 
1986: 42; Radhie, 1986: 50-54). Moreover, each country also has its own culture and 
identity. Asia is a mix of various cultures, unlike Europe, it is composed of Malay, 
Chinese, Indian and indigenous cultures. The nationalism of these countries is also 
strongly emphasised as they had been colonised for centuries by foreign powers, these 
countries thus prefer to be independent rather than being bound by supranational 
power. This is a deep sentiment for Asian people. Also they are geographically distant, 
even though they are in the same region, many of them are islands far apart from each 
other.
Therefore, deep economic integration with supranational institutions, as 
implemented in Europe, is unlikely to happen in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region 
in the near future. The Federalist model is also not favoured by ASEAN countries, as 
they have not developed as federal states within the region. ASEAN has developed on 
“the market dynamism model” with an emphasis on unilateral liberalisation, and now 
they have agreed to liberalise concertedly. Thus they prefer to develop a system of co­
ordinated regulatory networks and mutual recognition. This approach is more flexible 
and may allow ASEAN countries to maintain their national laws and regulations as 
well as their legal requirements, provided that they are consistent with and 
complementary to the ASEAN integration schemes, and that they are harmoniously 
implemented to facilitate regional integration. This model appears to fit ASEAN 
ideology and the practice of open regionalism.
However, in practice, a combination of models is possible; for instance, the 
EU, which is based on a centralised/supranational legal and institutional framework,
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has also developed new approaches and combined models, as it proved impossible to 
harmonise every law and regulation. German and French laws, for example, remain 
highly national. Thus the mutual recognition approach has been accepted in the EU, 
combined with a level of harmonisation.
Therefore, the development of ASEAN’s new direction of integration may 
initially adopt decentralised but co-ordinated regulatory networks and then shift to 
more positive integration facilitated by the harmonisation of laws and legal integration, 
or by a hybid approach of a combination of models. It is also arguable that legal 
integration is crucial to the success of an economic integration agreement. It has been 
observed that the creation of a dynamic system of law requires an institutional 
structure with decision-making powers, and the ability to react to changing needs. The 
surrender of sovereignty in the form of harmonising a certain level of the contracting 
countries’ legal regimes and creating dispute resolution institutions contribute to 
successful economic integration (Del Duca, 1993: 549). Nevertheless, “the amount of 
sovereignty required to be surrendered is proportionate to the level of integration 
sought to be achieved” (ibid.). This should reflect the degree of legal harmonisation 
among ASEAN member countries, or in other words, what degree of diversity is 
tolerable. This would allow ASEAN countries to decide what level of integration they 
wish to achieve and what degree of legal integration they are required to perform, and 
therefore what proportion of sovereignty they are willing to surrender, and also to what 
extent they need regional institutions.
Regarding the different factors in the integration process, they are firstly 
institutional integration, which refers to the collective decision-making institution 
necessary to develop and enhance norms promulgated pursuant to the goal of 
economic integration. The second factor is policy integration, which concerns the
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extent of policy-making power transferred to higher levels of government. The third is 
attitudinal integration, describing the degree to which public opinion within the area is 
a source of support for regional integration. And the last factor is security integration, 
which connotes the creation of a security community (Jordan and Feld, 1986: 91-92). 
However, it is important to note that the degree to which these integration aspects are 
implemented is a subject of considerable complexity, which requires a clear consensus. 
Therefore, the very basic ground on which economic integration can be implemented is 
rooted in the political will of the members and the aims and purposes of such 
integration as agreed by member countries.
7.3 Strengthening ASEAN’s Insitutional Framework
With the launches of AFTA, AIA, and AFAS, the process of ASEAN regional 
integration has become increasingly rapid, and ASEAN needs to sustain the region's 
international competitiveness on a world scale. This competitive pressure has 
stimulated ASEAN policy-makers to think more seriously about how to embark upon 
institutionalised integration in order to facilitate effective ASEAN economic 
integration with the world. It is important to underline that processes such as the 
harmonisation of standards, the mutual recognition of tests and certification of 
products, the mutual recognition of qualifications of service providers, and harmonised 
procedural requirements are very crucial, and they link with the removal of NTBs or 
regulatory differences. It needs to be made clear here that even negative integration 
implemented by any economic grouping still involves this process at a certain level for 
the purpose of the elimination of barriers to economic transactions. Therefore, in 
principle, legal integration, to a certain degree, is still crucial to the success of an 
economic integration agreement. Thus the institutional structure may also need to be 
developed. As Cremona has argued, “the creation of a dynamic system of law requires
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an institutional structure with decision-making powers able to react to changing needs” 
(Cremona, 1994: 508-9). Regionalisation inevitably involves a certain level of 
harmonisation, co-ordination or mutual recognition of laws if deeper integration is an 
aim.
The absence of harmonised ASEAN Laws implies a degree of risk for business 
networks and investment decisions. The question of how to ensure compliance by 
national administration vis-a-vis business is raised. One needs less law if public 
intervention is low, if the private market is preponderant and functions well, and if 
adequate rules of competition exist. Without this, and opting to avoid “ASEAN Law”, 
one needs to devise other compliance mechanisms which underpin business 
confidence. Without sufficient guarantees for legal security, one either encourages 
‘private deals’ or discourages business interest in the region.
At present, ASEAN has a very flexible legal framework to implement regional 
economic integration. Apart from the assertion of the principle of mutual recognition 
among ASEAN members, ASEAN has not created any judicial or monitoring 
institution to ensure the co-ordination of legal norms relevant to regional commerce, 
nor does it provide for any harmonisation. Pelkmans (1997:211) thus argues that 
“ASEAN lacks a treaty basis”. In fact, all ASEAN agreements concluded among 
member countries are a kind of legal instrument and can be regarded as a “treaty” 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 .
Therefore, all ASEAN agreements are indeed legal instruments and bind 
member countries. However, these agreements lacks substantive details and 
mechanisms for effective implementation, as they are mainly general framework
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agreements, and in practice leave the details and implementation process to the 
ASEAN member countries to sort out. They mainly function politically, based on the 
general legal commitment provided in such Framework Agreements.
These flexible framework agreements allow ASEAN countries to negotiate and 
seek solutions for the implementation of practical details later, which will lead to the 
creation of subsidiary agreements for implementation of the main framework 
agreements. Until now, thay have been usually made in the form of an “Action Plan” 
or “Protocol” annexed to the framework agreements. From a legal point of view, they 
are a legalistic commitment but are propelled by the political will of ASEAN 
countries. The only provision for resolution of disputes was that contained in the 1976 
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which called for the creation of a system of 
peaceful dispute settlement. However, until now ASEAN countries have essentially 
relied on diplomatic negotiations.
Recently, to begin to address the question of enforcement of the framework 
agreements, ASEAN has shifted to the WTO style by concluding a Protocol on a 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism-3. This encourages the amicable settlement of disputes 
between member states through their representatives by consultation and by other 
special procedures, or by additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement 
contained in the covered agreement. If these fail then the mechanisms of Good Offices, 
Conciliation or Mediation can be sought. The subject matter of the disputes is mainly 
in respect of the implementation, interpretation or application of the agreements.
2 Art. 2 (a) o f the 1969 Vienna Convention provided that “Treaty means an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation;”.
3 The Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism was done on 20th November 1996 at Manila, the 
Philippines to expand Art. 9 o f the AFTA Agreement to strengthen the mechanism for the settlement o f  
disputes in the area o f ASEAN economic co-operation. The rules and procedures o f this protocol apply
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Therefore, if any member country considers that another has failed to comply with any 
ASEAN agreement listed in the Annex, the affected country may make a request to 
that country, which is then required to reply to the request within ten days, and the 
parties shall enter into consultation within thirty days. If the consultation fails within 
sixty days, the matter shall be raised to the SEOM to establish a panel, or a special 
body where applicable, within thirty days. The panel will report to the SEOM within 
sixty days, with another ten days extension in exceptional cases. The SEOM will make 
a ruling within thirty days, also with ten days extension in exceptional cases. The 
parties to the dispute may appeal the ruling by the SEOM to the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers (AEM) within thirty days of the ruling and the AEM will make a decision 
within thirty days, with another ten days' extension in special cases. Parties to the 
dispute shall comply with the decision within thirty days or within a mutually agreed 
period not exceeding thirty days. Compensation and the suspension of concessions will 
apply to the party which failed to comply with the decision of AEM or with the ruling 
of SEOM. The main advantage of the Protocol is the rapid time frame and the effective 
enforcement of the decisions. This is a step towards stricter dispute settlement 
procedures, and a perhaps more legalistic process.
This development, in fact, reflects the necessity for ASEAN to shift toward 
positive integration and to strengthen ASEAN's institutional framework, as the new 
framework agreements are more complex and directly involve international players, 
and the inadequacy of ASEAN mechanisms may fail to achieve the aims of integration 
schemes. New arrangements also require effective facilities for the removal of barriers 
caused by regulatory differences and disparities between ASEAN countries. This does
to ASEAN agreements annexed to the Protocols which are all the agreements made between ASEAN, 
and covers all future ASEAN economic agreements.
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not necessarily mean the removal of national regulations or the creation of ASEAN 
laws substituting domestic ones, but to ensure the enforcement of national laws and 
regulations in conformity with each other and without unnecessary obstacles to 
regional economic transactions.
In 1983 when ASEAN first reviewed its structure and organisation, the 
ASEAN Standing Committee agreed with the advice of the ASEAN Law Association 
(ALA) to initiate regional co-operation in the legal field. They called for legal co­
operation in the field of the judiciary, legislature, law enforcement, and legal education 
(Haas, 1994: 859). However, so far legal co-operation between ASEAN countries has 
not made significant progress other than to establish limited judicial co-operation in 
procedural areas, including servicing of documents, obtaining evidence in civil and 
commercial matters, reducing obstacles to filing suit and making appearances in the 
courts of another ASEAN country4. The other recommended areas of law for 
harmonisation, especially rules affecting intra-ASEAN trade, investment, international 
activities and regulations, are far from being realised. In fact, regional rules concerning 
trade, business, industry, taxation, transportation, communication, science and 
technology, patent, immigration, private international law and other related fields were 
also recommended by the ALA (Valera-Quisumbing, 1986: 1-13).
As ASEAN countries integrate regionally and also integrate into the global 
economy, it has become necessary to create more effective implementation mechanism 
in the region. Despite the changes since 1976, ASEAN has not yet moved forward 
towards any form of regional court. It has preferred to retain the basic philosophy of
4. Valera-Quisumbing (1986: 1-13) pointed out that “ASEAN member countries have concluded a 
bilateral agreement on Judicial Cooperation that covers service o f  judicial documents, obtaining 
evidence, as well as reciprocal free access o f nationals to the courts o f either jurisdiction. Additionally, 
extradition treaties currently exist between Thailand and Indonesia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and
non-confrontation and consensus. ASEAN lacks a mechanism for settling private 
disputes that may arise either between private enterprises or between private enterprise 
and government. Now ASEAN is moving towards closer integration in the field of 
investment and services, as discussed in chapter 5, ASEAN is facilitating the right of 
establishment within the regiona of firms once established in one ASEAN country. 
This is implemented under the AIA through the concept of the ASEAN investor, and 
in AFAS through that of a service provider engages in substantive business operations 
in an ASEAN country, both companies and natural persons. Consequently, there might 
be problems arising from the implementation of ASEAN member countries regarding 
the approval of non-ASEAN company which wishes to exercise this right to establish 
itself in any ASEAN country, either under the AIA or AFAS. If any ASEAN country 
refuses to approve the entry of any company, such company would have to seek a 
solution under the appropriate chanel provided by ASEAN. For this to be effective, 
improved remedies are necessary to ensure that, if private company or natural person 
has been deprived of rights and privileges granted under the stated agreements, it will 
have opportunity to bring the case to ASEAN to settle such disputes. Therefore the 
question of a dispute settlement mechanism for the private sector is now coming to the 
fore, as this would ensure the confidence of investors or service providers from both 
inside and outside ASEAN.
To codify an ASEAN legal framework could formalise and harmonise ASEAN 
laws and regulations, thus increasing the expectations of community law for ASEAN 
members and outside trading partners. Harmonious laws and regulations in the region 
would, in turn, provide ASEAN with certainty, security and predictability as well as
Malaysia and Indonesia. ASEAN may broaden these agreements to include such right and 
responsibilities among and between ail member countries”.
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incentives to engage in trade deals and foreign direct investment, and provide a sense 
of potential outcome in disputes.
7.4 Towards the Harmonisation of ASEAN Laws and the Creation of 
an ASEAN Legal System
In its present form, ASEAN cannot exert any legal control over the regional economy.
The current ASEAN Framework Agreements, even the most recently launched
packages for economic integration, such as AIA, AFTA, AFAS and Intellectual
Property Co-operation, are merely declared intentions and objectives to implement
closer regional economic co-operation. The proposed advances in economic
integration are only potentially implemented through legally binding instruments at a
regional level, which can regulate the conduct of member countries, their conformity
with agreed rules, and the consequences of non-compliance. However, ASEAN
countries may firstly need to create the political will and the political basis for realising
the ultimate goal of regional integration. They need to elaborate and delineate a course
of action and a set of procedures for implementing recognised policies. Then a further
step is to determine the choice of appropriate models of legal regimes, the form of
integration, and to construct their own system, i.e. ASEAN regulatory networks.
The preliminary stage in formulating regional legal rules should focus on the 
harmonisation of certain relevant laws through co-ordination plans of member 
countries. In the case of ASEAN, it would be more realistic to take certain preliminary 
steps to create an ASEAN legal regime by designating fields in which to formulate 
regional legal rules. These fields may include some aspects of investment; the entry 
and establishment as well as the operation of foreign investment; mutual recognition of 
substantive and procedural requirements for both merchandise and service trade; 
harmonisation of double taxation avoidance; competition rules and policy; labour
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standards; intellectual property protection co-operation; transportation; 
communications; and dispute settlement for the private sector. A further step would be 
to harmonise those national laws or implement regulatory co-operation in certain areas 
that affect the implementation of ASEAN framework agreements and also related 
areas of laws. This would enable ASEAN members to have similar rules governing 
particular activities. This could be achieved by promulgating “model laws”.
As mentioned earlier, ASEAN appears to be taking preliminary steps in 
adopting the negative integration model that implements ‘bottom up’ liberalisation by 
eliminating barriers to free trade and investment from the bottom rather than by 
imposing a ‘top down’ liberalisation regime. Apart from the recommended 
harmonisation of laws, the new emergent approach of regulatory networks may be 
adopted by ASEAN where some areas of laws that cannot be harmonised might 
harmoniously remain anyway, based on a network system reinforced by the mutual 
recognition principle.
Indeed, the dichotomy of economic integration of ASEAN reflects the global 
trend of the balance between globalisation and regionalisation that has been debated 
broadly. This new direction of economic integration is a compromise between the 
ideologies of the closed trading block and the outward-looking economy. While 
deepening regional economic integration, and granting preferential treatment among 
member states of that economic grouping, it does not necessarily create a stumbling 
block for outsiders. Members of such a regional grouping can still welcome trade and 
investment flows from outside by keeping the margin of preferences as low as they 
can, and also because of the attractiveness of economies of scale, the enlarged market, 
and free mobilisation within the region enjoyed by outsiders when they enter the 
region. This enables outsiders to trade and invest in such regional groupings without
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significant barriers, so that regionalism and globalisation are balanced and consistently 
implemented. In this way, various countries in different regions with different level of 
economic development can take part in a harmonious global economy, through either 
their own regionalisation or through globalisation as they consider appropriate.
It appears that the new millennium round of WTO negotiations might encounter 
complex problems and difficulties, not only between the North and South, but also 
among members in the North and their citizens. If the gap between the North and 
South, and conflicts of ideologies on economic development between the two, can be 
narrowed such that both poles can realise their economic interests in their own ways 
but still be consistent with the global rules through a new approach of balancing 
regionalism with globalisation, then this would contribute greatly to global economic 
progress. On the one hand, this would allow more participation by developing 
countries in shaping the global regulatory regime in which they are governed. On the 
other hand, a multilaterally agreed set of rules and regulations on trade-related issues 
including investment that has never been agreed in the past may be able to be 
elaborated so that international standards and norms governing international economic 
activities can be gradually set up. The ultimate goal of global regulations is to help 
generate wealth among nations and also to help distribute wealth more evenly. The 
concept that a new direction for ASEAN is to balance regional and global 
liberalization and therefore to reduce North/South polarisation is an ambitious one, yet 
this may well be the new trend for the next millenium of regionalisation.
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Annex 1
FRAM EW ORK AGREEM ENT  
ON ENHANCING ECONOM IC COOPERATION
Singapore, 28 January 1992
The Sultan o f  Brunei Darussalam, the President o f the Republic o f Indonesia, the Prime Minister o f  
Malaysia, the President o f the Republic o f the Philippines, the Prime Minister o f the Republic o f  
Singapore and the Prime Minister o f the Kingdom of Thailand:
REAFFIRM ING their commitment to the ASEAN Declaration o f 8 August 1967, the Declaration o f  
ASEAN Concord o f 24 February 1976, the Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia o f  24 
February 1976, the 1977 Accord o f Kuala Lumpur and the Manila Declaration of 15 December 1987;
DESIRING to enhance intra-ASEAN economic cooperation to sustain the economic growth and 
development o f  all Member States which are essential to the stability and prosperity o f  the region;
REITERATING their commitment to the principles o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(hereinafter referred to as "GATT");
RECOGNISING that tariff and non-tariff barriers are impediments to intra-ASEAN trade and 
investment flows, and that existing commitments to remove these trade barriers could be extensively
improved upon;
NOTING the significant unilateral efforts made by Member States in recent years to liberalise trade 
and promote investments, and the importance o f extending such policies to further open up their 
economies, given the comparative advantages and complementarity of their economies;
RECOGNIZING that Member States, having different economic interests, could benefit from
subregional arrangements;
CONSCIOUS o f the rapid and pervasive changes in the international political and economic 
landscape, as well as both challenges and opportunities yielded thereof, which need more cohesive and 
effective performance o f intra-ASEAN economic cooperation;
M INDFUL o f  the need to extend the spirit o f friendship and cooperation among Member States to 
other regional economies, as well as those outside the region which contribute to the overall economic
development o f Member States;
RECOGNISING further the importance' o f enhancing other fields o f economic cooperation such as in 
science and technology, agriculture, financial services and tourism;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS :
ARTICLE 1 : PRINCIPLES
1. Member States shall endeavour to strengthen their economic cooperation through an outward- 
looking attitude so that their cooperation contributes to the promotion o f global trade liberalisation.
2. Member States shall abide by the principle o f mutual benefit in the implementation o f measures or 
initiatives aimed at enhancing ASEAN economic cooperation.
3. All Member States shall participate in intra ASEAN economic arrangements. However, in the 
implementation o f these economic arrangements, two or more Member States may proceed first if  other 
Member States are not ready to implement these arrangements.
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ARTICLE 2 : AREAS OF COOPERATION
A. Cooperation in Trade
1 . All Member States agree to establish participate in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (A within 15 years. 
A ministerial-level Council will be up to supervise, coordinate and review the implementation o f  the
AFTA.
2. The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme shall be the main mechanism for the A  
For products not covered by the CEPT Scheme, ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) or 
other mechanism to be agreed upon, may be use
3. Member States shall reduce or eliminate non tariff barriers between and among each other on the 
import and export o f products as specifically agreed upon under existing arrangements or any other
arrangements arising out o f this Agreement.
4. Member States shall explore further measure on border and non-border areas o f cooperation 
supplement and complement the liberalisation o f trade.
B. Cooperation in Industry, Minerals and Energy
1 . Member States agree to increase investment industrial linkages and complementarity by adoption 
new and innovative measures, as well as strengthening existing arrangements in ASEAN.
2. Member States shall provide flexibility for new forms o f industrial cooperation. ASEAN shall 
strengthen cooperation in the development o f the minerals sector.
3. Member States shall enhance cooperation in the field o f energy, including energy planning, 
exchange o f information, transfer o f  technology, research an development, manpower training, 
conservation an efficiency, and the exploration, production and supply o f energy resources.
C. Cooperation in Finance and Banking
1. Member States shall strengthen and develop further ASEAN economic cooperation in the field o f  
capital markets, as well as find new measures to the increase cooperation in this area.
2. Member States shall encourage and facilitate free movement o f capital and other financial resources 
including further liberalisation o f  the use o f ASEAN currencies in trade and investments, taking into 
account their respective national laws, monetary controls and development objectives.
D. Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry
1 . Member States agree to strengthen region cooperation in the areas o f development, production and 
promotion o f  agricultural products for ensuring for security and upgrading information exchanges in
ASEAN.
2. Member States agree to enhance technical joint cooperation to better manage, conserve, develop and
market forest resources.
E. Cooperation in Transportation
1 . Member States agree to further enhance regional cooperation for providing safe, efficient an 
innovative transportation and communications infrastructure network.
2. Member States shall also continue to improve and develop the intra-country postal and
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telecommunications system to provide cost-effective, high quality, high quality and customer-oriented
services.
ARTICLE 3 : OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION
1. Member States agree to increase cooperation in research and development, technology transfer 
tourism promotion, human resource development an other economic -.related areas. Full account shall 
also be taken o f existing ASEAN arrangements in these
2. Member States, through the appropriate ASEAN bodies, shall regularly consult and exchange views 
on regional and international developments and trends,
ARTICLE 4 : SUB-REGIONAL ECONOM IC ARRANGEM ENTS
Member States acknowledge that sub-regional arrangements among themselves, or between ASEAN 
Member States and non-ASEAN economies, could complement overall ASEAN economic
cooperation.
ARTICLE 5 : EXTRA-ASEAN ECONOM IC COOPERATION
To complement and enhance economic cooperation among Member States, and to respond to the 
rapidly changing external conditions and trends in both the economic and political fields, Member 
States agree to establish and/or strengthen cooperation with other countries, as well as regional and 
international organisations and arrangements.
ARTICLE 6 : PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
Member States recognise the complementarity of trade and investment opportunities, and therefore 
encourage, among others, cooperation and exchanges among the ASEAN private sectors and between 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN private sectors, and the consideration o f appropriate policies aimed at 
promoting greater intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investments and other economic activities.
ARTICLE 7 : MONITORING BODY
The ASEAN Secretariat shall function as the body responsible for monitoring the progress o f  any 
arrangements arising from this Agreement. Member States shall cooperate with the ASEAN Secretariat
in the performance o f its duties.
ARTICLE 8 : REVIEW OF PROGRESS
The ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting and its subsidiary bodies shall review the progress o f  
implementation and coordination o f the elements contained in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 9 : SETTLEM ENT OF DISPUTES
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Any differences between the Member States concerning the interpretation or application o f  this 
Agreement or any arrangements arising therefrom shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between 
the parties. Whenever necessary, an appropriate body shall be designated for the settlement o f  disputes.
ARTICLE 10 : SUPPLEM ENTARY AGREEM ENTS OR ARRANGEM ENTS
Appropriate ASEAN economic agreements or arrangements, arising from this Agreement, shall form
an integral part o f this Agreement.
ARTICLE 11 : OTHER ARRANGEM ENTS
1. This Agreement or any action taken under it shall not affect the rights and obligations o f the Member 
States under any existing agreements to which they are parties.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the power o f Member States to enter into other agreements 
not contrary to the terms and objectives o f this Agreement.
ARTICLE 12 : GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent any Member State from taking action and adopting measures 
which it considers necessary for the protection o f its national security, the protection o f public morals, 
the protection o f  human, animal or plant life and health, and the protection o f  articles o f  artistic,
historic and archaeological value.
ARTICLE 13 : AMENDMENTS
All Articles o f  this Agreement may be modified through amendments to this Agreement agreed upon 
by all the Member States. All amendments shall become effective upon acceptance by all Member
States.
ARTICLE 14 : ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Agreement shall be effective upon signing.
ARTICLE 15 : FINAL PROVISION
This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General o f the ASEAN Secretariat who shall 
promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed this Framework Agreement on Enhancing
ASEAN Economic Cooperation.
DONE at Singapore, this 28th day o f January, 1992 in a single copy in the English Language.
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Annex 2
AGREEM ENT ON  
THE COM M ON EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF  
SCHEM E FOR THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA
The Governments o f  Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic o f  the 
Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand, Member States o f the 
Association o f  South, East Asian Nations (ASEAN):
M INDFUL o f the Declaration o f ASEAN Concord signed in Bali, Indonesia on 24 February 1976 
which provides that Member States shall cooperate in the field of trade in order to promote 
development and growth o f new production and trade;
RECALLING that the ASEAN Heads o f Government, at their Third Summit Meeting held in Manila 
on 13-15 December 1987, declared that Member States shall strengthen intra-ASEAN economic 
cooperation to maximise the realisation of the region's potential in trade and development;
NOTING that the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) signed in Manila 
on 24 February 1977 provides for-the adoption of various instruments on trade liberalisation on a 
preferential basis;
ADHERING to the principles, concepts and ideals o f the Framework Agreement on Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation signed in Singapore on 28 January 1992;
CONVINCED that preferential trading arrangements among ASEAN Member States will act as a 
stimulus to the strengthening o f  national and ASEAN Economic resilience, and the development o f  the 
national economies . o f Member States by expanding investment and production opportunities, trade, 
and foreign exchange earnings;
DETERM INED to further cooperate in the economic growth o f the region by accelerating the 
liberalisation o f intra-ASEAN trade and investment with the objective o f creating the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme;
DESIRING to effect improvements on the ASEAN PTA in consonance with ASEAN's international 
commitments;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1 : DEFINITIONS
For the purposes o f  this Agreem ent:
1. "CEPT" means the Common Effective Preferential Tariff, and it is an agreed effective tariff, 
preferential to ASEAN, to be applied to goods originating from ASEAN Member States, and which 
have been identified for inclusion in the CEPT Scheme in accordance with Articles 2 (5) and 3.
2. "Non-Tariff Barriers"  mean measures other than tariffs which effectively prohibit or restrict import 
or export o f products within Member States.
3. "Quantitative restrictions"  mean prohibitions or restrictions on trade with other Member States, 
whether made effective through quotas, licenses or other measures with equivalent effect, including 
administrative measures and requirements which restrict trade.
4. "Foreign exchange restrictions"  mean measures taken by Member States in the form o f restrictions 
and other administrative procedures in foreign exchange which have the effect o f  restricting trade.
5. "PTA" means ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements stipulated in the Agreement on ASEAN
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Preferential Trading Arrangements, signed in Manila on 24 February 1977, and in the Protocol on 
Improvements on Extension o f  Tariff Preferences under the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements (PTA), signed in Manila on 15 December 1987.
6. "Exclusion List" means a list containing products that are excluded from the extension o f  tariff 
preferences under the CEPT Scheme.
7. "A griculturalproducts"  mean :
•  (a) agricultural raw materials/unprocessed products covered under Chapters 1-24 o f the
Harmonised System (HS), and similar agricultural raw materials/unprocessed products in 
other related HS Headings; and
• (b) products which have undergone simple processing with minimal change in form from the
original products.
ARTICLE 2 : GENERAL PROVISIONS
1 . All Member States shall participate in the CEPT Scheme.
2. Identification o f  products to be included in the CEPT Scheme shall be on a sectoral basis, i.e., at HS 
6-digit level.
3. Exclusions at the HS 8/9 digit level for specific products are permitted for those Member States, 
which are temporarily not ready to include such products in the CEPT Scheme. For specific products, 
which are sensitive to a Member State, pursuant to Article 1 (3) o f the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, a Member State may exclude products from the CEPT 
Scheme, subject to a waiver of any concession herein provided for such products. A review o f this 
Agreement shall be carried out in the eighth year to decide on the final Exclusion List or any 
amendment to this Agreement.
4. A product shall be deemed to be originating from ASEAN Member States, if  at least 40% o f its 
content originates from any Member State.
5. All manufactured products, including capital goods, processed agricultural products and those 
products falling outside the definition o f agricultural products, as set out in this Agreement, shall be in 
the CEPT Scheme. These products shall automatically be subject to the schedule o f  tariff reduction, as 
set out in Article 4 o f this Agreement. In respect o f PTA items, the schedule o f tariff reduction 
provided for in Article 4 o f this Agreement shall be applied, taking into account the tariff rate after the 
application o f  the existing margin o f preference (MOP) as at 31 December 1992.
6. All products under the PTA which are not transferred to the CEPT Scheme shall continue to enjoy 
the MOP existing as at 31 December 1992.
7. Member States, whose tariffs for the agreed products are reduced from 20% and below to 0%-5%, 
even though granted on an MFN basis, shall still enjoy concessions. Member States with tariff rates at 
MFN rates o f  0%-5% shall be deemed to have satisfied the obligations under this Agreement and shall 
also enjoy the concessions.
ARTICLE 3 : PRODUCT COVERAGE
This Agreement shall apply to all manufactured products, - including capital goods, processed 
agricultural products, and those products failing outside the definition o f agricultural products as set out 
in this Agreement. Agricultural products shall be excluded from the CEPT Scheme.
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ARTICLE 4 : SCHEDULE OF TARIFF REDUCTION
1 . Member States agree to the following schedule o f  effective preferential tariff reductions:
•  (a) The reduction from existing tariff rates to 20% shall be done within a time frame o f 5 years 
to 8 years, from 1 January 1993, subject to a programme o f reduction to be decided by each 
Member State, which shall be announced at the start o f the programme. Member States are 
encouraged to adopt an annual rate o f reduction, which shall be (X-20)%/5 or 8, where X 
equals the existing tariff rates o f individual Member States.
• (b)The subsequent reduction o f tariff rates from 20% or below shall be done within a time 
frame o f  7 years. The rate o f reduction shall be at a minimum o f 5% quantum per reduction. A 
programme o f reduction to be decided by each Member State shall be announced at the start 
o f  the programme.
•  (c) For products with existing tariff rates o f 20% or below as at 1 January 1993, Member
States shall decide upon a programme o f tariff reductions, and announce at the start, the 
schedule o f  tariff reductions. Two or more Member States may enter into arrangements for 
tariff reduction to 0%-5% on specific products at an accelerated pace to be announced at the 
start o f  the programme.
2. Subject to Articles 4 (1) (b) and 4 (1) (c) of this Agreement, products which reach, or are at tariff 
rates o f 20% or below, shall automatically enjoy the concessions.
3. The above schedules o f tariff reduction shall not prevent Member States from immediately reducing 
their tariffs to 0%-5% or following an accelerated schedule o f tariff reduction.
ARTICLE 5 : OTHER PROVISIONS
A. Quantitative Restrictions and Non-Tariff Barriers
1. Member States shall eliminate all quantitative restrictions in respect o f  products under the CEPT 
Scheme upon enjoyment o f the concessions applicable to those products.
2. Member States shall eliminate other non-tariff barriers on a gradual basis within a period o f five 
years after the enjoyment o f concessions applicable to those products.
B. Foreign Exchange Restrictions
Member States shall make exceptions to their foreign exchange restrictions relating to payments for the 
products under the CEPT Scheme, as well as repatriation o f such payments without prejudice to their 
rights under Article XVIII o f the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and relevant 
provisions o f  the Articles o f Agreement o f the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
C. Other Areas o f Cooperation
Member States shall explore further measures on border and non-border areas o f cooperation to 
supplement and complement the liberalisation o f  trade. These may include, among others, the 
harmonisation o f standards, reciprocal recognition o f  tests and certification o f products, removal o f  
barriers to foreign investments, macroeconomic consultations, rules for fair competition, and 
promotion o f venture capital.
D. M aintenance of Concessions
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Member States shall not nullify or impair any o f the concessions as agreed upon through the 
application o f  methods o f customs valuation, any new charges or measures restricting trade, except in 
cases provided for in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 6 : EMERGENCY M EASURES
1 . If, as a result o f the implementation o f this Agreement, import o f a particular product eligible under 
the CEPT Scheme is increasing in such a manner as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to 
sectors producing like or directly competitive products in the importing Member States, the importing 
Member States may, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or to remedy such 
injury, suspend preferences provisionally and without discrimination, subject to Article 6 (3) o f this 
Agreement. Such suspension of preferences shall be consistent with the GATT.
2. Without prejudice to existing international obligations, a Member State, which finds it necessary to 
create or intensify quantitative restrictions or other measures limiting imports with a view to 
forestalling the threat o f or stopping a serious decline o f its monetary reserves, shall endeavour to do so 
in a manner, which safeguards the value o f the concessions agreed upon.
3. Where emergency measures are taken pursuant to this Article, immediate notice o f  such action shall 
be given to the Council referred to in Article 7 of this Agreement, and such action may be the subject 
o f  consultation as provided for in Article 8 of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 7 : IN ST ITU T IO N A L ARRANGEM ENTS
1. The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) shall, for the purposes o f this Agreement, establish a 
ministerial-level Council comprising one nominee from each Member State and the Secretary-General 
o f  the ASEAN Secretariat. The ASEAN Secretariat shall provide the support to the ministerial-level 
Council for supervising, coordinating and reviewing the implementation o f this Agreement, and 
assisting the AEM in all matters relating thereto. In the performance o f its functions, the ministerial- 
level Council shall also be supported by the Senior Economic Officials' Meeting (SEOM).
2. Member States which enter into bilateral arrangements on tariff reductions pursuant to Article 4 o f  
this Agreement shall notify all other Member States and the ASEAN Secretariat o f such arrangements.
3. The ASEAN Secretariat shall monitor and report to the SEOM on the implementation o f  the 
Agreement pursuant to the Article III (2) (8) o f the Agreement on the Establishment o f the ASEAN  
Secretariat. Member States shall cooperate with the ASEAN Secretariat in the performance o f its 
duties.
ARTICLE 8 : CONSULTATIONS
1. Member States shall accord adequate opportunity for consultations regarding any representations 
made by other Member States with respect to any matter affecting the implementation o f  this 
Agreement. The Council referred to in Article 7 o f this Agreement, may seek guidance from the AEM 
in respect o f  any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution during 
previous consultations.
2. Member States, which consider that any other Member State has not carried out its obligations under 
this Agreement, resulting in the nullifications or impairment o f any benefit accruing to them, may, with 
a view to achieving satisfactory adjustment o f the matter, make representations or proposal to the other 
Member States concerned, which shall give due consideration to the representations or proposal made 
to it.
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3. Any differences between the Member States concerning the interpretation or application o f this 
Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties. If such differences cannot 
be settled amicably, it shall be submitted to the Council referred to in Article 7 o f this Agreement, and 
if  necessary, to the AEM.
ARTICLE 9 : GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent any Member State from taking action and adopting measures, 
which it considers necessary for the protection o f  its national security, the protection o f  public morals, 
the protection o f  human, animal or plant life and health, and the protection o f articles o f artistic, 
historic and archaeological value.
ARTICLE 10 : FINAL PROVISIONS
1. The respective Governments o f Member States shall undertake the appropriate measures to fulfill the 
agreed obligations arising from this Agreement.
2. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be made by consensus and shall become effective upon 
acceptance by all Member States.
3. This Agreement shall be effective upon signing.
4. This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f the ASEAN Secretariat, who shall 
likewise promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State.
5. No reservation shall be made with respect to any o f  the provisions o f this Agreement. In witness 
Whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed 
this Agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the Free Trade Area 
(AFT A).




TO AMEND THE AGREEM ENT  
ON THE COMMON EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF  
SCHEME FOR THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA
The Governments o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia,the Republic o f  the 
Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore and the Kingdom o f Thailand, Member States o f the 
Association o f  South East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
NOTING the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) ("the Agreement") signed in Singapore on 28 January 1992;
RECALLING the Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation (1992) signed on 15 December 1995 in Bangkok by the Heads o f Government reflecting 
the acceleration o f  the CEPT Scheme for AFTA from the year 2008 to the year 2003;
RECOGNISING the need to amend the Agreement to reflect the latest developments in ASEAN;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Article 2, paragraphs 3,5 and 6 of the Agreement be amended to read as follows:
"3. Exclusions at the HS 8/9 digit level for specific products are permitted for those Member 
States, which are temporarily not ready to include such products in the CEPT Scheme. For specific 
products, which are sensitive to a Member State, pursuant to Article 1 (3) o f the Framework 
Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, a Member State may exclude products 
from the CEPT Scheme, subject to a waiver o f any concession herein provided for such products. 
These temporarily excluded products are to be gradually included into the CEPT by 1 January 
2000 .
5. All manufactured products, including capital goods, and agricultural products shall be in the 
CEPT Scheme. These products shall automatically be subject to the schedule o f tariff reduction set 
out in Article 4 o f the Agreement as revised in Article 3 o f  this Protocol. In respect o f PTA items, 
the schedule o f tariff reduction provided for in the revised Article 4(A) set out in Article 3 o f this 
Protocol shall be applied,taking into account the tariff rate after the application o f tile existing 
margin o f  preference (MOP) as at 31 December 1992.
6. All products under the PTA which are not in the list for tariff reductions o f the CEPT Scheme 
shall continue to enjoy the MOPs existing as at 31 December 1992.".
ARTICLE 2
Article 3 o f  the Agreement be amended to read as follows:




Article 4 o f  the Agreement be substituted with the following:
"Schedule o f Tariff Reduction and Enjoyment o f concessions
A. Schedule o f  Tariff Reduction
1 . Member States agree to the following schedule o f  effective preferential tariff reductions:
a. The reduction from existing tariff rates to 20% shall be completed within a time frame o f 5 
years, from 1 January 1993, subject to a programme o f reduction to be decided by each Member 
State, which shall be announced at the start o f the programme. Member States are encouraged to 
adopt an annual rate of reduction, which shall be (X-20)%/5, where X equals the existing tariff 
rates o f individual Member States.
b. The subsequent reduction o f tariff rates from 20% or below shall be completed within a time 
frame o f  5 years. The rate o f reduction shall be at a minimum of 5% quantum per reduction. A 
programme o f  reduction to be decided by each Member State shall be announced at the start o f the 
programme.
c. For products with existing tariff rates o f  20% or below as at 1 January 1993, Member States 
shall decide upon a programme of tariff reductions, and announce at the start, the schedule o f tariff 
reductions.
2. The above schedules o f tariff reduction shall not prevent Member States from immediately reducing 
their tariffs to 0%-5% or following an accelerated schedule o f tariff reduction.
B. Enjoyment o f Concessions
Subject to Articles 4(A) (1 b) and 4(A) (1 c) o f the Agreement, products which reach, or are at tariff 
rates o f  20% or below, shall automatically enjoy the concessions.".
ARTICLE 4
The following be inserted after Article 9 as a new Article 9A to the Agreement:
"Accession o f New Members
N ew Members o f ASEAN shall accede to this Agreement on terms and conditions, which are 
consistent with the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (1992) and 
the Agreement, and which have been agreed between them and the existing Members o f ASEAN.".
ARTICLE 5
This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit o f instruments o f ratification or acceptance by all 
signatory governments with the Secretary-General o f  ASEAN which shall be done not later than 1 
January 1996.
This Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN, who shall promptly furnish a 
certified copy thereof to each Member Country.
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IN W ITNESS W HEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed the Protocol to Amend the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).




TO AMEND THE AGREEM ENT ON 
ASEAN PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEM ENTS
The Governments o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic o f  the 
Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore and the Kingdom o f Thailand, Member States o f the 
Association o f  South East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
NOTING the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)signed in Manila on 24 
February 1 977;
RECALLING the decision o f the Sixth ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council in Phuket, Thailand 
on 27 April 1995 to phase in all PTA products into the CEPT Scheme;
DESIRING to amend the Rules of Origin and its Operational Certification Procedures in the 
Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements in accordance with Article 1 7 (3) o f the 
Agreement which provides for the amendment to the Agreement, so as to implement this decision;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Annex 1 o f the Agreement on "Rules of Origin for the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements", 
previously amended by the Protocol on Improvements on Extension o f Tariff Preferences under the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements signed in Manila on 15 December 1987, and the 
"Operational Certification Procedures for the Rules o f Origin o f the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements" shall be substituted with the "Rules o f Origin for the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT)" Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the "Operational Certification Procedures 
for the Rules o f Origin o f the ASEAN Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area" set out in ANNEX 1 and ANNEX 2 respectively which shall form an integral part o f  
this Protocol.
This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit o f instruments o f ratification or acceptance by all 
signatory governments with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN which shall be done not later than 1 
January 1996.
This Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN, who shall promptly furnish 
certified copies thereof to all Member Countries.
IN W ITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed the Protocol to Amend the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements.
DONE at Bangkok, this 15th day of December 1995 in a single copy in the English Language.
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Annex 5 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
The Governments o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic o f  the 
Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore, the Kingdom o f Thailand, and the Socialist Republic o f  
Vietnam, Member States o f the Association o f South East Asian Nations (hereinafter referred to as 
"ASEAN");
RECOGNISING the Singapore Declaration o f 1992 which provides that ASEAN shall move towards 
a higher plane o f economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity;
RECALLING that the Heads o f  Government, at the Fourth Summit held in Singapore on 27-28 
January 1992 declared that an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) shall be established in the region;
NOTING that the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation signed in 
Singapore on 28 January 1992 provides that ASEAN Member States shall explore further measures on 
border and non-border areas o f cooperation to supplement and complement the liberalisation o f trade;
RECOGNISING that intra-ASEAN economic cooperation will secure a liberal trading framework for 
trade in services which would strengthen and enhance trade in services among ASEAN Member States;
DESIRING to mobilise the private sector in the realisation o f economic development o f ASEAN 
Member States in order to improve the efficiency and competitiveness o f their service industry sector;
REITERATING their commitments to the rules and principles o f the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (hereinafter referred to as "GATS") and noting that Article V o f GATS permits the liberalising 
o f trade in services between or among the parties to an economic integration agreement;
AFFIRM ING that ASEAN Member States shall extend to one another preference in trade in services; 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article I : Objectives
The objectives o f the Member States under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 
(hereinafter referred to as "this Framework Agreement") are:
(a) to enhance cooperation in services amongst Member States in order to improve the efficiency 
and competitiveness, diversify production capacity and supply and distribution o f services o f their 
service suppliers within and outside ASEAN;
(b) to eliminate substantially restrictions to trade in services amongst Member States; and
(c) to liberalise trade in services by expanding the depth and scope o f liberalisation beyond those 
undertaken by Member States under the GATS with the aim to realising a free trade area in 
services.
Article II : Areas of Cooperation
1 . All Member States shall participate in the cooperation arrangements under this Framework 
Agreement. However, taking cognizance o f  paragraph 3 o f  Article I o f this Framework Agreement 
on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, two or more Member States may proceed first if  
other Member States are not ready to implement these arrangements.
2. Member States shall strengthen and enhance existing cooperation efforts in service sectors and
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develop cooperation in sectors that are not covered by existing cooperation arrangements, through 
inter alia:
(a) establishing or improving infrastructural facilities;
(b) joint production, marketing and purchasing arrangements;
(c) research and development; and
(d) exchange o f information.
3. Member States shall identify sectors for cooperation and formulate Action Plans, 
Programmes and Understandings that shall provide details on the nature and extent o f  
cooperation.
Article III : Liberalisation
Pursuant to Article 1 (c), Member States shall liberalise trade in services in a substantial number o f  
sectors within a reasonable time-frame by:
(a) eliminating substantially all existing discriminatory measures and market access limitations 
amongst Member States; and
(b) prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures and market access limitations.
Article IV : Negotiation of Specific Commitments
1. Member States shall enter into negotiations on measures affecting trade in specific service 
sectors. Such negotiations shall be directed towards achieving commitments which are beyond 
those inscribed in each Member State's schedule o f  specific commitments under the GATS and for 
which Member States shall accord preferential treatment to one another on an MFN basis.
2. Each Member State shall set out in a schedule, the specific commitments it shall undertake 
under paragraph 1 .
3. The provisions o f this Framework Agreement shall not be so construed as to prevent any 
Member State from conferring or according advantages to adjacent countries in order to facilitate 
exchanges limited to contiguous frontier zones o f services that are both locally produced and 
consumed.
Article V : M utual Recognition
1 . Each Member State may recognise the education or experience obtained,requirements met, or 
licenses or certifications granted in another Member State, for the purpose o f licensing or 
certification o f service suppliers. Such recognition may be based upon an agreement or 
arrangement with the Member State concerned or may be accorded autonomously.
2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be so construed as to require any Member State to accept or to 
enter into such mutual recognition agreements or arrangements.
1. These agreements or arrangements are concluded for Member State only. In the event a Member
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State wishes to join such agreements or arrangements, it should be given equal opportunity to do at any 
time.
Article VI : Denial o f Benefits
The benefits o f  this Framework Agreement shall be denied to a service supplier who is a natural person 
o f a non-Member State or a juridical person owned or controlled by persons o f a non-Member State 
constituted under the laws o f a Member State, but not engaged in substantive business operations in the 
territory o f  Member State(s)
Article VII : Settlement of Disputes
1 . The Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism for ASEAN shall generally be referred to and 
applied with respect to any disputes arising from, or any differences between Member States 
concerning the interpretation or application of, this Framework Agreement or any arrangements 
arising therefrom.
2. A specific dispute settlement mechanism may be established for the purposes o f this Framework 
Agreement which shall form an integral part o f  this Framework Agreement.
Article VIII : Supplementary Agreements or Arrangements
Schedules o f  specific commitments and Understandings arising from subsequent negotiations under 
this Framework Agreement and any other agreements or arrangements, Action Plans and Programmes 
arising thereunder shall form an integral part o f this Framework Agreement.
Article IX : Other Agreements
1 . This Framework Agreement or any action taken under it shall not affect the rights and 
obligations o f  the Member States under any existing agreements2 to which they are parties.
2. Nothing in this Framework Agreement shall affect the rights o f the Member States to enter into 
other agreements not contrary to the principles, objectives and terms o f this Framework 
Agreement.
3. Upon the signing o f this Framework Agreement, Member States shall promptly notify the 
ASEAN Secretariat o f any agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in services to which that 
Member is a signatory.
2. Existing Agreements are not affected as these have been notified in the MFN Exemption List o f the 
GATS.
Article X : Modification of Schedules o f Specific Commitments
1 . A Member State may modify or withdraw any commitment in its schedule o f specific 
commitments, at any time after three years from the date on which that commitment entered into 
force provided:
(a) that it notifies other Member States and the ASEAN Secretariat o f the intent to modify 
or withdraw a commitment three months before the intended date o f implementation o f  
the modification or withdrawal; and
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(b) that it enters into negotiations with an affected Member State to agree to necessary 
compensatory adjustment.
2. In achieving a compensatory adjustment, Member States shall ensure that the general level 
o f mutually advantageous commitment is not less favourable to trade than that provided for in 
the schedules o f  specific commitments prior to such negotiations.
3. Compensatory adjustment shall be made on an MFN basis to all other Member States.
4. The SEOM with the endorsement o f the AEM may draw up additional procedures to give 
effect to this Article.
Article XI : Institutional Arrangements
1 . The SEOM shall carry out such functions to facilitate the operation o f this Framework Agreement 
and further its objectives, including the Organisation o f the conduct o f negotiations, review and 
supervision o f  the implementation o f this Framework Agreement.
2. The ASEAN Secretariat shall assist SEOM in carrying out its functions, including providing the 
support for supervising, coordinating and reviewing the implementation o f this Framework Agreement.
Article XII : Amendments
The provisions o f this Framework Agreement may be amended through the consent o f  all the Member 
States and such amendments shall become effective upon acceptance by all Member States.
Article XIII : Accession of New Members
New Members o f  ASEAN shall accede to this Framework Agreement on terms and conditions agreed 
between them and signatories to this Framework Agreement.
Article XIV : Final Provision
1 . The terms and definitions and other provisions o f the GATS shall be referred to and applied to 
matters arising under this Framework Agreement for which no specific provision has been made 
under it.
2. This Framework Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN, who 
shall promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State.
3. This Framework Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit o f instruments o f  ratification 
or acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN.
IN W ITNESS W HEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, 
have signed the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services.
DONE at Bangkok, this 15th day of December 1995 in a single copy in the English Language.
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Annex 6
ASEAN FRAM EW ORK AGREEMENT 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COOPERATION  
Bangkok, 15 December 1995
The Governments o f  Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic o f  
Philippines, the Republic o f  Singapore, the Kingdom o f Thailand and the Socialist Republic o f  
Vietnam, Member States o f  the Association o f South East Asian Nations (hereinafter referred to as 
"ASEAN");
RECOGNISING the important role o f intellectual property rights in the conduct o f trade and the flow  
o f investment among the Member States o f ASEAN and the importance of cooperation in intellectual 
property in the region;
DESIRING to foster closer cooperation in the field o f  intellectual property and related fields in order 
to provide a firm basis for economic progress, the expeditious realization o f the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area and prosperity among the Member States o f ASEAN;
RECOGNISING the need to promote closer cooperation and understanding among the countries in the 
region in the field o f intellectual property and related fields to contribute to regional dynamism, 
synergy and growth;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1 : Objectives
1 . Member States shall strengthen their cooperation in the field o f intellectual property through an 
open and outward looking attitude with a view to contributing to the promotion and growth o f  
regional and global trade liberalisation.
2. Member States shall promote cooperation in the field of intellectual property among government 
agencies as well as among the private sectors and professional bodies o f ASEAN.
3. Member States shall explore appropriate intra-ASEAN cooperation arrangements in the field o f  
intellectual property, contributing to the enhancement o f ASEAN solidarity as well as to the 
promotion o f technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination o f technology.
4. Member States shall explore the possibility o f setting up of an ASEAN patent system, including 
an ASEAN Patent Office, if  feasible, to promote the region-wide protection o f patent bearing in 
mind developments on regional and international protection of patent.
5. Member States shall explore the possibility o f setting up o f an ASEAN trademark system, 
including an ASEAN Trademark Office, if  feasible, to promote the region-wide protection o f  
trademark bearing in mind developments on regional and international protection o f trademarks.
6. Member States shall have consultations on the development o f their intellectual property 
regimes with a view to creating ASEAN standards and practices which are consistent with 
international standards.
Article 2 : Principles
1 . Member States shall abide by the principle o f mutual benefits in the implementation o f  
measures or initiatives aimed at enhancing ASEAN intellectual property cooperation.
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2. Member States, being mindful o f the international conventions on intellectual property rights to 
which they are parties, and the international obligations assumed under the provisions o f  the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights, shall implement intra- 
ASEAN intellectual property arrangements in a manner in line with the objectives, principles, and 
norms set out in such relevant conventions and the Agreement on TRIPS.
3. Member States shall strive to implement intra-ASEAN intellectual property cooperation 
arrangements which are beneficial to creators, producers and users o f intellectual property and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare.
4. Member States shall recognise and respect the protection and enforcement o f intellectual 
property rights in each Member State and the adoption o f measures necessary for the protection of  
public health and nutrition and the promotion o f the public interests in sectors o f vital importance 
to the Member State's socio economic and technological development, which are consistent with 
their international obligations.
5. Member States are conscious o f  and understand the necessity for each Member State to adopt 
appropriate measures to prevent the abuse o f intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain-trade or adversely affect the international transfer 
o f technology.
Article 3 : Scope of Cooperation
1 . Cooperation shall include, inter alia, the fields o f copyright and related rights, patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, undisclosed information and lay-out 
designs o f  integrated circuits.
2. Cooperative activities under this Agreement shall aim, among others, to strengthen ASEAN 
intellectual property administration; to enhance ASEAN cooperation in intellectual property 
enforcement and protection; and to explore the possibility o f setting up the ASEAN patent and 
trademark systems.
3. Cooperative activities under this Agreement shall include, inter alia;
3.1 Activities to enhance intellectual property enforcement and protection:
a. Effective protection and enforcement o f intellectual property rights;
b. Cross border measures cooperation;
c. Networking o f judicial authorities and intellectual property enforcement 
agencies..
3.2 Activities to strengthen ASEAN intellectual property administration such as:
a. automation to improve the administration o f intellectual property; and
b. the creation o f an ASEAN database on intellectual property registration.
3.3 Activities to strengthen intellectual property legislation such as:
a. comparative study o f the procedures, practices and administration o f  ASEAN 
intellectual property offices; and
b . activities related to the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and other
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recognised international intellectual property conventions.
3.4 Activities to promote human resources development such as:
a. Networking o f  intellectual property training facilities or centres o f  excellence on 
intellectual property and to explore the possibility o f establishing a regional training 
institute for intellectual property or other appropriate structures; and
b. Exchange o f intellectual property personnel and experts.
3.5 Activities to promote public awareness o f intellectual property rights.
3.6 Activities to promote private sector cooperation in intellectual property such as to explore 
the possibility o f :
a. The establishment o f  an ASEAN Intellectual Property Association; and
b. Providing arbitration services or other alternative disputere solution mechanisms for 
the resolution o f intellectual property disputes.
3.7 Information exchange on intellectual property issues.
3.8 Other cooperative activities as determined by Member States.
4. Details and the modalities to implement the cooperative activities are to be formulated in the form of  
a program o f  action on intellectual property under this framework Agreement.
Article 4 : Review of Cooperative Activities
An ASEAN mechanism shall be established, comprising representatives from Member States, to 
review the cooperative activities under this Agreement. It shall meet on a regular basis to review the 
progress o f  the cooperative activities and any arrangement arising therefrom and to submit its findings 
and recommendations to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM). The ASEAN  
Secretariat shall give necessary secretariat support to the mechanism.
Article 5 : Consultations
1. Any differences between the member States concerning the interpretation or application o f  this 
Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties.
2. Member States shall accord adequate opportunity for consultations regarding any 
representations made by other Member States in relation to the differences between them. If such 
differences cannot be settled amicably, they shall be dealt with by the SEOM and finally by the 
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting.
Article 6 : General Provisions
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice any existing or future bilateral or multilateral agreement 
entered into by any Member State or the national laws o f  each Member State relating to the protection 
and enforcement o f intellectual property rights.
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Article 7 : Funding
Activities under this Agreement will be subject to the availability o f funds. Expenses incurred as a 
result o f  any activity undertaken by a Member State to fulfil the objectives o f  this Agreement shall be 
borne by the Member State concerned unless all Member States decide otherwise.
Article 8 : Final Provisions
1. The respective Governments o f Member States shall undertake the appropriate measures to fulfil 
the agreed obligations arising from this Agreement.
2. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be made by consensus and shall become effective upon 
acceptance by all Member States.
3. N o reservation shall be made with respect to any o f the provisions o f this Agreement.
4. This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN who shall promptly 
furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State.
5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit o f instruments o f  ratification or 
acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN.
IN W ITNESS W HEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, 
have signed this ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation.




on the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme
The Governments o f  Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic o f  the 
Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic o f  
Vietnam, Member States o f the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
REAFFIRM ING their desire to collaborate for the acceleration o f economic growth in the region to 
promote greater industrialisation of their economies, to expand their trade and investment and to 
improve the economic infrastructure for the mutual benefit o f their people;
M INDFUL o f  the rapid development in the international economic environment and the need to 
maintain ASEAN's attractiveness and competitiveness as an investment region;
RECOGNIZING that the liberalization o f trade and investment in ASEAN Countries can support 
meaningful industrial cooperation which can greatly contribute to strengthening and broadening the 
base o f their industrial sector;
CONVINCED that ASEAN industrial cooperation will increase intra-ASEAN investment and 
investment from non-ASEAN sources;
CONVINCED ALSO that the sharing o f resources will foster closer ASEAN economic integration as 
well as enhance the technology base, economies of scale and scope, and the competitiveness of 
ASEAN industries;
NOTING the proposal by the ASEAN Chambers o f Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) on the 
ASEAN industrial cooperation scheme and the confidence expressed by the ASEAN-CCI in the 
viability o f  the scheme;
DESIRING to provide the guidelines and institutional framework within which the ASEAN private 
sector may collaborate on the basis o f mutual and equitable benefits for the ASEAN Member Countries 
and increased industrial production for the region as a whole;
M INDFUL o f  the need to develop the growth of Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) taking 
into consideration the stages o f development among ASEAN Member Countries;
ADHERING to the principles, concepts and ideals o f the Framework Agreement on Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation and the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area;




For the purposes o f this Agreement:
1. "AICO Scheme" shall mean the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme established by this 
Agreement.
2. "AICO Arrangement" shall mean a cooperative arrangement consisting o f a minimum o f two 
Participating Countries and one Participating Company in each Participating Country.
3. "Participating Countries" shall mean ASEAN Member Countries which agree to participate in an 
AICO Arrangement by granting the specified privileges to the Participating Companies.
4. "Participating Companies" shall mean companies incorporated and operating in ASEAN Member 
Countries meeting the criteria under Article 2(1) and Article 3 o f this Agreement.
5. "AICO Products" refer to the following:
a. AICO Final Products shall be the final output which does not undergo any further processing 
within the specific AICO arrangement; or
b. AICO Intermediate Products shall be products used within the AICO arrangement as an input to 
the AICO Final Product; or
c. AICO Raw Materials shall be used as input to an intermediate product or as direct input to the 
AICO Final Product;which shall be reflected in the Certificate o f Eligibility (COE) issued to the 
Participating Companies.
6. "Preferential Tariff Rates" shall mean the advanced CEPT rates fixed by Participating Countries 
within the range o f 0% to 5%.
7. "National Authorities" shall mean the relevant authorities o f ASEAN Member Countries responsible 




1. The AICO Arrangement shall be made up o f Participating Companies incorporated and operating in 
different ASEAN Member Countries which seek to cooperate in the manufacture o f  AICO Products.
2. The number o f Participating Companies in an AICO Arrangement may change subject to the defined 
minimum level.
3. An AICO Arrangement may have more than one Participating Company in each o f  the Participating 
Countries and may cover multiple products.
ARTICLE 3 
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
1. Companies wishing to benefit from the privileges o f the AICO Scheme shall fulfill the following
criteria:
a. be incorporated and operating in an ASEAN Member Country;
b. have a minimum o f 30% national equity. The equity condition may be waived after consultation 
by the Participating Countries in cases where the proposing companies meet the other criteria o f  
this Article; and
c. undertake resource sharing, industrial complementation or industrial cooperation activities.
2. Each Participating Company o f an AICO Arrangement must submit documentary evidence on 
resource sharing, industrial complementation or industrial cooperation activities such as joint ventures, 
joint manufacturing, technology transfer, training, licensing, consolidated purchasing and procurement, 
management service, sales and marketing agreement or other areas o f cooperation.
ARTICLE 4 
PRODUCT COVERAGE AND ELIGIBILITY
1. All products, other than products listed in Article 9 (General Exception) o f the Agreement o f  the 
CEPT Scheme, shall be eligible for the AICO Scheme.
2. Product approval shall be at HS 8-digit level and above.
3. An AICO Product shall meet the Rules of Origin o f the CEPT Scheme.
ARTICLE 5 
PRIVILEGES
1. A Participating Company shall be entitled to the following privileges under the AICO Scheme: a. 
approved AICO Products traded between Participating Companies shall enjoy preferential tariff rates 
o f 0%-5%, the actual rate o f which shall be determined by each Participating Country. The preferential 
tariff shall cease when the tariff rate of the product reaches the final CEPT rate; b. local content 
accreditation shall be accorded, where applicable, to products manufactured by Participating 
Companies; and c. non-tariff incentives offered by the respective National Authorities. The granting of 
these incentives shall be based on the fulfillment o f the requirements o f the respective Participating 
Country.
2. ASEAN Member Countries may subsequently introduce additional tariff and non-tariff incentives 
under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 6
OPERATING GUIDELINES AND AWARD PRINCIPLES
1. An AICO Arrangement shall only require the approval o f the Participating Countries.
2. A Participating Company shall be accorded the privileges under this Agreement upon the approval 
o f  its application in accordance with the provisions o f Article 7.
3. The approval o f an AICO Arrangement shall not be limited to the initial applicants manufacturing a 
particular AICO Product. Subsequent applications from companies manufacturing the same AICO 
Products shall also be approved once the companies meet the eligibility criteria.
4. A prospective company in a non-participating Member Country could participate in an on-going 
AICO Arrangement if the non-participating country agrees to extend the preferential tariff rates to the 
AICO Products and upon the agreement o f the existing Participating Countries.
5. A Participating Company shall use the intermediate parts and raw materials only in the manufacture 
o f AICO Products. A Participating Country may withdraw the privileges under this Agreement if  a 




1. Interested companies wishing to participate in an AICO Arrangement shall apply directly to the 
National Authorities for approval.
2. ASEAN Member Countries shall inform the ASEAN Secretariat o f their participation in an AICO 
Arrangement and the tariff rate to be applied within the 0%-5% band, within 60 days o f  receipt o f the 
application. ASEAN Member Countries which are unable to indicate a decision on the tariff rate within 
this period shall nevertheless indicate their decision on acceptance or otherwise, o f the arrangement and 
the product as an AICO Product.
3. The ASEAN Secretariat shall issue the COE within 14 days o f the receipt o f approval from 
Participating Countries.
4. The Participating Company shall use the COE to claim preferential tariff rates and to apply for non- 
tariff incentives from the relevant National Authorities.
5. Participating Countries shall grant the Preferential Tariff Rates within 60 days from the date o f the 
issuance o f  the COE by the ASEAN Secretariat.
ARTICLE 8 
MONITORING BODY
1. National Authorities shall monitor the implementation of their respective AICO Arrangements. The 
ASEAN Secretariat shall be responsible for the overall monitoring o f the AICO Scheme. For this 
purpose, Participating Countries shall submit regular reports on the AICO Arrangements in their 
respective countries to the ASEAN Secretariat.
2. The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) Meeting and its subsidiary bodies shall review the progress 
and implementation o f the AICO Scheme.
ARTICLE 9 
SETTLEM ENT OF DISPUTE 
Any differences between the ASEAN Member Countries concerning the interpretation or application o f  
this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties. If such differences 
cannot be settled amicably, it shall be submitted to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
ARTICLE 10 
ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS 
New Members o f  ASEAN shall accede to this Agreement by signing and depositing the instrument o f  
ratification with the Secretary General o f ASEAN.
ARTICLE 11 
OTHER PROVISIONS
1. The scope o f  coverage o f this Agreement shall subsequently be expanded to include additional 
sectors.
2. Participating Countries shall eliminate all quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers applicable 
to an approved AICO product.
ARTICLE 12 
REPEALING PROVISION
Upon the entry into force, this Agreement shall supersede the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial 
Joint Ventures (AIJVs) dated 15 December 1987 and the Memorandum o f Understanding on the 
Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC) Scheme dated 18 October 1988 subject to the following 
conditions:
a. that BBC and AIJV applications shall not be accepted upon entry into force o f this Agreement;
b. only amendments to approved models in the BBC Scheme shall be allowed;
c. that existing BBC companies shall continue to enjoy the margin o f  preference and the local 
content accreditation for products approved to this date until the expiry o f the current car model 
previously approved; and
d. for existing AIJVs, the privileges shall cease on 31 December 2002. With effect from 1 January 
2003 the final CEPT rate shall apply.
ARTICLE 13 
FINAL PROVISIONS
1. The respective Governments of ASEAN Member Countries shall undertake the appropriate measures 
to fulfill the obligations arising from this Agreement;
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2. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be made by consensus and shall become effective upon 
acceptance by all ASEAN Member Countries.
3. No reservation shall be made with respect to any o f  the provisions o f  this Agreement;
4. This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General o f  ASEAN who shall promptly 
furnish a certified copy thereof to each ASEAN Member Country; and
5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit o f  instruments o f  ratification or acceptance by 
all signatory Governments with the Secretary General o f ASEAN.
IN W ITNESS HEREOF, the undersigned have signed this Agreement on ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation Scheme.
DONE at Singapore, this 27th day o f April 1996 in a single copy in the English Language.
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Annex 8 
Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The Governments o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic o f  the 
Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore, the Kingdom o f Thailand and the Socialist Republic o f  
Vietnam, Member States o f the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
RECALLING the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation signed in 
Singapore on 28 January 1992, as amended by the Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on 
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation signed in Bangkok on 15 December 1995 (the 
"Agreement");
RECOGNIZING the need to expand Article 9 o f the Agreement to strengthen the mechanism for the 
settlement o f disputes in the area o f ASEAN economic cooperation;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS :
ARTICLE 1 
Coverage and Application
1. The rules and procedures o f this Protocol shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation 
and dispute settlement provisions o f the Agreement as well as the agreements listed in Appendix 1 and 
future ASEAN economic agreements (the "covered agreements").
2. The rules and procedures o f this Protocol shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and 
procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements. To the extent that there is a 
difference between the rules and procedures o f this Protocol and the special or additional rules and 
procedures in the covered agreements, the special or additional rules and procedures shall prevail.
3. The provisions o f this Protocol are without prejudice to the rights o f Member States to seek recourse 
to other fora for the settlement of disputes involving other Member States. A Member State involved in 
a dispute can resort to other fora at any stage before the Senior Economic Officials Meeting ("SEOM") 
has made a ruling on the panel report.
ARTICLE 2 
Consultations
1. Member States shall accord adequate opportunity for consultations regarding any representations 
made by other Member States with respect to any matter affecting the implementation, interpretation or 
application o f  the Agreement or any covered agreement. Any differences shall, as far as possible, be 
settled amicably between the Member States.
2. Member States which consider that any benefit accruing to them directly or indirectly, under the 
Agreement or any covered agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the attainment o f any 
objective o f the Agreement or any covered agreement is being impeded as a result o f  failure o f another 
Member State to carry out its obligations under the Agreement or any covered agreement, or the 
existence o f any other situation may, with a view to achieving satisfactory settlement o f the matter, 
make representations or proposals to the other Member State concerned, which shall give due 
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
3. If a request for consultations is made, the Member State to which the request is made shall reply to 
the request within ten (10) days after the date o f its receipt and shall enter into consultations within a 
period of no more than thirty (30) days after the date o f receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solution.
ARTICLE 3 
Good Offices, Conciliation or Mediation
1. Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to good offices, conciliation or 
mediation. They may begin at any time and be terminated at any time. Once procedures for good 
offices, conciliation or mediation are terminated, a complaining party may then proceed to raise the 
matter to SEOM.
2. If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may continue 
while the dispute proceeds.
ARTICLE 4 
Senior Economic Officials Meeting
1. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within sixty (60) days after the date o f receipt o f the 
request for consultations, the matter shall be raised to the SEOM.
2. The SEOM shall:
a) establish a panel; or
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b) where applicable, raise the matter to the special body in charge o f  the special or additional rules 
and procedures for its consideration.
3. Notwithstanding Article 4 paragraph 2, if  the SEOM considers it desirable to do so in a particular 
case, it may decide to deal with the dispute to achieve an amicable settlement without appointing a 




1. The function o f  the panel is to make an objective assessment o f the dispute before it, including an 
examination o f  the facts o f the case and the applicability o f and conformity with the sections o f the 
Agreement or any covered agreement, and make such other findings as will assist the SEOM in making 
the rulings provided for under the Agreement or any covered agreement.
2. The SEOM shall establish a panel no later than thirty (30) days after the date on which the dispute 
has been raised to it.
3. The SEOM shall make the final determination o f the size, composition and terms o f  reference o f the 
panel.
ARTICLE 6 
Function of the Panel
1. The panel shall, apart from the matters covered in Appendix 2, regulate its own procedures in 
relation to the rights o f  parties to be heard and its deliberations.
2. The panel shall submit its findings to the SEOM within sixty (60) days o f its formation. In 
exceptional cases, the panel may take an additional ten (10) days to submit its findings to SEOM. 
Within this time period, the panel shall accord adequate opportunity to the parties to the dispute to 
review the report before submission.
3. The panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body 
which it deems appropriate. A Member State should respond promptly and fully to any request by a 
panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate.
4. Panel deliberations shall be confidential. The reports o f panels shall be drafted without the presence 
o f the parties to the dispute in the light o f the information provided and the statements made.
ARTICLE 7 
Treatment of Panel Result 
The SEOM shall consider the report o f the panel in its deliberations and make a ruling on the dispute 
within thirty (30) days from the submission o f the report by the panel. In exceptional cases, SEOM may 
take an additional ten (10) days to make a ruling on the dispute. SEOM representatives from Member 
States which are parties to a dispute can be present during the process o f deliberation but shall not 
participate in the ruling of SEOM. SEOM shall make a ruling based on simple majority.
ARTICLE 8 
Appeal
1. Member States, who are parties to the dispute, may appeal the ruling by the SEOM to the ASEAN  
Economic Ministers ("AEM") within thirty (30) days of the ruling.
2. The AEM shall make a decision within thirty (30) days o f the appeal. In exceptional cases, AEM 
may take an additional ten (10) days to make a decision on the dispute. Economic Ministers from 
Member States which are parties to a dispute can be present during the process o f deliberation but shall 
not participate in the decision of AEM. AEM shall make a decision based on simple majority. The 
decision o f  the AEM on the appeal shall be final and binding on all parties to the dispute.
3. Since prompt compliance with the rulings of the SEOM or decisions o f the AEM is essential in order 
to ensure effective resolution of disputes. Member States who are parties to the dispute shall comply 
with the ruling or decision, as the case may be, within a reasonable time period. The reasonable period 
o f time shall be a period of time mutually agreed to by the parties to the dispute but under no 
circumstances should it exceed thirty (30) days from the SEOM's ruling or in the event o f  an appeal 
thirty (30) days from the AEM's decision. The Member States concerned shall provide the SEOM or 
the AEM, as the case may be, with a status report in writing of their progress in the implementation o f  
the ruling or decision.
ARTICLE 9
Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions
1. If the Member State concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with the 
Agreement or any covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with SEOM's 
rulings or AEM's decisions within the reasonable period of time, such Member State shall, if  so 
requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period o f time, enter into negotiations with any 
party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable
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compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 (twenty) days after the date 
o f expiry o f  the reasonable period o f time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures 
may request authorization from the AEM to suspend the application to the Member State concerned o f  
concessions or other obligations under the Agreement or any covered agreements.
2. However, neither compensation nor the suspension o f concessions or other obligations is preferred to 




Member States agree that the total period for the disposal o f a dispute pursuant to Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8 and 9 o f this Protocol shall not exceed two hundred and ninety (290) days.
ARTICLE 11 
Responsibilities of the Secretariat
1. The ASEAN Secretariat shall have the responsibility o f assisting the panels, especially on the 
historical and procedural aspects o f the matters dealt with, and o f providing secretarial and technical 
support.
2. The ASEAN Secretariat shall have the responsibility o f monitoring and maintaining under 
surveillance the implementation of the SEOM's ruling and AEM's decision as the case may be.
3. The ASEAN Secretariat may offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting 
Members to settle a dispute.
ARTICLE 12 
Final Provisions
1. This Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN who shall promptly furnish a 
certified copy thereof to each Member State.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit o f instruments o f ratification or acceptance by 
all signatory governments with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN.
IN W ITNESS W HEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
DONE at Manila, this 20th day o f November 1996 in a single copy in the English Language.
For the Government o f Brunei Darussalam :
(signed)
ABDUL RAHMAN TAIB
Minister o f Industry and Primary Resources
For the Government o f  the Republic o f Indonesia:
(signed)
T. ARIW IBOW O
Minister o f  Industry and Trade
For the Government o f Malaysia: 
(signed)
RAFIDAH AZIZ
Minister o f International Trade and Industry
For the Government o f  the Republic o f  the Philippines : 
(signed)
CESAR B. BAUTISTA
Secretary o f  Trade and Industry
For the Government o f  the Republic o f  Singapore:
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(signed)
YEO CHEOW  TONG
Minister for Trade and Industry
For the Government o f  the Kingdom o f  Thailand: 
(signed)
SUKON KANCHANALAI
Deputy Minister o f Commerce
For the Government o f the Socialist Republic o f Vietnam: 
(signed)
LE VAN TRIET
Minister o f Trade
APPENDIX 1 
COVERED AGREEMENTS
1. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights ofNon-Scheduled Services among ASEAN, Manila, 
13 March 1971.
2. Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, Manila, 24 February 1977.
3. Memorandum o f Understanding on the ASEAN Swap Arrangements, Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 
1977.
4. Supplementary Agreement to the Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement, Washington D.C., 26 September 1978.
5. Second Supplementary Agreement to the Memorandum o f Understanding on the ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement, Denpasar, Bali, 9 September 1979.
6. Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve, New York, 4 October 1979.
7. Basic Agreement on A S E A N  Industrial Projects, Kuala Lumpur, 6 March 1980.
8. Supplementary Agreement of the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects ASEAN Urea 
Project (Indonesia), Kuala Lumpur, 6 March 1980.
9. Supplementary Agreement of the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects ASEAN Urea 
Project (Malaysia), Kuala Lumpur, 6 March 1980.
10. Amendments to the Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Swap Arrangement Colombo, 
Sri Lanka, 16 January 1981.
11. Basic Agreement on A S E A N  Industrial Complementation, Manila, 18 June 1981.
12. Third Supplementary Agreement to the Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement, Bangkok, 4 February 1982.
13. ASEAN Ministerial Understanding on Plant Quarantine Ring, Kuala Lumpur, 8-9 October 1982.
14. ASEAN Ministerial Understanding on the Standardization o f Import and Quarantine Regulation on 
Animal and Animal Products, Kuala Lumpur, 8-9 October 1982.
15. Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve, Bangkok, 22 October 
1982.
16. ASEAN Customs Code o f Conduct, Jakarta, 18 March 1983.
17. ASEAN Ministerial Understanding on Fisheries Cooperation, Singapore, 20-22 October 1983.
18. Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, Jakarta, 7 November 1983.
19. ASEAN Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Agricultural Cooperatives, Manila, 
4-5 October 1984.
20. ASEAN Ministerial Understanding on Plant Pest Free Zone, Manila, 4-5 October 1984.
21. Agreement on ASEAN Energy Cooperation, Manila, 24 June 1986.
22. ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, Manila, 24 June 1986.
23. Agreement on the Preferential Shortlisting o f ASEAN Contractors, Jakarta, 20 October 1986.
24. Supplementary Agreement to the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, 
Singapore, 16 June 1987.
25. Fourth Supplementary Agreement to the Memorandum o f Understanding on the ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement, Kathmandu, Nepal, 21 January 1987.
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26. Protocol on Improvements on Extensions o f Tariff Preferences under the ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangement, Manila, 15 December 1987.
27. Memorandum o f Understanding on Standstill and Rollback on Non-Tariff Barriers among ASEAN  
Countries, Manila, 15 December 1987.
28. Revised Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, Manila, 15 December 1987.
29. Agreement Among the Government o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Republic o f the Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore, and the Kingdom o f Thailand for the 
Promotion and Protection o f Investments, Manila, 15 December 1987.
30. Protocol on Improvements on Extension o f Tariff Preferences under the ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangement, Manila, 15 December 1987.
31. Agreement on the Establishment of the A S E A N  Tourism Information Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 26 
September 1988.
32. Financial Regulations o f the ASEAN Tourism Information Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 26 September 
1988.
33. Memorandum o f Understanding Brand-to-Brand Complementation on the Automotive Industry 
Under the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation (BAAIC), Pattaya, Thailand, 18 
October 1988.
34. Protocol to Amend the Revised Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, 1 January 
1991.
35. Supplementary Agreement to the Basic Agreement on ASEAN industrial Projects - ASEAN Potash 
Mining Projects (Thailand), Kuala Lumpur, 20 July 1991.
36. Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
Singapore, 28 January 1992.
37. Second Protocol to Amend the Revised Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, 
Manila, 23 October 1992.
38. Ministerial Understanding on A S E A N  Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Bandar Seri 
Begawan, 28-30 October 1993.
39. Memorandum o f Understanding on A S E A N  Cooperation and Joint Approaches in Agriculture and 
Forest Products Promotion Scheme, Langkawi, Malaysia, 1994.
40. Third Protocol to Amend the Revised Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, 2 
March 1995.
41. Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme 
for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Bangkok, 15 December 1995.
42. Protocol to Amend the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, Bangkok, 15 
December 1995.
43. ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, Bangkok, 15 December 1995.
44. ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, Bangkok, 15 December 
1995.
45. Protocol Amending the Agreement on ASEAN Energy Cooperation, Bangkok, 15 December 1995.
46. Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Cooperation, Singapore, 26 April 1996.
47. Protocol to Amend the Agreement Among the Government o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f  
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic o f Singapore, and the Kingdom of  
Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Jakarta, 12 September 1996.
APPENDIX 2 
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
I. Composition of Panels
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, 
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served in the Secretariat, taught or 
published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official o f a Member 
State. In the nomination to the panels, preference shall be given to individuals who are nationals o f  
ASEAN Member States.
2. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence o f  the members, a 
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum o f experience.
3. Nationals o f Member States whose governments are parties to the dispute shall not serve on a panel 
concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
4. To assist in the selection o f panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list o f  governmental 
and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, from which 
panelists may be drawn as appropriate. Members may periodically suggest names o f  governmental and 
non-governmental individuals for inclusion on the indicative list, providing relevant information on
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their knowledge o f  international trade and o f the sectors or subject matter o f the covered agreements, 
and those names shall be added to the list upon approval by the SEOM. For each o f  the individuals on 
the list, the list shall indicate specific areas o f experience or expertise o f the individuals in the sectors 
or subject matter o f the covered agreements.
5. Panels shall be composed o f three panelists unless the parties to the dispute agree, within 10 days 
from the establishment o f the panel, to a panel composed o f five panelists. Members shall be informed 
promptly o f  the composition o f the panel.
6. The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the parties to the dispute. The parties to 
the dispute shall not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons.
7. If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date o f the establishment o f  a panel, 
at the request o f  either party, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the SEOM Chairman, shall 
determine the composition o f the panel by appointing the panelists whom the Secretary-General 
considers most appropriate in accordance with any relevant special or additional rules or procedures o f  
the covered agreement or covered agreements which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with 
the parties to the dispute. The SEOM Chairman shall inform the Members o f the composition o f the 
panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the Chairman receives such a request.
8. Member States shall undertake, as a general rule, to permit their officials to serve as panelists.
9. Panelists shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as 
representatives o f any organization. Member States shall therefore not give them instructions nor seek 
to influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a panel.
II. Panel Proceedings
1. In its proceedings the panel shall follow the relevant provisions o f this Protocol. In addition, the 
following working procedures shall apply.
2. The panel shall meet in closed session. The parties to the dispute, and interested parties, shall be 
present at the meetings only when invited by the panel to appear before it.
3. The deliberations of the panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing 
in this Protocol shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements o f its own positions to the 
public. Member States shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member State to the 
panel which that Member State has designated as confidential. Where a party to a dispute submits a 
confidential version o f its written submissions to the panel, it shall also, upon request o f  a Member 
State, provide a non-confidential summary o f the information contained in its submissions that could be 
disclosed to the public.
4. Before the first substantive meeting of the panel with the parties, the parties to the dispute shall 
transmit to the panel written submissions in which they present the facts o f the case and their 
arguments.
5. At its first substantive meeting with the parties, the panel shall ask the party which has brought the 
complaint to present its case. Subsequently, and still at the same meeting, the party against which the 
complaint has been brought shall be asked to present its point o f view.
6. Formal rebuttals shall be made at a second substantive meeting of the panel. The party complained 
against shall have the right to take the floor first to be followed by the complaining party. The parties 
shall submit, prior to that meeting, written rebuttals to the panel.
7. The panel may at any time put questions to the parties and ask them for explanations either in the 
course o f  a meeting with the parties or in writing.
8. The parties to the dispute shall make available to the panel a written version o f  their oral statements.
9. In the interest o f full transparency, the presentations, rebuttals and statements referred to in 
paragraphs 5 to 9 shall be made in the presence o f the parties. Moreover, each party's written 
submissions, including any comments on the descriptive part o f the report and responses to questions 
put by the panel, shall be made available to the other party or parties.
10. Any additional procedures specific to the panel.
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Annex 9
FRAM EW ORK AGREEM ENT ON THE ASEAN INVESTM ENT AREA
The Governments o f Brunei Darussalam, the Republic o f Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, the Union o f Myanmar, the Republic o f the Philippines, the Republic o f  
Singapore, the Kingdom o f Thailand and the Socialist Republic o f Vietnam, Member States o f the 
Association o f  South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
REAFFIRMING the importance o f sustaining economic growth and development in all Member States 
through joint efforts in liberalising trade and promoting intra-ASEAN trade and investment flows 
enshrined in the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Co-operation signed in 
Singapore on 28 January 1992;
RECALLING the decision o f the Fifth ASEAN Summit held on 15 December 1995 to establish an 
ASEAN Investment Area (hereinafter referred to as "AIA"), in order to enhance ASEAN’s 
attractiveness and competitiveness for promoting direct investments;
AFFIRMING their commitment to the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments and its 1996 Protocol to enhance investor confidence for investing in ASEAN;
MINDFUL o f  the decision to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the implementation o f  
the ASEAN Industrial Co-operation (AICO) Scheme, to encourage greater investment flows into the 
region;
RECOGNISING that direct investment is an important source o f finance for sustaining the pace o f  
economic, industrial, infrastructure and technology development; hence, the need to attract higher and 
sustainable level o f direct investment flows in ASEAN;
DETERMINED to realise the vision o f ASEAN to establish a competitive ASEAN Investment Area 
through a more liberal and transparent investment environment by 1st January 2010; and 
BEARING IN MIND that the measures agreed upon to establish a competitive ASEAN Investment 
Area by 2010 shall contribute towards ASEAN Vision 2020.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1 
Definition
For the purpose o f this Agreement:
"ASEAN investor " means -
i. a national o f  a Member State; or
ii. any juridical person o f a Member State,
making an investment in another Member State, the effective ASEAN equity o f  which taken 
cumulatively with all other ASEAN equities fulfills at least the minimum percentage required 
to meet the national equity requirement and other equity requirements o f  domestic laws and 
published national policies, if  any, o f the host country in respect o f that investment.
For the purpose o f this definition, equity o f nationals or juridical persons o f  any Member State 
shall be deemed to be the equity o f nationals or juridical persons o f the host country.
"effective ASEAN equity" in respect o f an investment in an ASEAN Member State means 
ultimate holdings by nationals or juridical persons o f ASEAN Member States in that 
investment. Where the shareholding/equity structure of an ASEAN investor makes it difficult 
to establish the ultimate holding structure, the rules and procedures for determining effective 
equity used by the Member State in which the ASEAN investor is investing may be applied. If 
necessary, the Co-ordinating Committee on Investment shall prepare guidelines for this 
purpose.
"juridical person" means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organised under 
applicable law o f a Member State, whether for profit or otherwise, and whether privately- 
owned or govemmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint venture, 
sole proprietorship or association.
"measures" means laws, regulations, rules, procedures, decisions, administrative actions, or 
any other actions affecting investments taken by Member States.
"national" means a natural person having the citizenship o f a Member State in accordance 
with its applicable laws.
ARTICLE 2 
Coverage
This Agreement shall cover all direct investments other than -
a. portfolio investments; and
b. matters relating to investments covered by other ASEAN Agreements, such as the ASEAN  




The objectives o f  this Agreement are:
a. to establish a competitive ASEAN Investment Area with a more liberal and transparent 
investment environment amongst Member States in order to -
i. substantially increase the flow o f investments into ASEAN from both A SEA N  and 
non-ASEAN sources;
ii. jointly promote ASEAN as the most attractive investment area;
iii. strengthen and increase the competitiveness o f ASEAN's economic sectors;
iv. progressively reduce or eliminate investment regulations and conditions which may 
impede investment flows and the operation o f investment projects in ASEAN; and




The AIA shall be an area where:
a. there is a co-ordinated ASEAN investment co-operation programme that will generate 
increased investments from ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources;
b. national treatment is extended to ASEAN investors by 2010, and to all investors by 2020, 
subject to the exceptions provided for under this Agreement;
c. all industries are opened for investment to ASEAN investors by 2010 and to all investors by 
2020, subject to the exceptions provided for under this Agreement;
d. the business sector has a larger role in the co-operation efforts in relation to investments and 
related activities in ASEAN; and




To realise the objectives referred to in Article 3, the Member States shall:
a. ensure that measures and programmes are undertaken on a fair and mutually beneficial basis;
b. undertake appropriate measures to ensure transparency and consistency in the application and 
interpretation o f their investment laws, regulations and administrative procedures in order to 
create and maintain a predictable investment regime in ASEAN;
c. begin the process o f facilitation, promotion and liberalisation which would contribute 
continuously and significantly to achieving the objective o f a more liberal and transparent 
investment environment;
d. take appropriate measures to enhance the attractiveness o f  the investment environment o f  
Member States for direct investment flows; and
e. take such reasonable actions as may be available to them to ensure observance o f  the 
provisions o f  this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within 
their territories.
ARTICLE 6 
Programmes and Action Plans
1. Member States shall, for the implementation o f the obligations under this Agreement, 
undertake the joint development and implementation o f the following programmes:
a. co-operation and facilitation programme as specified in Schedule I;
b. promotion and awareness programme as specified in Schedule II; and
c. liberalisation programme as specified in Schedule III.
2. Member States shall submit Action Plans for the implementation o f the programmes in
paragraph 1 to the AIA Council established under Article 16 o f this Agreement.
3. The Action Plans shall be reviewed every 2 years to ensure that the objectives o f  this 
Agreement are achieved.
ARTICLE 7
Opening Up of Industries and National Treatment
1. Subject to the provisions o f this Article, each Member State shall:
a. open immediately all its industries for investments by ASEAN investors;
b. accord immediately to ASEAN investors and their investments, in respect o f all 
industries and measures affecting investment including but not limited to the 
admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation and
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disposition o f  investments, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
like investors and investments ("national treatment").
2. Each Member State shall submit a Temporary Exclusion List and a Sensitive List, if any, 
within 6 months after the date o f signing o f this Agreement, o f  any industries or measures 
affecting investments (referred to in paragraph 1 above) with regard to which it is unable to 
open up or to accord national treatment to ASEAN investors. These lists shall form an annex 
to this Agreement. In the event that a Member State, for justifiable reasons, is unable to 
provide any list within the stipulated period, it may seek an extension from the AIA Council.
3. The Temporary Exclusion List shall be reviewed every 2 years and shall be progressively 
phased out by 2010 by all Member States except the Socialist Republic o f  Vietnam, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic and the Union of Myanmar. The Socialist Republic o f Vietnam 
shall progressively phase out the Temporary Exclusion List by 2013 and the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic and the Union o f Myanmar shall progressively phase out their 
Temporary Exclusion Lists by 2015.
4. The Sensitive List shall be reviewed by 1 January 2003 and at such subsequent periodic 
intervals as may be decided by the AIA Council.
ARTICLE 8 
Most Favoured Nation Treatment
1. Subject to Articles 7 and 9 o f this Agreement, each Member State shall accord immediately 
and unconditionally to investors and investments o f another Member State, treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to investors and investments o f any other Member State with 
respect to all measures affecting investment including but not limited to the admission, 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation and disposition o f investments.
2. In relation to investments falling within the scope o f this Agreement, any preferential 
treatment granted under any existing or future agreements or arrangements to which a 
Member State is a party shall be extended on the most favoured nation basis to all other 
Member States.
3. The requirement in paragraph 2 shall not apply to existing agreements or arrangements 
notified by Member States to the AIA Council within 6 months after the date o f signing o f  this 
Agreement.
4. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall prevent any Member State from conferring special treatment or 
advantages to adjacent countries under growth triangles and other sub- regional arrangements 
between Member States.
ARTICLE 9 
W aiver of Most Favoured Nation Treatment
1. Where a Member State is temporarily not ready to make concessions under Articles 7 o f this 
Agreement, and another Member State has made concessions under the said Article, then the 
first mentioned Member State shall waive its rights to such concessions. However, if  a 
Member State which grants such concessions is willing to forego the waiver, then the first 
mentioned Member State can still enjoy these concessions.
2. Having regard to the late entry into ASEAN of the Socialist Republic o f  Vietnam, the Lao
People's Democratic Republic and the Union o f Myanmar, the provisions o f  paragraph 1 o f  
this Article shall only apply to the Socialist Republic o f Vietnam for a period o f  3 years, and 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Union o f Myanmar for a period o f 5 years 
from the date this Agreement comes into force.
ARTICLE 10 
Modification of Schedules, Annexes and Action Plans
1. Any modification to Schedules I and II, and Action Plans thereof shall be subject to the 
approval o f the Co-ordinating Committee on Investments (CCI) established under Article 16 
(4) o f  this Agreement.
2. Any modification to or withdrawal o f any commitments in Schedule III and Action Plans
thereof and the Annexes shall be subject to the consideration o f the AIA Council in
accordance with the provisions o f the ASEAN Protocol on Notification Procedures.
ARTICLE 11
Transparency
1. Each Member State shall make available to the AIA Council through publication or any other 
means, all relevant measures, laws, regulations and administrative guidelines which pertain to, 
or affect, the operation o f this Agreement. This shall also apply to international agreements 
pertaining to or affecting investment to which a Member State is also a signatory.
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2. Each Member State shall promptly and at least annually inform the AIA Council o f the 
introduction o f any new or any changes to existing laws, regulations or administrative
, guidelines which significantly affect investments or its commitments under this Agreement.
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Member State to provide confidential 
information, the disclosure o f which would impede law enforcement, or otherwise be contrary 
to the public interest, or which would prejudice legitimate commercial interests o f particular 
enterprises, public or private.
ARTICLE 12 
Other Agreements
1. Member States affirm their existing rights and obligations under the 1987 ASEAN Agreement 
for the Promotion and Protection o f Investments and its 1996 Protocol. In the event that this 
Agreement provides for better or enhanced provisions over the said Agreement and its 
Protocol, then such provisions o f this Agreement shall prevail.
2. This Agreement or any action taken under it shall not affect the rights and obligations o f the 
Member States under existing agreements to which they are parties.
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights o f the Member States to enter into other 
agreements not contrary to the principles, objectives and terms o f this Agreement.
ARTICLE 13 
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on investment flows, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member State o f measures;
a. necessary to protect national security and public morals;
b. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
c. necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions o f this Agreement including those relating to:
i. the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects o f a 
defauit on investment agreement.
ii. the protection o f the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and 
dissemination o f personal data and the protection o f confidentiality o f individual 
records and accounts.
iii. safety.
d. aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection o f direct taxes in respect
o f  investments or investors o f Member States.
ARTICLE 14 
Emergency Safeguard Measures
1. If, as a result o f the implementation of the liberalisation programme under this Agreement, a 
Member state suffers or is threatened with any serious injury and threat, the Member State 
may take emergency safeguard measures to the extent and for such period as may be 
necessary to prevent or to remedy such injury. The measures taken shall be provisional and 
without discrimination.
2. Where emergency safeguard measures are taken pursuant to this Article, notice o f  such 
measure shall be given to the AIA Council within 14 days from the date such measures are 
taken.
3. The AIA Council shall determine the definition o f serious injury and threat o f serious injury 
and the procedures of instituting emergency safeguards measures pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 15 
Measures to Safeguard the Balance of Payments
1. In the event o f serious balance o f payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof, 
a Member State may adopt or maintain restrictions on investments on which it has undertaken 
specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for transactions related to such 
commitments. It is recognised that particular pressures on the balance o f  payments o f a 
Member State in the process o f economic development or economic transition may necessitate 
the use o f restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance o f a level o f  financial reserves 
adequate for the implementation o f its programme o f economic development or economic 
transition.
2. Where measures to safeguard balance o f payments are taken pursuant to this Article notice o f  
such measures shall be given to the AIA Council within 14 days from the date such measures 
are taken.
441
3. The measures referred to in paragraph (1):
a. shall not discriminate among Member States;
b. shall be consistent with the Articles o f  Agreement o f  the International Monetary 
Fund;
c. shall avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial interests 
o f any other Member State;
d. shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described in 
paragraph I; and
e. shall be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation specified in 
paragraph 1 improves.
4. The Member States adopting the balance o f payments measures shall commence consultations 
with the AIA Council and other Member States within 90 days from the date o f notification in 
order to review the balance of payment measures adopted by it.
5. The AIA Council shall determine the rules applicable to the procedures under this Article.
ARTICLE 16 
Institutional Arrangements
1. The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) shall establish an ASEAN Investment Area Council 
( in this Agreement referred to as "the AIA Council" ) comprising the Ministers responsible 
for investment and the Secretary-General o f ASEAN. The ASEAN Heads o f Investment 
Agencies shall participate in the AIA Council meetings.
2. Notwithstanding Article 21 o f this Agreement, the AIA Council shall be established upon the 
signing o f  this Agreement.
3. The AIA Council shall supervise, co-ordinate and review the implementation of this 
Agreement and assist the AEM in all matters relating thereto.
4. In the performance o f its functions, the A IA  Council shall establish a Co-ordinating 
Committee on Investment (C C I)  comprising senior officials responsible for investment and 
other senior officials from relevant government agencies.
5. The Co-ordinating Committee on Investment shall report to the AIA Council through the 
Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM).
6. The ASEAN Secretariat shall be the secretariat to the AIA Council and the Co-ordinating 
Committee on Investment (CCI).
ARTICLE 17 
Settlement of Disputes
1. The Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism for ASEAN shall apply in relation to any 
dispute arising from, or any differences between Member States concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Agreement or any arrangement arising therefrom.
2. If necessary, a specific dispute settlement mechanism may be established for the purpose o f  
this Agreement which shall form an integral part o f this Agreement.
ARTICLE 18
Amendments
Any amendments to this Agreement shall be made by consensus and shall become effective upon the 
deposit o f instruments o f ratification or acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary- 
General o f  ASEAN.
ARTICLE 19 
Supplementary Agreements or Arrangements 
The Schedules, Action Plans, Annexes, and any other arrangements or agreements arising under this 
Agreement shall form an integral part o f this Agreement.
ARTICLE 20 
Accession of New Members 
New members o f ASEAN shall accede to this Agreement on terms and conditions agreed between 
them and signatories to this Agreement and by depositing the instrument o f accession with the 
Secretary-General o f ASEAN.
ARTICLE 21 
Final Provisions
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit o f instruments o f ratification or
acceptance by all signatory governments with the Secretary-General o f  ASEAN. The
signatory governments undertake to deposit their instruments o f  ratification or acceptance
within 6 months after the date o f signing o f this Agreement.
2. This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary-General o f ASEAN, who shall promptly
furnish a certified copy thereof to each Member State.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being duly authorised by their respective Governments, 
have signed this Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.
Done at Manila, Philippines this 8th day o f  October 1998, in a single copy in the English language.
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Annex 10
H A N O I PL A N  O F  A C T IO N
Introduction
The Second ASEAN Informal Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur on 15 December 1997, adopted the 
ASEAN Vision 2020 which sets out a broad vision for ASEAN in the year 2020: an ASEAN as a 
concert o f Southeast Asian Nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded 
together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community o f caring societies.
In order to implement the long-term vision, action plans are being drawn up to realise this Vision. The 
Hanoi Plan o f Action (HPA) is the first in a series o f plans o f action building up to the realisation o f the 
goals o f the Vision.
The HPA has a six-year timeframe covering the period from 1999 to 2004. The progress o f its 
implementation shall be reviewed every three years to coincide with the ASEAN Summit Meetings.
In recognition of the need to address the current economic situation in the region, ASEAN shall 
implement initiatives to hasten economic recovery and address the social impact o f the global 
economic and financial crisis. These measures reaffirm ASEAN commitments to closer regional 
integration and are directed at consolidating and strengthening the economic fundamentals o f the 
Member Countries.
I. STRENGTHEN MACROECONOM IC AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION
To restore confidence, regenerate economic growth and promote regional financial stability through 
maintaining sound macroeconomic and financial policies as well as strengthening financial system and 
capital markets enhanced by closer consultations, so as to avoid future disturbances.
1.1 Maintain regional macroeconomic and financial stability.
1.1.1 Strengthen the ASEAN Surveillance Process; and
1.1.2 Structure orderly capital account liberalisation.
1.2 Strengthen financial systems.
1.2.1 Adopt and implement sound international financial practices and standards, where 
appropriate by 2003;
1.2.2 Coordinate supervision and efforts to strengthen financial systems;
1.2.3 Develop deep and liquid financial markets to enable governments and private firms to raise 
long-term financing in local currency, thereby reducing the over dependence on bank finance and 
limiting the risks o f financial crisis;
1.2.4 Adopt and implement existing standards o f disclosure and dissemination o f economic and 
financial information; and
1.2.5 Adopt prudential measures to mitigate the effects o f sudden shifts in short-term capital flows.
1.3 Promote liberalisation o f the financial services sector.
1.3.1 Intensify deregulation o f the financial services sector; and
1.3.2 Intensify negotiations of financial sector liberalisation under the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services (AFAS).
1.4 Intensify cooperation in money, tax and insurance matters.
1.4.1 Study the feasibility o f establishing an ASEAN currency and exchange rate system;
1.4.2 Establish an ASEAN Tax Training Institute by 2003;
1.4.3 Enhance the role o f "ASEAN Re Corporation Limited" as a vehicle to further promote 
regional cooperation in reinsurance business; and
1.4.4 Establish an ASEAN Insurance Training and Research Institute by 2003.
1.5 Develop ASEAN Capital Markets.
1.5.1 Adopt and implement internationally accepted practices and standards by the year 2003, and 
where appropriate at a later date especially for the new Member Countries;
1.5.2 Establish a set o f minimum standards for listing rules, procedures and requirements by 2003;
1.5.3 Coordinate supervision o f and programmes to strengthen capital markets;
1.5.4 Improve corporate governance, transparency and disclosure;
1.5.5 Develop a mechanism for cross-listing o f SMEs among ASEAN capital markets by 2003, 
and where appropriate at a later date for the new Member Countries;
1.5.6 Facilitate cross-border capital flows and investments;
1.5.7 Facilitate clearing and settlement systems within ASEAN;
1.5.8 Promote securitisation in ASEAN;
1.5.9 Foster collaborative and cooperative networks among capital market research and training 
centres in Member States;
1.5.10 Prepare the framework to develop bond markets in ASEAN by 2000; and
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1.5.11 Promote networking among development banks in Member States for financing o f  
productive projects.
II . E N H A N C E  G R E A T E R  E C O N O M IC  IN T E G R A T IO N
To create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a 
free flow o f goods, services and investments, a freer flow o f  capital, equitable economic development 
and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities.
2.1 Accelerate the implementation o f the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
2.1.1 Trade liberalisation
a. Maximise the number o f tariff lines whose CEPT tariff rates shall be reduced to 0-5%
by the year 2000 (2003 for Vietnam and 2005 for Laos and Myanmar);
b. Maximise the number of tariff lines whose C E P T  tariff rates shall be reduced to 0%
by the year 2003 (2006 for Vietnam and 2008 for Laos and Myanmar); and
c. Expand the coverage o f the CEPT Inclusion List by shortening the Temporary 
Exclusion List, Sensitive List and General Exception List.
2.1.2 Customs harmonisation
c. Enhance trade facilitation in customs by simplifying customs procedures, expanding 
the Green Lane to cover all ASEAN products and implementing an ASEAN 
Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature by the year 2000;
d. Promote transparency, consistency and uniformity in the classification o f goods 
traded within ASEAN and enhance trade facilitation through the provision o f  
facilities for obtaining pre-entry classification rulings/decisions at national and 
regional levels by the year 2003;
e. Promote the use o f transparent, consistent and uniform valuation methods and rulings 
through the implementation o f the W T O  Valuation Agreement by the year 2000;
f. Operationalise and st reng then  reg io n a l  gu id e l in es  on m utua l  assistance by the year 
2003 to ensure the p ro p e r  ap p lica t io n  o f  customs laws, w i th in  the competence o f the 
customs administrations and  su b jec t  to their  na tiona l  laws;
g. Fully operationalise the  A S E A N  C u s to m s  T ra in in g  N e tw o r k  by the year 2000; and
h. Undertake customs reform and modernisation, in particular to implement risk 
management and post-importation audit by the year 2003.
2.1.3 Standards and conformity a s se ssm e n t
c. Harmonise product standards through alignment with international standards for 
products in priority sectors by the year 2000 and for regulated products by the year 
2005;
d. Implement the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition 
Arrangements (MRAs) by developing sectoral MRAs in priority areas beginning in 
1999;and
e. Enhance the technical infrastructure and competency in laboratory testing, 
calibration, certification and accreditation by the year 2005, based on internationally- 
accepted procedures and guides; and
f. Strengthen information networking on standards and technical regulation through the 
use of, among others, the Internet, with the aim of meeting the requirements o f the 
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and WTO Agreement on the 
Application o f Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
2.1.4 Other trade facilitation activ it ies
f. Establish a mechanism o f information exchange and disclosure requirements to 
promote transparency o f government procurement regimes by the year 2003 to 
facilitate participation o f ASEAN nationals and companies;
g. Establish contact points in 1999 to facilitate ongoing exchange o f the above 
information;
h. Encourage the liberalisation o f government procurement;
i. Establish a mechanism o f information exchange by 2003 to promote transparency o f  
each domestic regulatory regime by publishing annual reports detailing actions taken 
by ASEAN Member States to deregulate their domestic regimes; and
j. Encourage the increased use o f regional currencies for intra-ASEAN trade 
transactions.
2.2 Implement the Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).
The ASEAN Investment Area aims to enhance the competitiveness o f the region for attracting higher 
and sustainable levels o f direct investment flows into and within ASEAN. Three broad-based 
programmes of action shall form the thrust o f the AIA arrangement. These are Cooperation and
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Facilitation, Promotion and Awareness, and Liberalisation Programme. These programmes shall be 
implemented through individual and collective action plans, within the agreed schedules and timetable. 
The ASEAN Investment Area is to be realised through implementing, among others, the following key 
measures:
f. Immediately extend national treatment and open up all industries for investments. However, 
for some exceptions, as specified in the Temporary Exclusion List and the Sensitive List, 
these will be progressively liberalised to all ASEAN investors by 2010 or earlier and to all 
investors by 2020 in accordance with the provisions o f the Framework Agreement on AIA;
g. Identify and progressively eliminate restrictive investment measures;
h. Liberalise rules, regulations and policies relating to investment; rules on licensing conditions; 
rules relating to access to domestic finance; and rules to facilitate payment, receipts and 
repatriation of profits by investors;
i. Complete implementation o f all the measures and activities identified in the Schedule 1 of 
"Cooperation and Facilitation Programme" under the AIA Agreement by 2010 or earlier;
j. Complete implementation o f all the measures and activities identified in the Schedule II o f
"Promotion and Awareness Programme" under the AIA Agreement by 2010 or earlier;
k. Improve and enhance the measures and activities o f the Cooperation and Facilitation, and
Promotion and Awareness Programmes to further strengthen the implementation process o f  
the AIA arrangement;
1. Undertake active and high profile joint investment promotion activities to promote greater
awareness o f investment opportunities in ASEAN to global and regional investors. This shall 
include, among others, joint publications o f investment and business information as well as 
databases and statistics;
m. Promote freer flow of capital, skilled labour, professionals and technology among ASEAN
Member States;
n. Work towards establishing a comparable approach o f FDI data collection, measurement and
reporting among the Member States;
o. Undertake activities to increase transparency o f investment regimes o f Member States; and
p. Identify' areas for technical cooperation in human resource development, R&D, infrastructure
development, SME and supporting industry development, information and industrial 
technology development.
2.3 Liberalise Trade in Services.
The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services will strengthen service suppliers and introduce more 
competition into this large and important sector o f  ASEAN Member's States and open new doors for 
service suppliers in the region.
2.3.1 Liberalisation
a. Progressively liberalise trade in services by initiating a new round o f negotiations 
beginning 1999 and ending 2001;
b. Expand the scope o f negotiations in services beyond the seven priority sectors, 
identified at the Fifth ASEAN Summit, to cover all services sectors and all modes o f  
supply;
c. Seek to accelerate the liberalisation o f trade in services through the adoption o f  
alternative approaches to liberalisation; and
d. Accelerate the free flow o f professional and other services in the region.
2.3.2 Facilitation
a. Encourage the free exchange of information and views among professional bodies in 
the region with the view to achieving mutual recognition arrangements;
b. Conduct an impact study by the year 2000 on the removal o f transport, travel and 
telecommunication barriers in ASEAN; and
c. Develop standard classification and categorisation o f tourism products and services 
to facilitate the region's implementation o f the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS).
2.3.3 Cooperation
a. Strengthen and enhance existing cooperation efforts in service sectors through such 
means as establishing or improving infrastructure facilities, joint production, 
marketing and purchasing arrangements, research and development and exchange o f  
information;
b. Develop cooperation activities in new sectors that are not covered by existing 
cooperation arrangements; and
c. Cooperate to harmonise entry regulations with regard to commercial presence.
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2.4 Enhance food security and global competitiveness o f  ASEAN's food, agriculture and forestry 
products.
ASEAN would strive to provide adequate levels o f  food supply and food accessibility within ASEAN 
during instances o f food shortages to ensure food security and at the same time, enhance the 
competitiveness o f its food, agriculture and forestry sectors through developing appropriate 
technologies to increase productivity and by promoting intra- and extra-ASEAN trade and greater 
private sector investment in the food, agriculture and forestry sector.
2.4.1 Strengthen food security arrangements in the region.
a. Enhance ASEAN food security statistical database and information by establishing 
an ASEAN Food Security Information System (AFSIS) which would allow Member 
States to effectively forecast, plan and manage food supplies and utilisation o f basic 
commodities;
b. Develop a Common Framework to analyse and review the regional food trade 
policies in the light o f the AFTA, and to enhance intra-ASEAN food trade by 
undertaking a study on the long-term supply and demand prospects o f major food 
commodities (rice, com, soybean, sugar, pulses and oilseeds) in ASEAN;
c. Strengthen the food marketing system o f agricultural cooperatives for enhancing food 
security in ASEAN; and
d. Review the Agreement on the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) to realise 
effective cross-supply arrangements o f food during times o f emergency.
2.4.2 Develop and Adopt Existing and New Technologies.
a. Conduct collaborative research to develop new/improved technologies in food, 
agriculture and forestry production, post-harvest and processing activities and sharing 
o f research results and available technology;
b. Conduct R&D in critical areas to reduce the cost o f inputs for food, agriculture and 
forestry production; and
c. Strengthen programmes in food, agriculture and agro-forestry technology transfer, 
training and extension to increase productivity.
2.4.3 Enhance the Marketability o f ASEAN Food, Agriculture and Forestry
Products/Commodities.
a. Develop, harmonise and adopt quality standards and regulations for food, agriculture 
and forestry products;
b. Promote diversification o f forest products; and
c. Promote and implement training programmes and share and exchange expertise in 
the field o f food, agriculture and forestry.
2.4.4 Enhance Private Sector Involvement.
a. Conduct a study to identify high-impact investment opportunities in key areas under 
the food, agriculture and forestry sectors in ASEAN and to provide essential 
information for investment decisions on these opportunities; and
b. Establish networking and strategic alliances with the private sector to promote 
investment and joint venture opportunities in ASEAN.
2.4.5 Enhance ASEAN Cooperation and Joint Approaches in International and Regional
Issues.
e. Strengthen ASEAN's cooperation and joint approaches in addressing issues and 
problems affecting trade in the region's food, agriculture and forestry products 
including environment and labour issues; and
f. Seek closer cooperation and negotiate, through relevant ASEAN bodies, with trading 
partners on market access for ASEAN products
2.4.6 Promote Capacity Building and Human Resources Development.
a. Promote and implement training programmes in the field o f food, agriculture and 
forestry, including the exchange o f experts; and
b. Develop and strengthen agricultural rural communities through enhanced human 
resource development.
2.5 Intensify industrial cooperation.
a. Expedite the implementation o f AICO.
b. Establish a Directory o f Major ASEAN Manufacturing Companies;
c. Explore the merits o f common competition policy;
d. Increase value-added contribution o f ASEAN Manufacturing Sector;
e. Explore/develop other areas o f cooperation that has not been covered under the existing
arrangement; and
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f. Establish R&D/ Skill Development Centres.
2.6 Foster small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Recognising that small and medium scale enterprises constitute the majority o f  industrial enterprises in 
ASEAN and that they play a significant role in the overall economic development o f Member States, 
ASEAN needs to cooperate in order to develop a modem, dynamic, competitive and efficient SME 
sector. The SME cooperation will address priority areas o f human resource development, information 
dissemination, access to technology and technology sharing, finance and market. The SME cooperation 
will also ensure the development and implementation o f non-discriminatory market-oriented policies in 
ASEAN that will provide a more favourable environment for SME development.
2.6.1 Facilitation
a. Encourage Member States to establish national export financing/credit guarantee 
schemes for SMEs;
b. Explore the possibility o f  establishing regional export financing/credit guarantee 
scheme;
c. Explore the possibility o f establishing an ASEAN Investment Fund for SME; and
d. Explore the possibility o f  establishing a trade or industrial cooperation scheme to 
promote intra-ASEAN cooperation for SMEs.
2.6.2 Cooperation
a. Compile Member States' S M E  policies and best practices in selected sectors to 
enhance mutual understanding and possible adoption;
b. Compile and provide information to SMEs on policies and opportunities including 
electronic media such as the Internet websites;
c. Promote information networking between existing SME-related organisations in 
ASEAN;
d. Promote awareness among S M E s  on benefits and availability o f other sources o f  
finance such as venture-capital and equity;
e. Enhance interactions between Government Sector Institutions (GSI) and Private 
Sector Institutions (PSI) on SME development by convening biennial GSI/PS1 
conference;
f. Undertake selected sectoral regional study on the potential areas o f finance, market, 
production technology and management for possible trade and industrial cooperation 
between/among SMEs in the region;
g. Organise annual ASEAN match-making workshops to promote SME joint-ventures 
and linkages between S M E s  and L S E s;
h. Organise annual joint ASEAN trade promotion activities/trade exposition;
i. Encourage national venture-capital company to go regional;
j. Organise annual meetings o f all national Credit Guarantee Corporations (CGC) in
ASEAN;
k. Harness the capacity o f non-ASEAN SMEs as a source o f technology to ASEAN 
SMEs;
1. Organise biennial ASEAN technology exposition;
m. Organise regular joint training programmes, seminars and workshops for SMEs;
n. Compile and publish a directory o f resource persons in ASEAN in the area of
production technology and management;
o. Develop programmes on entrepreneurship development and innovation in all 
Member States; and
p. Assist new members o f ASEAN on SME development through specialised training 
programmes and technical assistance.
2.7 Further intellectual property cooperation.
To ensure adequate and effective protection, including legislation, administration and enforcement, o f  
intellectual property rights in the region based on the principles o f Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment, national treatment and transparency as set out in the TRIPS Agreement.
2.7.1 Protection
a. Strengthen civil and administrative procedures and remedies against infringement o f  
intellectual property rights and relevant legislation; and
b. Provide and expand technical cooperation in relation to areas such as patent search 
and examination, computerisation and human resource development for the 
implementation o f the TRIPS Agreement;
2.7.2 Facilitation
a. Deepen Intellectual Property policy exchange among ASEAN Member States;
448
b. Survey the current status o f  intellectual property rights protection in each ASEAN 
Member State with a view to studying measures, including development principles, 
for the effective enforcement o f intellectual property rights;
c. Develop a contact point list o f  public and business/private sector experts on 
intellectual property rights and a list o f law enforcement officers, the latter list for the 
purpose o f establishing a network to prevent cross-border flow o f  counterfeits;
d. Exchange information on well-known marks as a first step in examining the 
possibility o f  establishing a region-wide trademark system;
e. Exchange information on current intellectual property rights administrative systems 
with a view to simplifying and standardising administrative systems throughout the 
region;
f. Ensure that intellectual property legislation conform to the TRIPS Agreement of the 
World Trade Organisation through the review o f intellectual property laws and 
introduction o f TRIPS-consistent laws. This would begin with a comprehensive 
review of existing legislation to be completed by the year 2000; and
g. Strengthen intellectual property administration by setting up an ASEAN electronic 
database by the year 2004 on patents, designs, geographical indications, trademarks 
and information on copyright and layout design o f integrated circuits.
2.7.3 Cooperation
a. Implement an ASEAN Regional Trademark and Patent Filing System by the year 
2000 ;
b. Establish an ASEAN Regional Fund for Trademark and Patent by the year 2000;
c. Finalise and implement an ASEAN Common Form for Trade Mark and Patent 
Applications;
d. Establish a regional trademark and patent registration system; or establish a regional 
trademark or patent office (on voluntary basis);
e. Promote accession of Member States to international treaties;
f. Promote Intellectual Property public and private sector awareness;
g. Introduce Intellectual Property as a subject in the curriculum o f higher learning 
institutions;
h. Develop training programmes for Intellectual Property officials; and
i. Enhance intellectual property enforcement and protection through establishing 
mechanisms for the dissemination o f information on ASEAN intellectual property 
administration, registration and infringement; facilitating interaction among legal and 
judicial bodies through seminars, etc.; facilitating networking among intellectual 
enforcement agencies; encouraging bilateral/plurilateral arrangements on mutual 
protection and joint cooperation in enforcement o f Intellectual Property Rights.
2.8 Encourage electronic commerce.
2.8.1 Create policy and legislative environment to facilitate cross-border Electronic Commerce;
2.8.2 Ensure the coordination and adoption o f framework and standards for cross-border Electronic 
Commerce, which is in line with international standards and practices; and
2.8.3 Encourage technical cooperation and technology transfer among Member States in the 
development o f Electronic Commerce infrastructure, applications and services.
2.9 Promote ASEAN tourism.
2.9.1 Launch the Visit ASEAN Millennium Year as the catalytic focus for the first plan o f action;
2.9.2 Conduct Strategic Studies for Joint Marketing o f the ASEAN Region in the 21st Century, 
and the convening o f Top-level Tourism Marketing Missions to promote the region;
2.9.3 Develop a Website/Information Database on relevant tourism statistical data and other 
related information within the ASEAN Secretariat by the beginning o f the year 2000;
2.9.4 Establish a Network among ASEAN Tourism Training Centres with emphasis on new job 
skills and new technologies by 2001 in tourism policy and planning;
2.9.5 Develop trainer and training material database for ASEAN to be completed by 2001;
2.9.6 Conduct Eco-Tourism Promotion Programmes for Travel Trade and Consumers;
2.9.7 Complete cruise tourism development study in ASEAN by the year 2000.
2.9.8 Encourage the establishment o f the ASEAN Lane for facilitating intra-ASEAN travel;
2.9.9 Increase the use of the Internet or other electronic global distribution systems in the ASEAN 
travel industry; and
2.9.10 Launch the ASEAN Tourism Investment Guide in 1999.
2.10 Develop regional infrastructure.
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To intensify cooperation in the development o f  highly efficient and quality infrastructure, and in the 
promotion and progressive liberalisation o f these services sectors:
2.10.1 Transport
a. Develop the Trans-ASEAN transportation network by the year 2000 as the trunkline 
or main corridor for the movement o f goods and people in ASEAN, consisting o f  
major road (interstate highway) and railway networks, principal ports and sea lanes 
for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport and major civil aviation links;
b. Operationalise the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation o f Goods in 
Transit by year 2000. For this purpose, its implementing Protocols will be finalised 
and concluded by December 1999;
c. Target the conclusion and operationalisation o f the ASEAN Framework Agreement 
on the Facilitation o f Inter-State Transport by the year 2000;
d. Implement the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multimodal Transport;
e. Develop a Maritime/Shipping Policy for ASEAN to cover, among others, 
transhipment, enhancing the competitiveness of ASEAN ports, further liberalisation 
o f  maritime transport services, and the integration o f maritime transport in the 
intermodal and logistics chain;
f. Adopt harmonised standards and regulations with regard to vehicle specifications 
(e.g. width, length, height and weight), axle load limits, maximum weights and 
pollution or emission standards;
g. Institute the policy framework and modalities by the year 2000 for the development 
o f a Competitive Air Services Policy which may be a gradual step towards an Open 
Sky Policy in ASEAN; and
h. Develop and implement the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link and the ASEAN Highway 
Network Projects.
2.10.2 Telecommunications
a. Achieve the interoperability and interconnectivity o f the National Information 
Infrastructures (Nils) o f Member States by the year 2010;
b. Develop and implement an ASEAN Plan o f Action on Regional Broadband
Interconnectivity by the year 2000; and
c. Intensify cooperation in ensuring seamless roaming o f telecommunications services 
(i.e., wireless communications) within the region, as well as in facilitating intra- 
ASEAN trade in telecommunications equipment and services.
2.10.3 Energy
a. Ensure security and sustainability o f  energy supply, efficient utilisation o f  natural
energy resource in the region and the rational management o f energy demand, with
due consideration of the environment; and
b. Institute the policy framework and implementation modalities by 2004 for the early 
realization o f the trans-ASEAN energy networks covering the ASEAN Power Grid 
and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects as a more focused continuation o f  the 
Medium-Term Programme of Action (1995-1999).
2.10.4 Water utility
a. Cooperate on a regular basis, exchange o f information, knowledge, and experiences 
among Member States as means to improve water resources management and water 
supply system within the region; and
b. Support the development of Trans-ASEAN land and submarine pipeline for 
conveyance o f raw water between ASEAN Member States.
2.11 Further development o f growth areas.
To narrow the gap in the level o f development among Member States and to reduce poverty and socio­
economic disparities in the region.
2.11.1 Actively expedite the implementation and further development o f  growth areas such as the 
Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Indonesia- 
Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle 
(IMT-GT), and the inter-state areas along the West-East Corridor (WEC) o f  Mekong Basin in 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and North-eastern Thailand within the ASEAN-Mekong Basin 
Development Cooperation Scheme.
2.11.2 Facilitate the economic integration o f the new Members into ASEAN.
III. PROM OTE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPM ENT AND DEVELOP  
INFORM ATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE
3.1 Establish the ASEAN Information Infrastructure (All).
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3.1.1 Forge agreements among Member Countries on the design, standardization, inter-connection 
and inter-operability o f Information Technology systems by 2001.
3.1.2 Ensure the protection o f intellectual property rights and consumer rights.
3.2 Develop the information content o f the All by 2004.
3.3 Establish networks o f science & techonology centres o f excellence and academic institutions by 
2001 .
3.4 Intensify research & development (R&D) in applications o f strategic and enabling technologies.
3.5 Establish a technology scan mechanism and institutionalise a system o f  science & technology 
indicators by 2001.
3.6 Develop innovative systems for programme management and revenue generation to support 
ASEAN science and technology.
3.7 Promote greater public and private sector collaboration in science and technology, particularly in 
information technology.
3.8 Undertake studies on the evolution o f new working conditions and living environments resulting 
from widespread use o f information technology by 2001.
IV . P R O M O T E  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ADDRESS THE S O C IA L  IM P A C T  O F  T H E  
F IN A N C IA L  AND ECONOM IC CRISIS
4.1 Strive to mitigate the social impact of the regional financial and economic crisis.
4.2 Implement the Plan o f Action on ASEAN Rural Development and Poverty Eradication and, in view 
o f the financial and economic crisis, implement the ASEAN Plan o f Action on Social Safety Nets to 
ensure that measures are taken to protect the most vulnerable sectors o f our societies.
4.3 Use the ASEAN Foundation to support activities and social development programmes aimed at 
addressing issues o f unequal economic development, poverty and socio-economic disparities.
4.4 Implement the ASEAN Plan o f Action for Children which provides for the framework for ensuring 
the survival, protection and development of children.
4.5 Strengthen ASEAN collaboration in combating the trafficking in, and crimes o f  violence against, 
women and children.
4.6 Enhance the capacity of the family and community to care for the elderly and the disabled.
4.7 Strengthen the ASEAN Regional Aids Information and Reference Network.
4.8 Enhance exchange o f information in the field of human rights among ASEAN Countries in order to 
promote and protect ali human rights and fundamental freedoms o f all peoples in accordance with the 
Charter o f  the United Nations, the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme o f Action.
4.9 Work towards the full implementation o f the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child and the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and other international 
instruments concerning women and children.
4.10 Strengthen regional capacity to address transnational crime.
4.11 Implement the ASEAN Work Programme to Operationalise the ASEAN Plan o f  Action on Drug 
Abuse Control by 2004, and continue developing and implementing high-profile flagship programmes 
on drug abuse control, particularly those related to prevention education for youth, and treatment and 
rehabilitation.
V. P R O M O T E  HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Strengthen the ASEAN University Network and move forward the process o f transforming it into 
the ASEAN University.
5.2 Strengthen the education systems in Member Countries by 2001 so that all groups o f  people, 
including the disadvantaged, can have equal access to basic, general and higher education.
5.3 Implement the ASEAN Work Programme on Informal Sector Development to provide 
opportunities for self-employment and entrepreneurship.
5.4 Implement the ASEAN Work Programme on Skills Training for Out-of-School Youth by 2004, to 
strengthen their capacity to obtain gainful employment.
5.5 Strengthen regional networking o f HRD centres o f  excellence and develop the regional capacity for 
HRD planning and labour market monitoring.
5.6 Establish and strengthen networks in education and training, particularly those promoting 
occupational safety and health, skills training for out-of-school youth, distance education by 2004.
5.7 Intensify efforts o f the ASEAN Network for Women in Skills Training to enhance the capacity o f  
disadvantaged women to enter the work force.
5.8 Begin to implement the ASEAN Science and Technology Human Resource Programme addressing 
the needs o f  industry and business by 2000.
5.9 Implement regional training programmes for ASEAN Civil Service Officers and strengthen 
networks among ASEAN Civil Service Commissions.
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5.10 Establish networks o f professional accreditation bodies to promote regional mobility and mutual 
recognition o f  technical and professional credentials and skills standards, beginning in 1999.
VI. PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND PROM OTE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPM ENT
6.1 Fully implement the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution with particular 
emphasis on the Regional Haze Action Plan by the year 2001.
6.2 Strengthen the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre with emphasis on the ability to monitor 
forest and land fires and provide early warning on transboundary haze by the year 2001.
6.3 Establish the ASEAN Regional Research and Training Centre for Land and Forest Fire 
Management by the year 2004.
6.4 Strengthen the ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation by establishing networks of 
relevant institutions and implement collaborative training and research activities by the year 2001.
6.5 Promote regional coordination for the protection of the ASEAN Heritage Parks and Reserves.
6.6 Develop a framework and improve regional coordination for the integrated protection and 
management o f coastal zones by the year 2001.
6.7 Strengthen institutional and legal capacities to implement Agenda 21 and other international 
environmental agreements by the year 2001.
6.8 Harmonise the environmental databases o f Member Countries by the year 2001.
6.9 Implement an ASEAN regional water conservation programme by the year 2001.
6.10 Establish a regional centre or network for the promotion o f  environmentally sound technologies 
by the year 2004.
6.11 Formulate and adopt an ASEAN Protocol on access to genetic resources by the year 2004.
6.12 Develop a Regional Action Plan for the Protection o f the Marine Environment from Land-based 
and Sea-based Activities by the year 2004.
6.13 Implement the Framework to Achieve Long-Term Environmental Goals for Ambient Air and 
River Water Qualities for ASEAN Countries.
6.14 Enhance regional efforts in addressing climatic change.
6.15 Enhance public information and education in awareness of and participation in environmental and 
sustainable development issues.
VII. STRENGTHEN REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
7.1 Consolidate and strengthen ASEAN’s solidarity, cohesiveness and harmony by strengthening 
national and regional resilience through enhanced cooperation and mutual assistance to further promote 
Southeast Asia as a Zone o f Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.
7.2. Promote coherent and comprehensive programmes o f bilateral and regional cooperation and 
technical assistance to ASEAN member states to strengthen their integration into the community o f  
Southeast Asian nations.
7.3 Ratify the Second Protocol of the Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as 
soon as possible.
7.4 Encourage and facilitate the accession by ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners and other interested 
countries to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with a view to developing the TAC into a code of 
conduct governing relations between Southeast Asian States and those outside the region.
7.5 Formulate draft rules of procedure for the operations o f the High Council as envisioned in TAC.
7.6 Encourage greater efforts towards the resolution of outstanding problems o f  boundaries 
delimitation between ASEAN member states.
7.7 Ensure border security and facilitate safe and convenient border crossings.
7.8 Encourage Member Countries to cooperate in resolving border-related problems and other matters 
with security implications between ASEAN member countries.
7.9 Promote efforts to secure acceptance by Nuclear Weapon States o f  the Treaty on Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), including their early accession to the Protocol to the 
SEANWFZ Treaty.
7.10 Convene the Commission for SEANWFZ Treaty to oversee the implementation o f the Treaty and 
ensure compliance with its provisions.
7.11 Support and participate actively in all efforts to achieve the objectives o f general and complete 
disarmament, especially the non-proliferation o f nuclear weapons and other weapons o f  mass 
destruction.
7.12 Encourage ASEAN Member Countries parties to a dispute to engage in friendly negotiation and 
use the bilateral and regional processes of peaceful settlement o f  dispute or other procedures provided 
for in the U.N. Charter.
7.13 Enhance efforts to settle disputes in the South China Sea through peaceful means among the 
parties concerned in accordance with universally recognized international law, including the 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea.
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7.14 Continue efforts to promote confidence-building measures in the South China Sea between and 
among parties concerned.
7.15 Encourage all other parties concerned to subscribe to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea.
7.16 Promote efforts to establish a regional code o f conduct in the South China Sea among the parties 
directly concerned.
7.17 Intensify intra-ASEAN security cooperation through existing mechanisms among foreign affairs 
and defense officials.
VIII. ENHANCE ASEAN’S ROLE AS AN EFFECTIVE FORCE FOR PEACE, JUSTICE, AND  
M O DERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND IN THE WORLD
8.1 Maintain ASEAN’s chairmanship in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process.
8.2 Undertake, actively and energetically, measures to strengthen ASEAN’s role as the primary driving 
force in the ARF, including directing the ASEAN Secretary-General to provide the necessary support 
and services to the ASC Chairman in coordinating ARF activities.
8.3 Formulate initiatives to advance, on a consensus basis and at a pace comfortable to all, the ARF 
process from its current emphasis on confidence-building to promoting preventive diplomacy.
8.4 Promote public awareness o f the ARF process and the need for ASEAN’s role as the primary 
driving force in respective ASEAN Member Countries.
8.5 Continue the involvement o f ASEAN defense and security officials together with foreign affairs 
officials in ARF activities.
8.6 Develop a set o f basic principles based on TAC as an instrument for promoting cooperative peace 
in the Asia-Pacific region.
8.7 Enhance consultation and coordination o f ASEAN positions at the United Nations and other 
international fora.
8.8 Revitalize ASEAN’s relations with Dialogue Partners on the basis o f equality, non-discrimination 
and mutual benefit.
IX. PROM O TE ASEAN AWARENESS AND ITS STANDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL  
COM M UNITY
9.1 Support the activities o f the ASEAN Foundation and other available resources and mechanisms to 
promote ASEAN awareness among its people.
9.2 Launch, within ASEAN’s existing resources, a concerted communications programme to promote 
ASEAN’s standing in the international community and strengthen confidence in ASEAN as an ideal 
place for investment, trade and tourism.
9.3 Establish and operate an ASEAN satellite channel by year 2000.
9.4 Provide and disseminate materials on ASEAN’s efforts to cope with the financial and economic 
crisis.
9.5 Publicise ASEAN’s HPA priorities through ASEAN’s external mechanisms with its Dialogue 
Partners.
9.6 Develop linkages with mass media networks and websites on key areas o f ASEAN cooperation to 
disseminate regular and timely information on ASEAN.
9.7 Prepare and adopt an ASEAN Declaration on Cultural Heritage by year 2000.
9.8 Mount professional productions of ASEAN performances and exhibitions within and outside 
ASEAN and provide adequate mass media coverage on such activities.
9.9 Organize art and cultural immersion camps and exchange programmes for the youth and encourage 
their travel to other ASEAN Member Countries.
9.10 Establish an ASEAN Multi-Media Centre by the year 2001 to conduct professional training 
programmes and provide production facilities and services for mass media and communication 
practitioners.
X. IM PROVE ASEAN’S STRUCTURES AND MECHANISM S
10.1 Review ASEAN’s overall organisational structure in order to further improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness, taking into account the expansion o f ASEAN activities, the enlargement o f  ASEAN 
membership, and the regional situation.
10.2 Review and streamline ASEAN external relations mechanisms with its Dialogue Partners, 
regional organisations and other economic groupings.
10.3 Review the role, functions and capacity o f the ASEAN Secretariat to meet the increasing demands 
o f  ASEAN and to support the implementation o f the Hanoi Plan o f Action.
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Annex 11 
STATEMENT ON BOLD MEASURES 
6th ASEAN Summit, Hanoi, 16 December 1998
1. The financial and economic crisis has severely affected the ASEAN economies and business 
dynamism in the region. In order to regain business confidence, enhance economic recovery and 
promote growth, the ASEAN Leaders are committed to the realisation o f  the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). In addition, the Leaders agreed on special incentives and privileges to attract foreign direct 
investment into the region. To enhance further economic integration o f the region, the Leaders also 
agreed to further liberalise trade in services.
Acceleration of AFTA
2. To accelerate the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Leaders agreed that the six original 
signatories to the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) - Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand - would advance the implementation o f AFTA by one year from 2003 to 2002. 
They also agreed to achieve a minimum o f 90% of their total tariff lines with tariffs o f  0-5% by the 
year 2000, which would account for 90% of intra-ASEAN trade.
3. Individually, each country would commit to achieve a minimum of 85% o f the Inclusion List with 
tariffs o f  0-5% by the year 2000. Thereafter, this would be increased to a minimum o f  90% o f the 
Inclusion list in the 0-5% tariff range by the year 2001. By 2002, 100% o f items in the Inclusion List 
would have tariffs o f 0-5% with some flexibility.
4. Member Countries also agreed to deepen, as soon as possible, tariff reduction to 0% and accelerate 
the transfer o f products, which are currently not included in the tariff reduction scheme, into the 
Inclusion List.
5. The new members of ASEAN shall maximise their tariff lines between 0-5% by 2003 for Vietnam 
and 2005 for Laos and Myanmar; and expand the number o f tariff lines in the 0% category by 2006 for 
Vietnam and by 2008 for Laos and Myanmar.
Short-Term  Measures to Enhance ASEAN Investment Climate
6. In the area o f  investments, each ASEAN country has agreed to extend additional special privileges to 
qualified ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors in the manufacturing sector, for applications received 
from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2000 and approved thereafter. These incentives cover the 
following seven areas:
iv. minimum three year corporate income tax exemption or a minimum 30% corporate 
investment tax allowance;
v. 100% foreign equity ownership;
vi. duty-free imports o f capital goods;
vii. domestic market access;
viii. minimum industrial land leasehold period o f 30 years;
ix. employment o f foreign personnel; and
x. speedy customs clearance.
Details o f  these measures are available in the attached ANNEX.
7. Highlights o f  the new measures offered by individual ASEAN countries include the following:
• Brunei Darussalam will allow 100% foreign equity in high-technology manufacturing and
export-oriented industries.
• Indonesia offers wholesale and retail trade up to 100% foreign equity ownership to qualified
investors, in addition to 100% foreign equity in all areas o f the manufacturing sector.
Indonesia has also reduced the processing time for approval in principle, for investments less
than US$100 million, to 10 working days. In the banking sector, listed banks are open for
100% foreign equity ownership.
•  Lao PDR offers duty exemption on imported capital goods required by the promoted 
investment projects.
•  Malaysia allows 100 percent foreign equity ownership in all areas o f  manufacturing except for 
seven specific activities/products. No export conditions are imposed for all new investments, 
expansions and diversifications.
• Myanmar will extend minimum o f 3 years corporate tax exemption to all investment projects
in all sectors. In addition, Myanmar will also extend duty free import o f raw materials to all
industrial investments for the first three years of operation.
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• Philippines is in the process o f opening up retail trade and distribution business to foreign 
equity. In addition, the Philippines has opened private construction in the domestic market to 
foreign companies.
•  Singapore has substantially reduced business costs as part o f a cost reduction package that 
amounts to S$ 10 billion in savings in addition to extending 30% corporate investment tax 
allowance on a liberal basis to industrial projects and to selected service industries in respect 
o f  productive equipment.
•  Thailand will allow 100% foreign equity ownership for manufacturing investment projects 
regardless o f locations.
•  Vietnam extends duty exemption on imported capital goods for all projects and on raw 
materials for projects located in mountainous or remote regions and for specially encouraged 
investments for the first 5 years of operation. Issuance o f  investment licenses for several types 
o f  projects has been reduced to 15 days from the receipt o f proper simplified documents.
8. Under the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area signed on 7 October 1998 in 
Manila, national treatment will be made fully available within six months after the date o f  signing o f  
the Agreement for ASEAN investors in the manufacturing sector, subject to certain exclusions. These 
exclusions will be progressively phased out by the year 2003 instead o f waiting for 2010 as initially 
agreed. Myanmar will join the six ASEAN countries to progressively phase out the exclusions by 2003 
instead o f 2015. Vietnam and Laos would exert their best efforts to achieve early realisation o f  AIA 
and shall do so no later than 2010, instead o f 2013 and 2015, respectively.
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme
9. To provide greater scope for industrial cooperation in the region, Member Countries agreed to waive 
the 30% national equity requirement under the AICO Scheme during the period 1999-2000.
Launching the Second Round of Negotiations on Services
10. In the area o f trade in services, the Leaders have agreed to initiate a new round o f negotiations 
beginning 1999 and ending 2001. The negotiations will be expanded beyond the seven priority sectors, 




TO ENHANCE ASEAN INVESTMENT CLIMATE
The following measures will be taken to stimulate investment in ASEAN. In particular, companies that 
submit relevant applications to the ASEAN Investment Agencies from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 
2000 and approved thereafter, with regard to investment projects in the manufacturing sector, will be 
granted the following:
Section 1
Privileges Granted to New Investments/Projects or 
Expansion of Existing Investment Operations
1. Fiscal Incentives
Companies will be given :
i. a minimum o f 3 years corporate income tax exemption or a minimum 30% corporate 
income tax allowance. This tax exemption is not granted on an incremental basis over 
and above existing incentive provisions.
ii. duty exemption on imported capital goods required by the promoted investment 
projects.
2. Domestic Market Access
Companies will be given free market access to the domestic market o f  the host country.
3. Foreign Equity Ownership
Companies will be allowed 100% foreign equity ownership.
4. Right o f  Use o f Industrial Land
Companies will be given the right o f use or lease o f factory or industrial land for a minimum 
period o f 30 years.
5. Customs Clearance
Approved investment projects will be given speedy customs clearance through the ASEAN  
CEPT Green Lane or equivalent procedures adopted by the ASEAN Member Countries for all 
raw materials and capital goods required by the investment projects.
6. Employment o f Foreign Personnel
The privileges cover more relaxed policy on the following:
i. Approval o f foreign professional, managerial and technical personnel posts required 
by the investor;
ii. At least one-year renewable multiple entry visas and exit permits for all foreign 
professional, managerial and technical personnel and their family members, where 
applicable; and
iii. Restrictions and levies on the employment o f foreign professional, managerial and 
technical personnel, if any.
Section 2
Privileges Granted to Investors Injecting Equity Into 
Existing Companies
All privileges available under Section 1, except for corporate tax incentives and land use 
privileges, also apply to investors under Section 2. However, with regard to tax incentives, the 
remaining period o f the tax privileges enjoyed by the company being taken over, or into which 
capital is injected, will continue to be available to the new equity owners.
Section 3
Highlights of Specific Measures Extended 
by ASEAN Member Countries
Brunei Darussalam
Brunei Darussalam will allow 100% foreign equity ownership in high-technology 
manufacturing and export-oriented industries.
Indonesia
Indonesia offers wholesale and retail trade up to 100% foreign equity ownership to qualified 
investors, in addition to 100% foreign equity in all areas o f  the manufacturing sector.
Indonesia has also reduced the processing time for approval in principle, for investments less
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than US$100 million, to 10 working days. In the banking sector, listed banks are open for 
100% foreign equity ownership.
Lao PDR
Lao PDR allows duty exemption on imported capital goods required by the promoted 
investment projects.
Malaysia
Malaysia offers 100% foreign equity ownership in the manufacturing sector with no export 
conditions imposed on all new investments, expansions and diversifications (except for seven 
specific activities and products).
With limited exceptions, foreigners can also own land in Malaysia.
Myanmar
Myanmar will extend minimum o f three years corporate tax exemption to all investment 
projects in all sectors. In addition, Myanmar will also extend duty free import o f raw materials 
to all industrial investments for the first three years o f operation.
Philippines
Philippines will open retail trade and distribution business to foreign equity. In addition, the 
Philippines has opened private construction in the domestic market to foreign companies. 
Singapore
Singapore has substantially reduced business costs as part o f a cost reduction package that 
amounts to S$ 10 billion in savings in addition to extending 30% corporate investment tax 
allowance on a liberal basis to industrial projects and to selected service industries in respect 
o f productive equipment. These activities include manufacturing, engineering or technical 
services and computer-related services.
Thailand
Thailand allows 100% foreign equity ownership for manufacturing projects regardless o f  
location. Furthermore, agricultural projects which export 80% of sales will receive import 
duty exemption on machinery, regardless o f location.
Vietnam
Vietnam extends duty exemption on imported capital goods for all projects. In respect o f  
inport o f raw materials for production for specially encouraged investments and for projects 
located in mountainous or remote regions for the first 5 years o f operation. Issuance of 
investment licenses for several types o f projects has been reduced to 15 days from the receipt 
o f proper simplified documents. In addition, investment licensing for projects under US$ 5 
million has been decentralised to all provinces and cities.
Section 4 
Conditions
To qualify for the privileges stipulated in the above sections o f this Memorandum, investors 
must satisfy the following specific conditions:
iv. Meet the minimum investment level specified by the host country, if  any;
v. The industry must be in the published priority list for tax incentives to enjoy this 
particular privilege;
vi. The industry must not be in any negative list, if  any; and
vii. The investor must show proof that foreign funds have been brought in for the entire 
amount o f the investment, if  required by the host country.
Some details on specific privileges are contained in the table below.
MEASURES <VALIGN="TOP"COMMENTS
1. Fiscal Incentives Details o f incentives, priority list and other terms and 
conditions can be obtained from the individual Member 
Countries’ websites or the individual Member Countries’ 
contact points listed in Section 6.
2. Duty exemption on the import o f  capital goods Malaysia - duty-free for export zones and exemption for 
export-oriented projects. For others, applicable, if not 
locally manufactured.
Philippines - only in export-zones, free ports and 
selected sectors covered by special laws. 
Thailand - duty free for export-oriented and 
special projects located in all zones and projects 
located in zone 3, if not manufactured locally.
3. Free market access to domestic market Indonesia - covers all industries except those in the
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negative list and those in the bonded zones.
Lao PDR - export condition may be imposed on 
selected products.
Myanmar - only a certain amount will be allowed 
for domestic market.
M alaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam - covers all industries except those listed 
in the negative list.
4. 100% foreign equity ownership Brunei Darussalam - only for high-technology 
manufacturing and export-oriented projects.
Indonesia - after 15 years, companies must have 




And Vietnam - covers all industries except those 
listed in the negative list.
5. Removal o f Restrictions and Levies on the 
Employment o f Foreign Nationals, if  any
Indonesia - any individuals must pay an exit tax but this is 
deductible against income tax.
Malaysia - Foreign professionals, managerial and 
technical personnel paying income tax are 
exempted from paying levy.
The priority list o f industries, the negative list o f the respective Member Countries and other 
details relating to the privileges are available in the ASEAN website as well as the individual 
Member Countries' investment agencies websites or through the individual Member Countries 
contact points listed in Section 6.
The Investment Agencies are required to complete processing o f the relevant applications 
within 60 working days from receipt o f fully completed applications.
In addition to the specific conditions, an investor must submit an application to the Investment 
Agency o f the host country before 31 December 2000. Investors or companies will receive 
official confirmation o f privileges relating to incentives, market access and equity ownership 
in writing on approval o f their applications.
Section 5 
Duration of Privileges 
Privileges will, unless otherwise specified in this Memorandum, or at the time o f  issue o f  
approval, continue for the life o f the investment project or such other period as may be 
specified by individual Member Countries at their websites. This will apply even if  there are 
subsequent changes in the investment or other laws o f the host country. If any approved 
project, under this Memorandum, is not implemented according to the project implementation 
schedule agreed to between the investor and the host government, during the promotion 
period, the above privileges may be withdrawn.
Section 6
Contact Points for Further Information and Enquiries 
Brunei Darussalam  
Brunei Industrial Development Authority (BINA)
Ministry o f Industry and Primary Resources
Jalan Menteri Besar 2065
Bandar Seri Begawan
Brunei Darussalam
T el: (673) 2 383 811
Fax :(6 7 3 )2  382 838
Web Site: http://www.brunet.bn/aseansummit/summit.htm 
E-mail: BinaLl@brunet.bn 
Indonesia
Deputy Chairman for Promotion 
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)
No. 44, Jalan Gatot Subroto, Jakarta 
Indonesia
Tel: (62)21 525 2008/525 5041 
Fax (62) 21 525 4945 
Web Site: http://www.bkpm.go.id 
E-mail: sysadm@bkpm.go.id
Lao PDR
Committee for Investment and Foreign Economic Cooperation 
Luang Prabang Road-Vientaine 
Lao People's Democractic Republic 
Tel: (856)21 216 563 
Fax: (856)21 216 563 
Malaysia
Investment Promotion Division
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority
Wisma Damansara, Ground 9 & 11 Floor




Tel: (603) 255 3633
Fax: (603) 255 7970/255 0697/253 8507 
Web Site: http://www.mida.gov.my 
E-mail: promotion@mida.gov.my 
M yanmar
The Office o f Myanmar Investment Commission 
653-691 Merchant Street 
Pabedan Township 
Y angon
Union o f Myanmar 
Tel: (951)241 918 
Fax: (951)282 101 
Philippines
Technical Services Group 
Board o f Investments 
Department o f  Trade and Industry 
Industry and Investments Building 
385 Senator Gil J. Puyat Avenue 
Makati, Metro Manila 
Philippines 
Tel: (632) 897 7895 
Fax: (632) 895 3978 
Web Site: http://www.dti.gov.ph/boi 
E-Mail: boitsg@mnl.sequel.net 
Singapore
International Policy Group 
Economic Development Board 
250 North Bridge Road#24-00 
Raffles City Tower 
Singapore 179101 
Tel: (65) 336 2288 
Fax: (65) 339 5203 
Web Site: http://www.sedb.com 
E-Mail: intemational@edb.gov.sg 
Thailand
Investment Service Centre 
Office o f the Board o f Investment 
555 Vipavadee Rangsit Road 
Jatuchak, Bangkok 10900 
Thailand
Tel: (662)537 8111




Ministry o f Planning and Investment (MPI)
Investment Legislation and Promotion Department
56 Quoc Tu Giam
Hanoi, Vietnam
Tel: (844) 823 5606/8258142
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